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Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
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ABSTRACT
Many conventional approaches to Renewable Energy Technology (RET) adoption in 
developing countries generally stress economic and technical factors; often relying on 
rural contexts. Systemic approaches are an alternative lens, attempting to include social 
and economic factors at various scales, but to date there is little evidence supporting 
their application. Based on empirical analysis in Mexico and Brazil, this thesis asks: 
What are the most important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing 
world?
Insights were explained using three systemic approaches on RET adoption at the meso- 
level. While systemic approaches are useful in highlighting larger social and policy 
trends, they are not without their limitations; rather, history and context are important.
Specifically, awareness of energy conservation in combination with previous 
experience (versus just awareness) also affects technology uptake. Moreover, longer 
established networks were seen to be more institutionalized, with knock-on affects on 
RET use. Dynamics within stakeholder groups were also observed to help explain RET 
adoption. One source of divisions was trade and competitiveness policies, where in 
Mexico there is a major divide between foreign and domestically-owned firms.
International influences (e.g. climate change) have also prompted networks in both 
places - but in Brazil, over time, the key drivers for action on climate change were 
domestic verses foreign. These facets are arguably happening as a result of Brazil’s 
trade and competitiveness approach which yielded more opportunities for developing 
technological capabilities, therefore positively impacting on RET uptake.
Although research is recent, the general consensus is that trade liberalization can lead 
to more RET use in developing countries. However, the findings of this study show 
that under certain conditions a provisionally open trade and competitiveness regime can 
also increase RET use. This is because technology use is also linked to local 
technology cooperation dynamics, and not just to trade and competitiveness policies.
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. Tim Forsyth (principal) and Dr. Ken Shadlen (secondary)
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CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
1.1. The renewable energy challenge for growing cities
Global energy demand is expected to grow by 55% from 2005 to 2030, with the 
majority of this increase (74%) coming from developing countries (IEA 2007). To 
meet this need, research, support and interest in renewable energy technology (RET) 
options for developing nations is growing. A number of advantages have been 
highlighted espousing their use. For instance, academics, policy makers and 
practitioners increasingly view the use of these technologies as a way to address global 
climate change. One avenue for developing countries to do this is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). In the CDM, countries of the industrialized world 
taking part in the global climate change process1 that have exceeded their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions allowance “pay” developing countries for undertaking projects 
that reduce GHG emissions, by placing a price on these emissions that were mitigated 
through projects.
RETs are also considered attractive options to reduce local and regional environmental 
impacts, such as air pollution in urban areas, mainly due to the burning of fossil fuels. 
Furthermore, the use of RETs in developing countries is considered a means through 
which to increase technological capacity, or those aspects that contribute to 
technological change at the level of a firm, country or region (Rogers 2003b). 
Adopting more renewables is also viewed as a way to increase energy security (see 
Mason and Mor 2009) for a comprehensive overview on energy security and 
renewables in the Middle East for instance) as many renewable energy sources are
1 The Kyoto Protocol, developed in 1997, and which came into force in February 2005, is an 
international environmental agreement that commits industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in the timeframe 2008-2012. The majority of industrialized countries are parties to 
the treaty, with the major exceptions of the United States and Australia. Canada, although a party to the 
agreement, has indicated that they will not be able to meet their commitments. Also, developing 
countries do not have targets.
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available domestically2 (e.g. sun, wind, biomass), thus reducing developing countries’ 
dependency on fossil fuels. Even those countries that have fossil fuel reserves 
domestically are interested in renewables as a way of reducing domestic consumption 
(and therefore freeing up more fossil fuels to be exported) (Massabie 2008), and to 
reduce vulnerability to price fluctuations of fossil fuels. 3
The use of renewables is steadily increasing, but progress is slow. For example 
although renewables are expected to increase in use by 60% from 2002-2030, in 2002 
these sources only accounted for 1% of global energy consumption (Renewables 2004: 
6 ). In other words, while there is increasing research, support, interest and use for 
RETs, they continue to remain on the margins of more conventional energy choices.
At the same time, the world is becoming increasingly urban. According to the United 
Nations Population Foundation (UNPFA), as of 2008, more than half of the world’s 
population lived in cities (UNFPA 2007). By 2030, it is estimated that over 60% of the 
world’s population will live in cities, and over four-fifths of this number will reside in 
developing country cities (WRI 2005). Urban areas are argued to be responsible for 
about 80% of annual global carbon dioxide emissions (UN-Habitat 2007: 4), although 
on a per capita basis, GHG emissions from city dwellers are often less than their rural 
counterparts (Dodman 2009). This recognition has prompted a small but growing body 
of literature examining cities and energy and environmental issues, including renewable 
energy policies. This literature has mainly drawn from evidence in industrialized 
nations (e.g. Nijkamp and Pepping 1998; Capello et al. 1999; Chemi 2002) with some 
examples from the developing world (e.g. Chemi 2001), or both (Dhakal 2008). In the 
area of climate change and developing countries, research on cities focuses on health 
impacts and adaptation (e.g. Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalan 2007; Bicknell et al.
2 Although many equate energy security with decreasing imports and increasing production of domestic 
energy resources but there are other aspects to energy security. For instance, threats to energy supplies 
can come from domestic sources too -see Wang, T. and J. Watson (2009). China's Energy Transition - 
Pathways for Low Carbon Development. Brighton, UK, Science and Technology Policy Research 
(SPRU). This has been demonstrated in Western Canada where ecoterrorists hindering the development 
the oil and gas sector in that region are purported to be Canadian. See Bright, A. (2008). Bombings of 
Canadian pipelines spark ecoterrorism fears. Christian Science Monitor (CSM).
3 As an example, the price of oil was almost US$150 per barrel of oil in July 2008, versus about US$68 
in July 2009.
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2009; Heinrichs et al. 2009; Lapitan et al. 2009). Studies on developing country cities 
and the adoption of renewables, and in Latin America in particular, 4 are sparse.
Conventional approaches aimed at increasing renewable energy technologies (RETs) in 
developing countries, stressing barriers and ways to overcome them, often neglect the 
urban context and place too much emphasis on technical and economic attributes. 
Systemic models have been proposed as an alternative approach as they try to 
include social and economic factors at various scales to explain RET adoption, but to 
date there is little evidence supporting their application. An important research 
question is thus:
“What are the most important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban 
developing world?”
To answer this question, the dissertation focused on the following three sub-research 
questions:
•  How can systemic approaches help to explain RET adoption in the urban 
developing world?
• What are the reasons SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies are 
being used or not in Mexico City and Sao Paulo?
• To what extent do trade and competitiveness policies explain RET adoption in the 
urban developing world?
The dissertation argues that systemic approaches can be effective tools to explain RET 
adoption because in addition to accounting for factors affecting adoption noted in 
conventional approaches (e.g. cost, direct incentives), they highlight larger social and 
policy trends. Yet, while systemic approaches are useful, they are not without their 
limitations when applied to real world examples. Rather, history and context are 
important, which put some assumptions into question when applying these approaches
4 Some exceptions include the studies done by Quintanilla, J. and P. Mulas (1998). Use of Solar Energy 
in Mexican Urban Areas to Substitute for Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG). 17th World Energy Congress. 
Houston: 1-10.; Quintanilla et al. (2000). Uso Masivo de la energia solar en sustitucion de combusitbles 
fosiles en la Zona Metropolitana de Vale de Mexico: Sectores residencial, hospitalario, hotelero, y de 
banos publicos. U. N. A. d. M. U. Programa Universitario de Energia. Mexico City, UNAM.; Ferrel- 
Mendieta, M. (1999). the Use of Solar Water Heaters in Mexico City. Masters thesis - Architecture. 
Montreal, McGill: 134.
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to Mexico City and Sao Paulo. Each approach on its own, with its strengths and 
weaknesses, can explain part of the story, but in combination, they represent a more 
complete understanding.
Specifically, I found that classical explanations for RET use (such as those emphasizing 
cost, awareness and incentives) can help to explain adoption rates in each location, but 
were unable to adequately account for differences between the two settings. I found 
that awareness of energy conservation in combination with previous experience with a 
technology also affects uptake, rather than just awareness of the actual technology 
stressed by most adoption studies on RETs.
Secondly, conventional approaches focus on interactions between stakeholder groups. 
But more attention is needed on the nature of these relationships. In my research I 
found that networks in Sao Paulo that had been around longer were more 
institutionalised and the stakeholders groups more mobilized, and that more links 
existed between various sectors, positively affecting RET use.
I also found that dynamics within stakeholder groups, affected by international 
influences, such as divisions uncovered at the meso-level, help explain RET use. One 
reason behind these divisions can be traced to trade and competitiveness policies, 
where in Mexico there is a major divide between foreign and domestically-owned 
firms.
Also, international influences have prompted and / or strengthened these networks in 
both locations, such as with climate change, but in Brazil, over time, the key drivers 
advocating climate change are domestic verses foreign. I argue that these three facets 
are happening as a result of their trade and competitiveness approach -  in Brazil there 
have been more opportunities for developing technological capabilities, therefore 
establishing more indigenous capacity and more ‘ownership’ of the technology 
cooperation process, which in this case plays a positive role on uptake.
Although research in this area is recent, the general consensus is that trade 
liberalization can lead to more RET use in developing countries (World Bank 2008a; 
Cosbey 2007). However, my findings show that under certain conditions a
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provisionally open trade and competitiveness regime can also increase RET use. This 
is because technology use is also linked to local technology cooperation dynamics, and 
not just to trade and competitiveness policies.
Many studies on renewable energy in the developing world use evidence from rural 
environments (e.g. Forsyth 1999; Wilkins 2002; Chemi et al. 2007), and often use 
information at the micro level or use countries, rather than cities, as case studies (e.g. 
Milton and Kaufman 2005; Rodrigues and Matajs 2005). In the developing world, 
there is little evidence based on the meso-level, including the experience of cities and 
renewable energy options. Analysis at the meso-level in the context of RET adoption 
in developing countries can represent an arena for a new methodological approach.
The meso-level centres attention on a system, as discussed in section 1.2. I view the 
cities of Mexico City and Sao Paulo and their surrounding areas as systems under 
scrutiny and place analysis at the meso-level through examining relationships between 
actors and the technologies and the environment. The meso-level focuses on social 
networks. Another reason the meso-level was chosen to centre analysis was to capture 
the potential effects of actions at various levels. Organizations that operate at this level 
link efforts undertaken in community / neighbourhoods with national and state level 
policies.
The dissertation focused on processes and networks occurring at the meso-level, which 
may yield some unique insights into the question -  “what are the most important 
factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world?” Stakeholders operating 
at the meso-level were identified as being key players that operate within the solar 
water heater / biogas / renewable energy sectors and that are involved in the technology 
cooperation process (sellers, buyers and intermediaries) at the meso-level (i.e. the 
municipal level). A common basis for the term stakeholder comes from (Freeman 
1984), who considers stakeholders to be those affected by or can affect a firm’s 
objectives. This definition is broadened however in this thesis, to include other 
organizations and institutions, not just firms. A good example is Reed (2008) where 
stakeholders are viewed as “those who are affected by or can affect a decision...those 
who hold a stake (whether directly or indirectly)...rather. ...than the wider public” 
(Reed 2008: 2420). A common way in which to distinguish stakeholders is through
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social units of organization that function within a system, such as a city. Attention was 
therefore placed on technology developers, producers, users and intermediaries (e.g. 
government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trade associations, 
firms) that operate at this level.
The adoption of RETs in urban settings of developing countries must be an essential 
component of global, national or sub-national energy sustainability strategies, as we 
move increasingly toward a carbon-managed world. Urban areas can be defined a 
number of ways. Some consider them to be centres of economic activity, using certain 
criteria based on economies of scale and density (Capello et al. 1999). In the 
developing world, urban areas can be considered locations with high concentrations of 
population and low service capacity. This dissertation however is looking more at 
citywide impact of renewable energy technologies. However, examining their uptake is 
particularly complex because more often than not, RETs are newer technologies in 
developing countries, and “evidence suggests that new technologies still have a very 
slow rate of diffusion in developing countries” (Tomlinson et al. 2008: 59).
1.2. Key concepts
Before answering the research question, it is important to establish what constitutes a 
systemic model, technology adoption, and renewable energy.
1.2.1. Systemic models - are those frameworks, approaches or perspectives that 
are applied to a system. A system can be defined in a number of ways. For instance, a 
system, also termed a structure, can be viewed more generally, as a set of elements, 
which interact and are independent, forming a more complex whole. Jay Forrester, a 
scholar, with initial training in engineering, applied a system to human situations. He 
was a pioneer of systems dynamics, which argues that the structure of any system — 
the many circular, interlocking, sometimes time-delayed relationships among its 
components — is often just as important in determining its behavior as the individual 
components themselves (Forrester 1961).5 Carlsson et al. (2002) view a system as
5 For a more extensive review of systems perspectives used in the social sciences please see Carlsson et 
al. (2002). " Innovation systems: analytical and methodological issues." Research Policy 31: 233-245
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consisting of components, relationships and attributes. Components are operating parts 
(actors, institutions, physical artifacts), relationships (links between the components 
and feedback loops, where the components and relationships change as the components 
interact), and attributes (the properties of the components and the relationships). In 
this vein, I consider a location, such as a city, as a system. Mexico City and Sao Paulo, 
the two cities under scrutiny, can be considered ‘global’ or ‘world’ cities, which are not 
isolated, but rather key axis points, intertwined in the capitalist system . 6
While some consider a system to be “components interacting within boundaries” 
(Metcalfe 2004: 19 cited in Watson 2008) it is often difficult to pinpoint exactly where 
the boundary of one system begins and another ends. Boundaries -  like a system — are 
fluid and often change over time. Furthermore, influences on the system are found 
within and outside the system -  but with links to it.
One distinguishing feature of this approach is that by taking a systems perspective, 
these approaches incorporate decision-making processes with their interaction with the 
environment; in other words technologies, along with the actors, policies and 
institutions are considered (Enos 1991; Watson 2008). It is important to point out that 
systemic models as defined here are based in qualitative studies, distinct from how a 
system and a model are defined in econometrics7.
1.2.2. Technology Adoption - One way to define technology adoption is when 
an individual, household or organization selects and uses a technology (Carr 1999). In 
the context of RETs, the concept of use, uptake and adoption taken is a broad one, as it 
implies that an end user can also improve or adapt a technology (whether domestic or 
foreign in origin) in order to make more suitable to their circumstances (Wilkins 2002). 
Adoption is defined here as actual use of renewable energy technologies by individuals, 
households and organizations over a sustained period of time. Users of these 
technologies can range from individuals who integrate novel goods, processes and / or 
knowledge into their daily lives and routines and their local context, or firms,
6 For a more further discussion of global or world cities please see Cherni, 2002, pp. 8-9
7 For further information on energy models for energy systems applied in developing countries please see 
Urban et al. (2007). "Modelling energy systems for developing countries." Energy Policy 35: 3473-3482.
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governments and / or research institutions that incorporate new products, processes or 
knowledge to produce different technologies (Sauter and Watson 2008).
This is distinct from technology diffusion, which is a process through which actors
learn about an innovation through various communication channels (Rogers 2003a). 
Technology transfer, another key concept of the thesis, will be discussed further in 
Section 1.4 and Chapter 2.
In order to determine if technology adoption has occurred, studies must be conducted 
over time. This is because time:
a) will affect the process of diffusion and adoption through the amount of time between 
users first being exposed to a technology and deciding to use it;
b) will distinguish between early adopters (tend to be more innovators) versus later 
adopters (more mainstream); and
c) will affect the rate and scope of adoption (e.g. often, if the technology has only been 
recently introduced, less people will be likely to adopt it right away) (McMaster et al. 
1997).
1.2.3. What is renewable energy?
While an increasing number of people agree that the uptake of renewables is good, 
arguments remain as to the definition of renewables in the context of energy. 
Renewable energy has been defined a number of ways. Very simply, they are those 
sources of energy that may be replenished, versus those sources of energy that are finite 
(NREL 2003). Renewables are generally viewed as a part of Environmentally Sound 
Technologies (ESTs), or those technologies that “protect the environment, are less 
polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes 
and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the 
technologies for which they were substitutes” (UNCED 1992, Paragraph 34).
Broader definitions of renewables include conventional biomass (e.g. fuelwood, 
charcoal) 8 (Bourdaire and Ellis 2000) and / or large-scale hydro (Renewables 2004).
8 In fact, including fuelwood makes biomass the most prevalently used renewable and the fourth largest 
energy source globally, accounting for about 15% of energy supply (Boudaire and Ellis 2000: 853).
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The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)’s Division for Technology, 
Industry and Economics (DTIE) includes all biomass but excludes large-scale hydro 
(UNEP / DTIE 2000). While biomass and large-scale hydro are renewable (sources of 
energy that can be replenished), they are associated with a number of major social, 
health and environmental problems such as respiratory illnesses, displacement or large- 
scale alterations of human and / or animal populations, and sediment deposits (IPCC 
1996). Thus, there is increasing consensus to exclude these forms of energy in the 
definition of renewables.
Some divide renewable energy sources into classes. Rowlands (2005) terms some 
renewable sources “light green”, which he considers all forms of hydro and biomass, 
and some “dark green”, which includes wind and solar. For instance, the European 
Union allows large-scale hydro (above 10MW) to be included in EU countries’ national 
renewable energy targets, but only allows smaller-scale hydro schemes (below 10MW) 
to qualify for support for renewables (Rowlands 2005). However, the problem with 
this classification is that other issues, including the location of these RETs, are not 
considered. For example, although debates regarding the carbon footprint accruing as a 
result of producing ethanol abound9, it is generally agreed that the carbon footprint is 
higher when using ethanol from com (where the United States dominates world 
production) versus sugarcane-derived ethanol (where Brazil is the world production 
leader) . 10 Furthermore, while biomass and large-scale hydro are renewable (sources of 
energy that can be replenished), they are associated with a number of major social, 
health and environmental problems such as respiratory illnesses, displacement or large- 
scale alterations of human and / or animal populations, and sediment deposits (IPCC 
1996; Bruce and Pickering 2000; Rowlands 2005). Thus, there is increasing consensus 
to exclude these forms of energy in the definition of renewables.
9 See for example, Searchinger et al. (2008). Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse 
Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change. Science. 319: 1238 - 1240. who argue that corn-based 
ethanol grown and produced in the United States nearly doubles greenhouse gas emissions for the next 
30 years.
10 Sugarcane derived ethanol is considered more efficient because it is already a sugar versus com, which 
is a starch that first must be converted into a sugar (where often fossil fuels are used in this process) 
Garrett, L. (2008). Food Failures and Futures. A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies 
Working Paper. Washington, D.C., Council on Foreign Relations: 16).
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The dissertation also uses a more narrow definition of renewables, or the definition 
adopted by the Brazilian Energy Initiative, termed “new” renewable energy sources. 
These sources consist of “modem biomass, small hydropower (generally defined by 
power output -  hydro is considered small often up to 10MW)11, geothermal energy, 
wind energy, solar energy (including photovoltaics) and marine12 energy. Modem 
biomass excludes traditional uses of biomass such as fuelwood and includes electricity 
generation and heat production, as well as transportation fuels, from agricultural and 
forest residues and solid waste” (Goldemberg 2002: 1-2). However, one clarification is 
that the only solid waste considered a renewable energy source is waste that is digested 
anaerobically rather than simply burned or left decomposing openly. This is consistent 
with the definition of renewables as indicated in the Conference Paper for the global 
conference on Renewables, held in Bonn, June 2004, which states that renewables also 
include the “biodegradable part of waste...only if it is provided and used in a 
sustainable manner” (Renewables 2004: 9).
This thesis examines the experience of two RETs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. The 
main technologies under scrutiny in this dissertation are solar water heaters (SWHs) 
and biogas, or landfill gas, to generate electricity. I am examining the physical object 
and the broader processes associated with their adoption (e.g. installation, operation, 
maintenance, tacit knowledge). These technologies were chosen as they were deemed 
some of the most economically viable RETs (White and Hooke 2004; Houri 2006) - 
including in urban environments. Chapters 4 and 5, which examine the case studies in 
detail, will provide further details on the specifics of these particular technologies used 
in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, but some attention to landfill gas will be paid here.
There are various types of technologies and methods used with respect to biogas. For 
instance, the gas can come from agricultural sources with bacteria added (e.g. a pig
11 This upper threshold varies in organizations and countries, including Canada and Brazil, which 
consider up to 30MW small hydro. There are often sub-categories too. In one Brazilian rural renewable 
energy United Nations-sponsored project eligible renewable hydro projects included small (defined as 1- 
30 MW), mini (lOOkW-lMW), micro (lOkW-lOOkW) and pico (up to lOkW). (BREED), Brazilian 
Rural Energy Enterprise Development. (2007). "Various Information." Retrieved March 19, 2009, from 
http://uneprisoe.org/BREED/DecentralizedEntrepreneursBrazil.pdf
12 This includes energy from tides, waves and Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC), which seeks 
to convert water warmed through solar radiation into electricity.
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farm) or it can come from municipal waste (e.g. a landfill). This dissertation examines 
biogas from municipal waste, or landfill gas.
Generally speaking landfill gas consists of:
• 50 per cent methane (CH4 );
• 47 per cent carbon dioxide (CO2);
• 2-3 per cent chlorine, benzene, non-methane organic compounds (NMOCs) 
(UNESCAP 2007: 15).
Methane is the major component of landfill gas, especially in developing countries. 
There are two main uses for landfill gas in the climate change context. The first is 
flaring, where instead of being passively released, by flaring the methane, it becomes 
mainly CO2 , which is not as powerful a GHG as methane. The second is through 
generating electricity (described below). This dissertation focuses on the latter process.
The use of methane, or landfill gas, as a renewable energy source remains 
controversial. First of all, some Non-Govemmental Organizations (NGOs) claim that 
including landfill gas as a renewable energy source is an incentive to create waste, 
rather than reducing it, and that attention should instead be focused on composting, 
recycling and reduction. Secondly, they are also concerned that municipal, or 
household, waste, in addition to organics, includes other components such as plastics 
which when burned can form toxic chemicals. Burning landfill gas (whether to run a 
motor or through flaring) can also form toxic chemicals when methane and some non­
methane organic compounds (NMOCs) (which constitute less than 1% of landfill gas in 
the United States by weight) are mixed (Ewall 2008). Thus, some countries exclude 
landfill gases in their definition of renewables (Haas 2001). Critics also suggest that 
any policies that include “waste to energy” projects as renewable energy sources 
compete with wind and solar (Ewall 2008; Grassroots Recycling Network 2008). 
Methane is a greenhouse gas (GHG) 25 more times powerful than carbon dioxide in 
terms of global warming impact (IPCC 2007). In addition, the energy content of 
biogas (as well as a number of other biomass sources) is roughly half that of coal; in 
other words, twice the amount of biogas versus coal13 is needed to produce the same 
amount of energy (Rubin 2001: 214).
13 It is important to note that this is a rough estimate, as this number varies depending on the type of coal 
used -  sub-bituminous, bituminous, lignite, anthracite, etc.,
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Those that support the use of landfill gas as a renewable argue that if this methane gas 
is recovered and combusted to run motors, it can be used to generate heat or create 
electricity through non-fossil means, and carbon dioxide rather than methane is 
released into the atmosphere. This can be especially important in instances where the 
landfill gas replaces fossil fuels as electricity (Pipatti and Savolainen 1996). There are 
also those who argue that by combusting landfill gas in an engine, it will lead to the 
destruction of other harmful chemicals (UNESCAP 2007) (See Table 1.1 below).
Table 1.1 - O bserved  landfill g a s  eng ine d estru c tio n  efficiencies for functional g ro u p s
Methane 96.0 99.6
Alkanes 70.2 >99.9
Alkenes 50.1 >99.6
Alcohols 84.1 >99.8
Aldehydes >42.4 95.9
Ketones >87.4 99.9
Aromatic hydrocarbons 92.0 >99.9
Terpenes - >99.9
Halogenated
hydrocarbons >70.1 >99.7
Sulphur com pounds >8.7 >96.6
S ource: UNESCAP 2007, p. 17
This dissertation considers landfill gas to produce electricity in some landfills in 
developing countries as a RET because the content of landfill gas in developing 
countries can be very different than in the developed world. Also, in locations where 
the temperatures are warmer and more humid, like Sao Paulo, these processes occur 
more rapidly. In landfills, bacteria breakdown organics anaerobically (when in an 
oxygen-free setting) which forms methane gas. These bacteria tend to particularly 
thrive in landfills where there is high moisture content, which is the case in a number of 
developing country landfills (Zerbock 2003). In the industrialized world, organics 
generally constitute about 30-40% of waste, but the amount of organic waste, or waste 
deriving from plant or animal elements (i.e. with carbon), in developing country 
landfills is much greater (e.g. some figures put it at 70-80% although this data comes 
from a study done in 1982) (Thomas 2006). Rather than being passively released, the 
landfill gas, which is mainly made up of methane, is directed through tubing to an
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electricity generating plant. The gas is treated (cooled down and then heated again) to 
enable it to be used as a fuel for electricity generation.
Figure 1.1 Landfill G as to  Electricity G eneration P ro cess
G a s  collection G a s  extraction  and  
flare burner E nergy  utilisation
P< P a tm
Source: Clean D evelopm ent M echanism  Project D esign D ocum ent (CDM-PDD) 
B andeiran tes 2005, p. 5
Furthermore, as indicated above, only solid waste that is decomposed using anaerobic 
methods will be considered. Brazil and Mexico, the two case studies under 
consideration, possess landfills that are equipped with what have been termed sanitary 
landfills, or those that have contemporary technology and comply with those countries’ 
most stringent environmental and health regulations. Bandeirantes and Sao Joao, the 
two landfills in operation outside of Sao Paulo being considered, are sanitary landfills. 
Figure 1.2 below provides details on waste in Brazil. Lixao means open-air garbage 
dumps.
Figure 1.2 -  Final D estination for W aste in Brazil (%)__________________________________
Not Informed; 4,9
Controlled Landfill; 18,3
Sanitary Landfill; 13,7
S ource: IBGE - Instituto Brasileiro de G eografia e  E statistica. Pesquisa Nacional de 
Saneamento Basico, 2000 taken from B andeiran tes CDM PDD, p. 8
Numerous landfill sites, including Bandeirantes and Sao Joao in Brazil, have been 
assessed in terms of technical and economic feasibility for landfill gas projects in these
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countries by the United States Government (USG) since 1998 (USG 2006). 
Furthermore, one study on biomass combustion, examining landfills equipped with 
these requirements, indicated that air toxic emissions were typically very low due to 
various mechanisms in place (e.g. high temperatures and good air-fuel mixing 
(Demirbas 2005). Another advantage of landfill gas in Brazil is that although the 
country is currently heavily reliant on hydropower for its electricity, governments at 
various levels are seeking out alternatives for electricity generation, especially to help 
the system in peak times. This search increased after the apagao of 2000/01. Generally 
speaking, thermal power plants -  using especially natural gas but oil too -  are the most 
favoured option. This is a part of Brazil’s strategy to increase their energy mix, such as 
through the New Petroleum Law of 1997 (Rom&n 2007).
1.3. The Renewable Energy Experience in Developing 
Countries -  Conventional Frameworks to Explain Their Uptake 
(or Lack of)
Various approaches found in technology adoption literature are used to explain the 
reasons for RET adoption in developing countries. Two of the most dominant types, 
and variations of them, stem from economics and public policy One way in which to 
term them is by grouping them as “push / pull” models and “barriers- or policy- 
oriented” models. The general thrust of these frameworks examines the adoption of 
RETs as being hindered by a series of barriers. The models suggest ways to overcome 
these barriers. A number of these models generally view renewable energy 
technologies as being used as a reflection of cost or technical features, or similarly, 
viewed as a question of supply and demand according to economics -  in other words, 
much emphasis is placed on economic and technical features. Recent variations also 
consider other aspects which may have a role, including barriers to awareness and 
institutional barriers, suggesting that the government must take on more of an active 
role, by implementing building codes and allowing for alternative infrastructure more 
conducive for RETs. However, as is explored below, one concern with these 
approaches is that they tend to neglect social and / or larger policy trends which may 
impact RET adoption.
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1.3.1. Push / Pull models
Models to explain environmental technology adoption in developing countries abound. 
For instance, many economists examine “push” (i.e. the supply side, including the 
actions of technology suppliers, research and development (R&D) activities) and “pull” 
(i.e. the demand side, including the aspects influencing the actions of technology 
buyers) factors. Studies focus on the level of a firm, a sector, or a country and 
generally characteristics of firms and the technology (e.g. (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; 
Blackman 1999; Mueller 2006; Nemet 2007).
However, these models place most of their attention on economic aspects. 
Furthermore, they are often applied in the case of firms, rather than individual people, 
families, other institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals) or communities, which have 
different characteristics and motivations than firms. Barriers-oriented or policy- 
focused frameworks are broader than these economic models, accounting for other 
aspects such as institutions and political dynamics.
1.3.2. Barriers-oriented or Policy-focused Frameworks
These conventional approaches target barriers, compartmentalizing them into various 
aspects. They focus on identifying barriers (technical, economic, institutional, among 
others) and ways to overcome these barriers, such as through providing financial 
incentives and training, mandatory policies, among others (e.g. Wilkins 2002, 
Renewables 2004), to ensure that RET adoption is successful. For instance, in Israel, 14 
where there is a 95% penetration rate of SWHs for houses, the government made it 
mandatory to use SWHs in households since 1980. The main premise for this policy 
was for security reasons (Mor 2008).
These types of approaches tend to centre on five classic explanations for RET adoption, 
or a lack of, in the developing world. These include: economic problems such as 1) 
little financing options available, and 2) the high cost of RETs in general and versus 
their alternatives, 3) technical problems, such as not being able to perform as hoped due
14 which is arguably not a developing country, although not classified as an Annex 1 nation, or a nation 
with a quantifiable GHG emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol (See Ayalon, O. (2009). Sustainable 
'Green' Rural Municipalities. Renewable Energy in the Middle East: Enhancing Security Through 
Regional Cooperation. M. Mason and A. Mor. Dordrecht, the Netherlands, Springer.: 112)
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to climatic conditions, 4) a lack of awareness and / or access regarding the RET, and 5) 
institutional issues including the fact that existing infrastructure often favours 
conventional energy sources (Martinot 2002; Wilkins 2002; Dorian et al. 2006). Many 
classify these obstacles under groupings as types of barriers -  including economic, 
technical, knowledge and institutional, although factors can be considered various types 
of barriers at the same time.
Economic barriers
The most prevalent explanations accounting for a lack of sustained RET use in 
developing countries fall under the grouping of economic barriers. Specifically, the 
key economic barrier proposed by many scholars to be the biggest obstacle for RETs in 
the developing world, is their high cost — in general and versus their alternatives 
(Dorian et al. 2006). Many RETs are characterized by having high up front costs for 
the purchase and installation of equipment, even if one does not have to “pay” for the 
source of energy (e.g. sun, wind) (Martinot 2002). By contrast, technologies for 
traditional energy sources are often either very inexpensive (e.g. basic stove using 
wood as fuel, electric showerhead) or significantly cheaper than their RET counterpart. 
Others also purport that the “true” cost of using fossil fuels is not reflected in their price 
as the health and environmental impacts involved in their use (e.g. respiratory illnesses, 
acid rain and global warming) is not incorporated (termed “externalities” by 
economists) in their price. They assert that internalizing these externalities will make 
renewables the most “cost effective” option (Bourdaire and Ellis 2000; Edinger and 
Kaul 2000). Some studies also talk about the economic barrier termed ‘split incentives’ 
where owners versus renters and, for new buildings, property developers are not 
interested in saving energy as the benefits will be accrued by future occupants 
(Philibert 2006).
Moreover, although a number of studies indicate over time that in the long run the RET 
is cheaper than its counterpart, many people in the developing world find it easier to 
pay for the cost of fuel month by month (a common practice for traditional energy 
sources) rather than everything at once (Quintanilla and Mulas 1998). For this reason, 
long term credit schemes, where consumers pay a certain fee every month, have been 
identified as a mechanism to increase RET uptake (Martinot 2002; UNDESA 2005: 48- 
49).
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Although this idea remains popular among experts examining renewable energy’s 
impasse in the developing world, in practice, little financing options are available for 
those interested in RETs. This is the second most common barrier identified in a 
number of studies on renewable energy in the developing world. Investors are often 
reluctant to allocate funds in this sector in general, and especially in the developing 
world. Many find that offering credit to potential developers, producers, dealers and / 
or consumers of RETs to be too risky -  because possible financiers know little about 
the technology or the business, and / or have doubts about the ability for potential 
lendees to repay the loan. Further concerns arise among potential investors with 
respect to facets common in developing countries (not just RETs) -  whether perceived 
or real —including the prevalence of sub-optimal products and processes, a lack of 
standards for these technologies, or political and economic instability (Muntasser et al. 
2000, Martinot 2002, Wilkins 2002).
In addition, little in-roads have been made with established lenders in the developing 
world. Traditional banks often find RET investments too risky. Even in those cases 
where established developing country credit or micro-credit institutions have expressed 
an interest in looking at RETs as a part of their portfolio, not much progress in this area 
has been made because their experience is different (e.g. lending small amounts of 
money rather than the larger amounts many RETs cost)15, or their requirements are too 
stringent (e.g. high credit rates and weekly payments; a potential lender must be a 
member, paying a membership fee) for much of the population in developing world 
(UNDESA 2005; Rodrigues and Matajs 2005).
Technical barriers
A number of studies also underscore technical barriers. Technical barriers, as viewed 
here, focus on the “nuts and bolts” of ‘hardware’ as well as the details of ‘software’. 
Martinot (2002), speaking of Photovoltaics (PV) in developing countries, states that 
“...historically, the reasons for failure of solar home systems projects included poor 
quality products, poor installation and maintenance, and systems being “oversold”
15 Pramana, V. (2006). Commercializing Renewable Energy in India (CREI) A. Mallett. Washington, 
D.C., personal communication, speaking about his experience on the Commercializing Renewable 
Energy in India (CREI) project
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(marketing claims that raise expectations higher than the technology can deliver)” 
(Martinot 2002: 52). Jafar’s (2000) study on RETs in the South Pacific echo the 
reasons identified above, as well as inappropriate design, for the failure of a number of 
RETs in this setting.
Knowledge barriers
A third challenge faced by those interested in increasing RET adoption in the 
developing world -  awareness — is highlighted under knowledge barriers. In this 
context, knowledge of a technology centres on being aware of its existence, how to 
access the technology and how it works. Conventional studies focus on how a lack of 
awareness about and / or access to the technology by the government, industry, 
investors, and the general population affect the adoption of renewables. According to 
Muntasser et al. (2000), examining the potential for the photovoltaic (PV)16 industry in 
developing countries, the lack of knowledge of the product and processes can be the 
most attenuating barrier faced by those interested in increasing the uptake of RETs. As 
these technologies are often not prominent vis-a-vis conventional energy sources, little 
information is available about them including quality, performance expectations, and 
maintenance and upkeep -  let alone the principles behind the technology. Even if 
people have rudimentary or in-depth knowledge about RETs, they often do not know 
how to obtain the products, the necessary components, or information about processes 
regarding the technology (Wilkins 2002).
Furthermore, there is a lack of information regarding the potential market, thus 
deterring possible investors, developers or producers from entering this area. More 
specifically, Wilkins (2002) argues that failures regarding the transfer of climate 
technologies to developing countries can be traced to the fact that foreign firms possess 
little knowledge of local settings (e.g. culture, language, purchasing habits, needs of 
population) or did not pay enough attention to how to adapt their technology to make it 
better suited for the developing country environment.
16 Photovoltaic describes the process that converts sunlight into energy. There are two basic solar 
technologies, solar cells and solar collectors. Solar cells convert solar insolation into electricity while 
solar collectors convert insolation into heat. Mallett et al. (2009). UK- India Collaboration to Overcome 
Barriers to the Transfer of Low Carbon Energy Technologies: Phase II. SPRU. Brighton, UK, SPRU, 
University of Sussex.
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But this definition of knowledge often equates knowledge to information and neglects a 
third, critical component of knowledge termed “know why” knowledge, or “principles 
knowledge” where people begin to understand not only what the technology is and how 
to use it, but the principles behind the technology (Bell 1990; Lall 1995; Lall 2000). 
This can have implications for adoption, as the more people understand a technology, it 
enhances their ability to adapt it to their particular situation, making them more apt to 
use it.
In addition, prior conditions which can affect knowledge, must also be taken into 
account (Rogers 2003a). For example, previous experience with the technology may 
negatively influence RET adoption more than lack of awareness. This is because a 
negative experience with a technology can do far more damage to its diffusion and use 
than a positive experience can to increase diffusion and adoption (Frewer et al. 1998).
Institutional and Legal Barriers
A rich body of literature exists regarding the definition of institutions17. Most studies 
on renewables are not clear how an institution is defined. However those that do make 
this clarification indicate that they are different than organizations, such as government 
departments and community groups. Institutions are rules which govern behaviours 
and / or the organization of a social grouping (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). Some 
suggest that the government must incorporate renewable energy sources into various 
applications including designing, retrofitting and constructing buildings, for generating 
electricity (Houri 2006). These requirements can be mandatory or encouraged through 
a series of directed incentives. Furthermore, as the infrastructure is often in place for 
conventional energy sources, it is sometimes difficult for architects, buildings, and 
producers of alternative energy sources to obtain the necessary permits, licenses, access 
to the grid, etc. (Rodrigues and Matajs 2005; Philibert 2006).
A series of proposals have been put forth to effectively address these barriers. For 
instance, the World Bank has proposed framework aimed at increasing the use of RETs
17 A well-known example is North, D. (1990). Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Under New Institutional Economics, the view 
distinguishes between organizations (groups of people and structures they create for governance) and 
institutions, which are the rules, both formal and informal, which govern their behaviour, decisions, 
organization, etc.
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in developing countries. This is called a Renewable Energy Toolkit (REToolkit), 
which consists of a website and an Issues Note to assist World Bank staff members and 
others to design and implement renewable energy projects, particularly in developing
1 ftcountries. The Issues Note examines relevant policy, economic and financial issues 
regarding renewable energy systems. More specifically, the Note provides a 
comprehensive examination of various policy frameworks worldwide to encourage the 
use of renewables including feed in tariffs, renewable obligations, tax credits, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), among others. Moreover, the Note also includes a 
technology chapter that provides technical details regarding a number of renewable 
energy technologies, such as hydropower, wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar 
photovoltaic (PV).
However, little attention is placed on social issues as well as larger indirect policy 
directions and their potential implication. For instance, in a 174 page document the 
World Bank does indicate the importance of community organizations and engagement 
(2008b: 28, 53-54, 81, 94-96) for RET adoption in rural applications, but the thrust of 
the framework stresses potential economic, legal and regulatory barriers and tools to 
overcome these barriers. Furthermore, the Bank emphasizes the need for training of 
technical and / or business skills, and not on the dynamics of communities and what the 
implications will be for the community should a particular technology be pursued, 
aspects which are also key (e.g. see Chemi et al. 2007).
Numerous other proposals have been put forth to increase RET adoption in developing 
countries including those noted in an issues paper for the Renewables Conference in 
200419 (Renewables 2004), and the United Nations Industrial Development
18 World Bank (2008b). "REToolkit: A Resource for Renewable Energy Development " Retrieved 
March 21, 2009, from http://go.worldbank.org/OWJW3JRYJ0 .
19 Here, emphasis is placed on a policy framework that increases access to finance (especially for women 
and the rural poor), increases knowledge about RETs (through research and development and capacity- 
building) and institution building. The paper suggests that policies focus on decreasing subsidies for 
conventional energy sources and internalizing costs involved in using energy sources that are often not 
incorporated (thus ‘leveling the playing field’ between RETs and other conventional energy 
technologies) through the creation of “smart subsidies’, or those that target the poor to help them finance 
renewable options, tax incentives, feed-in-tariffs, green certificates, etc.
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Organization (UNIDO)’s, Service Module 6: Sustainable Energy and Climate 
Change.20
More often than not, experts develop these guidelines, often from outside of the 
developing world; there is little engagement of communities and the public (whether 
from urban or rural areas), who could be acutely impacted by the implementation of 
any proposed RET adoption scheme. As an example, UNIDO notes that in developing 
this package, they engaged with stakeholders through workshops / conferences held on 
more macro-level topics, such as “Energy and NEPAD/Africa” and “Biomass 
gasification and South-South cooperation” (UNIDO 2005) but there are no details on 
who these stakeholders are or how they were identified.
While these barriers are important, their existence or lack of does not fully explain RET 
adoption in developing countries. The problem with these frameworks used to explain 
RET adoption is that they often place too much emphasis on technical and economic 
attributes and / or generally offer only immediate, or shorter term, policy options. Also, 
while some pay attention to the dynamics among different stakeholder groups or 
organizations, there is less attention placed on the nature of these relationships and on 
the differences within stakeholder groups. In addition, they often neglect to examine 
dynamics occurring beyond the level of scrutiny, such as international influences, 
which can impact RET use.
For example, one suggestion to address economic barriers, such as the high cost for 
some of these technologies, is through subsidies. This is an area of considerable debate 
in RET studies in developing countries. One view claims they are good for increasing 
RET use in developing countries, arguing that conventional energy sources receive 
subsidies (e.g. coal, oil and natural gas received $US151 billion in subsidies from 
1995-1998), which has helped encourage and maintain their usage (Muntasser et al. 
2000; Goldemberg 2006). Others suggest that, over time, those renewables that were 
subsidized are often not sustainable (Douthwaite 2002; Pramana 2006; UNEP 2006).
20Regarding renewable energy, this module mainly targets energy for productive use in rural 
environments, provide a generic “package” of services and products.
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Further debates arise regarding who should receive the subsidy. Some claim that a 
blanket subsidy for fossil fuels (e.g. cheaper gas) ends up benefiting the wealthy more 
than the poor. For instance, in Mexico, where subsidies on fuels are sometimes used, 
wealthier residents are more likely to own vehicles and / or a gas boiler / gas stove 
(Quintanilla et al. 2000). In India, subsidies on the price of electricity (and fertilizer) 
have often been criticized as helping wealthy agrobusiness rather than family farms, 
which often do not have electricity connections (Vedavalli 2007). Some also have 
concerns in India with that government’s feed in tariff law aimed at encouraging the 
use of photovoltaics (PVs) in that country, is favour large scale solar farms, which only 
wealthy investors have the necessary capital to start up a project, rather than smaller, 
decentralized options (Mallett et al. 2009)21.
As another example, Forsyth (1999), highlighting an experience from the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1970s, stresses the importance of 
local context, providing examples of failed biodigesters in India. Two of the main 
reasons for its failure were because the supply of dung was over-estimated and conflicts 
arose once dung went from being a common good to a commodity. He also examines 
biomass gasifiers in the Philippines, which failed as the pumps were meant for more 
intensive forms of farming and because they were perceived by farmers to be less 
reliable than waiting for rain.
Moreover, a number of these conventional approaches downplay key aspects including 
social well-being, the user’s wishes, needs and strengths, and local livelihoods. These 
are just as important as technical and economic attributes in any renewable energy 
decision-making process. Chemi et al.’s (2007) study demonstrates this, applying a 
multi criteria decision making model incorporating priorities identified by community 
members, including those noted above, alongside those of experts (e.g. climate change, 
poverty alleviation) including local and regional government officials.
Furthermore, in some contexts, factors termed as ‘barriers’ may be ‘drivers’ in another, 
and may change over time. For instance, Montalvo (2008) notes that for one
21 Also, for further details on the specifics of these policies please see Mallett et al. (2009). UK- India 
Collaboration to Overcome Barriers to the Transfer of Low Carbon Energy Technologies: Phase II.
SPRU. Brighton, UK, SPRU, University of Sussex.
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technology in one market in one moment in time, consumers may be drivers for 
environmentally friendly products, but in another setting or at a different time 
consumers may deter firms from investing in cleaner technologies if they do not 
perceive any existing or potential market demand. By not taking a nuanced, longer- 
term view, approaches based on barriers mean that more often than not, the uptake of 
these technologies is not sustainable, and RETs are discarded. In addition, these 
approaches do not account for the role that other, seemingly unrelated, indirect policies 
can have on RET adoption. In other words, these “end of tailpipe” solutions in 
environmental policy jargon or “band aid” solutions in development policy jargon are 
important but insufficient in and of themselves to effectively increase RETs. Another 
problem with this approach is that these barriers are often interdependent and their 
existence can be traced back to policies formulated at the macro-level. Thus, 
addressing one, several, or all of the barriers does not necessarily equate with an 
increase in technology adoption.
Some have turned to the international technology transfer process as a way to increase 
the use of RETs in developing countries.
1.4. Technology Transfer Approaches -  International Climate 
Change
Probably the best-known approach proposed to increase the uptake of RETs in
developing countries through technology cooperation at the international level, is
through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of
1992 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC is the most cited
article in support of the use of low carbon technologies in developing countries through
technology transfer. Here, developed countries
“shall take all practical steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how 
to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement provisions of the Convention” (UNFCCC 1992, Article 4.5: 11).
Since that time, the success of the Convention in achieving this has been widely 
questioned with many developing nations left feeling frustrated at the lack of progress
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that has been made in achieving technology dissemination, development and use in 
practice22 (Khor 2008).
Another mechanism designed to encourage the uptake of RETs in developing nations 
through technology transfer is through Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. In the Kyoto 
Protocol industrialized nations are required to limit their carbon dioxide emissions to 
specific targets, using a 1990 baseline, during the 2008-2012 period. Article 12 of the 
Protocol contains details of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM 
“allowed the north to support emission reduction projects in the south -  including 
industrial gas capture, renewables, energy efficiency and forest plantations -  in return 
for credits towards [their] Kyoto obligations and provided a small fund for adaptation 
through a tax on transactions.” (Liverman 2009: 293). Often these projects, involving 
organizations in northern and southern countries, have a technology transfer 
component. The CDM was designed as a way to counter some of the criticisms of its 
predecessor Activities Implemented Jointly (AU), which was a pilot phase for climate 
change investment after 1995. AU activities tended to favour certain regions (Latin 
America versus Africa) and certain types of projects -  carbon sequestration through 
forestry and land use activities, rather than those fostering industrial technology 
transfer (Forsyth 2009).
Supporters of the CDM emphasize economic benefits for developing countries due to 
the potential for generating funds through carbon credits through CDM projects (Castro 
Negrete 2005; Milton and Kaufman 2005; Rodrigues and Matajs 2005). According to a 
study on the benefits of CDM in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) conducted by 
Duic et al. (2003), where a price of 25 Euros / tonne of carbon equivalent abated was 
assumed, renewable energy projects were made that much more economically feasible 
when used as a CDM project (e.g. in Cape Verde, in 2012, they projected a cost of 
electricity of 8.7EU cents/kWh for combined cycle + wind versus 8.2 EU cents/kWh 
for combined cycle + wind + CDM potential). For a number of renewable energy 
projects, the CDM is argued to be a necessary tool; making those RETs that are nearly 
economically feasible become viable (Duic et al. 2003).
22 A lack of effective technology transfer to the developing world (and particularly least developing 
countries) is not limited to low carbon technologies. See Foray (2004) cited in Oliva (2008) which looks 
at technology transfer to least developed countries more broadly, within the context o f the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).
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But, economic benefits associated with CDM projects are not always clear as some 
scholars and practitioners avow that the CDM process is long, convoluted and riddled 
with bureaucracy, thus making projects more expensive by increasing transaction costs 
and reducing the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (e.g. Personal Communication, 
comments at a stakeholder forum with CDM executive board, Carbon Expo, May
2005).
In addition, with respect to technology, the main purpose of the Kyoto Protocol was to 
increase investment in national capacity to address climate change rather than to 
encourage technology transfer and adoption of low carbon technologies. The hope was 
that developed countries would meet some of their emissions through the transfer of 
new, clean technologies to developing countries through the CDM (Grubb et al. 2001; 
Ravindranath and Sathaye 2002), but the extent to which this has happened continues 
to be a subject of debate. For example, Schneider et al. (2008) argue that in addition to 
making potential projects commercially viable, actors involved in the projects increase 
access to information and access to capital -  thus encouraging technology transfer. On 
the other hand, they note that CDM projects do not improve the institutional framework 
of countries, arguing that domestic and international policy makers encourage CDM 
country specific measures to improve investment conditions.
In another example, an assessment of plans for technology transfer in CDM projects in 
2006, the plans varied significantly by project type and host country. In India, for 
instance, only 7.3% of CDM projects planned to involve some element of technology 
transfer compared to 55.1% in China and much as 83.3% in Malaysia (Haites et al.
2006).
Furthermore, it is not clear that these studies at the macro level provide an accurate 
reflection of what is really occurring. For instance, more recent analyses by Seres et al. 
(2007) and Seres and Haites (2008) report the shares of technology transfer for 
equipment only, knowledge only, and both knowledge and equipment. Knowledge is 
measured “only through training and the engagement of foreign experts” (Seres et al. 
2007: 12), but is this an accurate reflection of ‘knowledge’?
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Measuring knowledge using these proxies (e.g. number of training sessions, foreign 
experts, etc.) is very difficult. Debates regarding ‘what is knowledge’ have been around 
for many, many years. What is distinct about knowledge is that it is information that 
has been processed in the minds of individuals and that this individual’s prior 
understandings, experiences and environment will shape how this information is 
processed (Alavi and Leidner 1999). Many technology studies view information as 
synonymous with knowledge. But, people will process information given about a 
technology - what it is, how it works, etc. -  differently. Schneider and Ingram 
Schneider and Ingram (2007), speaking about policy spaces (e.g. climate change, drug 
use) where people galvanize around an issue, argue that these issues will be impacted 
by “ways of knowing” as people interpret aspects in this space and relationships 
between them.
Furthermore, even if one were to use this narrow definition of knowledge, if technology 
is considered ‘knowledge’ and ‘equipment’ only, how are processes accounted for? 
Also, these numbers and questions aside, as the CDM is so recent, it is not clear how 
technology cooperation, in instances where it is happening, is leading to their uptake in 
developing nations.
Some suggest that for more effective technology cooperation, the CDM consider the 
‘development dividend’, which is generally considered social and developmental 
benefits accompanying these emissions reduction projects. Forsyth (2007) and 
Morsink, Hofman and Lovett (in review) propose that cross-sectoral partnerships, or 
those between investors, public sector actors and citizens (e.g. through NGOs, 
community groups) where all are engaged in the designing and / or implementing of the 
investment, could be one such way to increase the development dividend and 
technology transfer, alongside the CDM.
In sum, the reasons behind the lack of RET adoption in developing countries are 
interdependent and vary depending on the circumstances. Scholars continue to look for 
commonalities, with some developing tools to assist policy makers and practitioners to 
increase the success of RET adoption in developing countries. Despite these efforts, 
there still is not a definitive basis why certain renewables are being adopted and not
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others in the developing world. One key aim of this dissertation is to contribute 
knowledge in this area through answering the question -  What are the most important 
factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world?
The dissertation does this conceptually by integrating technology adoption, cooperation 
and trade and competitiveness frameworks, and propose a new framework, urban 
technology cooperation, to better reflect RET use in developing country cities; 
methodologically by focusing my study on the meso-level; and empirically through 
applying three systemic approaches to the urban developing country context in Mexico 
and Brazil.
1.5. Explaining RET Adoption Using Systemic Approaches -  
Technology Adoption and Cooperation, and Trade and 
Competitiveness Regimes
This dissertation also answers three sub-research questions in order to answer the 
overall research question -  What are the most important factors affecting RET 
adoption in the urban developing world?
The first sub-research question is: How can systemic approaches help to explain RET 
adoption in the urban developing world? As noted earlier systemic approaches have 
been proposed as alternative frameworks to explain RET adoption as they try to 
incorporate economic and social facets at various scales. However, the bulk of the 
literature on systems and technology comes from innovation studies (Nieuwenhuis et 
al. 2003; Hekkert and van den Hoed 2006; Watson 2008). Some scholars, focusing on 
transitions and systems innovation view a system as a society, arguing that forces that 
have the potential to transform the system are found within and outside the system. 
Research on systems innovation focus on large-scale transformations of how societies 
function, including how they address the need to feed, house, and transport themselves, 
and communicate with others. The focus of these theories is on the regime, or the 
dominant aspect of society, as well as change originating from niches, or subsystems 
within the overall system (Frantzeskaki and de Haan 2008; Berkhout 2004 et al.; Geels
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2004). This view has been applied to the context of energy. Changes affecting energy 
systems, defined as those affecting on a societal scale, range from shifts to new or 
improved technologies in key sectors such as power generation, transportation and how 
energy is being used (Geels 2004).
In other innovation studies, a system is considered at the level of a country through the 
concept of National Innovation Systems (NIS)23 (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Patel 
and Pavitt 1994) or those processes surrounding a particular technology or group of 
technologies (Hekkert and van den Hoed 2006).
In fact, there are relatively few instances in which systems perspectives have been 
applied to the adoption of renewables in developing countries. Two examples however 
include 1) the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG)’s approach to 
energy and sustainable livelihoods, and 2) a software tool developed by Imperial 
College combining both quantitative and qualitative criteria, based on multi-criteria 
analysis called Sustainable Rural Energy Decision Support System (SURE-DSS). A 
key premise of these perspectives is to incorporate the views of people (e.g. a 
community) into the analysis. These two different frameworks provide valuable 
insights, aimed at providing a comprehensive view towards understanding RET 
adoption. However, studies using these frameworks are based on rural experiences in 
South Africa and Colombia (Chemi et al. 2007; Brent and Kruger 2009). These 
systems approaches are useful because they, along with a few others (e.g. Ockwell et 
al. 2007), integrate technology transfer and adoption.
The second sub-research question is “What are the reasons SWHs and biogas to 
produce electricity technologies are being used or not in Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo?”
As indicated above, the majority of approaches focusing on RET adoption focus on 
identifying barriers and ways to address these barriers. But, they generally focus on 
economic and technical factors, which, while important, do not adequately explain why 
technologies are being used or not. Systemic approaches have been proposed as
23 See (OECD), (1997). National Innovation Systems. OECD. Paris, OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/56/2101733.pdf for further details
40
alternative perspectives through which to assess RET adoption in developing countries, 
but there is little application of them to date.
This dissertation centres around three key themes -  technology adoption, technology 
cooperation, and trade and competitiveness approaches. Although numerous systemic 
frameworks within these themes could have been examined, the dissertation honed in 
on three of those deemed to be some of the most relevant in the case of RETs in 
developing country cities.
These approaches will be described in further detail in Chapter 2. The first systemic 
approach comes from adoption literature. Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations 
(2003a) is a technology adoption model that views the decision of whether or not to 
adopt a technology in stages. This model, recognizing the importance of underlying 
conditions, helped to explain how previous conditions in combination with awareness 
of energy conservation in general, rather than just awareness of the technology itself 
helped explain RET adoption. It is an agent-centric framework24 that focuses on the 
attributes of innovations, considering social and economic / technical aspects, and it 
highlights the role “change agents”. These agents can be people directly or indirectly 
involved in the development, production, distribution and / or use a technology.
There are a few examples of this model being applied in developing countries and / or 
renewables, including switching from wood to natural gas as a fuel in small scale 
industry in Bolivia (van Oosethout et al. 2005), a machine to ease food preparation 
tasks in Mali and the United States’ Million Roofs Initiative, aiming to have 
photovoltaics (PV) on one million roofs by 2010 (Rogers 2003a), but not renewables in 
developing countries specifically.
The second systemic approach, urban technology cooperation, comes from 
technology transfer literature. Technology transfer is a principal channel through which 
developing countries adopt Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs). It is an integral 
part of technology adoption. Technology as defined here includes processes (e.g. 
organizational and management practices, production processes), knowledge (tacit and
24 An agent-centered, or actor-oriented, framework focuses on the role of people, or organizations 
(populated by people) in shaping decisions and outcomes.
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codified) and products (e.g. physical equipment, artefact), also termed “software” and 
“hardware” (Lall 1995; IPCC 1996; Teece 2005).
Looking at evidence from the environmental and climate change arenas, one criticism 
is that many technology transfer models do not adequately reflect needs at the local 
level (Forsyth 2005) or the differences that can occur within groups or among 
individuals- they are often lumped together as the interests and influences on a 
“stakeholder”. In addition, the majority of technology transfer models stress the one 
way nature of flows. The word “transfer”, whether implicitly or explicitly, implies 
that it is a one-way, linear process in which one actor (the donor / active player / 
expert) provides technology (physical products and know-how) to another (the 
recipient / passive player / non-expert).
There are a number of critics of the term transfer (e.g. Shove 1998; Barton 2006) 
prompting some researchers to suggest an alternative concept, technology cooperation, 
to better reflect the two or more way exchange between participants (Heaton et al.
1994; Martinot et al. 1997). But it is not clear that these notions of technology 
cooperation include non-experts as stakeholders in the process. Also, Heaton views 
technology cooperation as “mutually beneficial joint undertakings by institutions in the 
developed and developing worlds to encourage, develop, adapt, and deploy 
technology” (1994: 39). Exchanges between the North and the South remain the centre 
of focus.
Like these scholars, I also support the use of an alternative term - urban technology 
cooperation. It builds on the previous technology cooperation work, highlighting the 
two or more-way nature of flows of knowledge, processes and equipment. But it also 
provides some clarification as developers, producers, distributors, intermediaries and 
end users, including non-experts, are viewed as necessary active players in the process. 
Emphasis is placed on cooperation with all stakeholders involved. Furthermore, the 
concept attempts to recognize the heterogeneity within stakeholder groups. One 
assumption of this concept is that in order for technology cooperation to be sustainable, 
it must be part of a larger process of technological capacity, where firms, organizations 
and communities acquire knowledge and expertise as well as physical equipment.
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This assumption is based on a number of other pivotal studies in this area that have 
demonstrated this link (e.g. Ockwell et al. 2007, Bell 1990).
The term urban was applied to properly account for cities, which are often central 
nodes “in a national, and increasingly international, society linked by means of 
networks” (Capello et al. 1999: 5). Also, drawing from the national systems of 
innovation literature, there is some evidence that supports cities as being regional or 
metropolitan innovation centres, which can positively affect the rate of technology 
development and use (Lundvall 1992; Doloreux and Parto 2005). Scholars in this vein 
highlight the role of proximity and communication occurring within a system. It also 
draws from the work of Porter (1990), who argues that firms and institutions operating 
in clusters, which in developing nations can often be found in cities, have competitive 
advantages. Other studies from Latin America also highlight that personal contacts, 
including face-to-face meetings, and relationships are key. Personal relationships are 
important everywhere, but even more critical in this setting, as emails and letters are 
seen as being too impersonal. Fostering personal relationships among various 
technology cooperation players in a city is easier due to proximity. Some Latin 
American researchers suggest that many Latin Americans lie somewhere in between 
Euro-American individual values (focusing on what is within people) and Asian 
collectivism (focusing on relationships between people) (Corral-Verdugo and Pinheiro 
2009). Discussions with key informants while conducting interview-based research in 
various developing country cities in Latin America and Asia (Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo for my PhD research, Santo Domingo for my masters research, and New Delhi, 
India for my research fellowship), also confirm this view.
The third systemic approach chosen comes from the trade and competitiveness 
literature. This is because these policies are some of the most important policies that 
shape technology transfer processes occurring at the systemic level. The third sub­
research question therefore is: to what extent do trade and competitiveness policies 
explain RET adoption in the urban developing world?
This question relates more to the national and sub-national level of policies, versus the 
first and second sub-research questions, which tend to relate to various scales.
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Debates regarding trade and competitiveness policies -  including their definition and 
which types are more effective in bringing about economic development, innovation 
and successful technology transfer and adoption -  abound. Chapter 2 will explore 
these issues in further detail.
Although there has been much research conducted on domestic and international trade 
and competitiveness policies in the developing world, including the multilateral World 
Trade Organization (WTO) system (e.g. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs), these studies generally focus on their role in economic development 
and innovation (see Kim 1998; Lall 2000; Grieve 2004; Wade 2004; Shadlen 2007 for 
example), and less so on their role in technology adoption, especially in the area of 
renewables. In the past, work on technology transfer in the area of renewable energy 
tends to overlook these policies, but is linked to national competitive and technology 
policies (see Forsyth 1999 for instance).
Competitiveness issues that have been raised in climate change research mainly focus 
on industry, where certain carbon emitters subject to a price and certain allocation of 
carbon (e.g. those firms involved in the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS)) would become less competitive to those carbon emitters not subject to any 
carbon constraint (e.g. a firm in China). The fear is that some firms, especially energy 
intensive ones, would source from or relocate to different areas where there is no such 
requirement on carbon in order to reduce costs. Specific industries include steel, 
aluminium and cement, as they are rather carbon intensive. Also, “these sectors also 
have some degree of product and process uniformity; consumers tend therefore to be 
indifferent to where products were made, provided they are less expensive” (Reinaud 
2009: 6). While recognizing the empirical limitations of these insights (as the ETS has 
only been in place since 2005), preliminary analysis of those potentially vulnerable 
firms in the ETS indicate that there was no major changes in trade flows or production 
during the three year time period under scrutiny (Reinaud 2009). This is supportive of 
Kuik, Tol and Grimeaud (2003), who stress that although the IPCC indicated a 
plausible carbon leakage rate between 5-20% in their Third Assessment Report based 
on models, projections of models have their limitations.
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Work is just beginning on the potential role that trade and competitiveness policies may 
have on the adoption of low carbon technologies in developing countries, of which 
renewables are a part -  one focus is on linking the World Trade Organization and 
climate change negotiations (e.g. Cosbey 2007). This research is particularly focused 
on the role that Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) may have on the transfer of climate 
technologies to developing countries (See World Bank 2008a; Littleton 2008; Mallett et 
al. 2009; Ockwell et al. in review). Highlighting the lack of success within the WTO to 
address environmental issues, Kemohan and De Cian (2007) look to regional trade 
agreements, such as those within the European Union framework, which are often 
“more far-reaching than multilateral trade negotiations in [their] coverage of domestic 
measures and environmental regulations, [they] might represent a reasonable 
opportunity for strengthening the credibility of controversial climate-related measures” 
(2007: 75).
Of those studies looking at the relationship between cooperation of low carbon 
technologies and trade and competitiveness policies, some scholars claim that an open 
trade regime, or policies that emphasizes trade liberalization, will increase the adoption 
of low carbon emitting technologies (Cosbey 2007; World Bank 2008a).
Research from other technologies in the developing world also makes this argument. 
Emphasis is placed on the market, centring on investor and consumer choice (Markusen 
and Venables 1999). Thus, foreign direct investment (FDI), exports, trade 
liberalization, and indirect government involvement are stressed. Technology 
cooperation under this approach is mainly characterized by shorter-term, more 
integrated methods (e.g. acquisitions / subsidiaries, direct purchasing of foreign 
technologies) with one participant serving as the key player. The claim is that these 
forms of technology cooperation are more effective as the process happens more 
quickly (Pietrobelli 2000). The market will decide which technologies are most viable 
for the environment in which they are to be used. With a single leader driving the 
process, providing coherent information to the public, and often possessing the means 
for quicker deployment, there is a greater likelihood that these technologies will be 
used. They argue that this form of technology cooperation is the most common version 
of this tool (namely internal, such as between a Multinational Corporation (MNC) and
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one of its subsidiaries), and the reason it is widely used is because it will lead to the 
most rapid diffusion and adoption of technology (Pietrobelli 2000).
Others suggest that a conditionally outward approach to trade and competitiveness is 
most conducive to increasing technology development, adoption and dissemination. In 
this view, while the presence of foreign investors is also encouraged, they have less of a 
'free reign’ in the local market. For instance, the government tends to take on a more 
direct role through creating legislation, mandatory requirements, and direct 
involvement in technology development, production, dissemination and adoption (Lall 
2004b). However, in current renditions, the government does not drive the technology 
cooperation process, but rather, is one of a number of key players. Emphasis is placed 
on building up indigenous capacity to absorb and adapt technologies. Some claim that 
technologies often work better in settings in which they are developed rather than those 
imported from elsewhere (Heaton et al. 1994), while others argue that foreign and local 
technologies are sources to draw from (Bell and Pavitt 1993). However, there is a lack 
of empirical evidence to support these claims in the context of renewables in 
developing countries.
These three themes -  technology adoption, technology cooperation and trade and 
competitiveness regimes, including variations on the approaches and why these 
particular approaches were chosen, will be explored in further detail in Chapter 2.
1.6. Research Design
Processes and networks occurring at the meso-level can provide innovative insights 
into the research question noted above- What are the most important factors affecting 
RET adoption in the urban developing world? This dissertation tackles this question 
by answering the three sub-research questions, indicated in the section above, using 
evidence from two cities which serve as case studies.
The dissertation turns to the experience of Latin America, the most urbanized part of 
the developing world (Chemi 2001), to answer these questions. Specifically, it looks at 
two dynamic and growing countries in the region and their largest and arguably most
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significant cities -  Mexico City, Mexico and Sao Paulo, Brazil. In-depth research and 
analyses were conducted within these cities to determine how Roger’s diffusion of 
innovations approach, urban technology cooperation and trade and competitiveness 
policies can influence technology adoption in the urban developing world.
Both cities have large populations, active civil societies, major discrepancies between 
the urban wealthy and poor, a high-energy demand, and high technological capability 
(TC), or assets (e.g. human resources, technical and scientific skills and infrastructure) 
held by a firm, region or country to bring about technological change (Rogers 2003a). 
The study examines RET use in these cities beginning from the mid-1970s to 2007, 
with a particular focus on the 2000 -  2007 timeframe. This time period was chosen as 
important events occurred globally and locally which can help to understand the 
context of RETs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. These facets include increased interest 
in renewable energy, major shifts and yet relative continuity at the political level 
(except for local politics in Sao Paulo), and similar yet different trends occurring 
regarding paths pursued for economic development.
For example, both Mexico and Brazil were affected by the first oil shock (October 
1973). This happened when the Arab nations of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the price of oil, reduced oil production and 
issued an oil embargo on numerous Western countries. These actions lead to 
subsequent interest and research in the renewable energy sector in many countries as a 
way of decreasing dependency on these foreign sources of fossil fuels, but stopped or 
slowed down after 1980. As a general trend, interest and research on RETs further 
waned worldwide once Saudi Arabia increased their production of oil in an attempt to 
reverse decreasing global demand for oil in 1986. But, interest and research on RETs 
has been steadily increasing again since the 1990s -  and especially in the mid-2000s 
due to environmental factors along with energy security reasons. For example, now 
alternative energy is viewed as a way of addressing climate change and local pollution, 
as well as decreasing dependence on foreign fossil fuel sources (ELA 1998).
Another contextual consideration for these cities has to do with their approach to 
economic development. The 1990s saw some major shifts regarding trade and 
competitiveness policies in both countries, explored further in Chapter 2. Numerous
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state-run companies were privatized, and both Mexico and Brazil began to liberalize 
their trade and competitiveness regimes, although Brazil did so to a lesser extent (Baer 
1996; Political Risk Services 2002; Cunha 2004; Shafaeddin 2005). More information 
on the case studies is in Chapters 4 and 5. The information collected is mainly 
qualitative, which was augmented with some quantitative information. Detailed 
information on research methods is in Chapter 3.
1.7. Thesis Overview and Objectives
The nature of the study dictates an interdisciplinary approach. As noted in this chapter, 
a rich body of literature exists to explain technology adoption and cooperation 
(explored further in Chapter 2) -  including approaches found in economics, political 
economy, to approaches that emphasize social contexts, such as constructivist literature 
and actor oriented frameworks. The most prevalent type of frameworks to examine 
RET adoption stem from barriers-oriented or policy-focused models.
I found that conventional approaches to RET adoption are often limited as they do not 
account for the effects that indirect policies may have on RET adoption, nor the 
interdependent nature of actors, technologies and policies operating in a system. I 
turned to several systemic approaches to determine how effective they are at explaining 
RET adoption.
The thesis also contributes to knowledge in this area through putting forth a new 
concept and a new methodology. To begin with, I propose the concept urban 
technology cooperation as a systemic approach to explain RET adoption in developing 
country cities. Technology cooperation is a pivotal channel for the uptake of RETs in 
developing countries, and it is these debates that the thesis turned to. The concept is a 
two-or more-way iterative, non-linear approach; it reflects all stakeholders involved in 
the process; and it is relevant for urban environments, recognizing their distinct 
features. Chapter 2 will explore the thesis themes further, examining the various 
debates underway in the areas of technology adoption, technology cooperation, and 
trade and competitiveness regimes, to provide more theoretical grounding, assessing 
their applicability in explaining what is occurring in urban Latin America.
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I also chose a new methodological tool by examining the meso-level. This level was 
chosen because it focuses on a system, social networks and attempts to assess the 
affects found at various levels.
Chapter 3 will to inform the reader about the methods and analysis used in the 
dissertation. The first section of this chapter will explain the research methods used for 
the study, including why case studies were chosen to explain the adoption of RETs in 
the urban developing world. This will include information on how the outcome 
(technology adoption) was “measured”. The metric used for the technology hardware 
is m2 / 100 inhabitants, while the metric used for biogas to produce electricity is MWs, 
or the capacity of the electricity generator. The complexity of attempting to measure 
technology software will also be addressed in this chapter. This section will also 
explain some of the methodological challenges involved in data / information collection 
for the case studies.
Chapter 3 will also turn to why I chose these particular methods to answer my research 
question: What are the most important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban 
developing world? -  And the sub-research questions that include: How can systematic 
models help to explain RET adoption? What are the reasons that SWHs and biogas to 
produce electricity technologies are being used or not in Mexico City and Sao Paulo?, 
and under what conditions, if any, do trade and competitiveness policies impact RET 
adoption? The second section of Chapter 3 will turn to the tools used to assist in the 
analysis of the results from the data and information collection, including why I chose 
Atlas ti, a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) program 
to assist in determining findings.
Chapters 4 and 5, regarding Findings in Mexico City, Mexico and Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
will each be divided into four sections. The first two sections will focus on the results 
of the outcomes -  namely technology adoption, measuring hardware and software. 
There will be one section on Solar Water Heaters and another on biogas to produce 
electricity. The second half of the chapter will turn to the results of the most important 
factors potentially affecting RET adoption as identified by the key informants, using
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Atlas ti to help determine common themes and trends. They will be sub-divided by the 
two technologies examined, SWHs and biogas to produce electricity.
From there, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 analyze the findings of the two case studies, using the 
three approaches identified earlier at the meso-level, assessing their strengths and 
limitations -  Rogers’ diffusion of innovations model, urban technology cooperation, 
and trade and competitiveness approaches.
Chapter 9 will bring all of these insights together, providing the discussion of the thesis 
by answering the sub-research questions -  How can systemic approaches help to 
explain RET adoption in the urban developing world? Why are SWHs and biogas to 
produce electricity technologies being used or not in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, and to 
what extent do trade and competitiveness regimes play a role on RET adoption? By 
answering these questions using evidence from urban Latin America, this dissertation 
seeks to
1) test three systemic approaches;
2) apply a new methodological approach in the area of RETs and developing 
country cities by focusing research at the meso-level;
3) provide more empirical evidence on the areas of trade and competitiveness 
policies and the adoption and cooperation of low carbon energy technologies; 
and
4) develop and test my own approach (urban technology cooperation)
Chapter 9 also concludes the thesis, bringing the discussion back to answering the 
overarching research question -  What are the most important factors affecting RET 
adoption in the urban developing world?
1.8. Conclusion
To summarize, although there is a general consensus that renewable energy 
technologies should be a part of developing countries’ energy portfolio, they remain on 
the margins. On the other hand, this sector is growing globally, including in the 
developing world.
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Conventional approaches aimed at increasing renewable energy technologies (RETs) in 
developing countries, stressing barriers and ways to overcome them, are useful in that 
they emphasize economic, technical and institutional aspects regarding RET use.
However, as indicated above, there are a number of problems with the above 
conventional frameworks. First of all, similar to other scholars critical of conventional 
RET approaches applied in developing countries (e.g. Chemi et al. 2007), I argue they 
tend to place too much emphasis on economic, technical, and institutional aspects, 
which, while paramount, neglect other aspects, including sociocultural dynamics, 
which can be just as important to potential users. In other words, ‘cut and dry’ business 
principles are often applied to explain renewable energy technology adoption, tracing it 
to “customer satisfaction, affordability, dealer profitability, and effective supply and 
service chains” (Martinot 2002: 42). These aspects are important but one must also 
look at “...the attitudes, values, beliefs and needs of potential users; for any innovation 
that goes against an entrenched custom in a community is unlikely to be adopted” 
(Troncoso et al. 2007: 5). These approaches often fail to adequately account for 
context.
Secondly, the ‘remedies’ offered are often short-term, reactive solutions. Because of 
this, these approaches do not account for the role that other, seemingly unrelated, 
indirect policies can have on RET adoption. These barriers are often interdependent 
and their existence can be traced back to policies formulated at the macro-level. Thus, 
addressing one, several, or all of the barriers does not necessarily equate to an increase 
in technology adoption. In other words, these models do not focus enough on 
integration.
Third, current approaches to knowledge tend to take a literal approach, viewing it as 
information, but knowledge is more than just information, it is also dependent on their 
people’s previous understandings, experiences and environment.
Moreover, of those conventional approaches that focus on relationships, emphasis is 
placed on the dynamics between stakeholder groups (e.g. government agencies versus 
firms versus community groups) rather than within stakeholder groups. Also, more 
information is needed on the nature of these relationships. Finally, these models tend to
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be applied at the micro or macro-level; the meso-level which can offer some unique 
insights is neglected. Systemic approaches are an alternative tool as they try to 
include social and economic factors at various scales to explain RET adoption, but to 
date there is little evidence supporting their application. Chapter 2 assesses their 
appropriateness to explain RET adoption in the urban developing world.
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CHAPTER 2: FRAMEWORKS OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION, 
COOPERATION AND TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS REGIMES
2.1. Introduction
The focus on Chapter 2 is on debates surrounding the key themes of the thesis -  namely 
those frameworks used to explain technology adoption, technology transfer and trade 
and competitiveness policies. The first purpose of the chapter is to assess the 
applicability of some alternative approaches, systemic frameworks -  in particular 
Rogers’ diffusions of innovations, urban technology cooperation, and trade and 
competitiveness regimes -  to help explain RET adoption in the urban developing 
world.
Conventional frameworks do a good job at highlighting economic and technical factors 
affecting the uptake of RETs in developing countries. However, the problem with 
these approaches is that they are based on short-term objectives, emphasizing economic 
and technical issues, and generally rely on experience from rural applications. 
Moreover, they tend to treat information and knowledge the same. They also do not 
scrutinize enough the nature of relationships between and within stakeholder groups 
and neglect the potential role that intermediaries can have on uptake. They are also 
often applied at the macro or micro-levels; the meso-level is neglected.
Systemic approaches have been proposed as an alternative lens to examine RET 
adoption as they account for larger social and policy considerations as well as 
economic and technical concerns.
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations (2003a) model was considered a useful approach 
because it recognizes that knowledge is shaped by underlying conditions and that it 
consists of principles knowledge, or knowledge on why a technology works rather than 
just what technology is or how it works. Social aspects, as opposed to mainly 
economic and technical issues also feature prominently. The model also considers 
technologies over time and the importance of change agents, or those people who 
influence others to use or not use as technology.
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On the other hand however one could also say that the model does not take the 
dynamics between and within stakeholder groups into account enough. Also, it is not 
clear from the framework how certain aspects within the system or external but with 
links to the system (in this case the city) play a role on adoption. To clarify, as is 
shown from the study results, some of the change agents, technologies and drivers were 
more foreign in Mexico City, whereas in Sao Paulo, they were more domestic. How, if 
at all, these origins play a role on adoption was explained using urban technology 
cooperation and trade and competitiveness approaches rather than Rogers’ model.
The second framework considered is urban technology cooperation. This alternative 
concept is in contrast to orthodox technology transfer models which are often linear, 
stress the one-way nature of flows and do not account enough for the dynamics 
between and within stakeholder groups, as well as non-experts. Urban technology 
cooperation focuses on the unique features of cities, emphasizes the role of 
technological capacity building in impacting use and is applied at the meso-level.
Some criticisms of this model include the fact that the meso-level is difficult to define 
as a ‘space’, that use of the term technology cooperation may downplay the power 
dynamics between participants, that it is too city-centric, and thus not useful elsewhere, 
and that models attempting to engage the public may be favoured in theory, but in 
practice have been plagued by difficulties.
The third type of systemic approach considered is trade and competitiveness policies. 
Although research on this area is recent, the general consensus is that trade 
liberalization can lead to more RET use in developing countries. However, the 
problem with this claim is that it is based on studies at the macro-level. A more 
appropriate question is under what conditions, if at all, do trade and competitiveness 
policies affect the use of RETs in developing country cities.
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2.2. Alternative Technology Adoption Approaches -  Systemic 
Frameworks
2.2.1. Rationale and Criteria for the Three Systemic Approaches
There are a number of perspectives through which to answer the research question: 
what are the most important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing 
world? I chose to concentrate research efforts on systemic approaches for a number of 
reasons. First of all, centring attention at the meso-level led the focus of research to be 
on stakeholders and networks versus individuals or macro-level institutions. Systemic 
approaches, which have been applied at the meso-level, and which attempt to include 
social and economic facets at various scales were felt to be an appropriate lens through 
which to assess how RET uptake occurs on a city-wide scale. Secondly, through 
answering the research question, the dissertation deemed it crucial to understand how 
choices and decisions can impact adoption through assessing the motivations, 
experiences and contexts of agents. Systemic approaches, examining networks, 
relationships and interactions, were deemed suitable to undertake this task.
The criteria and rationale to determine which specific systemic models to employ in the 
dissertation analysis were also decided upon. Criteria included whether or not the 
approach captured prominent factors that key informants identified as being pivotal in 
RET adoption in these developing country cities; whether or not the approach 
attempted to capture alternative factors, beyond the classical explanations for RET 
adoption, and whether or not the approach would be appropriate if applied at the meso- 
level: in other words, would it be able to capture the potential affects of choice and 
decision making by stakeholders versus individuals, or macro-level institutions.
Specifically, as noted above, I examined the case studies of Mexico City and Sao Paulo 
and the use of Solar Water Heaters and biogas technologies to generate electricity using 
Rogers’ diffusion of innovations model, a new concept termed urban technology 
cooperation and trade and competitiveness policies.
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It is important to note that these models represent only a few lenses through which to 
explain these changes. Other approaches stress the role of energy transitions (e.g. 
Geels 2004, Frantzeskaki and de Haan 2008; Berkhout et al. 2004), examining political 
institutions (Noble 1998) on ruling parties and industrial policy), or gender and 
renewables (Clancy et al. 2004). The potential contribution of these alternate 
approaches include:
• energy transitions -  serves as a way in which to understand changes occurring at a 
societal level. This approach focuses on niches (changes happening within or outside 
of the system such as the use of RETs, car sharing, organic farming) and regimes (the 
dominant aspects of societies such as conventional energy sources, individual or one- 
family car ownership, etc.). Scholars avow that a transition has occurred “when the 
societal system functions in a different way...the composition of the societal system 
had to change fundamentally...changing its structures, cultures and practices” 
Frantzeskaki and de Haan 2008: 4);
• political institutions and ruling parties (Noble 1998) -  through this approach, the 
tactics of governing parties, to create incentives to support industrial policies and to 
actively seek out coalitions and alliances with other parties maintain these policies, 
are assessed; and
• gender and renewables (Clancy et al. 2004) - provides an avenue to assess the 
impact that energy use has on women versus men (e.g. women in rural environments 
in developing countries are generally responsible for providing fuel within the 
household thus while reduction of energy subsidies for fossil fuels is often cited as 
being necessary to promote energy efficiency and environmental protection, these 
more expensive energy prices will have negative implications for poorer households)
The main rationale for choosing the three approaches was based on the criteria 
developed partially on what I was seeking to research before conducting fieldwork, and 
also based on results obtained from the fieldwork. For instance, before conducting 
interviews I knew that previous research in this area using conventional approaches 
indicated a number of crucial factors to consider. At the same time, I was interested in 
exploring the notion that more indirect policies and technology cooperation may play 
more of a role of technology adoption than conventional approaches would indicate. 
For those reasons, Rogers’ diffusion of innovations model was chosen at it focuses on
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classical explanations for RET use (including economic and technical features) but also 
attempts to capture social aspects. The concept of urban technology cooperation was 
chosen as the technology cooperation process is an integral part of adoption, especially 
in developing countries when the origins of technologies are often (at least partially) -  
but not always -  from abroad. The idea of ‘urban’ was a way in which to capture 
unique features of cities, which could also have an impact on RET use. Moreover, I 
thought that trade and competitiveness approaches -  intrinsically linked to technology 
development, production and use but often neglected in RET studies -  warranted a 
closer examination.
Ultimately however, results from discussions with key informants in the case studies 
reinforced the use of systemic approaches. For instance, as explored in further detail in 
Sections 4.7, 4.8, 5.7 and 5.8 trade and competitiveness policies and networks (or a 
lack of) featured prominently in responses as factors affecting RET use.
As another example, the issue of how the use of RETs affect women in particular did 
not really come up in discussions with key informants. That said, if a different study 
had been undertaken, such as a household-level survey comparing a wealthier and 
poorer neighbourhood in one of these cities, the issue of RETs and their impact on 
females in particular would likely have been a prominent theme. In addition, although 
the use of SWHs and biogas technologies has slowly been increasing, in both of these 
cities, at present their use remains on the periphery, although this may change, causing 
a large-scale shift at a societal level, making the transitions approach more relevant. 
Moreover, for the majority of the time period under scrutiny (mainly 2000 -  2007), at 
the relevant political levels in Mexico City (federal and local), the same political 
leaders were in power (2000-2006).25 Basically, Mexico had a more conservative, 
right-leaning party at the federal level, and a more socialist, left-leaning party
25 In 2000 the federal government of Vincente Fox of the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) or National 
Action Party (considered right-leaning), came to power, thus ending the 71 year rule of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) or Institutional Revolutionary Party. Mexico City, or the Distrito 
Federal (D.F.), does not have a state-level government as it is under different jurisdiction that the State of 
Mexico (the area surrounding Mexico City). In the 2006 federal elections of Mexico, Felipe Calderon, 
also of the PAN won (although very narrowly with a less than one percent lead). At the municipal level, 
in 2000, Andres Manuel Ldpez Obrador of the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) or Party of 
the Democratic Revolution (left-leaning party) was elected as the Head of Government at the municipal 
level in Mexico City (he resigned in 2005 to run in the federal election). Marcelo Ebrard, also of the 
PRD, was elected mayor of Mexico City in July 2006 (Informal discussions, various informants, 
November 2005-January 2006)
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controlling Mexico City. In Sao Paulo, there was relative stability at the federal and 
state level (left leaning party from 2002-2009 and centrist party at the state level).26 At 
the local level, there were shifts from right to left governing parties during the time of 
scrutiny27, but as indicated in Chapter 5, at the time of writing (2009), the main policies 
supporting SWHs and biogas technologies were still being implemented.
2.2.2. Contextualizing Technology / Socially-Embedded Frameworks
Contrasting the above techno-economic / policy approaches, are those that suggest the 
above models do not assess technology adequately. Based in science and technology 
studies, in contrast to those purporting orthodox technology adoption and transfer 
frameworks, these scholars emphasize context and define technology quite broadly. 
For instance Ursula Franklin who considers technology to be both practices and a 
system that "involves organization, procedures, symbols, new words, and most of all, a 
mindset" (Franklin 1990: 12). Scholars of this view argue that technology is implied to 
be positive or neutral, and treated separately from the social context in the above 
models. They claim instead that technology is the result of power relations, politics 
and hegemons, and vice versa. These hegemons determine why certain sets of 
technologies are the only ones deemed scientific (e.g. Western technologies versus non- 
Westem technologies) (Stewart 1977; Jasanoff et al. 1995; Shove 1998; Miller 2001). I 
view technology as products, processes and knowledge and recognize that technology 
has a symbiotic relationship with the social context -  in other words, they are dynamic 
and influence each other.
2.2.3. Actor-Oriented Approaches
Ultimately, agents are core to the technology adoption and (as discussed further below) 
the cooperation process. Ideas, knowledge, management practices, equipment, etc. can
26 In 2002, Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva, of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Workers Party, (left- 
leaning party) was elected president. He was re-elected president in 2006. At the state
27 Celso Pitta of the Partido Progressista do Brasil (PPB) or Brazilian Progressive Party (now called the 
Progressive Party (PP)) (right-leaning party) was mayor from 1997-2000 (excluding a period of a few 
weeks in May /  June where he was ousted by a decision from the State of Sao Paulo supreme court, and 
then reinstated when that decision was reversed), then Marta Suplicy of the PT was mayor from 2001- 
2004. Jose Serra, o f the PSDB, became mayor in 2005 until March 31, 2006, but then his deputy 
Gilberto Kassab, from the right-wing Democratas, or Democrats, political party, took over as mayor 
when Serra decided to run for the governorship of the State of Sao Paulo (Prefeitura de Sao Paulo, 2007).
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be exchanged, but not effectively if some participants do not understand the 
technology. More recent approaches to technology also stress the importance of agents 
-  active within the context they operate in; thus influencing their decisions (Shove 
1998; Biswas et al. 2001; Barton 2007).
Norman Long (1990), criticizing modernization and neo-Marxist approaches for being 
too reliant on external factors to explain social change, argued that the conduct of 
various actors diversified "even where structural conditions and types of external 
impulses are relatively constant." (Long 1990 cited in Schuurman 1993: 18). The 
ability to effect change by individuals and groups on a smaller scale are thought to be 
better explained with this analysis, as actors are the centre of focus in this approach.
Actor-oriented approaches are often linked to Actor Network Theory (ANT) but there 
are important differences. ANT uses the term actant, which is an element in a system -  
whether physical equipment, text, people or organizations (Latour 1987).
I take a more narrow approach, in that I view actors, or agents, as being individuals, 
organizations, and groups that can influence the technology cooperation process. In 
other words, there must be some human aspect involved in these groups. Examples 
relevant for this dissertation include NGOs, various levels of government, trade 
associations, consultants, end users, etc.
However, defining actors is difficult because the notion is an arbitrary one, used as a 
tool by researchers to delineate how different groups and / or individuals affect social 
change. Also, in the real world, people and groups can be considered various agents or 
actors simultaneously. For instance, in Mexico City, one consultant I spoke with had 
recently left the Mexican federal government at the time of our interview after having 
worked there for many years. He also had purchased a solar water heater for his home. 
So, he could be considered a representative of a consultancy, a recent government 
representative and an end user all at the same time.
Actor-oriented approaches were considered relevant to assess technology cooperation 
and adoption as number of studies examining technologies in developing countries 
have linked sustainable technology cooperation to strong networks between various
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actors involved in these technologies over time (Bunders et al. 1999; Douthwaite 2002; 
Briggs and Matsaert 2004).
Research on technology diffusion and adoption can focus on the attributes of agents, 
communities or organizations, or the technologies themselves. For example, as noted 
earlier, Chemi et al. (2007) examine the attributes of communities using a multi-criteria 
approach. They suggest that they have a number of assets or resources - social, natural, 
physical, human and financial. This approach draws from sustainable livelihoods, 
which is an agent-centric framework, where actors that will potentially use the RETs 
are active participants in decision-making process. It is a model that quantifies both 
qualitative and quantitative attributes -  termed capital (human, physical, financial, 
natural and social) in a community, assigning a 1.0 to capital that is considered ideal, 
and comparing this with what really could be achieved by implementing a new 
technology. This model was applied at the micro-level and assumes that “[g]iven that 
the needs were very similar in every household surveyed, it made sense to provide a 
common energy solution to the community” (Chemi et al. 2007: 1497).
These alternative approaches emphasize socio-culture factors as well as economic and 
technical facets. I view culture as a dynamic process, which changes over time and 
space. (Skelton 1997) suggests that it is “socially constructed and so an individual's 
experience and creation of culture is determined by such social factors as gender, race, 
class, sexuality, age, geography. ..[and] history and contemporary social, economic and 
political factors” (1997: 73). Culture is a form of social organization, a way of life, 
which affects a person's viewing of the world.
Although not exhaustive, Table 2.1, provides a list of some major theoretical 
frameworks used to explain renewable energy or other environmental technology 
adoption in industrialized and developing countries.
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T a b le  2.1 Selected  Exam ples of A pproaches to  Explain th e  A doption / D iffusion of 
R enew able Energy T echno log ies28______________________ _______________ _________
Type Main Disciplinary 
direction
Description Some Authors 
/  Organizations
Proposed 
Evidence and / or 
scale of scrutiny
Economic Economics push and pull factors 
(technology suppliers 
and R&D)
focus is on rate of 
adoption and why som e 
firms adopt more than 
others
Blackman 1999, 
2002
Level of firm, 
sector and country
Developing
countries
Barriers- 
Oriented / 
Policy focus
Economics and 
public policy
Economic, technical, 
political, social, 
institutional
Wilkins 2002
UNFCCC 1992 / 
Kyoto Protocol 
1997
Renewables
2004
REToolkit 2005
Developing 
countries -  
Southeast Asia
Global / developing 
countries
Europe / global
Developing
countries
Actor-oriented
approaches:
Behavioural
Models:
Asset or
Resource
Models
Communications, 
sociology, political 
science
Integrated ‘socio- 
technical potential’
Cherni 2007  
Shove 1998
Latin America 
Australia
Contextualizing
Technology
and
socially
embedded
approaches
Science and 
technology studies
Neo-Luddites / 
Technology critics
Technology as a social 
construct
Science (technology) -  
who defines?
Technology as a mindset 
/ practice
Mills 1998 
Jasanoff 1995 
Miller 2001 
Franklin 1990
Industrialized and
Developing
countries
Source: Author
2.2.4 Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations
Another actor-oriented approach is from Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations (2003a). 
This approach was chosen as a way to help explain RET adoption for various reasons. 
First of all, it is a systemic model, recognizing the dynamics of technology and its 
social context. Also, in addition to accounting for economic and technical aspects, 
Rogers takes sociocultural factors into consideration. Moreover, Rogers’ model
28 Please note that this table provides a general idea of the main thrust o f these approaches, some of 
which overlap
61
recognizes the potential impact that people, or what he terms ‘change agents’, may 
have on the uptake of technologies. Rogers model will be broken down further below, 
using evidence from other RET studies, especially those in developing countries, to 
determine how well it can explain RET adoption in urban Latin America.
Rogers can be applied looking at the attributes of agents and / or technologies. When 
referring to the attributes of agents, he names them innovators, early adopters, late 
adopters, and laggards. I chose instead to apply aspects of Rogers’ actor-oriented 
approach that examines the attributes of a technology rather than attributes of the 
individuals or organizations that are potential or actual adopters (Rogers 2003a). 
Although determining attributes of technology and actors can be very subjective, there 
is often less controversy with certain aspects of a technology (e.g. the price of 
equipment or services -  even if debates continue about whether or not all costs that 
need to be have been captured in the price) rather than an agent. Rogers also 
recognizes the limitations in these catergorizations of agents, noting that he had defined 
a farmer in Iowa as a ‘laggard’ who did not adopt the new hybrid variety of com 
(reliant on pesticides for its survival) because there were no more songbirds. Rogers 
further concedes that he reframed this farmer years later as an early adopter, when 
referring to the organic food movement in the United States (Rogers 2003a).
Rogers essentially views technology adoption as “a process of stages that occurs over 
time” (2003a: 197). It is a decision-making scheme; a process that a potential user 
must go through in order to make the decision whether or not to use a technology. His 
model consists of stages: knowledge, persuasion, implementation and confirmation. In 
his model, an actor (e.g. individual, organization), once aware of a technology makes a 
decision on whether or not to use the technology -- what he labels as the “persuasion 
stage” — based upon several attributes. The first factor is whether or not the technology 
is perceived to have relative advantages (e.g. economic, social). The second concept is 
what Rogers terms ‘complexity’ -  or how well potential users understand how the 
technology works and the principles behind it. The third factor that affects the 
persuasion stage is triability, or whether or not a potential user can “try out” a 
technology before fully committing to it. The actor then implements the decision 
(whether or not to use the innovation), and finally confirms this decision (either to 
continue using (or not use) the technology, or to change their mind). These stages all
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occur within a “ social system” (i.e. the context in which the decision takes place) and 
are informed by “prior conditions” (Peter 2002; Rogers 2003a).
Knowledge -  Like those RET studies (e.g. Wilkins 2002, Muntasser et al. 2000) that 
examine knowledge barriers, Rogers also pays attention to knowledge. As noted in 
Chapter 1, what distinguishes Rogers from these other frameworks is that the model 
recognizes the importance that underlying conditions may have on RET uptake. Actors 
can be passive- in that they happen to come across a technology -  or more active -  in 
that they are aggressively seeking out ways to address a need. Furthermore, his 
definition of knowledge considers not only awareness of the technology (defined as 
knowing it exists) and how it works, but also what can be considered principles 
knowledge, or what Lall (1995) refers to as ‘know why’ knowledge -  where people 
understand why the technology works. This is important because adapting RETs to 
local environments -  in addition to increasing uptake -- can also lead to indigenous 
technological developments, which can increase self-reliance and even lead to 
exporting this technology (physical equipment and expertise) abroad (Kalogirou 2004; 
Ockwell et al. 2007; Mallett et al. 2009). Chemi et al. (2007) also stress the 
importance of knowledge by recognizing in their model that communities need to 
understand the potential implications involved in using a renewable energy technology.
That said, Rogers is not exactly clear on how he defines knowledge. Knowledge and 
information mean different things to different people. As noted in Chapter 1, 
knowledge is more than just information; it can also include norms and assumptions. 
Actors process information differently based on their experiences, understanding and 
unique attributes.
Persuasion - The majority of RET studies in developing countries focus on what 
Rogers terms the persuasion stage. The first aspects within this stage are relative 
advantages. Many RET studies emphasize a number of these advantages, applied at the 
micro or macro levels, arguing for their adoption in developing countries (e.g. United 
Nations Environment Programme / Division of Technology 2000; Renewables 2004).
Like those studies noted in Chapter 1 that emphasis economic barriers, Rogers also 
notes that RETs must be seen as relatively economically advantageous for their
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adoption to occur. A number of scholars and practitioners argue that poverty reduction 
can occur with RET use. For example, studies demonstrate that poorer people 
(especially women) are often burdened with the task of finding conventional energy 
sources, such as fiielwood (which can take up to several hours per day), and so they are 
left with little or no available time; they argue that RET adoption -  through freeing up 
time ~  can help to improve the socio-economic situation of poorer people (Biswas et al. 
2001). Along these lines, studies show that RETs can lead to job and income- 
generation (Kaufman et al. 1999) and, looking at a more macro-level, provide more 
employment per unit of electricity generation versus non-renewable energy sources 
(Moody-Stuart and Clini 2001). For instance, one study shows that “up to 188 worker- 
years are created locally for every megawatt of small solar electric systems” (United 
Nations Environment Programme / Division of Technology 2000: 7). Another study on 
the link between employment and RETs in the United States indicates that wind and 
PV energy provide 40% more jobs per dollar than coal, and that these jobs often require 
higher skills (Singh 2001). Other economic benefits, such as those at the national level, 
can also be accrued through using RETs. According to Biswas et al’s (2001) study, 
economic competitiveness at the national level in Bangladesh is compromised when 
examining the “cost” of using fossil fuels, accounting for 9% of import costs and 15% 
of export earnings in the early 1990s.
Rogers’ model also considers political advantages, which can be applied at various 
levels (micro, meso and macro). For example, a country or region can consider the use 
of more RETs as decreasing dependence on fossil fuels. As noted in Chapter 1, even 
those countries that are large fossil fuel exporters consider RETs to be advantageous as 
their use domestically, frees up more fossil fuels for export, creating more opportunities 
for foreign exchange (Massabie 2008). For example, Venezuela’s state-owned oil 
company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), is investing in a 100 MW wind 
energy facility.29 Energy security arguments could also be considered here, as 
supporters are quick to claim that the majority of the world’s fossil fuel resources that 
are technically and economically ‘easiest’ to extract are in unstable parts of the world 
(e.g. Middle East, Russia, Nigeria)30 (Edinger and Kaul 2000).
29 Renewable Energy World.com, 2008
30 Although Alberta, Canada is second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of proven oil reserves (175 billion 
barrels versus Saudi Arabia’s 224 billion barrels), this oil comes from the tar sands (or oil sands), which
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In contrast to many conventional approaches however, Rogers also talks about the 
importance of technologies being considered socially advantageous compared to 
alternatives to increase adoption. Some researchers assess health and environmental 
impacts as an economic advantage by putting a monetary value on them (e.g. through 
measuring days of work lost due to respiratory illnesses) (e.g. Edinger and Kaul 2000, 
Bourdaire and Ellis 2000). But, they can also be viewed as relative social advantages -  
with attempting to assess their impact in a monetary value. Some of the health benefits 
are highlighted in Biswas et al.’s (2001) study on the potential for biogas use in 
Bangladesh and Milton and Kaufman’s study on SWHs (2005), arguing that 
renewables decrease problems (especially for women), that are associated with fuel 
currently used for cooking and heating (e.g. wood) in rural environments such as 
respiratory illnesses from smoke inhalation, low birth weights and lung cancer (Ezzati 
and Kammen 2002). Energy expert Jose Goldemberg further stresses that other 
conventional energy sources (namely fossil fuels) are associated with health problems. 
Specifically, he notes that “...energy-related emissions from fossil fuel combustion, 
including the transportation sector, particulate matter, sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide and other pollutants are major 
contributors to urban air pollution, which is thought to be responsible for about 
hundreds of thousands deaths annually around the world.” (2006: 2186). Studies also 
focus on the environmental improvements that can occur as a result of using RETs. 
They demonstrate the links between fossil fuel use and acid rain, ozone depletion and 
global warming (Kalogirou 2004; Edinger and Kaul 2000).
Another feature in Rogers’ (2003a) persuasion stage is complexity, or how well 
potential users understand the technology (how it works and / or the principles behind 
it). Unlike some conventional approaches to technology uptake, Rogers’ model 
examines technology adoption over time. Complexity is a part of an actor’s familiarity
is a more viscous, “dirtier” oil source. The process to extract this oil source into synthetic crude is 
expensive and environmentally-damaging. This can be done through open-pit mining (70 metres or less 
below the surface) or through extracting oil “in situ” which involves generating steam from natural gas 
into deep deposits of bitumen to enable it to flow to the surface (the majority of Alberta’s tar sands are 
deeper and so this process must be used) (CAPP), C. A. o. P. P. (2006). IS Oil Sands Backgrounder. 
Calgary, CAPP.
65
and experience with the technology. The adopter becomes more comfortable and adept 
with the technology (Douthwaite 2002). Assessing these facets over time is important 
in understanding adoption. This has important implications for RET use because as 
people become more comfortable with a technology, they are more likely to adopt 
technological “cousins”, where there are mainly incremental changes between the 
previous and newer technologies versus taking on a completely new technology. A 
drawback of this however is that it may lead to “path dependency”, where entities 
become “locked-in” to a particular set of technologies that they understand, have the 
infrastructure for, etc. (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lai 2004).
The other aspect that can persuade someone to use (or not to use) a technology is 
triability, or the ability for someone to temporarily use a technology (Rogers 2003a). 
Here, a potential user has the ability to use an innovation on a trial basis -  either for a 
limited time period, or as a complement to conventional system (i.e. they do not have to 
rely solely on the RET for their energy needs).
Implementation is the next stage — when the user decides to actually use (or not) the 
technology. This can be on a trial run (as noted above), or for a longer -  if not 
permanent -  period of time.
Confirmation is the final stage. It is the decision to keep using (or not using) a 
technology, or to change the previous decision made at the implementation stage. This 
is an important aspect that a number of studies on RETs in developing countries often 
downplay. For instance, Donna Green’s study assessing the Thailand government’s 
solar battery charging programme indicated that 60 percent of them were no longer 
used over time due to several limitations including the fact that these batteries only ran 
on direct current (DC), rather than supplying the alternating current (AC) that most 
electrical appliances require, a lack of communication among stakeholders, little 
training given to villagers, among others (Green 2004).
Throughout the decision making process, change agents influence how actors make 
decision.
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In sum, the model is a systemic approach that recognizes the interactions between 
RETs and their social context. This model builds on conventional approaches through 
various ways. First of all, knowledge is recognized as being shaped by underlying 
conditions and is not the same as information. Furthermore, Rogers’ recognizes that 
understanding not only what a technology is and how it works, but why a technology 
works plays a role on adoption.
Another strength of the approach is that in addition to economic, technical and political 
aspects, social aspects are also considered. Furthermore, the model examines 
technologies over time, including a stage of confirmation, where an individual or 
organization chooses to keep using a technology or not. Finally, Rogers’ approach 
accounts for the role that change agents may have on adoption.
However, there are certain shortcomings of this model. First of all, not enough 
attention is placed on the dynamics between and within the stakeholder groups. 
Dynamics between and within stakeholder groups, occurring throughout the stages, can 
play a major role on adoption. Green (2004)’s study on solar battery chargers in rural 
Thailand showed that in this instance many technicians and trainers only spoke Thai 
rather than the local languages spoken by the ethnic minorities in the northern part of 
the country (where the majority of that government programme was implemented). 
This meant that many villagers without knowledge of Thai (e.g. women, elderly) had to 
rely on certain villagers learn about the RET. This communication problem occurred 
throughout the decision making process, which had implications for the confirmation 
stage.
Secondly, as is noted in Chapter 6, a distinction should be made between these change 
agents. For instance, in the case of biogas technologies, the main change agents were 
domestic in Brazil but foreign and domestic in Mexico.
Thirdly it is not clear using this approach how indirect policies and other influences 
with links to the system (in this case the cities and surrounding areas of Mexico City 
and Sao Paulo), but not necessarily a part of it, can affect adoption.
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To address these shortcomings, the dissertation also turned to technology transfer 
debates, an integral part of the adoption process, to better explain the uptake of RETs in 
Latin American cities. In essence, this dissertation will explain RET adoption by 
integrating adoption and innovation literature.
2.3. From Technology Transfer to Technology Cooperation
International and domestic technology transfer are essential parts of technology 
adoption, especially in developing countries. It is an important channel in which 
Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) are acquired in the developing world. This 
can be done in order to obtain technology directly, to obtain components, or to 
encourage domestic innovation through absorption and adaptation to the local 
environment.
2.3.1 Historical approaches to technology transfer
In the past, technology transfer of energy technologies in the development context 
meant the transfer of equipment from industrialized countries -  whether governments, 
aid agencies, industry, or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to the developing 
world. In the 1950s and 1960s it was often “parachuted in with little attention given to 
building domestic capabilities to operate and maintain the equipment” (Wilkins 2002: 
42). Often, this meant the transfer of modem, capital-intensive equipment and large- 
scale production process methods, requiring more capital and less labour into countries 
who were characterized by having the opposite (little capital and a lot of labour) 
available to them (Akubue 2000). Stewart (1977) also asserts that in the past many 
technologies from the industrialized world to developing countries were not appropriate 
for these contexts; suggesting that the technologies (often capital intensive) were often 
better suited to the domestic elite and / or export markets rather than the domestic 
economy (often labour intensive).
Many argued that attention must also be placed on transferring skills and not just 
physical equipment in this process. The transfer of technologies in the renewable 
energy sector also saw a shift from transferring not only products, but also skills after
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the oil crisis in the 1970s, where the need to develop the technical skills of local staff 
and to use indigenous inputs and / or end-products was recognized (Wilkins 2002).
2.3.2 Current Renditions of Technology Transfer
Characteristics of Technology Transfer
While noting some important exceptions such as Schumpeter (1911 cited in Teece
2005) and (Arrow 1962), who recognized that technology was ever-evolving and 
technological change occurred as the result of a cumulative process, historically 
“technology” was viewed as something material and / or static that could be moved to 
other countries, companies, etc.
Proponents of technology transfer argue that the definition of technology had changed. 
They recognize technology to be processes (e.g. organizational and management 
practices, production processes), knowledge (tacit and codified) and products (e.g. 
physical equipment, artefact), also termed “software” and “hardware” (Lall 1995; IPCC 
1996; Maskus 2003; Teece 2005).
For instance, Practical Action, a NGO, based out of the United Kingdom, formerly 
called the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), considers technology 
to be “physical infrastructure, machinery and equipment, knowledge and skills and the 
capacity to organise and use all of these” (Practical Action 2006).
However, a number of people continue to view the concept in economic terms. For 
instance, (Schnepp et al. 1990), focusing on expertise and knowledge rather than 
physical equipment, stress that technology transfer occurs when it is passed from one 
person to another for economic gain. As I have argued in Chapter 1, although 
economic considerations are important, other aspects such as socio-cultural are just as 
relevant consideration.
Technology transfer in developing countries is characterized by a number of features. 
It can be integrated, where the originating body (e.g. Multinational Corporation 
(MNC), large domestic firm, academic institution) maintains the ownership of the 
technology. Or, it can be less integrated, where the actor in the local context can own
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and / or manufacture the technology. Some also call this vertical (relocation of 
technology through licenses or subsidiaries) or horizontal (less integrated) (Forsyth
1999). Others (e.g. Ockwell et al. 2007) consider vertical technology transfer to be 
technology moving from the lab to commercialisation, while horizontal technology 
transfer is technology from one geographic location to another. Technology transfer 
can also be short term, or longer term. Moreover, technology transfer can be internal, 
where one firm shares technology to a subsidiary company or through a Joint Venture 
(JV), or external, where one entity sells the technology and / or issues a license for 
others to use the technology. It can be formal (e.g. agreements, Memorandums of 
Understanding) or informal (e.g. personnel movement, publications, conferences, 
network discussions) (Pietrobelli 2000), or contain a mixture of both. It can be in the 
public or private domains (UNFCCC 1992). Finally, it can be through commercial 
(e.g. FDI, joint ventures) or non-commercial (e.g. scientific exchanges, foreign aid) 
mechanisms (Able-Thomas 1996). These differing features are considered to be 
pathways or channels (IPCC 2000).
2.3.3. Conventional Technology Transfer Models
A dominant model of technology transfer is the linear one. This is a model that occurs 
in stages, beginning with research and development, demonstration and deployment, 
and finally market penetration -  sometimes termed vertical technology transfer (Bush 
1945). This feature is common to a number of approaches used in the context of low 
carbon energy technologies. For instance the feedback model is another version of 
technology transfer noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
This model also occurs in stages: assessment, agreement, implementation, evaluation 
and adjustment, replication, which then feeds back into the assessment stage. Analysis 
of the interests and influences on various stakeholders occur at each stage in order to 
determine success (IPCC 2000). While not looking exclusively at renewables (e.g. case 
studies include in addition to wind energy a rice harvester technology used in 
Myanmar), Douthwaite (2002) also recognizes that as more use a technology, they will 
feedback into the technology development, production and use process through their 
experiences.
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Many low carbon technology transfer scholars and practitioners advocate barriers- 
oriented / policy-focused models, similar to those used in addressing technology 
adoption. Wilkins (2002) also compartmentalizes barriers into economic, technical, 
institutional, political aspects.
Some conventional low carbon energy technology transfer models operate at a systemic 
level in an attempt to account for influences at the micro and macro levels. For 
instance, the IPCC uses a “technology / innovation system” framework of analysis in 
their technology transfer study, where governments, research institutes and the private 
firms work with financial institutes, NGOs and International Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) in the flow of knowledge, products, processes and practices 
((IPCC) 2000). This focus on system has occurred as scholars have argued “it is the 
overall system and the quality of interconnections within it which effect success 
technology transfer” (Bessant and Rush 1995: 101).
2.3.4. Alternative Technology Cooperation Frameworks
These frameworks provide important insights into the transfer and adoption of 
renewable energy technologies as current renditions often take a longer-term approach 
to assess these processes. However, there are several shortcomings with these 
approaches.
First of all, the technology cooperation process is a more interactive approach, rather 
than isolated from stage, to stage, to stage -  consisting of networks, communication 
and relationships (Walter 2000). While a few conventional models recognize this 
non-linear process (e.g. IPCC 2000), most do not. It is important to examine all of the 
relationships of the organizations or individuals involved in technology cooperation 
(Harmon and al. 1997 citing Auster 1990: 425). This notion also has elements from 
the triple helix model in innovation studies where industry, the academic sector and 
governments at various levels (nation, region / state, and local) collaborate to develop 
and produce innovations. The argument is that those projects with more sources of 
leadership and support will be more than likely to succeed (Etzkowitz and Mello 
2004).
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Secondly, most conventional technology models often neglect to incorporate the views 
of the non-expert as well as other stakeholders. For instance, the IPCC recognizes that 
private sector firms are the main buyers of technology, but that state-run enterprises, 
individual entrepreneurs, and governmental agencies can also be purchasers (IPCC
2000). However, other actors can also be technology purchasers, including 
communities, private or state-run organizations -  not enterprises per se (e.g. hospitals, 
sports groups), local community groups, or non-expert individuals. Also, the 
framework highlights NGOs and international government organizations (IGOs) as 
intermediaries but what about community groups, trade associations and other actors?
Third, these models do not adequately reflect needs at the local level, or the differences 
that can occur within groups or among individuals (Forsyth 2005) -  they are often 
lumped together as the interests and influences on a “stakeholder”. Kremic (2003) 
examining the technology transfer process that occurs in government agencies versus 
the private sector also argues that individuals can play an important role in ensuring its 
success.
Finally, there are a number of weaknesses similar to conventional technology adoption 
models. For instance, they often treat knowledge and information similarly, they tend 
to neglect sociocultural dynamics, they do not capture the potential affects that indirect 
policies may have on technology transfer and adoption, and they tend to rely on 
evidence from the macro level or micro levels (often in rural versus urban settings).
Influenced by the work of Martin Bell (1990), Ockwell et al. (2007) also identify a 
series of transfer barriers in the context of low carbon energy technology transfer. Bell 
(1990) stated that technology transfer can be viewed as a series of flows -  Flow A 
consisted of goods and equipment, Flow B were skills and know-how regarding how to 
operate, maintain and fix these technologies, and Flow C was the knowledge and 
expertise needed to make some technological developments, or what Lall refers to as 
“know-why” skills, when agents understand the principles behind the technology (Lall 
1995).
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Figure 2.1. The technological co n ten t of in ternational techno logy  tran sfe r 
Technology Suppliers Technology Technology
Transferred Importers
Supplier Firms’ Capital Goods Creation Of New
Engineering, Flow A Engineering Services Production
Managerial And Other Managerial Services 
Product Designs
Capacity
Technological
Capacities
Flow B
x .
Skills and Know-How 
for Operation and
— -> Maintenance —4
Knowledge, Expertise Accumulation Of
FlowC and Experience for Technological
— > Generating and 
Managing Technical 
Change
■v-, _  .  .  ,__________, _ _  _  i.ai
Capacity
Source: Adapted from Ockwell et al. 2007 , p. 11 b ased  on Bell
Bell’s argument was that in many technology transfer processes, Flow C transfers were 
downplayed, which were critical to developing technological capacity (TC) or 
capability, or “those aspects, both embodied and non-embodied (e.g. human resources, 
infrastructure, technical and scientific skills) that cause technological change” at the 
level of the firm, country, region, etc. (Rogers 2003b: 9).
But even these models, as well as those noted above, stress the one-way nature of 
flows. A few exceptions exist. For instance, looking at technology transfer more 
generally, Mansfield in his 1984 study with Romeo noted that new technology flows 
were occurring to the US from US subsidiaries abroad, a process they term “reverse 
technology transfer” (Diamond 2003: 1611).
Table 2.2 provides an overview of some of the major technology transfer and 
innovation models.
31 Bell, M. 1990. Continuing Industrialisation, Climate Change and International Technology Transfer. 
SPRU, University of Sussex
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Table 2.2 S elected  E xam ples of Innovation /  Technology T ransfer M odels
Type Main
Disciplinary
Direction
Description Some Authors Proposed 
Evidence and / or 
Scale of Scrutiny
Technology 
T ransfer / 
Innovation 
Linear Models
Economics / 
Policy
Development, production, 
deployment, use
Donor / recipient 
Active / passive
Bush 1945 U.S.
Developing 
countries 1950s/ 
60s
Technology 
Learning / 
Change
Economics Technology as dynamic Schumpeter
1911
Arrow 1962
Technological 
Capacity / 
Essential 
Knowledge 
Flows
Economics / 
Policy
Products and processes, 
knowledge
Flows A, B and C
Lall 1995 
Bell 1990
Developing
countries
Developing
countries
Innovation -
feedback
loops
Economics,
Policy,
Innovation
More circular process, 
feedback loops
Douthwaite
2002
IPCC 2000
Developing
countries
Triple Helix/
Quadruple
Helix
University, public sector and 
private sector (+ public and 
intermediaries)
Different partners with 
different skills, experiences 
and perspectives 
Increased understanding
Nichols 2003
Lall 2005
Juma and Yee- 
Cheong 2005
Bunders et al. 
1999
Developing
countries
Global
Bangladesh
Technology 
Transfer-  
other facets 
(e.g.
communicatio
n)
Technology
Studies
Importance of communication 
in collaboration -  builds trust, 
helps create perception of 
‘ownership’
Walter 2000 Argentina
Technology 
transfer -  non­
linear
Science and 
technology 
studies, 
innovation
Networks
Tech transfer / Innovation 
system
Process between participants 
Intermediaries
Auster 1990
IPCC 2000
Wilkins 2002
Bessant and 
Rush 1993
Industrialized and 
Developing 
countries 
Southeast Asia
UK
Technology
cooperation
Policy Two or more way process
Inputs and insights by all 
players -  active players
Heaton et al. 
1994
Martinot et al. 
1997
Souce: Author
2.3.5 Urban Technology Cooperation
By addressing these shortcomings, urban technology cooperation is proposed as an 
alternative framework to help explain RET adoption in the developing world. The 
concept developed through a combination of deductive and inductive research. Initial
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formulation of the approach stemmed for pre-field research and was refined after 
collecting and assessing findings found using evidence in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. 
Urban technology cooperation differs from transfer in several aspects, which will be 
explained in further detail below:
• Sustainable technology cooperation includes technological capacity building
• It is an iterative two- or more-way process where all participants are active 
players, inputting into the technology cooperation process;
• cohesive and continuous communication between technology cooperation
participants -  developers, producers, distributors, intermediaries, and ideally,
end users;
• It operates at the meso-level -  focusing on links existing between networks 
across levels -  from the global to the local, better capturing the potential affects 
of policies and events at the macro-level that may affect the urban experience;
• It attempts to recognize the heterogeneity of stakeholders; and
• It focuses on the importance of cities
The first characteristic of urban technology cooperation is the notion that it can only be 
sustainable if it “takes place as part of a wider process of technological capacity 
building” (Ockwell et al. 2007: 8). In other words, technology cooperation must 
include opportunities for learning among players - adoption is linked to innovation 
(Douthwaite 2002). But opportunities for learning are not in and of themselves enough 
to ensure successful cooperation, players must also be able to assimilate and make use 
of this new knowledge, termed absorptive capacity (van den Bosch et al. 2003).
However, in Bell’s International Technology Transfer model, the flows are often 
represented as one-way. In contrast, urban technology cooperation is a two- or more- 
way process which is the second feature of the concept. Use of the term cooperation 
implies that all stakeholders -  each possessing unique skills and expertise to exchange 
with others — are active participants in the process (Heaton et al. 1994). Akin to those 
researchers working on other or similar environmental issues (e.g. Glasbergen (ed.) 
1998; Forsyth 1999; Mason 1999), it draws from cooperative environmental 
governance and global environmental democracy, where stakeholders, bringing various 
expertise and local knowledge to discussions, shaping environmental preferences
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through open communication. The view is that these deliberations “are more likely to 
lead to durable commitments to environmental sustainability insofar as decisions 
significantly affecting community interests are ‘owned’ by those involved” (Mason 
1999: 212). Urban technology cooperation is an iterative approach, emphasizing 
communication, interactions and relationships between various participants (Walter 
2000; Harmon et al. 1997), rather than a linear approach. It can be viewed as a series 
of networks.
Urban technology cooperation emphasizes the importance of cohesive and continuous 
communication between actors to ensure these players have a voice and so more 
players -  to a certain extent -  can lead to increased collaboration and thus RET 
adoption. This concept examines the nature of relationships between and within 
stakeholder groups further to determine how, if at all, they impact adoption. In contrast 
to this view, some scholars purport that technology adoption is less likely with more 
players involved in the technology cooperation process. Pietrobelli (2000) suggests 
that with more actors ‘under the tent’, there is less chance of coordination. In this view, 
the plethora of partnerships leads to increased transaction costs, conflicting agendas, 
etc. and so a single or dominant partner is more conducive to increasing uptake of 
technologies (Pietrobelli 2000).
In addition, similar to others working on technology, urban technology cooperation 
recognizes that the process can be facilitated or hindered through the actions of 
intermediaries (Wilkins 2002; UNFCCC 1992; Able-Thomas 1996; Bessant and Rush 
1993) — or those actors who do not directly exchange technologies but may facilitate 
the process and / or have an interest in them. Urban technology cooperation attempts to 
incorporate the views of users and intermediaries, which many technology transfer 
models downplay.
Also, urban technology cooperation operates at the meso-level, as discussed in Chapter 
1. Participants form networks and provide information amongst each other. As more 
information is exchanged and as links strengthen and grow, the technology itself and 
these networks are ever changing (Schenk et al. 2007). The meso-level was chosen to 
better reflect this reality rather than the traditional linear technology transfer process, 
which begins in the research lab, then goes to commercialization, to market, to use.
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The meso-level accounts for indirect policies, which are often generated and have 
implications at the systemic level, to determine their potential role on technology 
adoption. Other researchers also examine the links between the various levels, 
including Mulder (2005)’s study of technology adoption and diffusion patterns at the 
micro-level and how they impact sectoral energy consumption. However, the meso- 
level was also chosen as the place for analysis because by virtue of its location of 
scrutiny it often has more direct links to the local, national and international levels. In 
other words, by focusing on the meso-level it affords the ability to assess how 
relationships between stakeholders play out in the real world, including the different 
dynamics between and within stakeholder groups (as discussed in detail in Chapter 7).
Capello et al. (1999) examining energy policies and sustainable cities in Europe, is one 
example of a RET adoption at the meso-level. They suggest a Pentagon prism of 
critical success factors to address barriers for renewable energy technologies. The 
pentagon points are hardware (equipment), software (knowledge and processes), 
orgware (institutional and managerial efficiency in the urban energy and environmental 
sector), finware (cost saving and financial aspects of energy initiatives), and ecoware 
(urban social and quality of life conditions involved in the implementation of new 
energy initiatives) (Capello et al 1999: 45).
Urban technology cooperation, applied in these two case studies, examines 
stakeholders, rather than individuals. What is different about this concept rather than 
other meso -level approaches used in energy research which “acknowledges the mutual 
coherence of groups of actors” (Schenck et al. 2007: 1508), is that urban technology 
cooperation also attempts to recognize the heterogeneity of stakeholders. It draws 
from alternative approaches that account for differences between individuals or 
organizations within a “stakeholder” or “actor”, including Mulder (2005) who notes 
that there will be persistent heterogeneity among agents, as each person understands 
something differently. For instance, how can a “community” or a “developing country 
government” be expected to have a unified stance on renewables (Shove 1998, Barton 
2006; Forsyth 2005)?
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But, it is important to consider what exactly is meant by ‘heterogeneity’. As noted 
above, each person understands things differently, and has different experiences and 
motivations. On the other hand, at the other extreme, often positive-based approaches, 
attempt to model the behaviour of actors using a similar premise -  that actors are 
‘rational’ agents, seeking profit maximization. Yet, there are a host of other factors 
which also impact choices. My view is that individuals are different but at the same 
time, one of the main premises for groups coming together is due to some ‘common 
ground’ -  whether this be a shared culture, language, community, etc., and so the 
dynamics within these groups are iterative, changing over time.
The final aspect of urban technology cooperation lies with the term “urban” and its 
implications for RET adoption. The focus on cities was chosen for two reasons. First 
of all, as noted earlier, with limited exceptions (e.g. Quintanilla and Mulas 1998; 
Quintanilla et al. 2000), there is little evidence on the experience of RETs in 
developing country cities. Secondly, cities often serve as regional / metropolitan 
innovation systems which in turn impact the rate and scope of technology adoption, 
diffusion and development (Lundvall 1992; Doloreux and Parto 2005). Aligned with 
this is the notion that proximity between potential partners (e.g. universities, industry) 
also impacts the effectiveness of the technology cooperation process (Lindelof and 
Lofsten 2004). The term urban also attempts to capture Porter’s (1990) geographic 
‘clusters’ effect in a city, sometimes referred to as agglomerations in urban areas. A 
cluster is “a group of companies and other institutions in related industries that are co­
located in a specific geographic region” (Ketels et al. 2006). Using evidence from 
around the world including the Silicon Valley for information technology, and the 
British Midlands for car racing, the argument is that location is important for 
companies in helping them have competitive advantage over their counterparts. In this 
view, geographic proximity to other firms, institutions and resources gives firms 
competitive advantages because as these industries are grouped together, there are 
closer relationships, common local knowledge, and these groups are subject to similar 
incentives (Porter 1990). Similar to the triple helix model, these clusters drive 
innovation and the productivity of firms located within these clusters, which can assist 
adoption as they work together to tackle various challenges their industry is subjected 
to.
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In other words, the term ‘urban’ was applied to bring out these unique features of 
developing country cities. For example, as noted in Chapter 1, in developing countries, 
generally clusters of research and development (R&D) and innovation occur in cities, 
as they often serve as hubs for various institutions (firms, academic institutes, 
government agencies, community groups). These institutions tend to gravitate towards 
cities as there are -  generally speaking -  better access to resources (e.g. infrastructure, 
services, electricity, etc.). This is not to say that innovation centres are not in rural 
areas in developing nations, but that they tend to be more prolific in developing country 
cities, acting as clusters for technology development and production. Another unique 
feature of developing country cities is based on the premise that continuous face to face 
interactions, while important globally, are particularly important in Latin America. As 
many sector representatives of both SWH and biogas technologies industries are 
congregated in and around Mexico City and Sao Paulo, social networks have formed in 
both places. Of course social networks are just as important in rural settings -  and in 
fact even more so as day to day contact likely happens more frequently and amongst a 
small population ‘pool’ -  but in the case of these two particular RETs, many of those 
that develop and produce the technologies are located in cities (whether big or small) 
versus rural settings. For example, even the NGO Grupo Solaris, operating out of the 
USP campus focusing on agricultural research at Piracibaba, takes place close to that 
city, which has a population estimated to be between 300 000 - 400 000.32
While the effects of this agglomeration will be difficult to “test” in this dissertation, as 
both case studies are urban environments, it is important to point out that agents 
interacting in a common regional space (e.g. city) remain a key element in fostering 
knowledge, information exchange and collaboration, an important part of technology 
cooperation (Walter 2000). Although networks and exchanging information are also 
occurring across regions and national borders, personal contacts within a certain 
geographic setting remain especially important in the developing world. In sum, cities 
pose a unique perspective as they can serve as centres of innovation, from which 
technology cooperation players have an increased ability to interact due to proximity to 
each other.
32 Interview, one NGO, April 2007
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It is important to understand that these insights above were the result of a constantly 
involving process as I embarked on this dissertation research.
Figure 2.2 is a graphic representation of how the urban technology concept was being 
formulated. Through this concept I was trying to capture the effects that public policy, 
technological capacity and cooperation have on the various factors that have been 
identified in conventional and other alternative approaches as affecting RET use in 
developing countries. In addition, as there is a research gap with respect to cities and 
RET uptake in the developing world, I wanted to understand what unique role cities can 
play on affecting RET use -  examining literature focusing on innovation in cities 
looking at clusters, cities being a nexus for innovation, proximity to innovation sources 
and sources networks (e.g. in many developing countries, the use of a technology is 
often encouraged or discouraged through word of mouth, etc.), and how these aspects 
affect uptake. While Figure 2.2 below is more abstract, Figure 7.1 (p. 279) represents a 
more detailed portrayal of the urban technology cooperation concept through being 
applied to the case of SWHs and biogas technologies to generate electricity in Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo. The concept hones in on players at the meso-level. The model 
also captures links between players operating mainly at other levels (macro and micro) 
with those at the meso level.
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Figure 2.2 Urban Technology C ooperation -  Pre-Field R esearch
Public Policy Technology Cooperation
Competition from fossil fuels, job potei tial (RETs vs. fossil fuels), grid coverage, 
SMEs involved in RETs (or potential ft r), freedom for foreign investment, 
existence / potential o f  local market, att itude o f  government /  firms / public to
Role o f  Cities -  
sources o f  
innovation, 
clusters, 
networks and 
proximity
MEAs
Electricity
generators
(traditional
sources)
Federal
government
Community
Individuals / 
households
Source: Author
Some criticize approaches based on the meso-level as the scale and the action needed is 
not clear. For instance, the meso-level is generally referred to as the level of analysis 
between the national economy and the level of individuals, firms and households. 
However, some suggest it is difficult to try and define the meso-level as a “space”. For 
example, (Genus and Coles 2008) argue that Geels’ (2004) energy transitions model 
(with the meso-level being considered a ‘regime’) does not properly identify or analyze 
what the meso-level is. For this study, I view the meso-level as the cities of Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo and their surrounding areas, with the aim of having a city wide 
impact. The boundaries of this space are not definitive, and are dynamic, but rather the 
above (these cities and their surrounding areas) serve more as guideposts to the 
researcher.
Another criticism is that power dynamics are bound to play out in these relationships, 
with some players being more dominant that others in all, or different aspects of the 
technology cooperation process; thus, suggesting that technology transfer is a more 
accurate way to characterize what is happening (Stirling 2008).
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But the word “transfer”, whether implicitly or explicitly, implies that it is a one-way, 
linear process in which one actor (the donor / active player / expert) provides 
technology (physical products and know-how) to another (the recipient / passive player 
/ non-expert). Like others uncomfortable with the terms transfer (Heaton et al. 1994; 
Martinot et al. 1997), the dissertation asserts that by virtue of using a different term, 
cooperation, provides an opportunity for participants to view themselves as partners.
A further criticism of this approach is that by focusing on specific features of cities 
reduces the applicability of this framework to other settings including towns and rural 
areas in developing nations. I argue that many conventional approaches to technology 
adoption and transfer do not account for context enough -  their focus is on creating a 
framework at a macro, general level, to be applied as way to increase the use of 
renewable energy technologies in developing countries. Developing country cities 
have unique aspects, requiring a distinct approach.
Another criticism is involved with attempts to incorporate non-experts - some suggest 
that although deliberative approaches to technology and environmental governance 
decisions are to be applauded, in practice, attempts at incorporating the views of non­
experts have been difficult (Mason 1999; Ockwell 2008). These are valid 
considerations, and so an important task of the dissertation is to evaluate the three 
systemic approaches purported to examine RETs in these settings.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 have provided an assessment of systemic technology adoption and 
cooperation frameworks as ways to explain the uptake of RETs in developing country 
cities. However, when these systemic approaches are applied to real world situations, 
the above claims may not hold true. To do so, the dissertation will hone in on two 
types of systemic policies -  trade and competitiveness -  which often have profound 
effects throughout a country, region or city -  to focus on the other sub-research 
question examined: under what conditions, if at all, different trade and competitiveness 
regimes have an effect on RET adoption in Latin American cities?
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2.4. Trade and Competitiveness Regimes and RET Adoption -  
Key Debates
As noted in Chapter 1 and expanded upon in the following sections, many historical 
renewable energy technology adoption and transfer approaches overlook the potential 
influence that macro-level systemic policies can have on these processes. Trade and 
competitiveness policies are one such area. Speaking about technology more broadly 
however, one branch of trade and competitiveness suggests that an increase in 
technology development, adoption and dissemination mainly occurs through a 
principally outward approach -  emphasis is placed on the market, centring on investor 
and consumer choice. Another trade and competitiveness strategy suggests that a 
conditionally outward approach is most conducive to increasing technology 
development, adoption and dissemination. In this view, while the presence of foreign 
investors is also encouraged, they have less of a 'free reign’ in the local market. 
Although research examining the potential role of trade and competitiveness policies 
may have on the uptake of renewables is recent, the general consensus is that trade 
liberalization can lead to more RET use in developing countries.
2.4.1. Defining trade and competitiveness
These policies have been defined in a number of different ways. The WTO’s Trade 
Policy Review classifies trade policies and practices by measure, with the aim of 
determining the effects of these actions on trade. This system divides measures into 
three different types 1) those that directly affect imports (e.g. policies dictating rules of 
origin, quantitative restrictions and controls, etc.), 2) those that directly affect exports 
(e.g. restrictions on exports, or assistance for exports), and 3) other measures that affect 
production and trade (subsidies, trade-related intellectual property rights) ((UNCTAD)
2006): 3-4).
Regarding competitiveness policies, although a number of definitions also exist, the 
majority are rooted in terms of economic, technical, and / or business attributes. For 
instance, one definition focusing on firms suggests that competitiveness is “the ability 
of firms in a region / country to work in close cooperation amongst themselves and
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with other organizations (at home and / or abroad) to design and implement strategies 
for increasing their shares in the global market of goods and services” (Villaschi 2004). 
The World Economic Forum which has a Global Competitiveness Index, suggests that 
competitiveness encompass “the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine 
the level of productivity of a country” (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). This focus on 
productivity however is too narrow. In addition, it is not clear what exactly is meant by 
productivity or how it is measured over time. Take the example of ethanol production 
in Brazil, for example. In the 1970s and 1980s, Brazilian sugar mills were reliant on 
subsidies to make ethanol competitive with gasoline.
Initially, learning by using resulted in some temporary losses on production process as 
actors learned to use new technology (Mulder 2005). Over time, due to learning by 
doing or experience (when sugar mill operators learned more about producing ethanol 
rather than sugar), the price of producing ethanol decreased substantially from about 
US$ 100 per barrel in 1980 to current ranges of US$25 - $50 per barrel in 2007 
(Goldemberg et al. 2004; Skeer 2007). At present, little would dispute that Brazil is the 
world leader in this technology, and yet the sugar mills would not have been profitable 
without the government subsidies in previous decades; i.e. for a long time, their 
productivity declined.
Some countries / firms / organizations seek competitive advantage in basic products 
and services33, while others expend their efforts on increasing technological capability 
or technological learning to develop more complex goods and / or services (only or 
concurrently with more basic goods and services). In other words, competitiveness is 
broader than the objective of increasing market share would imply. Increasing 
competitiveness can also lead to increases in education (e.g. literacy, basic arithmetic to 
tertiary education), which may not impact a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
or a firm’s market share, but which can be reflected in a country’s Human 
Development Index (HDI)34.
33 This can be defined as those products and services that are, arguably, less knowledge- and learning- 
intensive (e.g. cash crops, basic tourism services).
34 See the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
developed by a group of scholars including Mahbub ul Haq on the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which incorporates information on life expectancy, literacy rate and infant mortality, among others, for 
example, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/.
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Competitiveness policies can be viewed as government actions to encourage various 
actors, such as firms (whether state-run or private), research institutes, etc. to work 
together and / or to increase knowledge and / or expertise among actors. For the 
purposes of this study, those trade and competitive approaches that emphasize gaining 
skills in technological capability will be examined as they are often closely linked into 
technology cooperation and adoption processes.
2.4.2. Inward-looking trade and competitiveness policies
The first view -  quite popular in Latin America - was influenced by dependency theory, 
informed by the structuralist economics of Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, and 
expanded upon by economists at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) such as Celso Furtado in Santiago, Chile, among others such as 
Andre Gunder Frank. This theory argued that colonialism and international trade led 
less to economic development for the developing world and more to a core-periphery 
relationship where developing countries exported raw materials for the manufactured 
products of the industrialized world; thus creating a situation where these nations were 
dependent on developed countries (Kay 2005). Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI), a state-led, inward-oriented development strategy, was particularly popular in 
Latin America from the 1950s-1970s/80s (although Brazil and Mexico began ISI in the 
1930s and 1940s as a result of the Great Depression) (Kay 2005; Shadlen 2007). ISI 
viewed state enterprises as key to economic development and industrialization. 
Governments conducted a series of policy actions under ISI. Generally speaking, these 
actions included, among others, protection from foreign goods and services through 
tariffs, controls on imports and foreign exchange, and the creation of development 
banks to provide finances to domestic or state enterprises (Baer 1996). Domestic 
rather than foreign trade was emphasized in order to build up industrialization through 
indigenous sources- an extreme version of this position advocates complete self- 
sufficiency; an autarky. Sectors central to economic growth and industrialization, such 
as steel, electricity and natural resources, often became state enterprises in order ensure 
a continuous supply of cheap inputs (Baer 1996).
Variations of this view exist with respect to how much government should be involved 
in the economy, but all agree that government involvement is an integral part in the
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industrialization process. Using empirical evidence from the Asian Tigers, attention 
focused on macro-level government action, targeting sectors to assist businesses to 
innovate and develop human capital skills, and the institutional framework needed to 
do so effectively (Kim 1997; Kim and Nelson 2000). In addition to these grand scale 
schemes, actions pursued at a smaller scale, termed “below-the-radar” aspects of 
industrial policy by (Wade 2004) (e.g. In Taiwan, Industrial Development Bureau 
officials encouraged foreign enterprises to use domestic rather than foreign suppliers) 
also play an important role in developing technological capability. According to 
Shafaeddin, “...with the exception of Hong Kong, no country has managed to 
industrialize without infant-industry protection” (2005: 1148-1149).
However, over time, support for this approach waned as a number of state-run 
enterprises became inefficient because they had a monopoly over their respective 
sector. They also often employed more people than necessary and as a result of their 
losses, forced the government to give them subsidies in order to continue operating 
(Baer 1996).
2.4.3. Conditionally-outward looking trade and competitiveness 
policies
Some contend that a conditionally outward approach (rather than inward approach) to 
trade and competitiveness is most conducive to increasing technology development, 
adoption and dissemination. In this view, while the presence of foreign investors is 
also encouraged, they have less of a 'free reign’ in the local market. For instance, the 
government tends to take on a more direct role through creating legislation, mandatory 
requirements, and direct involvement in technology development, production, 
dissemination and adoption (Lall 2004b). In current renditions, the government does 
not drive the technology cooperation process, but rather, is one of a number of key 
players. Emphasis is placed on building up indigenous capacity to absorb and adapt 
technologies.
Under a conditionally outward trade and competitiveness approach investors (foreign 
and / or domestic) must often form partnerships with local firms, use local suppliers, 
share their intellectual property rights (IPRs), and / or agree to train local people.
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Technology cooperation tends to be longer term and collaborative -  with more 
indigenous input and where partners have more equal footing (termed horizontal 
technology cooperation). Other countries use vertical technology cooperation as the 
principle method to acquire foreign technologies, but with horizontal aspects aimed at 
encouraging the development of local technological capabilities. This form of 
technology cooperation is increasing in the private sector, such as through joint 
ventures (IPCC 2000). Some argue that these forms of technology cooperation are 
more effective as they become more adapted to local conditions (Westphal 2001). For 
instance, the technology can be made less expensive, less complex, more applicable to 
the local climate, or in sync with the local culture (Westphal 2001).
2.4.4. Outward-looking trade and competitiveness policies
Another view, particularly dominant in the late 1980s and 1990s, as a part of the 
Washington Consensus,35 was that less government involvement was needed in order to 
achieve economic development and industrialization. This view espoused 
"competitiveness, deregulation, privatization, and the restriction of public intervention 
economic processes." (Hettne 1995: 38).
Greater increases in the GDP and / or industrialization of developing countries were 
linked to trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation and openness (e.g. for example 
see Clark et al. 1999 on industrialization and outward-oriented trade policies). Critics 
argue that often these actions lead to further wealth concentration and deepened 
regional disparities already in place in developing countries (Baer 1996; Sanchez- 
Reaza and Rodriguez-Pose 2002).
Regarding technology some research suggests that mainly outward trade and 
competitiveness policies will increase technology development, adoption and 
dissemination -  emphasis is placed on the market, centring on investor and consumer 
choice (Markusen and Venables 1999). Thus, foreign direct investment (FDI), exports, 
trade liberalization, and indirect government involvement are stressed. This view is
35 The Washington Consensus, was a term originally applied to a series of economic policy prescriptions 
by John Williamson to be used by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html for further information
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based on evidence which indicates that openness to trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) levels have facilitated technological diffusion (Tomlinson et al. 2008: 
61).
Technology cooperation under this approach is mainly characterized by shorter-term, 
integrated methods (e.g. acquisitions / subsidiaries, direct purchasing of foreign 
technologies) with one participant serving as the key player. The claim is that these 
forms of technology cooperation are more effective as the process happens more 
quickly (Pietrobelli 2000). The market will decide which technologies are most viable 
for the environment in which they are to be used. With a single leader driving the 
process, providing coherent information to the public, and often possessing the means 
for quicker deployment, there is a greater likelihood that these technologies will be 
used. They argue that this form of technology cooperation is the most common version 
of this tool (namely internal, such as between a Multinational Corporation (MNC) and 
one of its subsidiaries), and the reason it is widely used is because it will lead to the 
most rapid diffusion and adoption of technology (Pietrobelli 2000).
2.4.5. Trade and Competitiveness Policies and the Uptake of Low 
Carbon Energy Technologies
The nexus between trade and competitiveness policies and environmental issues has 
been well documented (e.g. Anderson and Blackhurst 1992; Esty 2001; Brack and Gray 
2003; Nuemeyer 2002), including research in developing countries, where some claim 
that openness leads to access to state of the art technologies, and to the extent that these 
technologies are ‘cleaner’ there can be environmental improvements as well as 
economic competitiveness gains by firms, and others which argue that openness does 
not necessarily mean that firms will choose these ‘cleaner’ often more expensive 
imported options, and that incentives are needed (See Rock and Angel (2005)’s study 
on several industries in East Asia for one example).
Discussions on the environment continue within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) context. For instance, on the one hand, the environment is considered an area
36 The WTO is an international entity established in 1995 to govern trade rules at the international level. 
The basis of its philosophy is support for free trade between countries, supporting the reduction of tariffs
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of general exception to the free trade rubric in that countries are allowed, under Article 
20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the international treaty the 
WTO is based on, trade restrictive measures towards goods and services considered 
harmful to human, animal and plant health, as well as those depleting natural resources 
(Mason 2007). Under the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations 
however, a number of Northern and Southern countries (e.g. Australia, Japan, the 
United States, Thailand, the Philippines, India, etc.) are challenging national 
legislation, labelled non-tariff barriers (NTB) put in place for health, environment and 
local economic development reasons (Friends of the Earth 2007).
Furthermore, the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 agreed that environmental 
goods and services should be an area targeted for faster liberalization. But, the WTO 
has yet to agree on a definition for what constitutes an environmental good or service. 
Areas of concern in the case of goods include how to deal with: a) single versus dual- 
use goods, b) relativity and evolving technology (e.g. something considered an 
environmental good now but may not be in the future as technology changes, and how 
to compare, e.g. cars based on a fuel cell versus those running on alternative fuels such 
as compressed natural gas (CNG), versus those running on ‘clean’ diesel, versus those 
running on regular diesel), c) implications for developing countries -  their ability for 
domestic manufacturing and export, and d) dealing with environmental agricultural 
products, such as biofuels. Many developing nations assert that discussions of these 
goods and services focus on high-technology products, where there are currently less 
opportunities for them to export -  Brazil for instance has pushed to have biofuels 
included as environmental goods. There are also debates regarding WTO rules and 
their compatibility with obligations under certain Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs), where trade is restricted for certain goods and services 
(Bemasconi-Osterwalder and Sherman 2005; World Bank 2008a; Kojima et al. 2007).
There are a number of studies that examine the link between trade and climate (Brack 
1999; UNEP 2009), and investment and climate (Forsyth 1999). Some investigate 
links between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the climate regime (Kuik et
and other barriers to trade. Mason, M. (2007). WTO. Encyclopedia of Environment and Society. 
Robbins. London, UK, Sage: 1990-1991.
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al. 2003), with some arguing that regional trade agreements, such as that under the 
European Union, may be a better way to address climate issues, as they can serve as a 
‘bottom up’ approach to encourage regulatory measures at more global levels (Fujiwara 
and Egenhofer 2007; Kemohan and De Cian 2007).
Studies looking at trade and competitiveness in the climate literature also focus on the 
impacts on firms of a cap on carbon emissions vis a vis those firms not subject to a cap 
(e.g. Reinaud 2009 as noted in Chapter 1). Mongia et al (1994) also suggest that those 
trade and industrialization policies favouring energy-intensive production (e.g. 
aluminium, cement) set tariff levels to reflect the ‘real’ economic costs of energy 
supplies.
There are few studies regarding the potential link between trade and competitiveness 
policies and the uptake of low carbon energy technologies however, although interest 
and research is growing. Recent research has focused particularly on the potential role 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on technology cooperation in developing countries 
(e.g. Middleton 2008, Mallett et al. 2009, Srinivas 2009). Discussions on IPRs are 
linked to the WTO because a stipulation for accession to the organization was also to 
join Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)37. IPRs are legal 
rights over ideas, creative processes and products. They include copyrights, 
trademarks, and patents -  where holders can prevent the use of these technologies; thus 
patents are likely the most important type of IPRs within this context (Harvey 2008).38 
To date, evidence regarding whether or not IPRs have been a barrier to technology 
cooperation in low carbon energy technologies is mixed.39
37 TRIPS, or the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, aims to create 
uniform IPR protection across developed and developing countries. It is administered by the WTO and 
has brought IPRs into international trade negotiations for the first time. Developing countries were given 
longer to conform to the agreement than industrialized countries and least developed countries have until 
2013 to conform, and 2016 for pharmaceutical patents.
38 Other IPRs include copyrights, which could be particularly relevant in the case of software used for 
low carbon energy technologies and Plant Variety Protection, relevant for both mitigation (e.g. biofuels) 
and adaptation (e.g. drought-resistant varieties of crops) Abbott, F. (2008). Innovation and Technology 
Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from Global Policy Development on Intellectual Property 
and Public Health. Conference of the Parties 14- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.. Poznan, Poland.
39 For further discussion on these debates please see Ockwell, D., R. Haum, A. Mallett and J. Watson (in 
review). "Intellectual Property Rights and low carbon technology transfer: the two polarities of diffusion 
and development." Global Environmental Change (in press).
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Other research is broader. For example, Cosbey states that “if barriers to trade in low 
emissions goods are lowered, there will be increased uptake, and increased incentives 
to invest in those technologies and goods (Cosbey 2007: 2). One World Bank study 
examining trade policies and the use of biofuels also purports that the removal of 
“barriers to biofuel trade would increase competition, which should in turn help 
improve efficiency, bring down costs, and enable the world’s most efficient producers 
to expand their market share” (Kojima et al. 2007: 74). Another World Bank study 
also indicates that reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade can increase 
technology diffusion, based on the results of their study of four clean energy 
technologies including wind, solar, clean coal and efficient lighting in 18 of the high- 
GHG emitting developing countries. Here, the authors note that removal of these 
barriers will result in an increase of trade volumes of up to 13 percent. This view also 
argues that streamlining Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), investment rules and other 
domestic competitiveness policies will encourage the diffusion of low carbon energy 
technologies in developing countries (World Bank 2008a: 13-14 and 53).
However, there are a number of problems with these assertions. First of all, they are 
based on macro level analysis. Secondly, it is difficult to make such an overarching 
statement (i.e. that open trade and competitiveness policies lead to RET adoption) 
because trade policies encompass a number of features including -  in addition to taxes 
and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) where attention is generally focused -  
privatization and foreign investment rules. It is more appropriate to ask, under what 
conditions, if any, do trade and competitiveness policies influence RET adoption -  the 
sub-research question of this dissertation.
2.4.6. Trade and competitiveness approaches in Latin America
As mentioned previously, in order to determine which trade and competitiveness 
approach, if any, is most conducive for RET adoption, two case studies in Latin 
America were chosen. The trade and competitiveness policies of Latin America are 
particularly interesting due to their historical experience in this area. For instance, the 
“hang over” from the ISI experience in the region, as well as the prominence of the 
Washington consensus has seen an unprecedented openness to foreign investment and 
technologies in the region -  a shift that is particularly pronounced in countries like
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Brazil, who was one of the most keen on developing indigenous technologies, while 
discouraging technology imports from abroad (Gibbons et al. 1994, OECD 2004; 
Villaschi 2004; Hemais et al. 2005; Kostoff et al. 2005). Trade and competitiveness 
approaches used in Mexico and Brazil is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.5. Conclusion
Systemic approaches have been proposed as an alternative tool to examine the uptake 
of renewables in developing countries as they account for larger social and policy 
considerations as well as economic and technical concerns. But to date, there is little 
evidence supporting their application. I chose to apply three systemic approaches to 
the cases of the adoption of two RETs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo.
Section 2.1 provided a brief overview of systemic technology adoption approaches, 
while honing in on Rogers’ (2003a) diffusion of innovations model in particular.
Rogers Diffusion of Innovations model was considered a useful approach because it 
considers social aspects as well as economic and technical issues. It also takes a 
broader view of knowledge, assessing how previous experiences can play a role on 
awareness, and indicates that ‘know why’ or principles knowledge is also important. 
The model also considers technologies over time and the importance of change agents, 
or those people who influence others to use or not use as technology.
But, the model does not take the dynamics between and within stakeholder groups into 
account enough. Furthermore, the model does not address the potential affects 
involved when the origins of change agents or technologies are different (domestic, 
foreign or both), which may have implications for RET uptake.
Section 2.3 argues that conventional technology transfer models are useful approaches 
to explain RET adoption because they take a longer-term view. However, the problem 
with many of these conventional approaches is that they suggest that this process 
happen in a series of stages. They also often neglect to incorporate the views of the 
non-expert as well as other stakeholders. These models do not examine closely enough 
the differences that can occur between and within groups or among individuals.
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Orthodox technology transfer frameworks also possess number of weaknesses similar 
to conventional technology adoption models. For instance, they often treat knowledge 
and information similarly, they tend to neglect sociocultural dynamics, they do not 
capture the potential affects that indirect policies may have on technology transfer and 
adoption, and they tend to rely on evidence from the macro level or micro levels (often 
in rural versus urban settings).
To address these shortcomings, a new concept urban technology cooperation was 
posited as an alternative framework to explain the uptake of RETs in Mexico City and 
Sao Paulo. In addition, it stresses the iterative non-linear process of cooperation and 
the two or more way nature of relationships. It accounts for features of cities and 
focuses on the dynamics between and within stakeholder groups and operates at the 
meso-level. However, some concerns with this approach are that meso-level not 
clearly identified (e.g. Genus and Coles 2008), but the meso-level here is defined as the 
cities and their surrounding areas. Others (e.g. Stirling 2008) suggest that that use of 
the term technology cooperation may downplay the power dynamics between 
participants. However, this dissertation argues that the dominant discourse centres on 
the term “transfer’, which neglects the two or more way nature of these relationships, 
and immediately implies that one person is a donor and the other is a recipient. 
Another critique could be that this model, centring on cities is not relevant for rural 
situations. But developing country cities are distinct, thus warranting a unique 
perspective. Finally, some (e.g. Ockwell 2008) assert that models attempting to engage 
the public may be favoured in theory, but in practice have been plagued by difficulties.
The third approach considered is trade and competitiveness regimes. Although 
research on this area is recent, the general consensus is that trade liberalization can lead 
to more RET use in developing countries. However, the problem with this claim is that 
it is based on studies at the macro-level. A more appropriate question is under what 
conditions, if at all, do trade and competitiveness policies affect the use of RETs in 
developing country cities.
Finally, when embarking on Chapters 6, 7 and 8 it is important to keep in mind when 
using these systemic approaches is that they are each different styles or manifestations
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of the systems perspective, which influences the explanations stressed as well as their 
interpretation. Table 2.3 provides a quick overview of these differences.
Table 2.3 C om paring th ree  system ic  ap p ro ach es  to  a s s e s s  RET adop tion  in developing 
coun try  cities______________________________________________________________________
Model/Approach. Roqcts Diffusion of Innovation
Strengths
Analysis (Decision)
Frame of reference (Individual, 
organization)
System (Norms, degree of 
interconnectedness)
Issues (attributes of people and 
technology)
Attempts to understand rationale for 
why people use technologies or not
Attempts to assess how actors 
influence change 
Recognizes role of values, 
connections
Recognizes technology attributes 
have different implications depending 
on actor, system, etc.
Attempts to understand motivation 
and choice
Limitations 
May not always be cognitive
Worldview (Agency, structure to a 
lesser extent)
Model/Approach: Urban Technology Cooperation
Strengths
Analysis (Processes)
Frame of reference (Stakeholders, 
participants)
System (Networks, Relationships)
Issues (dynamics between and 
within groups)
Worldview (Agency, Structure to a 
lesser extent)
A ssesses mechanics behind a 
phenomenon
Recognizes that stakeholders and 
participants change over time 
Focuses on the importance of 
dynamics between actors in shaping 
choices
More emphasis on dynamics 
between relationships 
Attempts to understand motivation 
and choice
Model/Approach:Trade and com petitiveness
Strengths 
Emphasizes the role of politics andAnalysis (Policies)
Frame of reference (Institutions - 
government, industry)
System (Country, state, region, 
city)
Issues (effects of policies)
Worldview (Agency or Structure)
policy
Important components of a system
Underscores the role of governments
A ssesses the implications of policies 
at varous levels
Attempts to understand motivation 
and choice or effects of system
Less emphasis on dynamics between 
relationships
Does not capture the fact that system is 
dynamic, changes over time 
Attributes of people is arbitrary and can 
change (farmer and songbirds)
May not take history and context into
account enough ________ _
Limitations 
May not place enough attention on the 
implications of an outcome 
By stressing cooperation and participation 
can downplay role of hegemons, power
Can downplay importance of individual 
behaviour in making decisions
Can over-emphasize the role of these 
dynamics on an outcome 
May not take history and context into 
account enough
Limitations 
Can neglect the role of other facets
Often downplays dynamics within these 
organizations
Can downplay role of non-govemmental 
actors
By stressing dominant political forces, 
sometimes downplays dynamics within
May over- or under-emphasize effects of a 
decision on system
Source: Author
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
3.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to inform the reader about the research design, methods 
and analytical tools and parameters of the dissertation. The first section of this chapter 
focuses on debates regarding methods at a more general level, suggesting that one’s 
ontology shapes how research is conducted, including concepts and methods chosen.
The second consideration posits that one problem with previous studies on RETs in 
developing countries is that they often centre attention on the micro and / or macro 
level, and rely on rural settings. Research at the meso-level and in urban environments 
offers a new methodological approach, which can shed further insights into this area of 
study.
The third part of the chapter focuses on the research methods and analysis used for this 
study, which was largely based on qualitative methods, but augmented with 
quantitative statistics where applicable. I chose to base my research from evidence 
obtained through qualitative interviews and codes for a number of reasons. First of all, 
these approaches are exploratory, and emphasize the importance of context and setting. 
Secondly, by capturing numerous aspects in a setting -  economic, technical, as well as 
social and cultural, they provide a deeper understanding of phenomena. In addition, by 
using these techniques, researchers are more equipped to develop concepts that 
recognize differences in settings. This approach is distinct from a hypothesis drive 
quantitatively based approach, seeking to determine general laws.
Although some critics of this approach argue that they are too anecdotal, using this 
approach is further support for the view that many assertions regarding RETs -  whether 
they are based in quantitative and qualitative techniques -  are dependent on context, 
history and technology. Large quantitatively based studies comparing indicators from 
developing countries are considered advantageous as they are less costly and more 
efficient. But, the problem with this technique is that data collected from developing
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countries is often questionable (e.g. a number of United Nations (UN) agencies rely on 
data provided by developing country governments to populate their statistical studies), 
and inferences about local level dynamics made from data aggregated at the macro 
level often do not reflect the reality on the ground.
I chose to ‘measure’ uptake of equipment through m2 for Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) 
and Megawatts (MW) for biogas technologies, similar to other studies on these two 
particular technologies. While recognizing the difficulty involved in attempting to 
measure knowledge and processes, one way to provide an indication is through 
examining the organizations, capacity building efforts and other activities underway 
regarding their use in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, which I have done.
Finally, I used Atlas ti to help me identify and assess prevalent themes identified by 
key informants.
3.2. Methods Used to Examine Renewable Energy 
Technologies (RETs) in the Developing World -  Impact of 
Worldview
Positivism versus Interpretivism
Another fundamental debate prevalent in the social sciences rests with a researcher’s 
ontology or worldview. Understanding this worldview is essential for research studies, 
as it will influence the researcher’s choice of methods and theoretical frameworks. One 
key debate in the social sciences lies with positivism versus interpretivism, where 
hermeneutics is the philosophy of interpretation. People suggest that positivists also 
‘interpret’, but rather interpretists tend to recognize that people have different ways of 
understanding the social world. One common view is that positivists tend to view the 
researcher and their environment / subject of scrutiny as being separate, while 
interpretists stress the fact that the researcher and the environment and subject of 
scrutiny are all the same. Those who are considered positivist tend to support 
quantitative methods of study, such as large surveys with a random sample size 
(Silverman 2006). For example, turning back to Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2,
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examining some technology adoption and cooperation frameworks, one can see that 
some approaches favoured by economists and policy makers could be considered 
positivist (including push and pull factors, focus on barriers in the adoption literature 
and linear, stages approaches in the technology transfer / cooperation literature).
But as this dissertation argues, the problem with these conventional approaches, are 
that they generally over-emphasize economic and technical factors, which, while 
important, tend to neglect other aspects, such as sociocultural considerations that these 
other analysts assert are just as relevant. That said, the methods and analysis used to 
understand the world are based on my preconceptions of the world, which have 
occurred as a result of my own experiences. So rather than belabouring the question -  
am I a positivist or an interpretist? I think a more appropriate question is to determine 
which methods would be most effective in answering my research questions?
In some circumstances, a more quantitatively based assessment would be useful to 
answer a certain research question, but in my case, I turned to systemic approaches to 
answer my research questions because they help to understand how motivations, 
agency and context explain choices. I decided that qualitative methods, augmented 
with quantitative aspects, would be able to address these above points, rather than 
macro-models, using economic data
Qualitative methods, which seek a more comprehensive sense of understanding, were 
also considered an appropriate means through which to apply actor-oriented 
approaches. This is because actors have differing perceptions, opinions, assumptions 
and experiences, which can be better captured using qualitative tools.
One reason for the shortcomings often found in conventional technology adoption and
cooperation frameworks is because the basis for these approaches stem from the notion
that individuals and groups are motivated by orthodox notions of self interest, and
hence seek to act ‘rationally’, in accordance with principles such as profit
maximization. But as Schneider and Ingram (2007: 21) point out:
“ ...a  great deal of physical and social science research suggests that human 
motivations are much more complex, that moral, aesthetic, intuitive, 
inspirational, empathetic, and other influences have important roles.”
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Also, as Fischer (2003) asserts, the formation of policies is just as much based on 
perceptions, assumptions, and is subjective, versus the espoused technocratic view 
emphasizing a more objective reality.
That said, an increasing number of scholars, such as Ron Weber (2004) working on 
information systems, question whether this schism is so stark. A course on research 
methods at the University of Queensland in Australia, where Weber teaches, lays out 
the basic differences between the two approaches.
Table 3.1 -  Differences between Positivism and Interpretism
Metatheoretical Assumptions 
About Positivism Interpretivism
Ontology Person (researcher) and reality 
are separate.
Person (researcher) and reality 
are inseparable (life-world).
Epistemology Objective reality exists beyond 
the human mind.
Knowledge of the world is 
intentionally constituted through 
a person’s lived experience.
Research Object Research object has inherent 
qualities that exist 
independently of the researcher.
Research object is Interpreted in 
light of meaning structure of 
person’s (researcher’s) lived 
experience.
Method Statistics, content analysis. Hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
etc.
Theory of Truth Correspondence theory of truth: 
one-to-one mapping between 
research statements and reality.
Truth as intentional fulfillment: 
interpretations of research 
object match lived experience of 
object.
Validity Certainty: data truly measures 
reality.
Defensible knowledge claims.
Reliability Replicability: research results 
can be reproduced.
Interpretive awareness: 
researchers recognize and 
address implications of their 
subjectivity.
Source: Ron W eber, MIS Quarterly, 2004, p. iv
Despite these assumptions laid out above, sometimes these distinctions are not as clear- 
cut as the above would suggest. For example, Ron Weber points out that researchers 
who would fall under the ‘positivist camp’ based on the above criteria “understand 
fully that their culture, experience, history, and so on impact the research work they
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undertake and thus the results of their work” (2004: iv). Yet, explanations put forth 
through positivist means only- narrow and often emphasizing the role of one or two 
factors to explain something — are found wanting. I suggest that in certain 
circumstances, positive methods are effective at assessing certain attributes, (e.g. in the 
case of Solar Water Heaters (SWHs), how pipes made from different materials -  such 
as copper and aluminum — affect water temperature reached), but are not the most 
effective tools for assessing human contextual aspects, such as the technology 
cooperation and adoption processes. Like other scholars (e.g. Danermark et al. 1997), 
rather than advocating a positivist versus interpretist “either-or” approach, I advocate 
the notion that a “both-and” approach can be useful (i.e. drawing on both traditions), as 
they each have strengths and limitations.
Structure versus Agency
Some of the most prevalent debates also lie between structure versus agency. A brief 
overview of these two views and how they shape frameworks, research and results, 
used to explain RET adoption is warranted.
Those theories emphasizing agency, focus on people and their ability to make choices 
and actions. Those scholars stressing structure however emphasize that an individual 
and / group of people’s choices are rooted in their context -  including culture, religion, 
previous experiences, etc. Agency and structure are linked, both influencing each 
other. While most recognize these linkages, many scholars emphasize either agency or 
structure as being more powerful, depending on their worldview. This in turn has 
implications for how concepts are defined.
Similar to the contrast between positivist and interpretist views, in some cases these 
distinctions are also not as easily made. For example, applying Friedman and Starr’s 
(1997) exploration of these debates in international relations to discussions about 
technology, shows how technologies, agents and the environment all interact. 
Technologies are “filtered through an agency’s consciousness” (1997: 38), and they 
formulate perceptions, and from there agents undertake choices and actions. By the 
same token, these technologies -  ones used, ones discarded, constantly re-assessed -
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are the result of actions and choices taken by one or a group of agents (Friedman and 
Starr 1997).
Figure 3.1 the Interrelationship between Agency and Structure
THE ONTOLOGICAL AGENT-STRUCTURE PROBLEM
4r
choico
options dscWon-maklng 
procedures
outcomes
structure
Source: Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, 1997. Agency, Structure and International Politics -  
From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry, p. 39
In the context of this study, although the use of renewable energy technologies (RETs) 
is viewed as the outcome, examining the processes that have the potential to affect their 
use, it is important to recognize that these outcomes and processes influence each other. 
In other words, causality flows are not unilinear.
I will put this more clearly, using one technology of the study, Solar Water Heaters 
(SWHs), which have been used in these countries for decades. As is shown in Chapter 
4, previous experiences with SWHs in Mexico City, plagued with problems due to 
improper installation and use, or inappropriate settings, led to negative perceptions of
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the technology among former users -  telling their friends, relatives, colleagues, etc. of 
their experience, which has impacted the use of the technology in that city. These 
negative perceptions have meant less interest among Mexicans in this technology, and I 
suggest that the SWH industry is likely smaller than would otherwise be the case 
(although a small but very committed group continues to thrive). As is discussed in 
Chapters 4, 6, and 8 this had led to less coordination in that country, including no 
nationally-sanctioned standards, and continued negative perceptions of this technology 
despite the major technical advances that have occurred during the past two decades.
3.3. Missing Areas of Scrutiny — the Meso-level and Urban 
Environments
As indicated in Chapter 1, many studies on renewable energy in the developing world 
use evidence from rural environments (e.g. Forsyth 1999; Wilkins 2002; Chemi et al. 
2007), and often use information at the micro level or use countries, rather than cities, 
as case studies (e.g. Milton and Kaufman 2005; Milton and Kaufman 2005; Rodrigues 
and Matajs 2005).
Furthermore, even if implicit, there is little distinction of scale of analysis. Scale can 
be referred to as “the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used by 
scientists to measure and study objects and processes” (Gibson et al. 2000: 219). 
Although the term level is often used interchangeably with scale, levels can be 
considered locations along a scale (e.g. regions such as macro, meso and micro-level, 
or time) (Gibson et al. 2000).
The meso-level is often described as the level that connects the micro (firm, 
interpersonal level) and the macro-level (general, larger-scale, e.g. a region, country). 
However others point out that this ‘space’ is difficult to define. Similar to debates 
regarding “what is a system,” (e.g. are there defined boundaries? does it change over 
time?) noted in Chapter 1, the meso-level is not something necessarily tangible; it is 
dynamic and shaped differently between contexts.
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Meso-level organizations, due to their ability to link macro and micro-level facets, 
have also been identified by some development agencies (e.g. the Dutch international 
cooperation agency) as being “critical agents in the fight against poverty and the 
improvement of governance” (Ubels and Gronden 2004: 3). One unique attribute of 
analysis at the meso-level is that it attempts to capture the interdependencies occurring 
within a system, which changes the dynamics of the overall system, rather than 
aggregating individual system elements. The meso-level involves the linking up of 
technologies and groups of actors, and examines these interactions (Schenk et al. 
2007). The meso-level is associated with systems analysis and also incorporates 
aspects from the micro and macro levels. One example of the meso level applied to an 
energy system is analysis from Schenk et al. (2007), who examine the electricity sector, 
noting that a mixture of renewables and conventional energy power plants may make 
the electricity system more or less efficient, depending on the amount of renewables vs. 
conventional power sources being used relative to electricity demand.
As indicated in Chapter 2, cities were chosen as the focus of scrutiny for two reasons. 
First of all, there have been little studies to date on RETs in developing country cities. 
Secondly, cities can serve as regional and metropolitan innovation systems (Lundvall 
1992; Doloreux and Parto 2005), as actors living in close proximity can affect the 
technology cooperation process (Lindelof and Lofsten 2004).
Cities have also been identified as a key area of bearing for multilevel analysis in the 
areas of environment, renewables and climate change. This is because they often have 
significant control over relevant aspects including energy consumption, transportation 
use, infrastructure, waste management, etc. (Setzer 2009).
3.4. Research Methods
3.4.1. Research Design
Several methods were used when conducting research for this dissertation. Information 
was obtained through previous studies and relevant literature in this area, as well as 
other sources (e.g. company, government and NGO reports, websites and papers). The
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diversity of people and contexts involved in this study made it advisable to pursue a 
number of methods for research. For example, some participants preferred to meet in 
person, while others preferred to respond over email, which gave them an opportunity 
to answer the questions over a longer period of time if needed.
The information drawn from these sources was largely qualitative collected through the 
qualitative data collection techniques explained below. This was augmented with 
some quantitative information, which provided information for some descriptive 
statistics where applicable (e.g. number of metres squared installed).
There are a number of merits to using qualitative research. For instance, quantitative 
research tends to focus on numbers to explain what is happening, whereas qualitative 
researchers focus on words to understand trends in social settings. Furthermore, 
“whereas a typical quantitative research project identifies and investigates the impact of 
only a few variables, qualitative research attempts to explore a host of factors that may 
be influencing the situation” (Hancock and Algozzine 2006: 8).
Qualitative research also relies on multiple methods as it is based on the notion that 
there is no one objective “reality”, but numerous ways in which reality is interpreted. 
By using various methods, sometimes referred to as ‘triangulation’, the researcher 
attempts to have a more in-depth understanding of what is happening by gathering 
these different interpretations -  the idea is an alternative perspective to traditional 
notions of ‘validity’, focusing on the accuracy of information to measure what you 
have set out to argue (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). In other words, the definition of 
validity is defined more through integrity and quality rather than “the rhetoric or norm 
of objectivity for its justification” (Gill 2000: 188).
The economist Mansfield suggested that qualitative research was needed to capture 
important nuances based on his experiences. He collected information directly from 
firms and other organizations “carefully tailored to shed light on the problem at hand, 
rather than to try and adapt readily-available general purpose data” (Diamond 2003: 
1613). This type of research assumes the value of context and setting, and searches for 
a deeper understanding of the participants’ lived experiences of the phenomenon
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(Marshall and Rossman 1999). Through qualitative methods a researcher is better able 
to develop context-sensitive concepts (Bennett and Elman 2006).
On the other hand, one critique of qualitative research purports that it is too anecdotal 
and insights are unable to be generalized (e.g. when Cheek (2008) refers to the 
experience of some qualitative researchers whose project was rejected by ethics 
committees on this basis). In other words, qualitative methods are too context-based 
and thus not as readily ‘transferable’ to other contexts. But as has been discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, applying an approach based more on numbers to a different setting 
might also overlook the importance of context and history in explaining key events or 
trends. My view is that all approaches have insights to share but that qualitative 
methods offer a more comprehensive, in-depth view of an intricate social question. 
This more profound examination is useful for researchers working in other areas (e.g. 
different regions / countries, different technologies) because it forces them to take a 
thorough look at their own specific research context and assess commonalities and 
distinct features.
The claim is that quantitative methods relying on statistics and large random samples 
provide a more accurate view of what is occurring, attempting to limit biases and 
subjectivity. But others point out that biases and subjectivity are inherent in all 
studies, whether consciously or not. Many statistics are singled out selectively 
depending on the objective. For instance, the United States only keeps track of the 
number of U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq since 2003; data on Iraqi citizens killed since then 
have not been published (Silverman 2006). This sends a message to assuage U.S. 
voting family and friends of soldiers killed that their comrades played an important role 
and will not be forgotten, while, by not noting the amount of Iraqis killed, downplaying 
the casualties involved in the war.
Furthermore, positive-based studies tend to centre on hypothesis testing, often using 
quantitative methods, which makes for too narrow of a frame of reference for the 
researcher. By using this approach, researchers tend to “neglect other aspects of theory 
development, such as the formation of new hypotheses or new questions to study” 
(George and Bennett 2004: 12).
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Quantitatively-based methods, such as Cross National Analysis (CAN), where statistics 
of different metrics (e.g. income per capita, rate of literacy) are analyzed, largely based 
on secondary sources such as the United Nations, have several advantages including 
low cost and time saved, and its efficiency (Herkenrath 2002). At the same time 
however a number of studies indicate that inferences at the individual level based on 
aggregate level data, lead to false understandings. One such study from Germany 
showed that at the individual level people more likely to be involved in right wing 
extremism were students and the employed, even though at the aggregate level, there 
were studies that indicated that states with higher levels of unemployment tend to have 
higher rates of right wing extremism (Herkenrath 2002).
Also, one problem with large quantitatively-based studies using data from developing 
countries is that the data is not there, questionable in terms of accuracy and or 
massaged / highlighted to make a certain point (which also happens globally too) 
(Herkenrath 2002). Qualitatively based studies, through interviews and discussions 
with key informants, provide avenues through which to collect information, 
recognizing the subjectivity involved in people’s responses, perceptions and opinions, 
through which a study can ascertain and assess findings.
The answers to the research questions were based upon a comparative analysis of two 
cities: Mexico City, Mexico and Sao Paulo, Brazil. In order to provide adequate 
comparability, while at the same time allowing for national / city level nuances, the two 
most economically viable40 RETs in these settings were examined: namely biogas to 
generate electricity technologies and passive solar water heaters in Sao Paulo and solar 
water heaters Mexico City (White and Hooke 2004). The technologies used in both 
places are comparable in terms of temperatures reached (e.g. 25 degrees Celsius for hot 
water being used to shower).
However, there is one difference regarding the ‘hardware’ of SWHs. Bearing in mind 
the differences between showers in different places and in different households and 
institutions (e.g. a 3 minute shower on average by family members may be the norm in
40 Defined by price of technology and price of electricity produced vis-a-vis their counterparts.
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one household, versus 10 minutes in another family), in Sao Paulo, a larger tank for 
water is needed for families in Brazil, as part of the local culture in Sao Paulo is to take 
two showers per day -  one in the morning and one in the evening. In Mexico City 
people tend to take one shower per day (although not surprisingly some people were 
perplexed when asked the question ‘ how many showers per day and / or week do you 
take’?)
The main research tool to be employed is the Case Study. The two case studies, termed 
collective case studies by some, chosen are the cities of Sao Paulo, Brazil and Mexico 
City, Mexico. The advantages of the case study include the fact that a researcher can 
undertake a variety of research methods and use multiple sources of data. The case 
study also tends to be favoured by social scientists that are studying something they 
have little control over, and that are based on phenomena happening in the real world 
(Yin 2003). Furthermore, a key goal of the case study is to “allow investigators to 
retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 2003: 2). 
This type of research tool allows for interdisciplinary, in-depth, multi-level analysis 
over time - which, when examining the links between global energy challenges and 
local development, is key (Mitchell 1983; Creswell 1998; Denscombe 1998).
I chose two case studies to provide a balance between comparison and detailed analysis 
because “the more cases an individual studies, the greater the lack of depth in any 
single case” (Creswell 1998: 63). I chose only to focus on two because although 
qualitative studies are ‘rich’ in information and peculiarities, as more case studies are 
added, these large amounts of information become unmanageable (Munoz 2002). 
These cities were chosen because they possess a number of similar traits such as large 
populations, an active civil society, major discrepancies between the urban wealthy and 
poor, major sources of investment and a large energy demand. In addition, while these 
cities have distinct cultures, languages and societies, they are both in Latin America, 
thus share some similar experiences (e.g. members of regional organizations such as 
the Organization of American States, former colonies of southern, heavily Catholic, 
European nations). These cities represent excellent opportunities for renewable energy 
technologies and energy policy and development. As well, like many mega-cities, they 
are both major hubs of technological learning, and, as large economies, are major 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters. I chose to compare case studies because “there is a
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growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is 
the use of a within-case analysis and cross-comparisons within a single study or 
research program” (George and Bennett 2004: 18). This research could be labelled 
qualitative comparative research, which is argued to account for conjunctural 
outcomes, or accounting for causal factors occurring in groups (i.e. that these factors 
alone may not be responsible for an outcome) (Munoz 2002).
Critics of the case study technique however claim that one cannot generalize through 
the use of one (or a few) examples (Denscombe 1998; Yin 2003). Also, some would 
say that each country is unique, and social processes develop interdependently with 
these unique cultures, structures and historical experiences, termed the historical 
singularizing perspective (Herkenrath 2002). But, as Mitchell (1983) highlights, a case 
study is not meant to suggest that it represents an overall social phenomenon. In my 
research, the goal of this comparison is to examine similarities and differences, not 
suggesting that these two cases are exactly the same. Each case is unique, but there are 
a number of similarities (e.g. large populations, significant increasing demand for 
electricity) between the two case studies chosen as noted earlier and other important 
urban centres in developing countries (e.g. New Delhi, India; Beijing, China) that face 
similar situations.41
Primary source methods included face to face interviews, telephone interviews, self­
administered questionnaires through email, and informal discussions. These mixed 
modes to collect information were chosen in order to account for different settings and 
to ease the comfort level of the interviewee. Potential interviewees were all given the 
option to meet in person42, to have a phone conversation, or to reply to a short 
questionnaire through email.
The technique known as triangulation was used (Hancock and Algozzine 2006), where 
“a number of different methods are used to measure the same thing, in order to achieve
41 With respect to Brazil for instance, it is a part of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which are 
expected to form a part of the world’s ten largest economies by 2050. Wilson, D. and R. Purushothaman 
(2003). Dreaming with BRICs: the Path to 2050. Global Economics Papers. G. Sachs, Goldman Sachs.
In 2007, Goldman Sachs updated their BRIC to include Mexico and South Korea, termed BRIMCK. See 
O’Neill, Jim, BRICs and Beyond, Goldman Sachs, November 2007 for further details.
42 Except for the last few as I was unable to be in Mexico and / or Brazil at that time
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reliable findings” (Outhwaite et al. 2007: 506). Specifically, I used information 
obtained through interviews and questionnaires, primary documents (e.g. firm and 
government websites), or secondary sources (e.g. previous studies conducted in this or 
related areas), and observations written down as field notes obtained while living in 
each setting for two and a half months. Also, there were some follow up discussions 
over email with a number of participants, asking some of the same and / or similar 
questions.
According to Dillman, “...few survey undertakings are as difficult as defining, 
sampling, contracting, and obtaining responses to self-administered questionnaires 
from businesses or other organizations” (2007: 323). For this reason, my primary 
objective was to conduct face-to-face interviews or have phone conversations, and to 
use an electronic questionnaire as a “back up” (i.e. when respondents preferred to use 
that method rather than the first two options).
A series of interviews and questionnaires, as well as informal discussions with relevant 
stakeholders were held with key informants in the renewable energy technology sector 
in each city (66 individuals in total) -  specifically those involved in SWHs and biogas 
from solid waste. Interviews (whether in person or through the phone or internet 
telephony) were formal meetings with prearranged agendas and often tape recorded 
answers. Informal discussions occurred over a longer period of time where I was able 
to spend a fair amount of time talking with a number of informants in a variety of 
settings (e.g. a training session, in the office, etc.).
How respondents were selected is discussed below. I purposely sought out a particular 
person to target, rather than send a generic electronic letter where possible in order to 
increase response rates. This is in line with other studies, such as one undertaken by a 
university research centre in the United States. Although researchers only achieved an 
average response rate of 51% for 26 surveys, when broken down, the response rate was 
72% for surveys addressed to individuals within companies / organizations compared to 
only 40% when surveys were addressed to only the company (Dillman 2007).
Furthermore, as well as relying on ‘common sense’, I adhered to some typical 
surveying principles when soliciting information from businesses and other
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organizations. These principles include planning at the start for a mixed-mode design 
and having the first interviews serve as “trial runs”, where the questions were altered, 
deleted or added as appropriate depending on the type of organization being 
approached, and the effectiveness of getting responses (Dillman 2007).
3.4.2. Influences on Responses
According to Marshall and Rossman, whether a researcher undertakes a longer-term 
ethnography, or a study largely based on in-depth interviews, where the researcher 
often stays in a setting for a briefer amount of time, but interacts with participants, “the 
researcher enters the lives of participants. This brings a range of strategic, ethical and 
personal issues that do not attend quantitative approaches” (1999: 79).
Some factors assisted in bringing about a frank exchange between respondents and me. 
These factors included the fact that in both Brazil and Mexico the interviews were 
conducted in the first language of the respondents, the fact that I was associated with 
two reputable organizations working in and around these cities for quite some time 
(UNEP / ROLAC (1972) in Mexico City and Vitae Civilis (1989) in Sao Paulo), the 
fact that I was living with a Mexican and Brazilian in each place, and the fact that I also 
had professional and academic experience in this field (working for the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and for the Canadian government on international energy and 
environmental issues). In addition, the fact that I was a part of a university, played a 
role on responses -  especially in the private sector, where anything they revealed was 
not considered confidential (unless they explicitly told me they wished it to be so). At 
the same time, being from a university, I was not considered to be working for a 
competitor, interested in gaining insights into the business (Dillman 2007).
My age, gender and situation may have worked against me (early thirties, female, a 
foreigner, and noticeably pregnant in Brazil), but generally, I found that most 
respondents (about 80% male, 20% female in Mexico and 90% male, 10% female in 
Brazil) were open and treated me professionally (if not a little surprised that I was 
undertaking this alone and while pregnant!). On the other hand, it offered me a way to 
“break the ice” with participants who spoke about their children and families.
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Finally, some such as (Bessette 2004) argue that a shorter stay in the field can hinder 
trust, as time is needed for respondents to get to know the researcher and become more 
open; they advocate for Participatory Action Research, where the researcher works 
directly with the community to identify problems, conduct research and develop 
answers to research questions together. A variation of this approach is when the 
researcher studies ‘those in his or her own backyard’, or settings in which the 
researcher is already intimately involved. However, one challenge with these 
approaches is that the researcher, whether inadvertently or not, is perceived to be more 
aligned with (and / or manipulated by) one or more particular groups (Cleaver 2001); in 
other words, the researcher is viewed as being not as impartial. This may affect 
responses by having some informants withhold information or provide knowledge 
which could be particularly sensitive to an ‘insider’ researcher (Creswell 1998). For 
instance, in Brazil, although I explained that while there I was doing some work for 
Vitae Civilis from Sao Paulo, I found informants to be quite frank with me. This is 
probably because I also explained that I was rather independent because the NGO is 
located in a city 1 hour outside of Sao Paulo and it was not easily accessible for me to 
get to without a vehicle and so I did some desk-based research from them from the 
home of my host family in Sao Paulo, i.e. I did not interact with NGO members on a 
day-to-day basis.
A shorter stay also allowed me to remain steadfastly focused on the goal at hand (to 
obtain as much information as possible to answer the research questions while in each 
location). For instance, some organizations in Brazil and Mexico spoke very candidly 
about divisions that existed between various groups (e.g. in Mexico firms that were 
owned by foreigners and those owned by Mexicans and firms considered to be “in the 
club” (i.e. those always being awarded the government contracts) and those “outside 
the club”; organizations that were a part of the trade association ABRAVA in Brazil, 
and those not). One could argue that these groups would not have been so forthcoming 
if I had longer-term relationships built up with one or more of the opposing groups.
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3.4.3. Interview Techniques
The principle qualitative research method used was in-depth interviews and 
questionnaires, based on a series of questions and responses. The interviews were 
semi-structured; purposely designed to be “fluid”. In other words, the questions 
provided “signposts” for the discussion, while at the same time allowing for a good 
conversation flow. The ordering of questions was also conducted to provide more ease 
for the interviewee / respondent -  with basic questions (e.g. number of employees, 
number of years in existence) first and opinion questions last, and ensuring a flow 
between questions and sections. Moreover, interviews / questionnaires / questions 
asked were tailored to the specific organization providing information.
The interviews were designed so as to avoid ‘embeddedness bias’, or asking the 
questions in such a way as to obtain preconceived responses. To avoid this, interviews 
were constructed to broach topics as broad themes where discussion was open-ended 
allowing discussants to highlight topics they found relevant. Discussion began around 
basic information about the company or organizations, the industry and market in 
general, and then moved on to themes the dissertation was particularly interested in 
including classical explanations for RET adoption, technology cooperation and trade 
and competitiveness policies. The idea was to present the themes more generally, 
gauging the relevancy of these themes in explaining RET adoption through the 
responses of interviewees rather than asking them pointed questions (e.g. how do taxes 
affect the use of SWHs or biogas technologies?)
These types of interviews and questionnaires are often criticized as being too 
influenced by researchers through ways in which questions are phrased and which 
words are used (Ockwell 2008).
One alternative suggestion is the narrative interview where the interviewee tells a story. 
The idea of the narrative interview is to allow the speaker to increase their comfort
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level, by generating a story, to provide a more accurate account from the interviewee’s 
perspective. The interviewer acts more as a listener that is unaware of the event, thus 
interested in all information; a critique of the conventional “question-response schema 
of most interviews” (Bauer 1996: 2). But, there are a number of criticisms to this 
approach. First of all, the informant may emphasize certain parts of the story he / she 
would like the respondent to focus on, highlighting his or her role positively, etc., 
termed strategic communication. Also, as the interviewer conducts more and more 
interviews, he or she is bound to learn more about the event. “The credibility of the 
attitude [that the interview knows little or nothing on the topic] reaches its limits. The 
interviewer’s informedness cannot always be hidden” (Bauer 1996: 10).
People who were involved in this investigation did so voluntarily. They were all made 
aware of the objectives of my thesis -  looking at RET adoption, paying particular 
attention to the role of trade and competitiveness policies and examining the 
technology cooperation process. This was done briefly over the phone or through 
email, where I was met with a “gatekeeper”, or was directly in touch with the relevant 
person, and then more extensively in the interview. Using these techniques allowed the 
companies and organizations themselves to decide who would be best to respond to my 
queries. They all had the option to provide their responses anonymously or not, and to 
choose whether or not to have the interview tape-recorded. In addition, respondents 
were made aware up front that should they wish to change questions, or emphasize 
something else missed, they could do so. Furthermore, all had the opportunity to add to 
the interview / questionnaire. I varied the questions somewhat, depending on who was 
being interviewed (e.g. a firm versus a government agency, NGO or consultancy). An 
example of the questions asked in the interviews and via questionnaires can be found in 
Annex 1.
I chose to focus on interviews and questionnaires rather than other qualitative research 
tools, such as visual data, through photographs for instance, as well as interactive 
analysis through focus groups for various reasons. First of all, with respect to visual 
data, a number of informants were not comfortable with their offices / companies being 
captured on film. In addition, one problem noted by other scholars is that in some 
research “photographs have been misunderstood as constituting forms of data in their 
own right... [rather than as] a means of preserving, storing, or representing information”
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(Emmerson 2004: 251). In other words, visual data is similar to code sheets, audio 
recordings, transcriptions of interviews, etc. Because of the reluctance of some 
informants regarding visual information, I chose to focus on those other tools noted 
above.
With respect to focus groups, some advantages cited by researchers include the fact that 
in a group setting, respondents build on each others’ responses, therefore providing a 
more detailed account of something that may likely not have occurred in individual 
interview settings (Wilkinson 2004). I did not use this method for practical reasons 
(e.g. it would be more difficult to accurately transcribe the often fast-paced discussions 
in Spanish and Portuguese, and hard to get these people together) and I also felt that in 
a group setting, respondents might be less willing to open up to me.
This is important because it was through these individual interviews that people spoke 
candidly about the divisions occurring within stakeholder groups. For example, I had 
the opportunity to attend meetings between technology cooperation members already 
taking place (e.g. in Mexico City I was invited as an observer to discussions underway 
regarding the proposed mandatory standard for SWHs on new buildings by the 
municipal Secretary of Environment). There I was able to make observations at the 
meeting regarding the interactions between these participants. I was able to get a sense 
of some tensions between these groups, but specific clarity on what was causing these 
divisions and what the tension points were, were captured in the individual interviews 
(e.g. the divide found between domestic and foreign SWH companies in Mexico City, 
and the fact that some SWHs companies felt like outsiders from ‘the club’).
Another question that arises is whether or not this research constitutes discourse 
analysis, but this classification is tricky because as Gill (2000) points out, there are 
likely more than 57 variations termed ‘discourse analysis’. On the one hand, in the 
sense that I assumed informants spoke a ‘similar language’ referring to technologies 
(although I spoke about technology meaning not only equipment but also knowledge 
and processes, informants generally considered technology to be ‘hardware’ only), 
institutions working on renewable energy, etc., a discourse analyst might suggest that 
not enough attention was played on the subtleties and different interpretations involved 
in these words. Yet, on the other hand, this dissertation examines the power of
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discourse as it tried to understand how perceptions, assumptions and experiences shape 
people’s decisions, technologies, etc.
3.4.4. Selection of respondents
The selection of participants for this study are similar to a number of other studies 
examining energy, environmental and policy issues in the developing world that use a 
political science / policy implementation approach (e.g. Purkitt’s study (2002) of 
environmental security in southern Africa, Green’s (2004) study of solar home systems 
in northern Thailand, Marquez et al. (2008) study on household solid waste generation 
in Mexicali, Mexico among others). Those interviewed were from a purposeful 
sample, also called a convenience sample, or a pre-defined structure selection, 
compiled in 2004-2005, which served as a basis before undertaking field research. I 
chose this approach because the research focuses on a phenomenon (the adoption of 
certain RETs in two cities), which is not as constrained by either place or population. 
Studying phenomena requires the researcher to “determine a sampling strategy that is 
purposeful and representative” (Marshall and Rossman 1999: 68).
This list of key informants was built upon while in these locations (2005-2006), in 
consultation with the organizations I was affiliated with (UNEP / ROLAC and Vitae 
Civilis) and other active players working in these sectors in both locations. Termed 
snowball sampling, additional study participants are identified through information 
given by the first group of individuals. This approach is often used when participants 
are not as readily identified through conventional sampling methods (Kagee 2004). 
This approach was considered appropriate for this dissertation because there were some 
instances where some companies did not have websites and the lists were not as 
updated and experts were known through “word of mouth”. Some people suggest that 
“care should be taken in making generalizations from a non-random sample” (Purkitt 
2002: 119). Alternatively, a non-random sample can be advantageous because by 
ensuring players considered relevant are involved, it can help provide insights into the 
broader issues which the researcher is trying to understand (Bryman 1989).
As noted in Chapter 1, a system consists of components, their relationships and 
attributes. I consider a city to be a system. For this reason, I used a pre-defined
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structure selection (purposeful sample) in order to ensure that relevant parties involved 
in the technology cooperation process were accounted for. .
I contacted key informants with the help of several in-country experts identified 
beforehand and while there; individuals who were very knowledgeable and active in 
these cities in these particular RETs. Interviewees were also identified through direct 
calling / emails from me courtesy of lists provided by Energy Source Guides 
(www.energy.sourceguides.com) for both countries, the National Commission to Save 
Energy, or Comision Nacional de Ahorro de Energia (CONAE) and the National 
Association of Solar Energy, or Asociacion Nacional de Energia Solar (ANES) in 
Mexico, and the trade association, the Brazilian Association of Refrigeration, Air 
Conditioning, Ventilation and Heating - National Department of Solar Heating, or 
Associate) Brasileira de Refrigera^ao, Ar Condicionado, Ventila^o e Aquecimento - 
Departamento Nacional de Aquecimento Solar, ABRAVA-DASOL in Brazil. 
Informants identified through these various means directed me to other relevant 
players.
In Mexico there are over 50 companies that distribute and / or make SWHs. In Mexico 
City and the surrounding area (such as Cuernavaca, and Puebla), about 20 active 
companies were identified that make and / or distribute or sell SWHs in Mexico City43, 
and a number of government officials at the national, regional, and local levels working 
in this area exist. In addition, there are three universities working on this form of solar 
energy in and around Mexico City, as well as few NGOs and consultancy firms, such as 
the National Association for Solar Energy, or Asociacion Nacional para Energias 
Solares (ANES). There are two consultancies investigating biogas for electricity in 
Mexico City. Information was formally collected through interviews and 
questionnaires conducted in Spanish from 15 SWH companies, two biogas companies, 
three universities (five representatives from one university), one public research 
institute, three consultancies, one NGO, and seven government agencies. In addition, 
two energy experts familiar with the renewable energy sector in Mexico City also
43 Older lists o f SWH companies in Mexico City were also used, but after various attempts at 
communication (e.g. phone numbers and emails that did not work, and asking around), I was informed 
that about every year in Mexico about three or four SWHs companies went under and another three or 
four were created. (Interview, one SWH company and one government agency, November -  December 
2005).
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provided insights through more informal conversations occurring at various times in the 
research process (Total = 35).
In Brazil, there are over 140 companies that produce and / or distribute SWHs 
(ABRAVA 2007). In Sao Paulo and the surrounding state, there are about 23 
companies that produce, distribute and / or sell SWHs in Sao Paulo. Many of these 
companies are members of ABRAVA -  DASOL. In addition, a number of government 
officials at the federal, state and local levels are working in this area (SWHs in Sao 
Paulo). Also, there is one university working on this form of solar energy in and 
around Sao Paulo, as well as few NGOs and consultancy firms, such as Vitae Civilis 
and Sociedade do Sol. With respect to biogas, there is one company (actually a 
consortium of companies), one university, two government agencies, and a number of 
consultants in Sao Paulo working on biogas to produce electricity in Sao Paulo. 
Information was formally collected through interviews and questionnaires conducted in 
Portuguese from 14 SWH companies, one biogas company, one alternative energy 
company, one energy company, three NGOs, two consultancies, one trade association, 
one university (four representatives), and three government agencies. Informal 
discussions were also held with the Canadian consulate in Sao Paulo (Total = 32). 
Some interviewees were comfortable with being quoted directly, others were fine with 
indicating they participated in the study but not with directly attributing quotes to 
themselves, while others wished to remain anonymous. After careful consideration, it 
was decided to keep all interviews anonymous with respect to who said what. In places 
where the interviewee wished to remain anonymous (or indicated their first name only) 
it was written in Annex 2 as such. End user information was obtained informally 
through discussions with a number of end users / potential end users (institutions (e.g. a 
hospital)), individuals (about 20)) and through the experiences of other players 
involved in the technology cooperation process (over 50 individuals). Specific details 
about the interviewees (names, organizations, dates of interviews) can be found in 
Annex 2.
3.4.5. Language
The majority of the information was obtained in the (likely) native (and sometimes 
only) language of the Mexicans and Brazilians involved in this study -- Spanish in
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Mexico (one interviewee wished to conduct his interview in English) and Portuguese in 
Brazil (some informal conversations were held in English -  e.g. those with the 
Canadian consulate in Sao Paulo). I learned Spanish in Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic in 1998, becoming fluent and took two more formal courses in Canada. I 
studied Portuguese in London and Sao Paulo and was able to communicate at an 
intermediate level with interviewees.
3.4.6. Factors Affecting RET Adoption
Information from interviews and questionnaires as well as other secondary sources 
including government and company websites shed light on factors affecting RET 
adoption in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. The experiences of those involved in the 
technology cooperation process (e.g. technicians and other industry representatives (a 
little less than half of the respondents in each location), government officials, Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trade association representatives, consultants) 
formed the basis of this investigation. What is distinct about asking these people for 
information is that the main objective of the interview or questionnaire is to gamer a 
sense of organization itself, which they represent (Dillman 2007), although some 
personal opinions were asked. At least one representative from each organization, and 
ideally more, were consulted to reflect differences between and within groups of 
stakeholders, such as “firms” or “government agencies” (and sometimes individuals 
within an organization) and to better capture sub-groupings within groups of 
stakeholders (e.g. domestic firms versus subsidiary firms) to establish trends.
Questions began with a request for basic information about their company or 
organization and the market for renewable energy sources (especially SWHs and 
biogas) and specifics about the technology (hardware and software), including the cost 
of the technology in general and vis-a-vis alternatives. Interviewees also gave their 
opinion on the perceptions of the technology by different stakeholders at the end of the 
discussion. Respondents also answered questions relating to possible energy and / or 
environmental mechanisms (incentives) with which to assist the adoption of RETs in 
these cities.
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From there, participants were asked questions regarding trade and competitiveness 
policies, and how they affected buying and selling patterns of the technology under 
scrutiny -  if at all.
Moreover, questions about their technology cooperation process were asked, including 
how their technologies were developed, produced, bought and sold. These questions 
were asked to determine if they worked with other companies or organizations to 
design, produce, sell or buy technology and the nature of their relationship (e.g. 
subsidiary versus a joint venture, formal contract versus informal (often oral) 
agreement).
These questions were asked for two reasons. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the 
technology cooperation process is characterized by being of different types, including 
integrated forms, where the ownership of the technology often belongs to one actor 
(e.g. the headquarters of a multi-national corporation and subsidiaries in developing 
countries), often found in open trade regimes, or less integrated forms of technology 
cooperation, where the ownership of technologies is shared (e.g. through joint ventures, 
memorandums of understanding), often found in conditionally open trade regimes. 
These questions were also asked to get a sense of the relationships that were occurring 
between the stakeholder in question and other participants involved in the process.
“ Measuring" RET Use in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
The sciences, including social sciences, tend to rely on empirical evidence, or 
experiences and observations, to validate claims made. One reason for this is that 
empirical evidence serves as a proxy to help to understand what is happening in the 
world.
There are various ways to ‘measure’ the adoption of renewable energy technologies 
(RETs). This thesis examines actual use of a technology rather than potential use, or 
intent to use. One reason for this decision is due to the difficulty involved when trying 
to measure an actor’s “intension to use” a technology, especially in the developing 
world. For example, some studies use willingness to pay (e.g. Wustenhagen and
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Bilharz 2006) as a way of determining intent to use or to assess existing market 
potential in the industrialized world. One can determine willingness to pay by asking 
potential end users if and how much of a premium for “green” energy sources they 
would be willing to pay. Having said this, looking at WTP might not be as applicable 
in the developing world due to a number of reasons which can be more pronounced in 
these countries, such as a potential lack of environmental awareness and / or lower 
household income. Moreover, there may be a “long way from declaring a willingness 
to pay to taking the actual purchasing decision” (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006: 
1690).
As a specific example, a survey on micro-generation technologies in the United 
Kingdom (which include micro-wind generation, solar water heaters and photovoltaics 
for household use), showed a difference of 90% of survey respondents that indicated 
renewable energy is a good idea versus only 20% who indicated they were likely to 
install any of these micro-RET options (Ellison 2004, cited in Watson and Sauter 2007: 
2776). Actual use of a technology is more appropriate to measure rather than intent to 
use because there may be differences between how the technology actually works and 
how the technology was expected to work (Rogers 2003a: 181).
I measured the adoption of Solar Water Heaters, the first technology under scrutiny, 
through various features. The hardware was measured by metres squared (m2). 
Furthermore, to account for potential differences due to population, the dissertation 
adopted the metric of m2 / 100 inhabitants -  a metric found in many studies on SWHs 
worldwide (See for example, Houri 2006: 670; Milton and Kaufman 2005: 6; Milton 
2004: 8; Nahar 2002: 631; Philibert 2006: 12).
A number of SWH studies (or parts of SWHs studies) focus more on energy use, and 
utilize kWs or kW/h as a measurement of energy use. Energy use is calculated as a 
way of measuring energy savings to determine payback period, reduction in fossil fuel 
or electricity use, carbon or other pollution abatement or potential income generated 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)’s Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) (e.g. Rodrigues and Matajs 2005: 53; Headley 1998: 258; Perlack and Hinds 
2001: 5; Nahar 2002: 633; Milton and Kaufman 2005: 23).
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In line with those studies examining SWH usage, I use m2 to measure SWH use but 
will refer to kW or kW/H when looking at energy use -  when applicable. Ultimately 
however, when measuring “technology adoption”, I chose the metric m2 to measure 
SWH use because this data was more readily available -  the majority of companies and 
organizations had this information on hand. In this context, SWH use was assessed 
through metres of SWH panels that are installed and working / being used (when this 
information was available).44 Other information, such as number of installations, 
number of individual systems sold, etc. will also be provided when available to better 
understand SWH adoption.
Market growth -  to help give a better indication of SWH use trends — was measured 
through examining various aspects involved in the technology cooperation process over 
time. Like other studies, such as Houri (2006), examining the market growth of SWHs, 
aspects to measure market growth include changes in technology sales (whether 
physical products or services), installations, production and capacity.
Data limitations for SWH use
As noted above, the main metric used to determine how many SWHs are being used in 
both cities is m2 / 100 inhabitants. However, at present, no reliable numbers exist on 
m2 of SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. More detailed information on number of 
m2 of SWHs is expected to be available some time soon in Brazil, but at the time of 
writing, this information is still unavailable.45 For this reason, information on m2 in 
Mexico City and Sao Paulo was estimated using two sources of data 1) data provided 
by the companies themselves and 2) m2 at the national level and dividing by the 
population in those metropolitan areas. Fortunately a previous global study (Weiss et 
al. 2004) on SWHs included Mexico as a case study and estimates on what percentage 
of the SWH market Mexico City constitutes were provided.
44 This last part is particularly important in Mexico and Brazil, as the market for SWHs also includes 
poor quality versions or poor installations (even if the quality of the equipment is good) (Interviews, 12 
informants-Mexico, November 2005-January 2006; 4 informants-Brazil, March -  May 2006).. Previous 
studies conducted on SWHs in Mexico and Brazil also confirm this fact Fernandez and Martinez, A. a. J. 
(2003). Mexico's Advances With Regard to Climate Change, 2001 - 2002. R. a. G. P. General 
Directorate for Research in Urban. Mexico City, Federal Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources, National Institute of Ecology: 80. and Brazil (Rodrigues and Matajs 2005 ).
45 Interviews, one NGO, December 2005, and one trade association, May 2007; personal communication, 
one trade association, February 2008
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Several challenges involved with the collection of data from local sources included the 
fact that a few companies were unwilling to provide me with this data, while other 
companies were able to give me an estimate but were not able to pinpoint with 
precision the final point of sale of their products (i.e. if they were within the borders of 
Mexico City or elsewhere), and a few more were not able to give me an estimate of the 
m2 they had sold and knew or assumed (because of no complaints) were working. In 
addition to this, sometimes the logistics involved in tracking down these companies and 
figuring out how to get to these various places using the public transit system also 
proved to be a daunting task in and of itself!
To ensure more accuracy, these numbers were compared by using information that 
existed at the national level. In the case of Mexico, m2 information is given annually 
by the National Association on Solar Energy (or ANES in Spanish). The NGO requests 
these numbers from all SWH companies in the country every year. Although not 
completely precise (about 3-4 SWH companies go out of business and the same number 
start every year on average), ANES makes these estimates to the best of their 
knowledge. Furthermore, because no one could say with certainty what percentage of 
the SWH market in Mexico, el Distrito Federal represented, I used the previous study 
(which used data from Mexico City up to 2000) (Weiss et al. 2004: 33) for this 
estimate.
In the case of Brazil, similar to Mexico, companies are asked to provide their annual 
sales of m2 to the national trade association for SWHs (among other technologies), 
ABRAVA. However, in Sao Paulo, the Sociedade do Sol’s SWHs, even though their 
project to disseminate this technology had yet to “take o ff’ at the time of research, the 
hardware of this technology is considered of too low quality to receive the PROCEL 
stamp, or ABRAVA affiliation and so they are not included in ABRAVA’s total. To 
account for these differences, sensitivity analysis was conducted when generating 
numbers, to provide a range of plausible numbers in which the mean was eventually 
used and compared with the numbers obtained from these local sources.
The use of biogas to produce electricity however was measured in MW, a number 
more easily obtained. This metric (MW) is used like other studies on (or the potential
121
of) this same technology (See for example Katinas and Skema (2001: 815) on 
Lithuania; Shin et al. (2005: 1261) on Korea; Wanichpongpan and Gheewala 
(2007:1822) on Thailand; and Aitchison (1996: 1113) on the United Kingdom). 
Information in MWs was readily available, and so provided a single form of 
measurement that could also take other technology use measurements into account. 
These other technology use measurements include the number and capacity of motors 
in place, the amount of biogas to be combusted to generate electricity daily, etc.
However, technology is both “hardware” and “software”. Thus, SWH and biogas use 
was also measured by examining activities occurring in both cities regarding these 
technologies. These less tangible forms of technology are more difficult to measure. 
For instance, Park and Park (2005) note that technological knowledge is difficult to 
measure because it is often is comprised of heterogeneous and multidisciplinary 
sources, it is often tacit and thus difficult to quantify, and it is often subject to certain 
differences between sectors. Nevertheless, they and other researchers measure 
knowledge through a number of proxies such as research and development (R&D) 
expenditure, number of researchers, patents, or types of patents, among others (Hu and 
Jaffe 2003; Park and Park 2005). This thesis looks at knowledge and processes 
generally however for two reasons. First of all, as indicated earlier, knowledge is more 
than just information, it is also shaped by experiences, assumptions and values and so it 
is not clear how adequate these proxies are to determine knowledge. Secondly, there 
was also a lack of precise information available about money spent on research and 
development and the specific amount of researchers for SWHs in Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo.
Patents will be explored in Chapter 8, which examines Trade and Competitiveness 
Approaches. However, this was not used as a proxy to measure technology adoption as 
there were some inconsistencies regarding how they were perceived. For instance, in 
both locations there was a general consensus that SWHs were in the ‘open domain’ and 
that no patents existed on these technologies. However, some companies claimed they 
did have a patent or “trademark” on their technology, while one NGO claimed that to 
seek a patent was counterintuitive to their philosophy -  which was to make their
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technology be developed by all.46 In the case of biogas to produce electricity, all 
informants indicated that the patents for the hardware of a lot of the patents were held 
by other countries (namely companies such as Caterpillar in the Unites States, as well 
as Canadian and Dutch and Swiss firms). In addition, the majority of studies use 
patents as a proxy to measure innovation (e.g. Hu and Jaffe 2003; Park and Lippoldt 
2008), rather than adoption. The subject of patents will be treated instead as one of a 
number of potential factors affecting technology adoption, rather than as a way of 
measuring adoption.
Other factors can also be indicators of knowledge and / or processes. These factors 
include formal and informal capacity building efforts and the number of organizations 
working on solar water heaters (SWHs). An indirect way of learning about SWH use is 
through examining the awareness, or what some call knowledge, of the technology 
amongst the population. But, as I argue in Chapters 1 and 2, this view of knowledge 
tends to equate it with information. However, this thesis views “awareness” as also 
being a factor that can help to explain the “why” the technology is or is not being 
adopted. For this reason “awareness” will be investigated in Chapter 6, which deals 
with the question of “why SWHs and biogas into electricity technologies are or are not 
being used in Mexico City and Sao Paulo”.
Some other proxies used to measure aspects such as knowledge and processes include 
number of courses on solar water heating, number of installers (whether certified or not 
certified), number of organizations working on SWHs, among others (e.g., in Tunisia 
the number of SWH suppliers doubled and number of installers quadrupled in four 
years following a UNEP program encouraging their use in that country (Volans 2009). 
This study includes this information where obtainable. However, as indicated above, 
some “official” information that other studies have used as proxies to “measure” 
technology use was not available for Mexico City or Sao Paulo, or was considered 
unsuitable for this study. For this reason, interviews and discussions with key 
informants, as well as information obtained from other sources (e.g. government, NGO 
and company websites) helped to glean insights in this area.
46 Informal discussions and Interviews, three informants Mexico, November 2005-January 2006; and 
Informal discussions and interviews, six informants Brazil, March -  May 2006
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3.5. Analysis Techniques
This information was mainly analyzed through an in-depth evaluation and 
interpretation of information supplied through these primary and secondary-sources. 
As discussed in Section 3.4, information was collected with the objective of answering 
the research and sub-research questions:
What are the most important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing 
world?
• How can systemic approaches help explain RET adoption in developing country 
cities?
• What are the reasons that SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies 
are being used or not in Mexico City or Sao Paulo?
• To what extent do trade and competitiveness regimes affect the uptake of 
RETs?
One option was to transcribe interviews and examine completed questionnaires, 
looking for trends and common themes with no software programs. Another alternative 
was to use a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
program, such as Atlas-ti. This program allows the researcher “to manage, extract, 
compare, explore and reassemble meaningful segments of large amounts of data” 
(Atlas-ti 2008) in order to identify common themes and trends in the qualitative data 
and to link these insights to conceptual analytical frameworks. The software is based 
on four premises -  termed the VISE principle, offering opportunities for Visualization, 
Integration, Serendipity, and Exploration of information in the study process (Atlas-ti 
2008). One other advantage of using a CAQDAS program is that it counts the number 
of times themes are revealed, which can reinforce the prominence of themes identified 
qualitatively. As there was a large amount of information to consult -  over 60 
interviews and questionnaires in Spanish and Portuguese, sometimes translated in 
English - it was deemed suitable to use a CAQDAS program.
Atlas-ti was the CAQDAS program chosen. There were a number of reasons why I 
chose this program rather than other CAQDAS programs (e.g. Nvivo, ALCESTE). 
First of all, the program allows for a verbatim record to be kept of the interviewee’s 
responses and that the frequency and word usage can help to determine patterns and 
themes from this information (Yin 2003). Also, Atlas-ti allows visual as well as textual
124
data to be incorporated into the analyzed documents. This function allowed for the 
possibility of including information in other forms -  such as charts and tables if 
necessary to be assessed. Furthermore, one of the other programs, ALCESTE, has all 
of the commands in French. Although I have fair knowledge of French, I thought it 
would be best to use a program in English -  especially important as the interviews 
themselves were in Spanish and Portuguese. Finally, at the time of deciding which 
program to use (early 2007), one other CAQDAS program under consideration, Nvivo, 
was expected to come out with a newer version and it was not clear how compatible 
these two versions would be.
After transcribing the interviews, I came up with about 30 or so pre-selected codes 
based on my research questions and the themes that came up consistently during the 
interviews. From there, I coded the interviews manually using these pre-selected 
codes, as well as adding further codes revealed when going through the textual 
information thoroughly again when coding versus transcribing. This approach of 
developing codes at the start of data analysis and then modifying them is similar to 
other studies that also use this tool (including Kagee 2004: 627; Grunwald and Kieser 
2007: 380, Zhang 2005: 68, among others). If deemed applicable, text from the 
interviews was associated by more than one code (e.g. if the text touched on issues to 
do with trade policies and networks, the text had these two codes associated with it). I 
initially had over 100 codes, and then narrowed them down to about 40. From there, I 
undertook a second order of analysis, taking these 40 codes and grouping them into 
four code families to do with RET adoption and cooperation, to determine how best to 
explain these factors using the theoretical guideposts indicated in Chapters 1 and 2: 1) 
conventional explanations 2) Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations, 3) Urban Technology 
Cooperation, 4) Trade and Competitiveness Regimes
Using Atlas-ti proved to be a learning process in and of itself -  not only becoming 
familiar with the software, but also learning some strategies to ‘step out of the weeds’ -  
one example is by linking codes that were initially separated but closely related 
together (e.g. patents and Intellectual Property Rights) -  See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 
for details on how the trade and competitiveness regimes code family was established. 
In sum, by using this software tool, I was better able to identify trends and themes and 
common threads between these various concepts.
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Table 3.2 Constructing the trade and competitiveness index__________________________
• I examined all the codes developed (over 100 in total)
•  I went over the codes and looked for similar codes and decided to am algam ate 
certain codes into one larger code. In this instance I had som e information about 
trade and com petitiveness policies under this heading. I also had information from 
other related codes -  including patents, intellectual property rights, imports, etc. I 
decided to am algam ate these  codes into a  larger code called “trade and 
competitiveness regim es.” Other codes which did include som e information about 
trade and com petitiveness regim es som etimes, but not always (e.g. Mexican 
electricity sector) were not included, a s  the relevant text had already been captured 
in another code related to trade and com petitiveness regimes (e.g. privatization). 
Here I had about 40 codes in total
•  I then created code families, through further linking of related them es. I established 
one code family called “trade and com petitiveness regim es”
Source: Author, August 2009
Figure 3.2 represents a graphic interpretation of the relationship between various codes 
and amalgamating them into one code family. The diagram also helps the researcher to 
examine the links between particular codes that fall within one code family. For 
example, in the figure below arrows link text that falls under “imports”, “imports-other 
technology”, and “trade policies”. These sub-themes within the code family were 
extremely helpful in developing the analytical chapters, as they helped to determine 
exactly how conventional and alternative explanations could determine the most 
important factors affecting RET use in developing country cities.
Figure 3.2 - Trade and competitiveness regimes code family
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3.6. Conclusion
To summarize, this chapter explained the research design, methods and analysis used in 
the study and the basis for choosing them. Conventional technology adoptions often 
overlook the importance of context and the connectivity between actors. I therefore 
turned to systemic approach, which have been proposed as an alternative lens through 
which to understand RET uptake, but to date there has been little application of them in 
practice in this area, to answer my research question -  What are the most important 
factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world?
In answering this question, I chose qualitative approaches because they provide a better 
way in which to understand how choices and decisions impact uptake through the 
motivations, experiences and contexts of agents. Qualitative techniques also offer a 
number of advantages including a more in-depth view of phenomena, and better reflect 
the subjectivity involved when conducting research.
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Specific techniques used include probability and snowball sampling in order to ensure 
that relevant players involved in the technology cooperation process were considered. 
Furthermore, while some researchers would criticize my fieldwork approach as being 
too short (staying roughly 2.5 months in each location), in that not enough time was 
given to develop and establish trust, on the other hand, by being in each place for a 
shorter time, I felt there was less chance of me being perceived as being aligned with 
any one particular interest.
I chose to ‘measure’ uptake of equipment through m2 for Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) 
and Megawatts (MW) for biogas technologies, similar to other studies on these two 
particular technologies. In order to account for data limitations, especially with m2, I 
used a number of sources 1) information from the companies themselves, 2) 
information provided by two important agents at the national level, 3) information 
provided by other studies conducted in this area.
Finally, I chose to use Atlas ti, a computer based program to help qualitative 
researchers analyze large quantities of data. I found this program extremely helpful in 
identifying, amalgamating and conceptualizing key themes as discussed by informants.
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CHAPTER 4: SOLAR WATER HEATERS AND BIOGAS TECHNOLOGIES IN 
MEXICO CITY
4.1. Introduction
The study looks at trends regarding these two technologies from about the mid-1970s to 
the present (2009), with most information collected between 2005-2009. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Mexico City and Sao Paulo provide fascinating backdrops for this research. 
Both cities have large populations, active but unique civil societies, major discrepancies 
between the urban wealthy and poor, a high-energy demand, and high technological 
capability (TC), or the ability of firms, regions, countries, etc., possessing various 
assets including human resources, technical and scientific skills and infrastructure, to 
cause technological change. As well, akin to many mega-cities, they are both major 
hubs of technological learning, and, as large economies, are larger greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emitters. One distinct difference between the two places is that they possess 
differing trade and competitiveness approaches. Details about Sao Paulo are discussed 
in Chapter 5.
The main purpose of this chapter focuses on the sub-research question ““What are the 
reasons SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies are being used or not in 
Mexico City?” The focus of this chapter and Chapter 5 is on the findings from Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 analyze these findings using the three 
systemic frameworks as guidelines for their explanation. This chapter provides details 
about the situation for both technologies -  Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) and biogas 
technology to produce electricity in Mexico City. It is divided into five sections. The 
first section provides information about Mexico City. The next two sections focus on 
information about these two RETs in Mexico City, including segments are using them, 
where they are being used, and most importantly, how much they are being used. The 
latter part of the chapter consists of the other two sections. It turns to the factors 
affecting their uptake in Mexico City, teasing out common patterns and themes, as 
identified by informants and other secondary sources.
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This chapter shows that in comparison with other nations with similar attributes (e.g. 
insolation patterns, population), Mexico has a lower than average rate of SWH use. 
However, this rate is higher in Mexico City versus other parts of the country. It also 
shows that, to date, there are no biogas technologies to generate electricity being used 
in Mexico City, despite the fact that there are a number of these projects being planned 
as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in other cities in Mexico, as well as 
a project underway in Monterrey.
Similar to other studies examining the adoption of SWHs in developing nations (e.g. 
Muntasser et al. 2000, Headley 1998, Milton and Kaufmann 2005), this chapter shows 
that in the case of SWHs in Mexico City, respondents also noted direct environmental 
policies (2nd most prevalent theme noted) and awareness (4th most prevalent theme 
noted) as key factors affecting RET use. An interesting finding of this chapter 
however, is that in contrast to many studies emphasizing direct economic and technical 
aspects, two of the most prevalent themes identified by participants as having the 
potential to affect RET use in Mexico City are trade and competitiveness regimes (1st 
most common) and networks (or a lack of them) (3rd most common).
Apart from some World Bank, and joint World Bank / consultant assessments of the 
Bank’s Monterrey biogas project (e.g. Bartone et al. 2005; Roth and Grajales-Cravioto 
2005; Vergara 2005), the majority of studies of biogas technologies to produce 
electricity in Mexico are Project Design Documents (PDDs) of the CDM 
(EcoSecurities 2006a; EcoSecurities 2006b; EcoSecurities 2007; Juarez 2007), which 
are plans assessing the potential for these technologies, rather than an analysis of their 
uptake, or lack of uptake in certain settings. That said, other studies examining 
biomass (e.g. Goldemberg 1998) indicate the importance of direct environmental 
policies. Similar to these studies, I found that direct environmental policies were the 
most common theme cited by interview responders. However, an interesting trend is 
that, similar to the SWH results but different than many RET studies in developing 
countries, trade and competitiveness regimes were also noted as being important (2nd 
most common theme) and networks (4th most common theme). These findings lie 
outside of the classical explanations of RET adoption, centering on costs, access to 
finance, technical problems, awareness and institutional issues.
130
4.2. Mexico City -  Context
Mexico City is the capital of Mexico. The city has a large population -  almost 10 
million in the city proper, and over 19 million when the outskirts are included. Mexico, 
a country with a large degree of openness in international trade, practices an outward- 
oriented trade and competitiveness approach. Emphasis is placed on encouraging 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and free trade, and increasing technological capability 
through the manufacture and supply of foreign-designed technology. For instance, in 
2007, Mexico had the largest amount of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), with 43 
countries worldwide (ANIERM 2007). Furthermore, the Mexican renewable energy 
market in 2003 was estimated to be about $US 241 million, with imports of $US 216 
million -  or almost 90 %. In Mexico, end-users of RETs tend to buy integrated 
products, therefore Mexicans only become engaged in the construction / engineering 
aspects at the RET implementation stage (Dessommes 2004).
Electricity used in Mexico City is generated by the federally-owned Comision Federal 
de la Electricidad (CFE) and the Electric Power Utility Law (revised in 1992) limits 
private participation. For instance, Independent Power Producers (IPPs) must consume 
their electricity generated or sell it to CFE at long term (25 years), fixed low prices 
(Dessommes 2004; Estrada 2005). In Mexico City, electricity is distributed by another 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) Luz y Fuerza.
As noted earlier, the two technologies under scrutiny are Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) 
and biogas to generate electricity technologies. SWHs used in both cities are on a 
large-scale (e.g. institutions) and a smaller scale (e.g. household level). Biogas 
technologies to generate electricity being considered or in use in both cities are 
generally used at a larger-scale (e.g. landfills for large cities). For these reasons, it is 
important to examine the amount of disposable income and access to credit available 
for residents of these two cities and access to credit available to larger institutions.
The first point to be examined is disposable income, relevant for SWHs for household 
use. According to David Morillon, president of ANES in 2005, there are about 23 
million residences (which includes houses and apartments) in the Federal District and
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surrounding area, but of the people living there, “which ones can realistically purchase 
a SWH?”47. To answer this question, I turned to Quintanilla et al.’s (2000) study on 
SWH use in Mexico City. That study assumed that the monthly income of a home 
would need to be at least four times higher than minimum wage to afford a SWH for 
use in homes in the Federal District (taking other factors such as monthly expenditure, 
etc. into account). He estimated that 43% of homes in and around Mexico City or 
homes where the monthly income was at least four times higher than the minimum 
wage, could afford a SWH.
For a more recent estimate, I examined statistics from 2005. In Mexico City, the 
Mexican National Institute of Geography Statistics and Computer Science, or Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica Geografia and Informatica (INEGI) has data on almost 4 
million people employed in Mexico City in 2005 of the 8 721 000 that lived in Mexico 
City in 2005 48 According to INEGI, of this number, more than 1 480 000 people made 
in and around four times the minimum wage or higher in Mexico City in 2005. The 
minimum wage in Mexico City for the year 2005 (from January 1 -  December 31) was 
46.80 pesos / day or about US$4.35 dollars / day49. Using these estimates, one can 
assume that at least 17% of the population in Mexico City could afford a SWH in 
2005.
However, this is a very conservative estimate because 1) the information from INEGI is 
calculated per person, whereas generally speaking, there are about four people in the 
average home in Mexico City50 and 2) some larger scale SWHs for use in apartment 
buildings would require less upfront costs for potential users, and 3) the monthly 
income for a Mexican home can also come from sources other than formal employment 
such as informal employment activities and remittances from family members abroad. 
Taking this information into account, Quintanilla’s estimate that about 43% of homes 
in and around Mexico City could afford a SWH seems plausible too. There are no 
credit schemes in place to help families or institutions purchase a SWH in Mexico City. 
Institutions have better access to credit versus individual families, which can help them
47 Interview, one NGO, December 2005
48 (INEGI), I. N. d. E. G. y. I. (2007). "Various information from website." Retrieved September 16, 
2007, from www.inegi.gob.mx.
49 using an exchange rate of US$ 1 = 10.78 pesos December 31, 2005, www.oanda.com
50 Informal discussions, November 2005 -  January 2006; However, Quintanilla et al (2000: 10)’s study 
indicated that on average about five people lived in homes in Mexico City at that time.
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come up with the capital needed to purchase a SWH. Some photos of Mexico City are 
included in Figures 4.1 below. The purpose of these photos is to give the reader a 
flavour of the city. The first tries to capture how large the city is it (as this photo 
represents only a very small portion of the city) and also tried to demonstrate that the 
city is a modem hub, linked globally to other global cities, regions and countries. 
Furthermore, the photo shows that the city is situated in a valley, which means that 
some environmental problems, such as air pollution, are more pronounced.
The second photo shows the central part of Mexico City, called the Zocalo. It is a large 
square, where people congregate for various reasons (celebrations on holidays, a protest 
site, such as during the 2006 elections by supporters of Lopez Obrador when he lost the 
2006 federal elections by about 1%, etc.). The purpose of the photo is to indicate that 
daily face to face interactions among people and providing a space for these 
interactions is an important part of Mexican cities.
The third photo shows a girl walking in Bordo Poniente, Mexico City’s one main 
landfill site (at the time of research as the city is currently in the process of closing this 
one down and allocating other landfill sites to address the city’s waste). The purpose of 
this photo is to show that there are stark contrasts between wealth (as can be surmised 
in the first photo) and poverty (as indicated in the third photo). The photo also shows 
that communities exist, eking out a living (through finding recyclables to resell, etc.) 
within Bordo Poniente (versus Bandeirantes in Sao Paulo, where there are communities 
near the landfill site, but not directly within / adjacent to it). As is discussed further in 
this chapter in Section 4.8, the fact that people live directly within the current Mexico 
City landfill will have some implications should any potential biogas technology to 
electricity project using waste from Bordo Poniente come to fruition. A positive 
outcome could be providing electricity for these communities and training, employment 
for some community members to work on the project.
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Figures 4.1 Views of Mexico City
Permission to use - © andres balcazar 
Source: www.istockphotos.com
Permission to use - © andres balcazar 
Source: www.istockphotos.com
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Permission to use © Milan Klusacek 
Source: www.istockphotos.com
The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of Mexico City are largely caused by fossil fuels 
(especially oil and natural gas), which the city is heavily reliant on for its electricity and 
transportation needs -  for instance, daily energy consumption is about 44 million litres 
of gasoline equivalent (Plan Verde 2009). Various studies conducted calculating GHG 
emissions in that city, such as the 2004 “Local Climate Action Strategy of Mexico 
City”, range from estimates of about 34.9 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 1996, to 
about 60 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2000, and 62.6 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent in 2004. Some reasons for these discrepancies include the fact that some 
studies include emissions from aviation and solid waste51 while others do not and that 
very few official inventories exist (Dodman 2009; Gobiemo de Districto Federal 2004).
51 When assessing GHG emissions and removals, the IPCC is concerned with “methane produced from 
the anaerobic microbial decomposition of organic matter at solid waste disposal sites” (IPCC 2006, 
Chapter 8: 33) - C 0 2 is accounted for separately, but whether or not these sites include municipal and /  or 
industrial waste depends on the actual landfill. See IPCC (2006). Chapter 8: Reporting Guidelines and 
Tables. Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. I. P. o. C. C.  (IPCC). Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
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4.3. Solar Water Heater (SWH) Use in Mexico and Mexico City -  
the hardware
The first step when answering the sub-research question “what are the reasons SWHs 
and biogas to produce electricity technologies being used or not in Mexico City?” is to 
establish exactly how much of these RETs are being used. This is important, as a key 
goal of the dissertation is to determine if there are acute differences between the two 
locations in terms of how much these RETs are being used and potential factors that 
may affect RET adoption, in which more general deliberations can be established. As 
noted in Chapter 3 on Research Methods, the use of RETs will be measured by 
examining technologies that are considered hardware (physical equipment) and / or 
software (knowledge and processes).
4.3.1. Mexican SWH Industry -  The government and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) confirmed that although small, the SWH industry has firm, long­
standing roots in the country -  it has been in existence in Mexico for over 40 years52. 
In addition, the technology itself has been in existence for a long time -  according to 
one SWH company - for 85 years53. In Mexico there are over 50 companies that 
distribute and / or make SWHs54. Both government officials and industry firms 
indicated that in Mexico City and the surrounding area (e.g. Puebla, Cuernavaca), about 
20 active companies were identified (2005-06) that made and / or distributed or sold 
SWHs in that area55. A number of government officials at the national, regional, and 
local levels working in this area exist. According to one company in Mexico City that 
used to produce SWHs, before there were around 70 companies making SWHs in 
Mexico, but now, he claimed there were only about 1 0 - 1 5  that were producing good
52 Interviews, two NGOs, and one government official, November 2005 - January 2006
53 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
54 Interview, one NGO, December 2005
55 Older lists of SWH companies in Mexico City were also used, but after various attempts at 
communication (e.g. phone numbers and emails that did not work, and asking around), I was informed 
that about every year in Mexico about three or four SWHs companies went under and another three or 
four were created. (Interview, one SWH company and one government agency, November -  December 
2005).
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quality SWHs56. Sources from all sectors of the SWH industry indicated that 
companies are either wholly Mexican, Mexican but with imported products, or 
subsidiaries of international firms.57 In addition, there are three universities and one 
technical institute working on this form of solar energy in and around Mexico City, as 
well as a few NGOs and consultancy firms, such as Energia, Tecnologia y Educacion 
(ENTE), the National Association for Solar Energy, or Asociacion Nacional para 
Energias Solares (ANES) and Consultorfa y Servicios en Tecnologfas Eficientes 
(CYSTE).
At the national level, the SWH industry is generally centred around three areas of the 
country. In the 1950s, there were a number of immigrants that came to the state of 
Jalisco (in and around Guadalajara) and so the first place that the Mexican SWH 
industry developed was there.58 The two other places where the industry is 
concentrated are in Morelia and the area in and around Mexico City (especially 
Cuernavaca -  a city located about 80 km south west of the City). Sources from the 
private sector, as well as a NGO and consulting firms stressed that the main reason the 
Mexican SWH industry is concentrated in these locations is due to climate. For 
instance, Cuernavaca is also known as the “city of eternal spring” and the city claims to 
have the most pools in the world -  according to one source, about 35, 000 -  40, 000 
pools59.
Key informants from a broad range of SWH industry actors noted that when looking at 
Solar Water Heater (SWH) use in Mexico, SWHs represent only a small portion of the 
technologies used in Mexico to heat water. The main technologies used to heat water 
are natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), which is used in Mexico City. 
Electric and diesel water heaters are used very little60. For example, (Quintanilla and 
Bauer 2001) call the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (MAMC) -  an area which 
includes the Federal District and 51 of the surrounding localities located to the north of 
the Federal District, in the State of Mexico -  “the world’s largest LPG market” (2001:
56 Interview, one former SWH company, December 2005
57 Interviews, three SWH companies, three government representatives, one consulting firm, and one 
NGO, December 2005
58 Interview, one consulting firm, January 2006
59 Interviews, one SWH company, one NGO and two consulting firms, November and December 2005
60 Interviews, one consultancy, three SWH companies, four university representatives, three government 
representatives, November 2005 - January 2006
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1). Regarding specifics, in 1992, about 43% of LPG use in Mexico City was used to 
heat water; however, at the time only 54% of residential dwellings had any water heater 
(Bauer, Quintanilla et al. 2000: 284) -  so this number is likely higher.
4.3.2. SWH equipment use in Mexico - In 2006 there were about 840, 000 m2 
of solar water heaters installed in Mexico (ANES 2007). This number is an increase 
from a little over 650, 000 m2 in 2004 (CONAE 2007: 13) and 2005, which was 
approximately 740, 000 m2. While this growth may seem impressive on the surface 
(about 100,000 m2 per year), when comparing Mexico to other countries with a similar 
climate, Mexico’s rate of SWH installation is rather low. For example, Turkey, with an 
estimated population of almost 70 million in 2005 versus Mexico, with an estimated 
population of over 107 million in 2006 (Population Resource Center 2007; CIA 2007), 
saw an annual SWH installation increase in 2003 of about 630, 000 m2 (Milton and 
Kaufman 2005: 12).
To provide another comparison, some forecasts have put Mexico on par with the BRIC 
countries, or Brazil, Russia, India and China, projected to account for the majority of 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), economic growth and investment opportunities 
by 2050, with some coining the term BRIMCs.61
Another of the BRIMCs, with a large growing economy and increasing GHG 
emissions, is China. This country is the world leader in SWH use. For instance, in 
2006, there were around 20 million additional m2 installed -  therefore making the total 
almost 100 million m2 of SWH installed in China in 2006 (REN21 2008: 12). 
However, as the population of China was estimated to be about 1 314 million in 2006 
or about 1 330 million as of July 2008 (CIA 2008), or about 12 times higher than 
Mexico’s, a more comparable rate would be m2 / inhabitant. When couched in these 
terms, using data from 2006, China’s rate would be a little over 7.5 m2 / 100 inhabitants
61 The term Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico and China (BRICs), stem from a 2001 and later 2003 Goldman 
Sachs report where these four countries were singled out in forecast scenarios to account for the majority 
of global GDP, economic growth and investment opportunities by 2050. In a 2005 Goldman Sachs 
paper, Mexico was also projected to have rates similar to the rest o f these countries O'Neill et al. (2005). 
How Solid are the BRICs? Global Economics Paper. G. Sachs. New York, Goldman Sachs: 1-24. 
(O’Neill et al. 2005: 4), leading to the term BRIMCs but as noted in Chapter 3, this was further updated 
to include South Korea O'Neill, J. (2007). BRICs and Beyond. G. Sachs. New York, Goldman Sachs: 1- 
272.
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versus Mexico’s less than 0.8 / m2 per inhabitant. This is particularly striking when one 
looks at the potential for solar energy in Mexico, which some informants indicated is 
one of the highest in the world62. Other studies, such as Hoyt et al. (2006) and Torres 
Roldan and Morales (2006), indicate that Mexico has an average insolation rate, or rate 
of solar radiation, of about 5kWh/m2/day, also highlight this point. For comparison,
ry
New York, New York has an average insolation rate of 3.53 kWh/m /day.
4.3.3. SWH Market in Mexico - Generally, SWHs in Mexico are used to heat 
swimming pools (between 70 and 80%). The rest of the market is for SWHs used in 
commercial / industrial heating water applications and SWH for home use (mainly for 
bathing / washing purposes). Residential clients (whether using hot water for personal 
pools or for other purposes) are often wealthy or middle class. Large clients, whether 
for pools or heating water for other purposes, make up more than half of the SWH 
market64. Commercial and industry clients include hotels, sports clubs, hospitals, and 
various companies who need to heat water for industrial purposes65. According to 
ANES, SWHs for commercial and industry use represents about 20% of the industry.66 
All informants indicated that the market for SWHs for residential use was “very 
marginal”67 in Mexico. Some informants indicated that SWHs for residences 
represented about 1% of the market68, while others noted this market was about 5% to 
8%69.
62 Interviews one consultant, two university officials, November 2005- January 2006
63 This yearly average was obtained using 10 years of data (1990-2000) Whitlock et al (2000). Release 3 
NASA Surface Meteorology and Solar Energy Data Set. Renewable Energy Industry Use. Rise & Shine 
2000, the 26th Annual Conference of the Solar Energy Society of Canada Inc, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
NASA. See http://www.apricus.com/html/insolation_levels_usa.htm
64 Interview, one university representative, December 2005
65 Interviews, one SWH company, one NGO and two university representatives, November and 
December 2005
66 Interview, one NGO, December 2005
67 Interview, one university representative, December 2005
68 Interviews, two SWH companies, December 2005
69 Interviews, three SWH companies, November-December 2005
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Figure 4.2 Estim ated Market S hare  of SWHs in Mexico (approx.)
Residential
Use
5%
Commercial/ 
Industrial Use
20%
Swimming
Pools
75%
Source: Author, based on estimates provided by key informants November 2005-January 2006
The majority of other studies examining SWHs in Mexico have numbers regarding 
SWH use similar to the ones noted by informants. But, there are some discrepancies 
with respect to household use of SWHs. For example, Milton (2004: 5) indicates about 
1% in 2003 were used. Other studies suggest that SWHs for residences in Mexico are 
generally closer to the higher numbers provided by respondents. For example, one 
study notes that in 2003, 78% of the SWH market was for swimming pools, 14% for 
commercial / industrial applications, and 8% for domestic use (Hoyt et al. 2006: 11). 
Quintanilla et al. indicated that, in 1999, SWH for residences was about 9% of the 
market (2000: 46).
Some respondents noted that interest in renewables was increasing in Mexico. In 
addition, the general view among all stakeholders within the SWH industry indicated 
that the SWH market in Mexico has generally been increasing steadily -  and especially 
since 200070. Other studies also confirm this trend. For example, in 1990, there were 
around 150, 000 m2 of SWHs installed in Mexico, increasing to around 370, 000 m2 in 
2000, 430, 500 m2 in 2001 and 574, 000 m2 in 2003 (Castro Negrete 2005: 21; Weiss et 
al. 2004: 6; Milton 2004: 64). Previous reports indicate that annual installations of 
SWH remained relatively constant at about 12,000 m2 from 1990 -  1996 (Castro 
Negrete 2005: 21), or around 20 000 m2 in the 1990s (Quintanilla et al. 2000: 45). In 
the 2000s, yearly installations ranged from about 45,000 m2 in 2000 to over 50 000 m2
70 Interviews, six SWH companies, three government officials, one university official, and one
consultancy
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in 2002 (Fernandez Zayas and Valle 2005: 5). This number had increased to almost 
100,000 m2 installed per year in 2005 and 2006 (Heliocol 2007).
A broad range of stakeholders noted that increases were not as pronounced in the 
housing sector but more in the industrial and commercial sectors -  especially 
institutions such as hotels and sports centres71. Another company saw the market 
shifting more towards the residential sector and less towards pools in terms of growth 
patterns based on recent trends within their company (e.g. a 300% increase in SWHs 
for homes, but 50% less for pools in 2005)72.
4.3.4. Types of SWHs in Mexico - As shown in Table 4.1 below, the principal 
SWHs used in Mexico differ in price, size, and form. The Table lays out the SWH 
forms from least expensive to most expensive forms. The cheaper versions are used to 
heat pools, while the most expensive forms are used to heat water for commercial or 
industrial purposes, although one expensive version of the SWH available in Mexico 
(made by Genersys, a company from the United Kingdom (UK)) can also be used in 
houses.
71 Interviews six SWH companies, three government officials, one university official, and one 
consultancy, November 2005-January 2006
72 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
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T able 4.1 Principal T ypes of SWHs Used in Mexico
SWH Type C ost in US$ 
(equipm ent + 
installation)73
Details Main Use
Plastic with no 
covering
400. + Varies -  3m*, 9m*+ Residential swimming 
pools
Plastic with covering 700. Varies -  3m*, 9m* Residential water heating 
(single family)
Residential swimming 
pools
Copper with glass 
covering
800-900. 2-3 m*
about 150 litres 
about 30 -  60 
degrees Celsius 
depending on climate 
/ conditions
Residential water heating 
(single family)
Crystal Tubes with 
glass covering
920. Up to 80 degrees 
Celsius depending on 
climate / conditions
Residential water heating 
(single or multifamily) 
Commercial, industrial 
water heating (e.g. 
hospitals, hotels)
Copper with glass 
covering
1000. 6 m* Larger sized swimming 
pools (e.g. hotels, sports 
clubs)
Copper with glass 
covering
2000+ 10 m* + Commercial, industrial 
water heating (e.g. 
hospitals, hotels) 
Residential water heating 
(Single or multiple)
Sources: Interviews with 13 SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006, September 
2007. Some information confirmed from Hoyt et al. 2006: 29 and Heliocol website, 2007 
NOTE: 1 US dollar = 10.6 pesos in January 20006, www.finance.yahoo.com
As indicated in Table 4.1 above, an average SWH system for domestic water heating 
use for a family in Mexico (150 litre tank and 2-3 m2 of panels) would cost about 
US$800-900. Depending on family size, one may need a tank holding more water or 
more m2 (e.g. 200 litres or 4m2)74. This is consistent with other studies, such as Torres 
and Gomez, which state that in Mexico, generally flat solar collectors cost about US$ 
242 per m2 installed (2006: 62). This is generally considered to be on average, or a 
little higher, than the average costs for this technology globally (Hoyt et al. 2006: 2).
In Mexico, one can find many types of solar water heaters, from sophisticated systems 
that force water circulation, to ones that use natural circulation to move water, 
including cheaper, more simper versions of SWHs75 -  according to Ubaldo Inclan of
73 This is the average number based on information provided by key informants when in Mexico. 
However, even within certain types o f  SWHs, the price range can vary greatly.
74 Interviews, five SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006
75 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
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SENER, “the differences in prices [for SWHs] is enormous”76. It is difficult to say 
which material for SWHs is the most popular in Mexico after interview discussions and 
consulting the literature. A number of interviewees noted that plastic (whether covered 
in a glass panel or uncovered), because it was the cheapest, was the most popular form 
of SWH77. However some informants indicated that the traditional type made from 
copper and covered with a glass panel was the most popular78.
Imported technology (hardware), mainly finished products but some components, 
consists of about 70% of the SWH market, although national production is increasing79. 
According to Mexican energy expert Odon de Buen, the majority of components for 
SWHs made domestically are from Mexico -  although the copper used in certain forms 
of SWHs is from Chile80.
To summarize, there is significant variation with respect to SWHs in Mexico -  ranging 
from differences in price, style, size, materials used and origins of the hardware. 
General trends include the fact that this technology is steadily increasing in use within 
the country but that when compared to other developing countries with similar 
climates, the adoption rate is rather low. While the above is important to provide 
context, the chapter will specifically turn to SWH use in Mexico City.
4.3.5. SWH Equipment Use in Mexico City - According to a number of 
informants engaged in this sector, the above pattern of market segments for SWH use 
in Mexico (e.g. percentage of SWHs used in commercial processes, homes) in Figure 
4.1 is similar in Mexico City81. In Mexico City, like the rest of Mexico, SWHs can 
generally be divided into two groups -  a) those of plastic, either uncovered or covered 
by glass (imported or locally-made) which are used to generate lower water 
temperatures, often used to heat swimming pools (around 25-30 degrees Celsius); and
76 Interview, one government representative, November 2005
77 Interview, three SWH companies, November and December 2005
78 Interviews, one university representative, two SWH companies, November - December 2005
79 Although respondents were aware that I was defining technology as both hardware and software, here 
they are referring to physical equipment. Interviews, one SWH company and one government 
representative, December 2005
80 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
81 Interviews, three SWH companies and one organization, November and December 2005
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b) those made from copper, aluminum, glass tubes, among other materials, often 
covered with glass, made to generate higher water temperatures (e.g. around 70 degrees 
Celsius), used in industrial / commercial processes, or other uses (e.g. hot water use for 
hotels / hospitals / etc.) on a large scale. Some plastic SWHs that can reach 
temperatures of 40-48 degrees without problems were also included in this group82.
In terms of style of systems used in households in many developing countries, SWHs 
can be characterized three ways -  namely, a basic version in which the storage tank 
and heat collector are integrated, a version in which the tank (which is insulated 
therefore allowing for hot water in the evening and on cloudy / cooler days) and panel 
are adjoining, and a third version in which the heat collector is separate from the 
storage tank, also insulated (Milton 2004). In Mexico City and the surrounding areas, 
the second version is often used (where the tank and solar panel are adjoining).
Figure 4.3 Som e ty p es  of SWHs u sed  in Mexico City
Source: Modulo Solar, Cuernavaca, Mexico. The top one uses copper piping, while piping in 
the bottom one is made up of an alloy made from aluminum.
82 Interviews, 13 SWH companies, and one consultancy, November 2005 -  January 2006
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It was difficult to determine what percentage of the Mexican SWH market Mexico City 
represents, as official statistics do not exist at present. For this reason, a number of 
methods were used to calculate the amount. With respect to statistics at the national 
level, ANES indicated that in 2006, 840 000 m2 of SWHs were used nationally. A high 
level statistic was used because figures for Mexico City from other studies do not 
provide enough information. For example, Weiss et al., who did a global study of 
SWHs, representing about 85-90% of the SWH market in 2001 (2004: 4), have figures 
for the Mexico City SWH market for single family homes and larger institutions but 
only those SWHs for hot water or bathing, i.e. not pools. They indicate that the Federal 
District represented 28% of the market for single family SWHs and 72% of the market 
for multifamily or industrial-scale SWHs in 2001 in Mexico (2004: 30-31). However, 
it is not clear how much of the SWH market for pools (which is about 75% of the 
overall SWH market in Mexico) is in Mexico City.
In order to calculate the approximate amount of metres squared of SWHs in Mexico 
City, I used ANES’ number of approximately 840, 000 m2 in 2006. As noted 
previously, discussions with key informants indicated that SWHs for houses range from 
about 1 - 10 % of the overall SWH market. However, the amount of SWHs used in 
houses in Mexico City is only for single-family dwellings. For this reason, I will 
estimate that 5% of SWHs are used in single-family dwellings in Mexico, rather than 
numbers at the higher end of this range. Assuming 5% then, the number of SWHs for 
residential use in Mexico in 2006 was about 42 000 m2 and Mexico City is 28% of this 
number, or about 11 760 m2 for SWHs for one family dwellings.
Respondents indicated that SWHs for pools represent between 70-80% of the SWH 
market. Using a number in the middle of this range, or 75%, this would be equal to 630 
000 m2 in 2006. It is difficult to determine exactly how many metres squared for pools 
are in Mexico City, as there is no official number. Numerous inquiries to determine a 
ballpark figure did not reveal confident results. I was told that the majority of SWHs 
for pools in Mexico are in the Cuernavaca, Acapulco and Cancun areas; Mexico City 
represented a smaller portion of this market. So, using a range of between 10 -  20% of 
this 75%, one could estimate that there were about 63 000 - 126 000 m2 of SWHs for 
pools used in Mexico City in 2006.
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Interviewees indicated that SWHs for commercial and / or industrial purposes make up 
the rest of the SWH market. Including SWHs used in multifamily dwellings, this 
would represent about 20% of the SWH market in Mexico. In 2006, this would be 168 
000 m2 and Mexico City is about 72% of this number, or about 121 000 m2. Therefore, 
in total, it is estimated that there were approximately 144 500 m2 of SWHs not 
including pools in Mexico City, or between 207 500 m2 - 270 500 m2 including pools in 
the Federal District, as of the end of 2006.
The latest accurate data on the population of Mexico City is from the Mexican National 
Institute of Geography Statistics and Computer Science, or Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica Geografia and Informatica (INEGI) in 2005, states that the population of the 
city was a little under 8 721 000 in order to determine m2 / 100 inhabitants. Using the 
same calculations shown above, and using a population figure of about 9 million for 
Mexico City in 2006, it was determined that there were approximately 1.6 m2 / 100 
inhabitants (not including pools) in Mexico City, or 2.3 -  3 m2 / 100 inhabitants using 
SWHs, which, is significantly higher than the national average of 0.8 m2 / 100 
inhabitants using SWHs.
Table 4.2 E stim ates of SWH Use by Market S egm en t in Mexico City - 2006
Market S hare 
Nationally
Market S hare  in 
Mexico City
A m ount of SWHs u sed  
in Mexico City (m2)
Residential (single 
family)
5% 28% 11 760
Swimming Pools 75% 10-20% 63 000 - 126 000
Commercial / Industrial 
or Residential 
(multifamily)
20% 72% 121 000
TOTAL 207 500 -270 500
Source: Author, based on assumptions indicated above
In sum, depending on the assumptions made when determining the percentage of the 
SWH market in Mexico City, the majority of SWHs used in this region, measured by 
m2, are used to heat swimming pools. These SWHs often made from black plastic 
panels and plastic tubing, versus a glass plated aluminum panel and copper tubing, or 
glass vacuums also covered in glass, are generally cheaper, making them an attractive 
option for many Mexicans. This finding -  that cheaper versions of RETs would be 
more widely used in developing countries -- is similar to those studies on SWHs and
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other RETs that emphasize price as a critical factor affecting adoption (e. g. Matajs and 
Rodrigues 2005: 7; Nahar 2002: 623, Iniyan and Jagadeesan 1997: 316, among others).
The next largest segment of the SWH market in Mexico City is the commercial and 
industrial sectors, ranging from about 58% to 44% of the market in the Federal District, 
depending on the assumptions made regarding SWHs for pools. These findings are 
consistent with those studies on RETs that focus on the need for financing options to 
encourage RET adoption (Matajs and Rodrigues 2005: 9; Painuly 2001: 79), especially 
for residential use, as the industrial and commercial sectors often have more access to 
capital and credit, especially in developing countries.
However, when these figures that have been broken down into market segments are 
compared with another location, these findings become interesting. As will be shown 
in Chapter 5, they are significantly different than those results on SWH use in Sao 
Paulo, another mega-city in Latin America with similar traits such as percentage of 
population with disposable income available to purchase a SWH at current prices and 
the credit available to the commercial and industrial sectors.
4.3.6. SWH market growth in Mexico City -  Representatives from a NGO, 
the government and a consultancy also noted that there is a large potential for the SWH 
market to grow in Mexico City83. Previous studies also confirm this potential. For 
instance, as noted earlier, a 1998 comprehensive study on the possibility of using 
SWHs for residential hot water use in Mexico City indicated (using data from the 
Mexican INEGI 1992 survey) that “private houses where the family income exceeds 
four minimum salaries accounted for 47 percent of the total number of dwellings [in the 
Metropolitan Area of Mexico City]; these are considered [as having] sufficient income 
to invest in a solar water heating system” (Quintanilla and Mulas 1998: 3). In 
Quintanilla and Mulas’ (1998) study they did not include the possibility of SWHs 
substituting gas heaters in apartment buildings in MAMC. Other studies indicated that 
urban, wealthier Mexicans are considered to be one of the top potential market areas for 
SWHs in the country (Ferrel-Mendieta 1999: 68). Similar to market trends in Mexico, 
some saw market growth for SWHs in Mexico City occurring in all areas -  pools,
83 Interviews, one NGO, two government representatives, one consultancy November - December 2005
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industrial and commercial applications, and residential applications84. Others predicted 
growth would occur more in SWHs for industrial or commercial applications85.
The final aspect regarding the SWH market to be considered is the climate in Mexico 
City. The amount of savings of a SWH can provide in Mexico City vis-a-vis a fossil 
fuel counterpart are less than in other parts of the country (e.g. Cuernavaca, Acapulco). 
For instance, Jorge Davila, of the SWH company Sunway, noted that plastic SWHs 
(generally used to heat swimming pools) would only provide 35% of savings versus 
using their fossil fuel counterparts in Mexico City. Solar panels made from copper and 
covered in glass would provide up to 80% of savings in Mexico City, rather than 90% 
of savings in other places with a warmer, sunnier climate in Mexico versus using their 
fossil fuel counterparts. Another SWH company representative also pointed out the 
differences in efficiency, thus providing a variety of temperature ranges, between 
Mexico City (water temperatures up to 30 degrees Celsius) and Acapulco (water 
temperatures up to 90 degrees Celsius) using the same SWH.87
Some informants avowed that one is not likely to rely on a SWH to heat their water 
year round. Specifically, there are periods where there is rain during afternoons (the 
rainy season is from about June - September in Mexico City), and there is also a “cold” 
season in Mexico City (generally considered December -  February). Because of these 
seasons, one would likely need to have a “back up” system (e.g. LPG or natural gas)88.
Although some other studies indicate the same (see Ferrel-Mendieta 1999), a survey on 
the potential for SWHs conducted in two Federal District neighbourhoods in 1989 by 
the National Institute of Funds for Workers’ Housing or Instituto del Fondo Nacional 
para la Vivienda de los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT), the largest public mortgage 
lender in Mexico, showed that 97% and 90% of respondents supported the use of 
SWHs in those locations, while only 3% and 10% of respondents did not support 
SWHs for various reasons; the main one being the need for a gas water heater during 
the cold season (Quintanilla et al. 2000: 48).
84 Interviews, three SWH companies, November -  December 2005
85 Interviews, one SWH company, one university representative, one government official, December 
2005
86 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
87 Interview, one SWH company, January 2006
88 Interviews, two government officials, November -  December 2005
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Detailed information regarding how often this back up would meed to be used was 
unavailable. Quintanilla’s study showed that in the worst month Jfor SWHs in Mexico 
City (December) the SWH systems of all of the seven SWH producers interviewed 
could provide a maximum of 60 litres per person per day of water greater than 50 
degrees Celsius if four panels were used (using one or two panells would only yield a 
maximum of 15 to 32 litres per person per day of water -  indicatimg the need for a back 
up in this time period) (Quintanilla et al. 2000: 134). Altejmativelly, one could 
purchase a sophisticated SWH (e.g. like those models common im colder climates like 
northern Europe and Canada) (very expensive for many Mexicans)) to heat their water.
4.4. SWH Use in Mexico and Mexico City -  the software
In addition to “hardware” other forms of technology use were examined. These include 
knowledge and processes -  also known as the “software”. As noted in Chapter 3, other 
studies use proxies such as research and development (R&D) expenditure, number of 
researchers, patents and types of patents to measure technological knowledge and 
processes. In the case of SWHs in Mexico City, research and development 
expenditure, as well as number of researchers working on SWHs was difficult to 
determine quantitatively, due to a lack of availability of data1.. Companies generally did 
not have an allocated budget for R&D, nor specific staff or staff time devoted to R&D, 
but incremental innovations were occurring, mainly with respect to the production 
process, over time89. Other organizations, such as govemmients and universities, were 
unable to provide a specific figure for budgets, although soime were able to provide an 
approximation of staff.
Another proxy used to “measure” knowledge is through pattents or types of patents as 
noted in Chapter 3. However a number of interviewees imdicated that there were no 
formal patents in Mexico on the SWH technology90, makinig this indicator difficult to 
determine. According to one university representative, the itechnology is in the public
89 Interviews, two SWH companies, and informal discussions November ■- December 2005
90 Interviews, two SWH companies, one university representative, Novenmber -  December 2005
149
realm91. Another source noted that the technology is simple92, making it difficult to 
have a patent in place. This is not to say that informants were not concerned about 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and other propriety issues involved with their 
technologies -  something that will be explored further in Chapter 8, when the effects of 
trade and competitiveness policies on the adoption of these technologies are assessed.
In addition, as noted in Chapter 1, the problem with using these proxies as ways to 
measure knowledge is that they do not account for the distinction between just 
information (e.g. number of patents applied for and received, R&D dollars) and 
knowledge (information and how this information is processed and interpreted). While 
recognizing these limitations, one way to measure the software is to examine those 
organizations working on SWHs in Mexico City.
4.4.1. Organizations working on SWHs in Mexico City
There was a general consensus among stakeholders that the main organization 
undertaking capacity building efforts for solar energy in Mexico and Mexico City is 
ANES93. This organization, which has been in existence since 198094 undertakes 
various activities, including coordinating yearly conferences and providing intermittent 
workshops and seminars to discuss developments in solar energy, their applicability to 
Mexico, etc.)95.
In addition to ANES’ activities, many informants spoke about the networks that ANES 
had built up over time and were maintaining between industry and academics, and 
more recently, their engagement with the government -  especially at the local level in 
Mexico City. In addition, respondents indicated that dynamics within ANES were 
influencing SWH use in that city and country in a positive way. They specifically 
indicated that in the past, key positions in ANES were taken up by academics, but that 
recently the organization was incorporating more industry representation into the NGO,
91 Interview, one university representative, November 2005
92 Interview, one consultancy, December 2005
93 Interviews, three university representatives, one NGO, three consultancies, three government 
representatives, three SWH companies, November 2005-January 2006
94 However, the first meeting of specialists working on renewable energy in Mexico -  which formed the
basis for ANES - took place in 1977 (ANES 2007)
95 Interviews, one NGO and one SWH company, December 2005
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not only academics. Because of representation from both the academic and industry 
communities, the NGO’s actions were viewed as being more ‘in tune’ with what was 
needed to encourage adoption -  e.g. not only seminars focusing on cutting-edge lab 
research in Mexico and elsewhere, but particularities -  including opportunities and 
challenges — of the Mexican SWH market.96
Another more recently created organization working on renewable energy, operating 
out of Cuernavaca, is the Association of Renewable Energy Suppliers, or la Asociacion 
de Proveedores de Energias Renovables (AMPER). This organization is a trade 
association. However, only two respondents mentioned AMPER97, which is quite new 
(officially created in October 2004) and its main activities are centred on photovoltaic 
energy98. Other organizations working on SWHs in Mexico City are the consultancy 
firms ENTE and CYSTE.
In and around Mexico City, formal capacity building efforts also includes those 
regarding technological development on renewables, which mainly occurs through 
various universities. In addition, the Electricity Research Institute, or Institute de 
Investigaciones de Electricidad (EE) in Cuernavaca, an arms-length organization 
created by the federal government in 1975 also conducts research on RETs in Mexico, 
although they conduct little work on SWHs99. With respect to solar thermal 
technology, there are a number of key universities in and around Mexico City that 
conduct work on Solar Water Heaters. These are the Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de Mexico (UNAM) -  particularly its Centre for Energy Research, or Centro de 
Investigaciones en Energia (CIE) in Cuernavaca and its Engineering Institute and 
Observatory for Solar Radiation, Geophysical Institute in the Federal District; the 
Universidad Autonoma Metropolitania (UAM); and the Iberoamericana University. In 
addition, the Institute Politicnico Nacional (IPN) also works on SWHs (15 people), 
including running various tests on SWHs through a laboratory. Government institutes 
working on SWHs in Mexico City include SENER (1 person) and CONAE (2 people),
96 Interviews, one NGO and four SWH companies, November-December 2005
97 Interviews, one consultancy and one SWH company, December 2005
98 The organization works to certify companies that sell photovoltaic energy in Mexico, as well as to 
promote renewable energy in schools and universities (CONAE 2005).
9 Personal Communication, one research institution, November 2005 and October 2007; Interviews, four 
university representatives, and one government representative, November - December 2005
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and a number of people within the Secretary of Environment of the Federal District100. 
More recently the German aid agency, GTZ and the consultancy, Econergy Mexico 
have become involved in SWHs in Mexico. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
also has a global SWH project, of which Mexico is one of the case studies. The aim is 
to have 2.5 million m2 of SWHs installed by 2011.101 Having said this, the majority of 
capacity building regarding solar energy occurs through experience gained on the 
job102, also termed learning by doing103.
But, one factor hindering the use of this technology in Mexico City and the country is 
the fact that there is no school in place to certify potential developers, producers, and / 
or installers of SWHs in Mexico. In fact, in Mexico, there is no government-run, 
national-level certification program or school available for people to develop, produce 
and / or install SWHs104. Sources from the private sector, universities and a 
consultancy indicated that people are certified through individual companies which 
provide courses / training, or not at all. Other organizations that provide courses on 
solar energy in Mexico are ANES and AMPER and SYS-CON but these last two 
mainly focus on photovoltaics (PV)105. One company highlighted a course on SWHs 
and solar energy in Spain106. People were concerned about this as they felt that 
without at least one national school and / or -accredited nationally certification 
program on SWHs, there was no common vision to rally around and / or critique. 
Others noted that no certification program or government-sanctioned standards 
program opened the door to bad quality products on the market.
100 Interviews, six university representatives, and four government officials, November -  December 2005
101 Personal Communication, UNEP representative,, Lebot, B. (2006). Information regarding global 
SWH project at GEF. New York and confirmed (GEF), G. E. F. (2008). "UNDP/UNEP Solar Water 
Heating Market Transformation and Strengthening Initiative - Mexico." Retrieved September 16, 2009, 
http://www.thegef.org/uploadedfiles/07-01%2008%20ID2939%20Global%20SWH%20Final.pdf
102 Interviews, two university representatives and two SWH companies, November -  December 2005
103 Learning by doing is when producers, through experience, are able to carry out activities using less 
time, resources and energy (This concept comes from Kenneth Arrow’s work on endogenous growth 
theory, recognizing that firms also innovate internally, Cortright, J. (2001). Reviews of Economic 
Development Literature and Practice: No. 4. U. S. D. o. Commerce. Portland, OR, Impresa Consulting: 
1-40.: 23).
104 Interviews, two SWH companies, November - December 2005
105 Interviews, three SWH companies, two university representatives, one consultancy, November- 
December 2005
106 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
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Chapters 7 and 8 explore the reasons behind this lack of coordination -  which are 
traced to three factors -  the nature of these relationships between stakeholders, 
dynamics within stakeholder groups, and trade and competitiveness policies.
In sum, the SWH market in Mexico City is increasing, and at 1.6 m2 / 100 inhabitants 
or 2.3 - 3 m 2 / 100 inhabitants, it is higher than the national average of 0.8 m2 / 100 
inhabitants in 2006. Compared to other countries with similar climates and 
populations, both the national average and Mexico City’s average are rather low. Many 
different types of SWHs are available -  consisting of a wide range in price, materials 
and layout. Characteristics of SWH use in Mexico City -  that cheaper versions of the 
technology are more prevalent in general, and that those with more capital available to 
them (businesses, hospitals, sport institutes, etc.) are using SWHs more than 
households are similar to classical explanations of RET use in the developing world. 
However, when compared with results for Sao Paulo in Chapter 5, these findings 
become very interesting and some factors affecting uptake do not fall into these 
conventional explanations.
Regarding the ‘software’, with about eleven organizations (including three government 
agencies) actively working on SWHs in and around the context of Mexico City, an 
active group of players exists, attempting to increase the use of this technology in the 
Federal District. Informants indicated that ANES was by far the most effective and 
active champion for SWHs in the city and country, and that internal dynamics were 
beneficial to their use. On the other hand, respondents were concerned about the lack 
of Mexican courses, schools and certification programs in this area. Chapters 7 and 8 -  
using two systemic frameworks — explore why this is the case.
How does this situation compare with that of another RET deemed viable for Mexico 
City - biogas to generate electricity? Section 4.5. examines this RET.
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4.5. Biogas Use to Produce Electricity in Mexico and Mexico 
City -  the hardware
Another potential renewable energy source for urban areas in Mexico is biogas. 
Specifically (as noted in Chapter 1) the RET examined is the production of electricity 
through landfill gas. This technology was chosen based on previous research done in 
this area, arguing for its potential. For instance, using municipal solid waste (MSW) to 
produce electricity from the ten main cities in Mexico (which includes Mexico City), 
“could lead to the installation of 803 MW and generate 4, 507 MWh/year” (Torres and 
Gomez 2006: 65). Representatives from the private sector and government indicated 
that this technology is attractive in Mexico and Brazil, as well as other developing 
countries, due to the make up of waste in many of these countries, which consists of a 
higher organic to inorganic ratio.107
4.5.1. Biogas to produce electricity equipment use in Mexico
At the time of writing, there was only one biogas to produce electricity project up and 
running in Mexico. This project produces about 7 MW of electricity. It is located in 
Monterrey, Mexico, and was established through partial funding from the Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF) of the World Bank. Sistemas de Energia Intemacional S.A. 
de C.V. (SEISA) is the company that implemented the project along with the 
municipality of Monterrey. The idea of this project is to serve as a pilot in order to 
replicate this endeavour in other parts of the country108. As of late 2007, there were 
four landfill gas to energy projects in the CDM pipeline managed by Ecosecurities and 
another five in the development stage proposed by other companies.109 In the 
Monterrey project, the equipment used is foreign (motors to generate electricity which 
normally use natural gas, diesel, or some other fuel, which are adapted to use biogas as 
a fuel); however Mexican expertise is utilized110.
4.5.3. Biogas to produce electricity equipment use in Mexico City
107 Personal communication, interviews, two biogas company representatives and one government 
official in Mexico, December 2005-January 2006 and one government official and one engineering 
consultant in Brazil, March 2006
108 Interview, one government representative, December 2005
109 Personal Communication, one research institution, October 2007
110 Interviews, two biogas companies, one government representative, December 2005 -  January 2006
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Informants confirmed the viability, in technical terms, of this RET as an option to 
produce electricity for Mexico City, although to date there is no project. Discussions 
with these experts indicated that any biogas to electricity project in Mexico City would 
likely be similar to the Monterrey project -  namely a joint effort between foreigners 
and Mexicans, using foreign hardware (the Swiss and Dutch have expertise, and a 
Canadian company was also identified) and foreign and domestic knowledge and 
processes111.
4.6. Biogas Use to Produce Electricity in Mexico and Mexico 
City -  the software
Like SWHs, it is important to examine the “software” involved in biogas from solid 
waste to produce electricity. In addition to the problems noted earlier with equating 
information to knowledge, there were other problems involved with using proxies used 
to measure knowledge by other studies. For instance, research and development 
(R&D) expenditure and number of researchers -  when it was occurring — was very 
difficult to determine as this was mainly occurring abroad. In addition, companies 
were unwilling to share this information. Other sources conducting studies did not 
have this information available. Also, patents were deemed inappropriate indicators to 
measure knowledge of this technology in Mexico City as the patents are foreign112.
4.6.1. Organizations working on biogas to generate electricity in 
Mexico City
With respect to number of organizations working on this technology, at present, the
companies Ecosecurities and MGM International are interested in exploring this
1 1  *2potential in Mexico City and so were starting to conduct studies. In addition, several 
government agencies, such as Environment and Natural Resources Secretariat or 
Department, or Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), 
and National Institute of Ecology, Instituto Nacional de Ecologia (INE) (within
111 Interviews, one consultancy, two biogas companies, five government representatives, November 2005 
-  January 2006
112 Interviews, two biogas companies, four government representatives, November 2005 -  January 2006
1,3 Interviews, two biogas companies, December 2005 - January 2006
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SEMARNAT), the Energy Secretariat or Department, Secretaria de Energia (SENER) 
and the National Commission to Save Energy, or Comision Nacional para el Ahorro de 
Energia (CONAE) (within SENER) are also conducting studies on the possibility of 
this technology within the country, of which Mexico City would be a part114. In 
addition, the government sponsored research institution, the Institute of Electricity 
Research, or Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas (HE) is conducting a study on this 
possibility in the Federal District115. However, there is little knowledge amongst the 
general public of this technology in Mexico, let alone technical personnel available to 
work on this area116.
There are a number of companies such as Ecosecurities, MGM International, 
Conestoga, Biotermica, among others117, conducting studies regarding the potential for 
landfill gas in Mexico. Most of these companies are foreign or a subsidiary, but there 
are also a few Mexican or joint foreign and domestic ones. Some of these studies are 
assessing the possibility of generating electricity through biogas. However, the 
majority are assessing the potential to flare one of the main by-products of landfill gas, 
methane, so it is converted into CO2 before being released into the atmosphere, which, 
as noted in Chapter 1, is 25 times less harmful in terms of global warming potential 
(IPCC 2007).1'8
Although this facet did not come up often, interestingly, in contrast to a number of 
studies examining biogas, such as some in Asia, where generating electricity rather 
than carbon credits was more important (see Forsyth 1999 and 2005), some informants 
indicated that because of the structure of the electricity market in Mexico (monopolized 
by government-run agencies with some opportunities for Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) to sell electricity to the CFE but at terms considered unfavourable to investors 
and plagued by permits, various forms and subsequent delays) these types of projects 
(i.e. those to generate electricity rather than just flaring methane) were too cumbersome
114 Interviews, four government representatives, November 2005 -  January 2006
115 Personal Communication, one research institution, November 2005 and confirmed in October 2007
116 Interviews, two biogas companies, December 2005 -  January 2006
117 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
118 Some consider methane flaring to be a “low hanging fruit” or those projects, which are the most 
economically viable, but may not have the greatest environmental or social benefits Muller-Pelzer, F. 
(2004). the Clean Development Mechanism. HWWA Hamburg Report. Hamburg, Hamburgisches Welt- 
Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) - Hamburg Institute of International Economics: 27). However, this thesis 
specifically looks at biogas to generate electricity.
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and too costly to interest investors. That said, I did not find any NGO or community 
group working on this issue in Mexico City at the time of research (2005-06) despite 
various prodding of informants working on biogas technologies, or working on 
environmental and climate change issues more generally.
To summarize, this technology is relatively unknown in Mexico City, although the 
landfill gas to energy project in Monterrey is starting to become known amongst 
technical experts within the country. There is increasing interest in biogas for 
electricity as a potential energy source for urban areas (although methane flaring 
remains the principal area of interest) and so a number of companies -  mainly 
international -  are exploring this possibility in the country and within the Federal 
District. It was stated by both private sector and government representatives that the 
major impetus for these companies getting involved, as well as piquing the interest of 
the municipal government, is due to climate change -  they see it as a way to obtain 
carbon credits through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Thinking on this 
however was sparse on specifics as examples of who would sell or purchase these 
credits were hypothetical (e.g. the municipality and / or the landfill owner or 
industrialized nations).119 However, as noted above, there are no biogas to energy 
projects up and running in Mexico City at the time of writing (2009) -  although as 
noted in more detail in Section 4.8, there are more recent plans to undertake some 
biogas projects. The reasons for this are explored in Section 4.8 and also examined 
further in the subsequent chapters, when we explore the “why” involved in technology 
adoption for RETs in urban Latin American settings. To begin this task, we will turn to 
results regarding why SWHs and biogas for electricity are or are not being used, based 
on evidence from Mexico City.
4.7 Factors Affecting SWH Use in Mexico City
To help ascertain which factors had the most impact on the use of SWHs and biogas to 
produce electricity in Mexico City, I turned to Atlas ti, a computer assisted qualitative
119 Interview, one government representative, November 2005 and two biogas firms, December 2005- 
January 2006
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data analysis software (CAQDAS) program, as discussed in Chapter 3. Codes were 
themes identified by respondents, with some based on predetermined topics to serve as 
guideposts, during the discussions. As noted in Chapter 3, after transcribing the 
interviews, I came up with about 30 or so pre-selected codes based on my research 
questions and the themes that came up consistently during the interviews. From there, I 
coded the interviews manually using these pre-selected codes, as well as adding further 
codes revealed when going through the textual information thoroughly again when 
coding versus transcribing. The final step was amalgamating some codes, which spoke 
about similar themes. For example, I originally had separate codes for patents and 
taxes on imported products and services, then I grouped these together into “trade and 
competitiveness regimes”.
The graph below represents the frequency that processes were discussed by informants 
-  namely those factors having an impact on the uptake of these RETs. It is important to 
point out that these codes do not respond to a ‘per person’ basis. In other words, if one 
person spoke about various aspects of trade and competitiveness policies six times, then 
the frequency was noted as six for that person, and not one. While recognizing that 
people will tend to emphasize and come back to certain themes more than others, these 
responses were scrutinized thoroughly to ensure that the themes presented represented a 
broader view (i.e. that a number of people shared this view, rather than -  say -- one 
overly enthusiastic policy maker promoting their specific policy or program, thus 
mentioning direct environmental policies 34 times). (See Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for 
responses on a per person basis for the four code families noted in Chapter 3 -  
Conventional approaches, Rogers’ diffusion of innovations, urban technology 
cooperation and trade and competitiveness regimes).
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As noted in the graph above, themes identified by res pondents ranged from trade and
environmental policies to motivation and the urban poor. This chapter on findings will
explore the most prevalent themes affecting the uptake of these RETs, as identified by
key informants.
The most frequent theme noted by respondents w.-as trade and competitiveness
regimes. Specific topics identified include privatization, joint ventures, taxes, whether
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the technology was foreign or domestic, as well as the role of customs, transportation 
issues, as well as patents and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Although many 
participants felt that trade and competitiveness regimes played some role on adoption, 
there was no general consensus among informants that Mexico’s current regime 
(favouring free trade) was helping or hindering the uptake of SWHs.
On the one hand some, such as one SWH company, noted, “There are no restrictions on 
imports [for SWHs into Mexico]...I call my friend in Florida and he sends me a 
container of solar panels via UPS”.120 Many echoed this view such as another who 
stated, “NAFTA has reduced a lot of barriers for exports and imports within North 
America, especially during the last few years. [Now tariffs are] practically 0%; nothing
t 0 1more than the cost of transporting the technologies here”. These lack of tariffs into 
Mexico only apply to certain regions, including the rest of North America and the 
European Union. On the other hand, others indicated that the SWH market in Mexico, 
with little or no restrictions on imports, also had “risks as there are big companies 
coming into Mexico and taking more of the market [share]”122 Those of this view felt 
that the Mexican government was “doing nothing to help Mexican companies”123 and 
that one problem with this easy entry into the Mexican market by foreign companies 
was that this approach, hand in hand with a lack of nationally certified standards, 
“allowed foreign companies selling bad quality products and installations”124 into the 
market, therefore creating more bad experiences among actual and potential users.
The majority of informants indicated that any subsidy to LPG or natural gas hindered 
the uptake of SWHs and that anything done to reduce the price of SWHs, whether 
purposely or inadvertently (e.g. reducing tariffs from foreign finished products and / or 
components following trade liberalization) would increase SWH use in Mexico City. 
In addition, domestic companies highlighted the fact that they were “a Mexican 
company making Mexican technology”.125 Foreign companies too were quick to point 
out their local expertise -  e.g. making adaptations to the installation to make it suitable
120 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
121 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
122 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
123 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
124 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
125 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
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for Mexico City126, and their efforts to create a Mexican production factory, using 90% 
of Mexican components127. A prevalent view was that the Mexican SWH industry “has 
a strong national component but companies need to take advantage of all 
technologies”.128
This theme, the most prevalent, is particularly interesting as it falls outside the five 
classic explanations for RET use or a lack of use in other developing country studies as 
indicated in Chapter 1 (high cost of RETs, little financing options available, technical 
problems, lack of awareness and institutional issues, such as infrastructure favouring 
non-renewables), stressed by conventional models.
The second most prominent theme identified was the role of direct environmental 
policies; or, those policies put in place for the purpose of increasing the uptake of 
renewable energy sources -  either generally but which could include SWHs, or policies 
targeting this RET in particular -  which were deemed influential in increasing, or 
decreasing, the adoption of these RETs. In the case of Mexico City, these were 
government policies at the municipal and federal levels. A subset of this theme 
identified was climate change. Related to this area were environmental policies in 
other locations or for other renewables, where respondents noted success stories or 
failures with other RETs or in other settings.
Many informants spoke about work being done to promote renewables and / or 
specifically Solar Water Heaters, such as discussions for the Law for the Advancement 
of Renewable Energy Sources in Mexico, Ley para el Aprovechamiento de las Fuentes 
Renovables de Energia (LAFRE) (which was passed November 28, 2008). Another 
program noted is one by the National Commission to Save Energy, or Comision 
Nacional para el Ahorro de Energia (CONAE) in Spanish, an arms-length organization 
of the Mexican Ministry of Energy, begun in 2002, to promote the sale of SWHs in 
homes. However, there was a broad consensus among stakeholders that the challenge 
with this program appears to be a lack of promotion, a change in leadership within 
CONAE and little coordination amongst the public, the government and the private
126 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
127 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
128 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
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sector. For instance, even if one manages to find out about the program (which due to 
little promotion was rare), one must express an interest in the program through the 
internet and wait for a response regarding a proposal to install a SWH in their home. 
However, when a response is received, it is often very complicated and onerous (e.g. 
the potential user had to calculate their current energy usage and expenses), and unclear 
-  thus, not making this program very successful to date. Furthermore, there are no 
financial incentives provided to potential participants who must calculate the amount of 
natural gas or Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) used and money spent per year in order 
to compare it with accrued savings through the SWH129. After the time of field 
research (2005/06), CONAE also created a National Solar Water Heating Program -  
Programa de Calentadores Solares de Agua (PROCASOL) in 2007, with funding from 
the GTZ, the German development agency, targeting industry, low income housing and 
buildings with the aim to increase SWHs to 1.8 million m2 by 2012 (IEA 2008). Also, 
with the entry into force of LAFRE November 28, 2008, CONAE became the National 
Commission for Energy Efficiency, or Comision Nacional para el Uso Eficiente de la 
Energia (CONUEE).
Many stakeholders also highlighted the municipal government’s requirement for Solar 
Water Heaters in the Federal District, which makes it mandatory for new buildings in 
the city with 50-100 or 100+ employees have 30% of their water heating come from 
SWHs. One of the main rationales for this program is climate change. The 
government estimates that by 2012, with the implementation of this law, that a little 
over 350 000 tons of CO2 equivalent will be abated (Sheinbaum and Vasquez 2006). 
At the same time, representatives from the private sector, government, universities and 
consultancies reflected that these efforts were minimal (although an important step) and 
at the time of research some informants had never heard of these programs -  or just 
barely.130
Federal government officials and consultants stressed that there were two goals for the 
Mexican government regarding the provision of electricity -  1) electricity for all
129 Interviews with eight SWH companies, two government agencies and one consultancy, November 
2005 - January 2006
130 Interviews, 13 SWH companies, seven government representatives, five university representatives and 
two consultancies, November 2005-January 2006; Informal discussions, November 2005- January 2006
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Mexicans131 for socio-economic improvement, and 2) electricity for productive 
applications, so as, they argued, to also increase economic development for these 
communities. The focus on RETs in Mexico is principally on rural areas, where some 
RETs, including photovoltaics (PV) and wind, are more viable. One official gave an 
example about a project in a remote community in Tamaulipas, a northeast state in 
Mexico, which in addition to providing electricity to 40 families, also used electricity to
1 'XOrefrigerate shrimp. Some experts also spoke about the potential for CDM projects in 
this area, arguing that to make solar water heating into a viable CDM project, a number 
of projects would need to be bundled together, increasing the transaction costs; thus not 
many considered the CDM as a viable option at present. The potential for CDM is 
discussed further in Chapter 7.
Many other studies examining RET uptake in developing countries (e.g. Philibert 2006; 
Renewables 2004) also purport that direct environmental policies play a positive role 
on increasing adoption. These results are interesting because while in principle 
although people all agreed that these types of policies help encourage RET use, there 
were mixed views regarding their actual effectiveness in the case of SWHs in Mexico. 
Attention must be placed on how a policy is designed, managed and executed. 
Furthermore, these results indicate that direct environmental policies are only one 
factor affecting RET use. Other aspects often neglected, including systemic policies 
such as trade and competitiveness approaches, as well as networks also play an 
important role.
The third theme that respondents underscored was the role that networks, or a lack of 
networks, can have on the uptake of SWHs in Mexico City. One challenge with 
respect to the concept of networks is that “there has yet to be a common lexicon for 
studying the construct, leaving those who study networks with multiple definitions and 
a tangle of meanings” (Provan et al 2007: 481). Having said this, a number of common 
traits shared by most definitions include attention to “social interaction (of individuals
131 As o f late 2005, about 5% of the population did not have electricity, or 5-6 million people. Interview, 
one government official, November 2005
132 Interview, one government official, December 2005
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acting on behalf of their organizations), relationships, connectedness, collaboration, 
collective action, trust, and cooperation4* (Provan et al. 2007: 481).
Some scholars take a more narrow approach, focusing on relationships between 
organizations. However networks are broader. Others also highlight this broader view, 
examining the relationships between nodes -  whether those nodes be individual people, 
organizations, communities, etc133. It is important to clarify that the definition of 
networks will differ between contexts and actors. As this study centres on the meso- 
level, the core networks under scrutiny are those between and within stakeholder 
groups, rather than between individuals. Subsets of this theme also highlighted by 
respondents include agreements with other institutions, whether informal or formal, and 
communication. There are variations regarding the concept of communication, which 
can be verbal and nonverbal, but generally involves at least two people, organizations, 
or groups who share ideas, insights, information, etc. When referring to 
communication, people mainly spoke about interpersonal networks, although some 
referred to mass media channels -  including the potential to increase awareness through 
newspaper, television advertisements, etc.
A number of interviewees noted that, generally speaking, there was a disconnect 
between companies, universities, and government institutions. Furthermore, even in 
the instances when these three groups did come together, the public remains outside of 
the technology cooperation process. In addition, although universities collaborated 
with other universities on solar energy, there was little collaboration between 
government institutions and companies. That said, these relationships are changing -  
for instance, as noted earlier the NGO ANES, run by academics in the past, was 
incorporating more industry representatives in their management committee. Also, at 
the time of study (2005-06), the municipal government was very interested and active 
in this issue and was establishing links between themselves, academics and industry. 
Since that time, personnel including the Secretary of Environment of the Federal 
District and many of her staff have changed (e.g. she left the position in 2006 to work 
on Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s presidential campaign), so it is not clear how 
active the municipal government is in this area at the time of writing (2009).
133 For a more thorough discussion on the debates regarding the concept of networks please see Provan et 
al. 2007
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There was also a lack of communication within industry. Although the market was 
dominated by “technically simple” versions of SWHs, companies shared little 
information -  jealously guarding and protecting their niches, and cooperating little with 
other companies and / or organizations. For instance, also linked to the first theme, 
trade and competitiveness regimes, some experts indicated that “fighting” occurred 
between Mexican SWH companies and foreign or local subsidiaries / distributors of 
foreign SWH companies, terming it a “war” between these groups134.
Interactions done by companies with universities (if there was any) often consisted of 
providing information to interested students, attending fairs, or talking informally to a 
few professors135. Representatives from firms, the government and consultancies 
asserted that the research community involved in solar energy (small but strong) was 
out of touch with the problems faced by the Mexican population (e.g. those people with 
no access to hot water or no access to electricity (or only with poor quality electricity) 
often possess little income)136.
Many SWH companies engaged with the end user only at the point of sale and often, 
for many companies, little action is taken after the sale for follow up -  as one 
interviewee remarked “no news is good news.” 137 This was confirmed through a 
number of informal conversations with final users, who noted that after purchasing a 
SWH there was little follow-up or guidance to ensure the user knew how to maintain 
the product, confirm it was working, etc. (e.g. no manual, presentation).138 Some end 
users went further to express their dissatisfaction with their lack of engagement with 
those developing, producing and selling the technology. For instance, one hospital in 
Mexico City bought a large number of SWH panels in 1994 and claimed that they 
never worked and so they have always been using diesel to heat water for hospital 
use139. Another informant, extremely dedicated to energy and environmental issues,
134 Interviews, one government agency and one consultancy, November 2005 and January 2006
135 Interviews with five SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006
136 Interviews with seven SWH companies, two consultancies and one government agency, November 
2005 -  January 2006
137 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
138 Only two SWH companies indicated that they followed up with clients at least once a year 
(Interviews, two SWH companies, December 2005).
139 Informal discussion, one organization representative, January 2006
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also noted that once he had a SWH installed at his house he was “left on [his] 
own...there were no follow up phone calls, maintenance checks, etc.”140
While many conventional studies on renewables do not pay enough attention to 
networks, alternative technology adoption and innovation studies (e.g. Douthwaite 
2002, Walter 2000) stress the importance of relationships, arguing that linkages can 
create understanding and trust. This theme is explored further in Chapter 7.
The fourth prevalent theme affecting the use of SWHs in Mexico City was awareness, 
amongst potential users about this technology -  that it exists and / or can be an 
alternative to gas in order to heat water in Mexico City. There is no single agreed-upon 
definition for awareness, but generally people view it as knowing something exists, that 
something will happen, or has happened based on experiences they have had 
themselves or from others. Awareness also relates to different things including 
situations, behaviours, etc. Regarding technology, as indicated in Chapter 2, similar to 
Rogers (2003a), I view awareness as knowing that a technology exists, and also 
recognize that previous events, current trends, and perceptions can influence awareness.
According to respondents, not many people amongst the general public in the city and 
nation were aware of this technology, which had a negative impact on its use. This 
claim is similar to other studies (e.g. Quintanilla et al. 2000). A broad range of 
stakeholders including university representatives, the private sector and the 
government, noted however, that this technology was known amongst those with a 
technical background (e.g. engineers, government or academic researchers in 
engineering and / or the environmental and energy sciences)141. Furthermore, while 
only mentioned by one interviewee, informal conversations indicated that wealthier 
segments of the Mexican population were aware of SWHs.142
140 Interview, one consultancy representative, January 2006
141 Interviews, five university representatives, three SWH companies and two government officials, 
November 2005-January 2006
142 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005; Informal discussions, November 2005 -  January 
2006
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For instance, one SWH company stated that “people do not trust this technology 
because they do not know it [versus] gas technology, which they do know”143. Another 
company pointed out that SWHs were unknown -  it was not like “Coca Cola, where 
everyone knows the product and the company that makes it”144. In essence, key 
informants claimed that although “people with technical skills [e.g. engineers] realize 
the advantages [of the SWH]”, the Mexican public in general remains uninformed145.
An important facet that some spoke under this theme had to do with the negative 
impact on SWH use that has occurred as a result of previous negative experiences with 
SWHs in Mexico City and elsewhere in the country. The main types of problems were 
technical in nature, including improper installation, inferior equipment, technical 
glitches, or being installed in improper environments, therefore being unable to deliver 
hot water at the temperature and amount promised. Representatives from the 
government and the private sector avowed that these negative experiences by some in 
the past permeated into the present, despite the technical advances that had been made 
on this technology146.
In contract to those RET studies that emphasize the importance of awareness of 
technology itself, previous experiences affect awareness, or how a technology is 
perceived. This is important in the adoption of RETs because as Frewer et al. (1998) 
argues, a negative experience with a technology often has a more pronounced negative 
affect on use, rather than a positive experience with a technology with help boost 
uptake.
The fifth theme interviewees spoke of was government engagement. Responses 
varied with regard to general trends within the government. Some claimed that, 
generally speaking, the Government of Mexico at the federal level especially is not
really interested in Solar Water Heaters or renewables at the moment147, although a
number of people recognized that advocates for renewables within government existed 
and were trying to push for initiatives to promote their use.
143 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
144 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
145 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
146 Interview, four SWH companies and two government agencies, November -  December 2005
147 Interviews, six SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006
167
Others noted that the government at all levels was becoming more aware of the need 
for renewables due to environmental issues such as climate change and energy security 
issues. The municipal government is interested in this technology (so much so that 
they created a mandatory environmental norm regarding SWHs for new buildings -  
discussed in detail in Chapter 6). A third view regarding government was that it was 
antagonistic towards the penetration of RETs in Mexico. They stressed the corruption 
and vested interests that exist within the government, highlighting the fact that the 
Mexican government is heavily interdependent with the petroleum industry (Petroleos 
Mexicanos - PEMEX), which is state-run. When up against “the power of PEMEX”148, 
as manifested in their advertising and ability to influence, (some indicate that about one 
third of federal government revenue is generated through the activities of PEMEX), the 
task of promoting solar energy is made that much more difficult.149 This figure 
(PEMEX providing about one third of government revenues) is confirmed by other 
sources (USDOE 2007). I considered energy security issues here, where informants 
indicated that the government has not paid enough attention to this. Informants felt 
there was a missed opportunity here to promote renewables more -  that the government 
was being too short-sighted by concentrating efforts on NGCC — because about one 
third of natural gas is imported from the United States and purchased at market prices. 
Studies indicate that there are domestic sources for natural gas, but PEMEX does not 
have adequate technical capacity or resources to access this natural gas.
Unlike those studies which highlight a link between government efforts -- whether 
positive or antagonistic — and the use of renewables, these differing views mean this 
link is not clear. Even within the same level of government, there is a hierarchy among 
different agencies. Relationships between and within these organizations, as well as 
with the ruling party and / or leader, are dynamic; changing, as people change and the 
institutions change.
The sixth most common theme identified by key informants as affecting the use of 
SWHs in Mexico City was capacity building; ranging from the need to create more
148 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
149 Interview, one SWH company, December 2006 and Informal discussions, November 2005- January 
2006
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programs and certification requirements in universities and technical institutes, to 
informal seminars to the general public. As noted earlier in the chapter, many spoke of 
the efforts of the National Association of Solar Energy or Asociacion Nacion de 
Energia Solar (ANES) in Mexico, to increase awareness about SWHs.
After assessing these relevant themes, as noted in Chapter 3, Section 3 .4 ,1 undertook a 
second level of analysis to determine how often these codes manifested themselves in 
the four explanations proposed by the thesis 1) conventional explanations, 2) Diffusion 
of Innovations 3) Trade and competitiveness regimes, and 4) urban technology 
cooperation.
Table 4.3150 F requencies of Key Explanations for SWH Use in Mexico City
Conventional
Explanations
Rogers Diffusion of 
Innovations
Trade and competitiveness 
regimes
Urban Technology 
Cooperation
p 1 4 12 5 12
P 2 17 16 1 7
P 3 14 13 12 14
P 4 14 13 9 13
P 5 8 8 6 12
P 6 17 18 11 16
P 7 16 16 4 10
P 8 9 12 10 16
P12 10 9 5 2
P13 6 6 2 2
P14 8 10 8 11
P15 13 11 6 6
P16 5 8 4 8
P17 12 10 8 13
P18 10 10 9 9
P19 11 11 1 3
P20 17 15 7 13
P21 5 5 10 8
P23 10 9 6 3
P24 13 12 4 8
P25 20 20 10 16
P26 13 12 4 8
P27 5 4 5 10
P28 13 11 5 7
P29 13 11 4 6
TOTALS: 283 282 156 233
Source: Author b ased  on Atlas ti analysis, August 2 0 0 9
Table 4.3 above shows common themes grouped under these frameworks were among 
SWH informants in Mexico City. As the table indicates, conventional explanations for 
renewable energy adoption (emphasizing economic factors, technical issues and
150 See Annex 2 for details on respondents
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awareness for instance) are very important determinants. What is interesting however 
is that in contrast to conventional explanations for RET adoption, networks and trade 
and competitiveness approaches, grouped under the ‘urban technology cooperation’ 
and ‘trade and competitiveness regimes’ frameworks, also constituted a large portion of 
explanations (discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8). Rogers (2003a) diffusion of 
innovations also picks up on these conventional factors but takes them further, as 
shown in Chapter 6, through understanding how prior experiences and awareness of 
energy conservation can impact technology awareness and thus adoption.
The next step is to decipher the details within these code families regarding how these 
three alternative frameworks reveal the most important factors affecting RET use in 
developing countries. This analytical task is carried out in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. Before 
undertaking this task however, themes identified by respondents in the case of biogas to 
produce electricity in Mexico City will first be examined.
4.8 Factors Affecting the Use of Biogas to Produce Electricity 
in Mexico City
This section examines factors affecting the uptake of biogas to produce electricity in 
Mexico City as identified by informants. Codes were themes identified by respondents, 
with some based on predetermined topics to serve as guideposts, during the 
discussions.
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Graph 4.2 above represents the frequency that processes were discussed by informants 
-  namely those factors having an impact on the uptake of these RETs. The, the key 
factor in acquiring enough interest to get any biogas to electricity project off the ground 
was due to direct environmental policies, and especially climate change policies (e.g. 
CDM, methane to markets initiative151, renewable energy sources). Although not all 
respondents mentioned that these influences were international, those people that 
explored this theme further noted that the main source of interest was from abroad (e.g. 
World Bank, US EPA and USAID, as well as foreign companies interested in 
generating carbon credits).
151 Methane to markets is an international initiative, spearheaded by the United States’ Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), to reduce methane emissions by capturing methane for use (e.g. flaring, using 
as an alternative fuel to coal or petroleum). See www.methanetomarkets.org for further information.
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For instance, one biogas company saw the CDM as a:
“...national opportunity that works well, as Mexico does not have targets [to 
reduce GHG emissions] under the Kyoto Protocol....there are no specific 
policies [to help biogas to produce electricity], but the government is open to 
the possibility of taking on targets in the second commitment period”152
Another biogas company stated, “with respect to environmental policies and sectors [to 
focus on], in each of the secretaries (ministries), they are looking at sustainable 
development [options] in the country, and are looking at the Kyoto Protocol”. The 
representative further claimed that of those within the government who knew of these 
opportunities to generate carbon credits, about 50% were in favour of them, while the 
other half were not, for various reasons -  including the fact that they did not understand 
the issue or would not stand to gain from carbon credits.153 These views are similar to 
other studies emphasizing the benefits of biogas projects for developing countries either 
for climate change purposes or as a way to increase renewable energy sources, and 
local environmental quality, (such as Iniyan and Jagadeesan 1997; UNESCAP 2007).
An additional theme discussed and related to this is environmental policies in other 
locations and / or other RETs, where informants spoke about the Monterrey biogas to 
electricity project (discussed in Section 4.7), or those to help other RETs, such as the 
Federal Electricity Commission’s goal to have 100 MW come from wind power154, and 
those related to SWHs (discussed above).
While most did not see trade and competitiveness policies as being a key reason 
affecting use of this technology, nevertheless this was the second most common theme 
discussed by respondents. I was told that companies are focusing on foreign 
equipment, but using Mexican expertise. “They are not making this technology in 
Mexico”155; the hardware all comes from abroad, including places such as “France and 
Spain”, but that “...normally [companies] use local technicians”.156 The majority of 
companies exploring this technology are foreign, although two Mexican companies -  
using foreign physical equipment -  are also looking at biogas to generate electricity
152 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
153 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
154 Interview, one government official, December 2005
155 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
156 Interview, one government official, November 2005
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opportunities. One foreign biogas company is currently focusing on “American 
technology for projects, but we are looking to develop this technology in 
Mexico...depending on the project, we are looking for technology that can be made in 
Mexico...equipment; more than components”. 157 How exactly trade and 
competitiveness regimes affect the use of this RET will be examined further in Chapter 
8, Trade and Competitiveness Policies.
The third topic is themes labelled government engagement regarding biogas to 
generate electricity in Mexico and Mexico City. Respondents, like those in the SWH 
section, noted that interest in renewables is increasing in Mexico, and was expected to 
continue. One government official indicated the Mexican government’s interest in 
alternative energy sources “as oil and gas prices have been rising and are expected to 
keep rising” 158.
With respect to biogas technologies in particular, (and related to the networks (or lack 
of) theme), people noted, “the main parties involved are the private sector and [a few] 
municipalities, rather than [the state and federal] govemment[s]”. People claimed this 
was the case because those within government, let alone the general public, were not 
aware of this option; or if they were aware, some were not as keen on this technology 
and the potential to generate carbon credits, “because it does not serve their 
interests.”159 While some didn’t elaborate, others highlighted again the Mexican 
government’s relationship with the oil and gas sector in that country. Private firms and / 
or municipalities are the principal owners of landfills in Mexico, rather than the federal 
and state governments.
The fourth factor identified by interviewees affecting the use of biogas to produce 
electricity is awareness of this technology. This technology is generally unknown 
amongst the populace in Mexico City and the rest of the country. -  With respect to 
methane or biogas from landfills “the public knows nothing about this.”160 In other 
words, for many Mexicans, they were not aware of the possibility of generating 
electricity through their garbage through various technologies. People that I spoke with
157 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
158 Interview, one government official, December 2005
159 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
160 Interview, one government official, December 2005
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in Mexico City were aware that their garbage (in areas of the city where it was 
collected) went to one large, central dump. Some indicated that a few people within the 
government knew of this technology, but not many knew about the potential for biogas 
projects to be CDM projects. Awareness was slowly increasing however.
Another theme highlighted by energy experts that influences the uptake of biogas to 
produce electricity in Mexico City is networks, or the lack of them. Many Mexicans 
noted that the nature of projects, and the various jurisdictions involved, warranted 
collaboration among domestic and foreign partners -  including municipalities, federal 
government agencies (e.g. CONAE, SENER and CFE if electricity is being generated) 
and foreign and domestic businesses. In addition, foreign government agencies, such 
as the US EPA and USAID are also active. Having said this, as in the case of SWHs, 
these networks are not necessarily institutionalized; they are more ad hoc on a per 
project basis. At the same time, more permanent links are starting to form, such as 
when some government agencies work together, such as the federal environmental 
agency SEMARNAT and the federal energy agency SENER on questions of carbon 
emissions and credits.
Respondents further noted that a key obstacle to replicating this project in Mexico City 
and elsewhere in the country was not due to technical or cost restrictions, but due to 
administrative or infrastructure problems. One government official spoke in detail 
about the Monterrey biogas to electricity project, which “...had problems. The project 
needed the permission of the CFE [to get its electricity on the grid] and there were 
operation and interconnection problems...[but] with this experience, they are resolving 
these problems and hoping to replicate this project and technology in other parts of the 
country.”161
Regarding Mexico City, the government of the Federal District has a law requiring the 
separation of organic and inorganic garbage in place since 2003, which was voluntary 
in 2005-06, although it is scheduled to become mandatory. However, informants noted 
this law would be difficult to implement due to a number of reasons including a lack of
161 Interview, one government representative, December 2005
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garbage trucks that would be needed to transport the separated garbage. Informants 
indicated that the city had to purchase special trucks with separate compartments (in 
early 2009 about 90 percent of them did not have these special compartments)162 but 
were unwilling to speculate further (e.g. the dynamics involved between players 
involved in the current garbage contract, and those pushing for these changes). The 
municipal government was not thinking necessarily about separating the garbage to 
make biogas from the organic garbage to produce electricity , and so some informants 
argued, lacks the necessary infrastructure to make this into a viable project. In 2005/06, 
there was only one landfill which accepting waste for Mexico City, Bordo Poniente164. 
This dump handles about 700-900 truckloads of waste per day.165
However, the potential to reduce GHG emissions was estimated in Mexico City’s Local 
Climate Action Strategy in 2004, with an estimate that this separation could lead to a 
reduction of 1.8 million tons of CO2 equivalent between 2006-2012, mainly through 
burning methane rather than having it be passively released (Sheinbaum and Vasquez 
2006). Since the time of research (2005/06), things have changed dramatically as the 
Clinton Foundation and Mexico City mayor in 2009, Marcello Ebrard, are working 
together to shut down Bordo Poniente, which is nearing capacity and to capture the 
methane this dump produces and create a biogas plant generating 10-20 MW of 
electricity, for 10 years, to be used on the city’s subways and homes. They are also 
working together to open up some new waste management sites, using best practices on 
waste management from Los Angeles and Madrid for Mexico City. Also, the garbage 
collectors employed by the city have agreed to collect organics and inorganics on 
separate days in order to use existing garbage trucks. The project also aims to employ 
current formal and informal garbage workers -  from those who live at the dump and 
scavenge daily, to city workers and others who collect garbage from other people for a 
fee, although details are sketchy regarding how this is to be achieved.166 This strategy
162 See http://www.msnbc.msn.eom/id/28777897// for further details
163 Interview, three government representatives, and two biogas companies, November 2005 -  January 
2006
164 Interview, one government representative, December 2005
165 http://www.msnbc.msn.eom/id/28777897// and Foundation, C. (2009). "Waste Management in 
Mexico City." Retrieved August 21, 2009, from http://www.clintonfoundation.org/i/mexico-city-waste- 
management.
166 http://www.msnbc.msn.eom/id/28777897// and http://www.clintonfoundation.org/i/mexico-city- 
waste-management
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is similar to other waste to energy projects, such as in the Philippines and Inda 'when 
companies aiming to produce biogas offered jobs to informal garbage collectors 
(Forsyth 2005).
As mentioned earlier, at the time of study, the key players involved were the private 
sector, and to a lesser extent, municipalities, but not Mexico City. Because Df these 
infrastructure and administrative challenges -  especially involved when geieirating 
electricity - 1 was told that the majority of investors in Mexico were more inteieslted in 
reducing carbon emissions for credits, and saw generating electricity as a ‘bonus,’ that 
may or may not be worthwhile to do depending on the amount of work (e.g. obtaining 
permits, networking with the ‘right’ people) required. This stands in contrast to other 
studies on this issue, such as Forsyth (1999; 2005)’s experience in Asia where 
communities and governments were very keen on generating energy. For instance, the 
government of Thailand “Small Producer Programme and Biomass Programme” which 
provided a subsidy for plants to use new technologies for waste to energy projects. 
That said, the joint project by the Clinton Foundation and Mexico City noted above, is 
likely to increase engagement by the state and federal government in this area, which 
would be favourable to waste to energy projects rather than just flaring methane to 
generate carbon credits.
After assessing these relevant themes, as noted in Chapter 3 ,1 undertook a second level 
of analysis to determine how often these codes manifested themselves in the four 
explanations proposed by the thesis 1) conventional explanations, 2) Diffusion of 
Innovations 3) Trade and competitiveness regimes, and 4) urban technology 
cooperation.
Table 4.4 below shows how common themes grouped under these frameworks were 
among biogas informants in Mexico City. The discussion chapters -  6, 7 and 8 -- 
assess these findings using the frameworks indicated.
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Table 4.4167 F requencies of Key E xplanations for B iogas T echno log ies to G enerate 
Electricity Use in Mexico City____________________________________________________
Conventional
Explanations
Rogers Diffusion of 
Innovations
Trade and 
competitiveness 
regimes
Urban Technology 
Cooperation
P 2 17 16 1 7
P10 2 2 3 4
P11 9 10 4 6
P23 10 9 6 3
P24 13 12 4 8
P28 13 11 5 7
TOTALS: 64 60 23 35
Source: Author b ased  on Atlas ti analysis, August 2 0 0 9
Similar to Table 4.3, conventional explanations for RET uptake in developing countries 
is the most prevalent grouping, similar to Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations approach, 
but trade and competitiveness regimes and urban technology cooperation -  ways 
through which to capture networks and trade and competitiveness approaches, two of 
the most common themes highlighted respondents -  also featured prominently. Like 
Table 4.2, the next step is to assess the details within these code families regarding how 
these three alternative frameworks reveal the most important factors affecting RET use 
in developing countries. This analytical task is carried out in Chapter 6, 7 and 8.
4.9 Conclusion
2
To conclude, as sections 4.2 and 4.3 indicate, the uptake of SWHs in Mexico, at 0.8 m 
/ 100 inhabitants in 2006 is low when compared with other countries with similar 
populations and climates. In Mexico City, the adoption of this technology is higher, as 
shown above, at about 1.6 m2 / 100 people (without pools), or 2.3 - 3 m 2 / 100 
inhabitants (including pools), although still relatively low when compared with other 
countries, such as China with a rate of about 7.5m / 100 inhabitants in 2006. 
However, as indicated in these earlier sections, these numbers are in no way meant to 
represent a definitive figure, rather they serve as a guideline for researchers. This is 
because I based these numbers on a number of assumptions, which would change, 
depending on the assumptions I use.
167 See Annex 2 for details on respondents
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Furthermore, in Mexico City, cheaper versions of the technology are being used (i.e. 
those for swimming pools rather than to produce hot water for residential use) and are 
more common among commercial and industrial customers, or those who have more 
access to capital. Conventional models -  that stress the high cost and access to capital 
-  provide explanations for why this is the case. But these models cannot explain why 
Mexico and Mexico City have lower adoption rates in comparison to other cities and 
countries. In addition, as will be shown in Chapter 5 that looks at Sao Paulo, when 
broken down by market segment, these models cannot provide adequate explanations 
for the differences between the two cities.
Having said this, the SWH market is growing steadily. The industry has been in the 
country for a number of decades (since the 1950s). Furthermore, Mexico City and the 
surrounding environs possess an active group of engaged actors working to promote the 
use of SWHs. Major players that have been dominant in this area are continuing their 
efforts and other players are increasingly getting involved. However, there are still 
some major hurdles with respect to SWH adoption in Mexico City -  these factors will 
be explored further and assessed in the analytical chapters (6, 7 and 8).
With respect to biogas to generate electricity, as noted in section 4.4 and 4.5, this 
technology is unknown in Mexico City, except among a small group of experts 
including biogas companies, mainly foreign, and some people working at the federal 
environment ministry, SEMARNAT and energy ministry (SENER and CONAE) and 
the public research institution HE. Having said this, interest in this technology is 
increasing. At the time of study, I found that the main driver was the potential to 
generate carbon credits rather than to generate electricity. One reason why I suspect 
that to be the case is due to the prominence of the private sector in this area at the time 
2005-06, although municipalities were also becoming more interested. The planned 
project to generate between 10-20 MW of electricity on Bordo Poniente between the 
city and the Clinton Foundation -  generating electricity, carbon credits, and attempting 
to employ informal workers -  will likely create more interest in generating energy 
rather than just carbon credits. Behind this trend lies the larger question regarding how 
electricity is generated and distributed in Mexico City. At present, although IPPs can 
be sub-contracted by CFE to generate electricity and sell it to them, many argue that the 
process (e.g. permits needs, negotiations, etc.) are complicated, terms are considered
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unfavourable by investors, etc. Privatizing the energy sector is a very politicized issue 
in Mexico and so a major reformation of the sector is not likely to occur in the near 
future. Nevertheless, there are opportunities to make the process easier for IPPs (e.g. 
perhaps they could sell directly to the distributer, Luz y Fuerza, for Mexico City rather 
than Cf^E, or ‘red tape’ issues could be reduced) which can also help Mexico meet its 
growing electricity needs through non fossil fuel means.
The last two sections turned to the question “why (or why not) are these technologies 
being used in Mexico City?” Similar themes came up in discussions with people 
speaking of both technologies. Trade and competitiveness and environmental policies 
featured the most prominently in discussions with informants. Regarding trade 
regimes, the origin of the technologies (hardware and software) and / or the companies 
was discussed. With respect to environmental policies and SWHs, the two programs 
discussed the most were CONAE’s program to increase the use of SWHs in Mexican 
homes -  with a number of informants questioning its effectiveness - and the Federal 
District Secretary of the Environment’s mandatory requirement to use SWHs for 30% 
of hot water needs in larger new buildings. In the case of biogas to generate 
electricity, as noted earlier the key influence on this technology is through 
environmental policies (especially climate change), although the origins of these 
policies come from international initiatives, including the CDM, methane to markets, 
among others.
These findings are important for two reasons. First of all, the role of trade and 
competitiveness regimes and networks are areas generally neglected in conventional 
explanations of RET adoption (or a lack of use). Secondly, while many studies espouse 
the importance of direct environmental policies to increase uptake of RETs, more 
attention is need on how these policies are designed, managed, implemented and 
evaluated.
The above findings suggest that conventional approaches to technology adoption and 
transfer / cooperation, mainly focusing on economic and technical attributes are 
inadequate explanatory frameworks to explain the uptake of RETs in the urban 
developing world. This thesis therefore turns to systemic approaches, which have been 
proposed as an alternative approach as they try to include social and economic factors
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at various scales to explain RET adoption. But, as noted earlier, to date there is little 
evidence supporting their application in this area. Chapter 5 will compare these 
findings with those uncovered in Sao Paulo, while Chapters 6, 7 and 8 analyze the 
findings in the context of the three systemic approaches -  Rogers’ diffusion of 
innovations, urban technology cooperation and trade and competitiveness policies — 
identified earlier, with the aim of answering the research question: What are the most 
important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world?
Using these same RETs in a different location, how does Mexico City compare with a 
similar urban centre in Latin America — Sao Paulo, Brazil? Chapter 5 will answer this 
question.
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CHAPTER 5: SOLAR WATER HEATERS AND BIOGAS TECHNOLOGIES IN 
SAO PAULO
5.1. Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter focuses on the sub-research question “what are the 
reasons SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies are being used or not in 
Sao Paulo?” The focus of Chapter 5 is on the findings from Sao Paulo. Chapters 6, 7 
and 8 analyze these findings using the three systemic frameworks as guidelines for their 
explanation. This chapter provides details about the situation for Solar Water Heaters 
(SWHs) and biogas to produce electricity in Sao Paulo. The chapter is divided in five 
sections. The first section provides more information about Sao Paulo. The following 
two sections focus on information on these two RETs in Brazil and Sao Paulo - 
including, which segments are using them, where they are being used, and most 
importantly, how much they are being used. The last part of this chapter consists of the 
other two sections and turns to the factors affecting their uptake in Sao Paulo, teasing 
out common patterns and themes, as identified by informants and other secondary 
sources.
As noted in Chapter 4, the study looked at trends regarding these two technologies from 
about the mid-1970s to the present (2009), with a focus on the 2000 -  2007 time frame. 
Mexico City and Sao Paulo provide fascinating backdrops for this research.
Chapter 4 spoke about some of the similarities between these two cities (large 
populations, a high-energy demand, major discrepancies between the urban wealthy 
and poor, etc.). Yet these cities are different in important and subtle ways.
One distinct difference between the two places is that they possess differing trade and 
competitiveness approaches. Mexico has a more open approach, favouring free trade, 
while Brazil also does, but there are more stipulations in place regarding trade and 
foreign investment. In addition, their electricity sector is distinct as Mexico City’s 
electricity is generated and distributed by state-run organizations, whereas Sao Paulo’s 
electricity is generated and distributed by companies that are owned by both the public 
and private sectors. Also, the electricity for Mexico City mainly comes from fossil
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fuels (thermal power plants run on oil and / or natural gas) whereas Sao Paulo relies 
mainly on hydropower.
This chapter shows that in comparison with other nations with similar attributes (e.g. 
insolation patterns, population), Brazil also has a lower than average rate of SWH use, 
although it is higher than Mexico (2 m2 / 100 inhabitants versus Mexico’s 0.8 m2 / 100 
inhabitants in 2006). In Sao Paulo, the rate of use is 2 m2 / 100 people, which is higher 
than Mexico City’s calculated rate of 1.6 m2 / 100 people not including pools, or lower 
than Mexico City’s rate of 2.3 - 3 m 2 / 100 inhabitants including pools. In addition, as 
explained in detail in the chapter, when broken down by market segment, the number 
of SWHs used in each city is quite different.
Regarding biogas technologies to generate electricity, there are two landfill gas to 
electricity projects up and running in Sao Paulo, with the generation of carbon credits 
serving as the key rationale to their development.
Similar to other studies examining the adoption of SWHs in developing nations noted 
in Chapters 1 and 2 this chapter shows that in the case of SWHs in Sao Paulo, 
respondents also noted direct environmental policies (2nd most prevalent theme noted) 
and awareness (4th most prevalent theme noted) as key factors affecting RET use. The 
ranking of these themes in terms of frequency is also the same in the case of SWHs in 
Mexico City. Similar to findings in Mexico City, two of the most prevalent themes 
identified by participants as having the potential to affect RET use in Mexico City are 
trade and competitiveness regimes (1st most common) and networks (or a lack of them) 
(3rd most common), which were also the same ranking in Mexico City. These themes 
are not as readily explained using conventional technology adoption and transfer 
models.
In the case of biogas technologies, like Mexico, a lot of the majority of studies on 
biogas technologies in Brazil assess the potential through various PDDs (e.g. PDD 
Bandeirantes and Sao Joao), rather than an assessment. I found that direct 
environmental policies were the most common theme. That said, other studies 
examining biomass in Brazil (e.g. Goldemberg 1998) indicate the importance of direct 
environmental policies. However, an interesting trend is that, similar to the SWH
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results but different than many RET studies in developing countries, trade and 
competitiveness regimes were also noted as being important (2nd most common theme) 
and networks (4th most common theme). These findings lie outside of the classical 
explanations of RET adoption, centering on costs, access to finance, technical 
problems, awareness and institutional issues.
5.2. Sao Paulo -  Context
Sao Paulo, with a population of nearly 10 million, and 18 million when including the 
outskirts, is the largest city in Brazil. Brazil practices a more conditionally-open trade 
and competitiveness approach. Under this rubric, at the national level, there are more 
restrictions on foreign investment (e.g. more Joint Ventures, more ‘buy-locally’ 
policies). Beginning in the early 1990s, Brazil has undertaken a series of measures 
aimed at encouraging foreign investment, such as allowing foreign investment in the 
Brazilian stock market in 1991, and the privatization of some key state sectors such as 
energy and telecommunications in 1995 and the insurance industry in 1996) (Political 
Risk Services 2002).
The Real Plan, (consisting of privatization, exchange rate reform and structural 
economic reform) which former President Cardoso introduced in 1994, saw inflation 
decrease from over 2000 percent in 1994 to 3 percent in 1998 (Elass and Myers Jaffe
2004). Having said this, there are a number of stipulations in place, such as, in those 
firms that employ three or more people, Brazilians must constitute two thirds of the 
workforce and receive two thirds of the payroll (Political Risk Services 2002).
This push and pull toward liberalization and / or increasing domestic ownership has
also manifested itself in the energy sector:
Expensive but socially beneficial government intervention in the energy sector 
can serve as the basis for short-term economic stimulus as well as help 
redistribute income inside society. However, heavy government intervention in 
the energy sector can be expensive in the longer term, preventing a country 
from reaping the efficiency gains from the liberalization of energy markets and 
keeping it competitive internationally. Brazil has wavered between these two 
policy alternatives over the last decade. (Ellas and Myers Jaffe 2004: 4).
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The beginnings of reform occurred with the democratic constitution of 1988 where the 
private sector was able to invest in infrastructure, but after anticipated investment did 
not materialize, Cardoso (1994-2002) began to aggressively target the electricity sector 
for privatization. The idea was to debundle generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity. However, a number of problems occurred that affected this reform -  
including the devaluation of real, overall management problems with the sector as 
personnel and priorities changed, and the apagao of 2000/01. These problems slowed 
the Brazilians government’s enthusiasm for privatization of the sector (Roman 2007).
But since then Lula developed a New Model for electricity generation, which stops 
further privatization and the government has control again. Generation and distribution 
are still unbundled but two markets have been created -  one for smaller consumers that 
is regulated (contracts are for 8 years), and one for larger consumers who are able to 
negotiate sales prices and on a longer term (Roman 2007). But, potential investors 
have become skittish in this sector as the government “has had a tendency to change the 
rules at the last minute” (Roman 2007: 47).
Electricity generators, including government and private sector, are able to sell 
electricity to either smaller consumers through Agenda Nacional de Energia Eletrica, 
ANEEL, or larger consumers, but the largely government-controlled power generators 
have a buy-local policy, therefore foreign companies must undertake joint ventures 
with Brazilian firms (Cunha 2004).
For example, the Brazilian government has developed the Alternative Sources of 
Electricity Incentive Programme (Programa de Incentivo as Fontes Altemativas de 
Energia Eletrica, PROINFA), where the government is actively seeking the generation 
of 3,300 MW of energy equally from biomass, micro hydro plants and wind.168 In 
order to qualify, 60% of the project’s components must be from Brazilian sources (ITA
2005). Wind energy projects require 70% of domestic sources.169 Electricity 
generation for Sao Paulo mainly comes from Empresa Metropolitana de Aguas e 
Energia (EMAE), owned by the state of Sao Paulo. It is distributed by a somewhat
168 For details on the program, including its problems (e.g. the targets for wind energy and micro hydro 
under PROINFA have not been met), please see Ruiz et al. 2007
169 Interview, one electricity distributor, April 2007
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privatized entity (Eletropaulo, owned jointly by AES of the U.S. since 1998 and the 
Brazilian National Bank for National Social and Economic Development (BNDES)). 
Eletropaulo distributes electricity to the city of Sao Paulo and parts of the surrounding 
area, equivalent to about 8.8% of the population of Brazil.170
Another interesting facet regarding the electricity sector in Sao Paulo is the apagao (or 
black outs) of 2000/01. Brazil, including Sao Paulo, is heavily reliant on large-scale 
hydropower for their electricity, over 80% (US DOE 2007). During the apagao, major 
parts of Brazil, including Sao Paulo, were subjected to black outs and energy rationing 
due to an electricity shortage as there were droughts at the time and Brazilian electricity 
is mainly hydroelectric. Basically, “this involved a five months energy cut of 20% for 
both private consumers and industry, as well as organized blackouts all over the 
country. Needless to say, the societal costs were immense as industry was forced to a 
virtual standstill” (Roman 2007: 33). As noted in Chapter 1, in the immediate 
aftermath of these black outs, there was more push for diversification of electricity 
sources, although representatives from universities and a NGO suggest that the Lula 
government continues to be too reliant on hydro power.171 Roman (2007) also notes 
that despite ‘all the talk’ of the government wanting to diverge away from hydropower, 
the sector grew by 6.1% in 2005, higher than ethanol (5.9% - natural gas was the only 
energy sub-sector higher (7.4%) that year.
In Sao Paulo, and the rest of Brazil, transportation of natural gas, and domestic 
production of natural gas, is dominated by Petrobras, which owns most of the 
infrastructure. The company is partially privatized, in that it is still majority 
government-owned. Petrobras regulates the price of natural gas to distributors -  setting 
it lower for certain uses (including for industry / commercial use) in order to encourage 
its uptake (Roman 2007). In Mexico City, natural gas is state-run but the price is often 
at market rates172. Table 5.1 provides a summary of these differences.
170 Interview, one electricity distributor, April 2007
171 Interviews, one university representative, two NGO representatives, March 2006
172 Interviews, three SWH companies, Mexico, November 2005-January 2006 and one NGO and one 
government representative, Brazil, March 2006 and Ellsworth and Gibbs 2004
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Table 5.1 Different A pproaches Between th e  C ase  S tud ies
Mexico City Sao Paulo
Trade and com p etitiven ess  
regim e
O pen (foreign investm ent with 
little stipulations encouraged , 
m any free trade agreem en ts)
Conditionally op en  (foreign 
investm ent a lso  encouraged  
but stipulations -  m ore buy 
local policies, m ore JV s 
versu s subsidiaries, 
Brazilians majority of 
workforce and payroll for 
foreign firms in Brazil)
Environmental Policies In the past, mainly fo cu sed  on 
air pollution
A few  m ore recent exam p les  
targeting renew ables (e.g . 
SW H s) at the federal and 
municipal levels
Long history of support for 
renew ables (including large- 
sc a le  hydro), esp ecia lly  at the  
federal level (e .g . ethanol 
program, PROALCOOL, 
PROINFA)
More push for diversification  
after ap agao, although so m e  
argue that the governm ent 
continues to b e too reliant on 
hydro power
Main electricity sou rces Fossil fuels (oil, natural gas) L arge-scale hydro power
Electricity sector G eneration, transm ission and 
distribution state-run
Generation state-run but 
transm ission and distribution 
jointly run by sta te  and private 
sector
Natural g a s  sector State run but at market rates 
(although som etim es  
subsidized  to M exicans)
Dom inated by Petrobras, 
partially privatized, but at 
regulated rates
Source: Author
As noted in Chapter 4, SWHs used in both cities are on a large-scale (e.g. institutions) 
and a smaller scale (e.g. household level). Biogas technologies to generate electricity 
being considered or in use in both cities are generally used at a larger-scale (e.g. 
landfills for large cities). It is important to examine the amount of disposable income 
and access to credit available for residents of these two cities and access to credit 
available to larger institutions.
Disposable income - It is difficult to know how many families would be able to make 
the necessary investment to purchase a SWH. This is because official figures for the 
average disposable income in Sao Paulo were unavailable. In addition, the prices of 
SWHs in Sao Paulo at the household level range from US$100 to US$900.
That said, an extensive study on monthly home budgets between 2002-2003 by IBGE 
was consulted to make some estimates. In the IBGE 2004 study, the average monthly 
income (from all sources including formal and informal employment and remittances)
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for a family in the Southeast (which includes Sao Paulo) was about R$2 205 or 
US$760173 (IBGE 2007). For many Brazilian families, monthly expenses were the 
equivalent or even higher than monthly incomes -  on average, in 2003, monthly 
expenses took over 93 percent of monthly income (IBGE 2007). In urban areas (which 
includes Sao Paulo) about 84 percent of respondents in the study stated they had 
difficulty meeting their monthly expenses. If one assumes that the same trend existed 
in Sao Paulo, only 16% of the population would not have difficulty in meeting their 
monthly expenses. This is interesting because even though a cheaper SWH option for 
a household exists in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City (US$100 versus US$800-900), 
using the above figures, about 16% of the population would be able to afford to 
purchase one at the household level. This number is similar to Mexico City, where it 
was estimated that about 17% of the population could purchase a SWH.
There are no credit schemes in place to help families or institutions purchase a SWH in 
Sao Paulo, although at the time of study (2006) the NGO Vitae Civilis was looking into 
potential Energy Service Company (ESCO) schemes to be used in Brazil, or schemes 
where a family could purchase the services of a SWH (similar to renting a house or 
leasing a car). Institutions have better access to credit versus individual families, which 
can help them come up with the capital needed to purchase a SWH. Some photos of 
Sao Paulo are included in Figures 5.2 below. Similar to the figures of Mexico City 
included in Chapter 4, the purpose of these photos is to give the reader a flavour of the 
city of Sao Paulo. The first photo is Paulista Avenue, which is a main artery within the 
city, and a street where a number of companies are located -  linking the city to other 
global cities, regions and countries. The second photo tries to capture how large the 
city is too -  as can be seen, the buildings (mainly apartments and offices) stretch for 
many kilometres. Finally, the third photo shows that like Mexico City, Sao Paulo is a 
city of contrasts. On the one hand, it is a city with major wealth concentration (e.g. it is 
the city with the most privately-owned helicopters on a per capita basis), while at the 
same time the city possesses a number of shantytowns, termed favelas, where families 
live in rudimentary, self-made shacks.174
173 Using rates from December 31, 2003 www.oanda.com
174 Informal discussions, various informants, January -  March 2006
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Figures 5.1 Views of Sao  Paulo
Permission to use © luoman 
Source: w w w .istockphotos.com
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Permission to use © Aidas Zubkonis
Source: w w w .istockphotos.com
Permission to use © AM29 
Source: w w w .istockphotos.com
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The municipal secretary of environment of Sao Paulo conducted a 2005 GHG 
inventory with the aid of a prominent national climate change research centre, the 
Centro Clima da Coordenagao dos Programas de Pos-gradua^ao de Engenharia 
(COPPE) da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Using the guidelines 
established by the IPCC, the study estimated that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
Sao Paulo were approximately 15.7 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2003 
(Secretaria Municipal do Verde e do Meio Ambiente (SVMA) de Sao Paulo 2005). 
This amount is significantly lower than the estimates given for Mexico City, which as 
noted in Chapter 4, range from 60 million CO2 equivalent in 2000 to 62.6 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2004.
GHG emissions in Sao Paulo from solid waste175 (a little more than 23% of emissions) 
are higher than in other cities (e.g. in Mexico City and the surrounding area, they are 
estimated to be 6.6%), while emissions from the transport and electricity sector are 
much lower as many vehicles run on ethanol or a mixture of ethanol and petrol, and the 
majority of electricity is from large hydro. Energy (including industry, agriculture, 
transport, commercial enterprises and households) makes up the bulk of GHG 
emissions at about 76% in 2003 versus Mexico City where they were estimated to be 
94% of GHG emissions in 2004. Of this amount, electricity was about 11%, while 
almost 89% was due to fossil fuel combustion. Even though transport emissions are 
lower than other cities in comparison, they still constitute the largest source of energy 
use (about 78%). Other sectors, such as industry (about 7%) and residential use (about 
9% are much lower) (Dodman 2009, Secretaria Municipal do Verde e do Meio 
Ambiente (SVMA) de Sao Paulo 2005; Sheinbaum and Vasquez 2006).
175 When assessing GHG emissions and removals, the IPCC is concerned with “methane produced from 
the anaerobic microbial decomposition o f organic matter at solid waste disposal sites” (IPCC 2006, 
Chapter 8: 33) -  CO2 is accounted for separately. The IPCC also suggests that if solid waste is a key 
component of GHG emissions, then the “inventory compiler should determine whether subcategories are 
significant” (IPCC 2006, Chapter 4: 12). In Sao Paulo, the landfills mainly have municipal waste. 
Industrial waste is calculated separately (in 2003 they accounted for about 0.05% of GHG emissions) as 
they are treated separately at sewage treatment stations, although some waste (e.g. some informal 
enterprises), ends up dumped in water sources (Sao Paulo SVMA 2005).
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5.3. Solar Water Heater (SWH) Use in Brazil and Sao Paulo -  
the hardware
As discussed in Chapter 4, when answering the research question “what are the reasons 
that SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies are being used or not in Sao 
Paulo?”, one must establish exactly how much of these RETs are being used. This is 
important, as a key goal of the dissertation is to determine if there are acute differences 
between the two locations in terms of how much these RETs are being used and 
potential factors that may affect RET adoption, in which more general deliberations can 
be established. As noted in Chapter 3 on Research Methods, the use of RETs is 
measured by examining technologies that are considered hardware (physical 
equipment) and / or software (knowledge and processes).
5.3.1. Brazilian SWH Industry
There is a solid national SWH industry, with many companies, and a large SWH 
market in Brazil.176 According to informants, the SWH industry has been active in the 
country for over 30 years. The industry mainly began when one professor from the 
State University of Sao Paulo, or Universidade Estadual de Sao Paulo, (UNESP), went 
to Israel (one of the pioneering countries involved with this technology) and became 
familiar with the Solar Water Heater, and adapted it to the Brazilian climate. Later on, 
the Brazilian company Tecnosol was created in 1991, using this technology based on 
an Israeli design but adapted to Brazilian conditions, which produced and sold SWHs 
in Brazil.177
As of 2007, In Brazil, there were about 140 companies that produce and / or distribute 
SWHs (ABRAVA 2007). In Sao Paulo and the surrounding state, there are about 23 
companies that produce, distribute and / or sell SWHs in Sao Paulo. Many of these 
companies are members of these companies are members of the trade association, the 
Brazilian Association of Refrigeration, Air Conditioning, Ventilation and Heating - 
National Department of Solar Heating, or Associa^o Brasileira de Refrigera^ao, Ar 
Condicionado, Ventilasao e Aquecimento - Departamento Nacional de Aquecimento
176 Interviews, two SWH companies, March 2006 and May 2006
177 Interview, one SWH company, April 2006
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Solar (ABRAVA -  DASOL). In addition, a number of government officials at the 
federal, state and local levels are working in this area (SWHs in Sao Paulo). Also, 
there is one university working on this form of solar energy in and around Sao Paulo, as 
well as few NGOs and consultancy firms, such as Vitae Civilis and Sociedade do Sol. 
According to ABRAVA, about 26 SWH companies are members of the association, 
which represent about 70% of the SWH market in Brazil (ABRAVA 2007).
Many stakeholders indicated that SWH companies in Brazil are Brazilian and the 
majority use either 100% or almost 100% of Brazilian components for their equipment 
(copper is imported from Chile and all copper in the country is distributed through two 
companies located in Sao Paulo). However, there are a few companies working on 
SWHs for pools (using plastic for heating) that import equipment then produce SWHs 
in Brazil, while one company imports systems from abroad.178 In addition, a number 
of government officials at the federal, state and local levels are working on SWHs in 
Sao Paulo. Also, there is one university working on this form of solar energy in and 
around Sao Paulo, as well as few NGOs and consultancy firms, such as Lumina, Vitae 
Civilis and Sociedade da Sol.
Like Mexico, Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) are only a small portion of the energy 
sources that are used to heat water in Brazil. For example according to a 
comprehensive 1988 study by Brazil’s National Electricity Conservation Program, or 
Programa Nacional de Conservagao de Energia Eletrica (PROCEL) on the residential 
use of electricity, looking at electrical appliances and consumption habits, about 83.5 % 
of homes used an electric showerhead to heat their water in the Southeast region of 
Brazil (the region most densely populated and the region where Sao Paulo is located) 
(Rodrigues and Matajs 2005: 13).
5.3.2. SWH equipment use in Brazil
According to ABRAVA-DASOL, the installed capacity of SWHs in Brazil was about 3 
634 000 m2 in 2006, or 4 134 000 m2 in 2007 (ABRAVA 2007). This is the equivalent 
of almost 2 m2 / 100 inhabitants, which is also low when compared to countries with
178 Interviews, one NGO, 11 SWH companies, March-May 2006
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similar climates and larger populations, such as China,179 with a rate of 7.5 m2 / 100 in 
2006, mentioned in Chapter 4, although higher than Mexico’s rate of 0.8 m2 / 100 
inhabitants in 2006.
5.3.3. Brazilian SWH Market
Interviewees from the government, a consultancy and the private sector indicated that 
the Brazilian SWH market is growing steadily.180 One company noted that they had 
seen growth of 120% for SWHs from year to year in the state of Sao Paulo, or about 
20% in monthly increases.181 One interesting fact about the Brazilian energy sector 
mentioned by about one third of respondents was the apagao of 2000/01. All 
stakeholders viewed the apagao as a great opportunity for renewable energy -  noting 
that interest in renewables in general was also growing.182
During this time period and shortly after, people working in the SWH sector saw major 
increases in interest, purchases and use of SWHs- especially SWHs for largest 
applications (e.g. hotels, motels and industry). 183 Even though these respondents 
noted that the rates of growth for the SWH industry between years after 2001 are not as 
striking as between the years 2000 and 2001, as noted above, the uptake of SWHs is 
steadily increasing. Moreover, some informants indicated that the potential market for 
SWHs in Brazil is large but has been explored little.184
Previous studies also confirm these trends. For example, the installed capacity of 
SWHs in Brazil was 2.2 million m2 in 2002. This was equal to about 1.2m2 / 100 
inhabitants in 2002 (Milton and Kaufman 2005: 17). However, installed capacity 
increased to about 3.2 million m2 in 2005. As Brazil’s population was a little under 
184 185 000 in 2005, this was equal to about 1.7 m2 / 100 inhabitants in 2005. Annual 
production is generally about 350, 000 m2 per year, and growth rates are about 10 
percent per year, although production increased to almost 500, 000 m2 in 2001 after the 
2000/01 apagao in Brazil (Hoyt et al. 2006; Milton and Kaufman 2005).
179 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
180 Interviews, five SWH companies, one government agency, one consultancy, March 2006
181 Interview, one SWH company, April 2006
182 Interviews, two SWH companies, one union, two government representatives, one alternative energy 
company
183 Interviews, two SWH companies, March 2006
184 Interview, one NGO, one consultancy, March 2006 and May 2007
193
Representatives from the private sector and a NGO noted that SWHs in Brazil are used 
in residences to heat water in single-family houses -  about 80% of the market (although 
one informant indicated this number was as high as 90%). Like Mexico, residential 
clients in Brazil are often wealthy, or from the highest earning top 10% of the 
population. Hotels, sports clubs, hospitals, and other businesses also use SWHs.185 In 
addition, even though there are little SWHs being used for industrial purposes in Brazil, 
an increasing number of industries and hotels are looking for alternatives, such as 
SWHs, to heat their water.186 SWHs for multifamily dwellings are about 8%. SWHs 
used for industry is very recent and represents about 1%. The rest are for pools as well 
as hospitals, hotels, etc.
Figure 5.2 E stim ated Market S hare  of SWHs in Brazil (approx.)
Swimming Pools 
and Commercial 
Use 
19%
Industrial Use 
1%
Residential Use 
80%
Source: Author, B ased  on Estim ates Provided by Informants, March 2009
5.3.4. Types of SWHs in Brazil
An average SWH system for a family in Brazil to be used for domestic hot water use 
would consist of a simple open-looped system where a storage tank would adjoin solar
185 Interviews, one NGO four SWH companies, March-April 2006
186 Interviewes, four SWH companies, March-April 2006
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panels. According to a number of interviewees, the average price for a SWH for family 
use (equipment and installation) in Brazil (on average 4-5 people, requiring 2-3 m for 
a 200 litre tank) is about $US900. One company however indicated that the price could 
be as low as $US500.187 However, a larger tank may be required. The most popular 
form of SWH sold by Soletrol, the largest producer of SWHs in the country, is a 400 
litre tank with 4 solar panels of 1 m2 each. This version can be considered ideal for a 
Brazilian family (average 4 people), assuming each person on average uses 100 litres of 
water per day.188 As noted earlier, please in Sao Paulo take two showers per day. In 
Mexico City less hot water is used. Estimates show that between 30-80 litres of water 
are used per person per day, depending on income and family habits (Castro Negrete 
2005: 18).
Like Mexico, one can find many different types of SWHs at many different prices. For 
instance, some noted that aluminium and copper (which is the tubing that the water 
runs through) are the most common materials used for SWHs in Brazil.189 A common 
size for SWHs for residences is about 6-10 m2 per residence, although there are also 
systems available with 50 -  100 m2.190 A higher end version costs about US $1400 
while a lower end version can cost as low as a little over $US100. In addition, one 
NGO noted that while a SWH costing a little under $US 500 does exist; it is rare 
because there is simply no market in Brazil to purchase it (i.e. little “middle class”)191. 
Previous studies conducted on SWHs in Brazil confirm these figures (e.g. Milton and 
Kaufman 2005; Rodrigues and Matajs 2005).
Representatives from the private sector and a NGO stressed that looking at the global 
SWH industry, prices in Brazil for SWH systems are considered moderate to low.192 
Several interviewees indicated that this is mainly due to the climate in Brazil (a lot of 
sun on average annually and little frost), which means that simpler forms of SWHs can 
be used. However, SWHs even at lower prices remain unaffordable for much of the
187 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
188 Interview, one SWH company, May 2006
189 Interviews, two SWH companies, one consultancy, March -  May 2006 and May 2007
190 Interview, one consultancy, May 2007
191 The exchange rate of $1US dollar = R2.13 Brazilian reais, March 2, 2006, was used as this was the 
date of the interview. See www.oanda.com. Interview, one NGO, March 2006
192 Interviews one NGO, two SWH companies, March 2006
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Brazilian population,193 who, according to one interviewee indicated that, generally 
speaking, “ ...even though SWHs deemed “first class” in Brazil are about one third of 
the cost of those in Europe....salaries in Brazil are a tenth of what they are in 
Europe”.194 This statement is interesting because while in both places, but particularly 
in Brazil, I found that there was an affinity towards Europe as being an example to 
emulate, ranging from topics as diverse as environmental policies (considered 
innovative and effective), technologies (considered cutting-edge), to quality of life and 
other attributes (income distribution, socialized medicine, maternity leave, etc.), 
(considered advanced).
Table 5.1 Principal T ypes of SWHs Used in Brazil
SWH Type C ost in US$ 
(equipm ent + 
installa tion)195
Details Main Use
Plastic with no 
covering
100
400 -5 0 0
2-3 m2, no gu arantees, 
lower water 
tem peratures (e.g . 25  
d eg re es  C elsius)
Varies, lower water 
tem peratures (e.g . 25 -  
30  d eg re es  C elsius)
Residential W ater Heating 
(single family)
Residential swim m ing  
pools
Copper with g la ss  
covering
500-900 .
900+
2-3  m*
about 2 0 0  litres 
about 30 -  60  d eg rees  
C elsius depending on  
clim ate / conditions
4 m2
about 4 0 0  litres 
about 30-60  d eg re es  
C elsius depending on  
clim ate / conditions
Residential w ater heating  
(single family)
Copper with g la ss  
covering
1400. Varies Larger s ized  swimming  
pools (e.g . hotels, sports 
clubs)
Copper with g la ss  
covering
1400+ Varies Comm ercial, industrial 
water heating (e.g . 
hospitals, hotels)
S ources: Interviews with 1 NGO and 4 SWH com panies-B , March -  May 2006 .
NOTE: 1 US dollar = 2 .1 5  reais in March 20006 , w hen the majority of this information w as  
obtained, w w w .oanda.com
193 Interviews, one SWH company, one organization, March 2006
194 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
195 This is the average number based on information provided by key informants when in Brazil.
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Figure 5.3 -  Exam ples of Solar W ater H eaters U sed in Brazil
Source: ABRAVA, 2 0 0 7
5.3.5. SWH Equipment Use in Sao Paulo
A broad range of stakeholders noted that the pattern of the SWH market in Brazil is 
similar in Sao Paulo. For instance, SWHs for single-family residences represent about 
80% of the SWH market in Sao Paulo. Also, like Brazil, a numerous respondents 
indicated a strong market growth potential in Sao Paulo whether the city itself or the 
greater metropolitan region (called Grande Sao Paulo).196 For instance, one consultant 
indicated that SWHs could heat water in buildings of the middle class. He indicated 
that approximately 60% of apartments produced in Sao Paulo are for the middle class -  
which, in 2007, represented about 100 000 apartments.197
The main reasons of this view cited by informants were because of the high population 
density of the region (in 2006, the population of Grande Sao Paulo was about 18 
million, or almost 10% of the country)198, and the apagao, which affected Sao Paulo 
greatly and made this population more aware of energy issues and SWHs. One NGO
196 Interviews, one government agency, three SWH companies, one NGO representative, one university 
representative, one consultancy, March 2006 and May 2007
19 Interview, one consultancy, May 2007
198 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
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representative also mentioned that the Brazilian government and energy companies 
were becoming increasingly concerned about the electricity “peak” and looking at ways 
for demand management (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6) of which SWHs could 
play a role.199
Compared to Belo Horizonte, where SWHs are fairly common, they are not used very 
much in Sao Paulo.200 ABRAVA is scheduled to release accurate data on the number 
of SWHs installed by state and / or city in Brazil at some point in 2009.201 For this 
reason, calculations on number of m2 in Sao Paulo were done using two approaches. 
Using a population of about 184 million for Brazil and 10 million for Sao Paulo in 
2006, and 3 634 000 m2 of SWHs, in Brazil, one could calculate the amount, based on 
population figures, or about 195 700 m2 of SWHs in the city of Sao Paulo, or almost 2 
m2 / 100 people, similar to the country average of about 2 m2 / 100 people.
According representatives from the private sector and government, similar to Mexico 
City, the climate in the city of Sao Paulo would make it useful for SWH users to have 
an alternative technology to heat water as a “back up”. This is because the region is 
subject to periods of rain. In addition, the climate of Sao Paulo is cyclical and the 
region has colder winters about every four to five years.202 This is confirmed by other 
studies such as one done by (Montoro Taborianski and Prado 2004) who conducted an 
in-depth comparison of the SWH to an electric showerhead, and a hybrid of the two in 
a suburb of Sao Paulo, and showed that “the auxiliary system [to the SWH] was used 
23 percent of the time” (2004: 649).
Basically, what I was told was that people wanted the convenience of having a hot 
shower (either once or twice daily in Mexico City and Sao Paulo respectively) exactly 
when they wanted it.203 A SWH with a back up alternative can fulfill this need. Other 
studies on SWHs versus their counterparts in Sao Paulo suggest that “the water flow 
obtained through a gas or solar heater is larger [versus an electric shower] and provides
'"interview, one NGO, March 2006
200 Interview, one government official, November 2006
201 Personal communication, ABRAVA, February 2008
202 Interviews, two SWH companies, one government agency, March 2006
203 Interviews, one Mexican energy expert, September 2007 and Interviews, two university 
representatives, March 2006 and April 2007
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a more comfortable bath for the user” (Taborianski and Prado 2004: 645), although 
informants in Brazil did not mention this advantage.
5.4. SWH Use in Brazil and Sao Paulo -  the software
Another part of these technologies examined is the “software”. Like the two 
technologies in Mexico City, the majority of information came from responses from 
key informants, including formal and informal capacity building activities, and the 
number of organizations working on SWHs in and around Sao Paulo. Indicators used 
in other studies, namely R&D expenditure, number of researchers and patents, were not 
easy to determine quantitatively. This was mainly because of a lack of availability of 
data while others did not wish to disclose this information. Like Mexico, many 
companies in Brazil did not have a specific amount of budgetary expenses allocated to 
R&D nor staff or staff time specifically for this purpose. This is because (like Mexico) 
the majority of SWH companies in Brazil are Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
and so do not have the budget, space, or time to conduct R&D activities. However, 
small adaptations of the technology were occurring over time. For instance, one SWH 
company noted that the cost of a solar panel in Brazil (aluminum with copper) had 
decreased from about US$500 to under US$100 in a 13-14 year period.204 While some 
of this price has to do with the price of materials, reductions in price have also occurred 
as a result of learning, thus increasing the efficiency of production processes. The 
reduction in price of solar panels for SWHs in Brazil is particularly interesting because 
before the global downturn of Fall 2008, the price of copper had been -  on and off — 
steadily increasing since 2002 (where it was under US$1.00). Copper was trading at 
about US $4.08 per pound in July 2008, versus about US$1.35 in January 2009 (Gross 
2009).
Other organizations, such as Sociedade de Sol, provided their monthly budget, which 
was 7 000 reais, or US$ 3 300 and mainly financed through monthly courses, but this 
included all activities of the NGO -  a large portion being devoted to dissemination, and 
the operations involved in running an NGO (e.g. salaries, overhead) -  not just R&D 205
204 Interview, one SWH company, April 2007
205 Interview, one NGO representative, March 2006
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Another proxy used to “measure” knowledge is through patents or types of patents. In 
general companies do not have a patent on their SWH (although some receive royalties
POfiwhen a distributor uses a SWH produced by another company). One company 
indicated that no one had a patent as it was a common good -  although another 
company did indicate that they had a patent on their SWH in Brazil.207 One NGO 
noted that they “do not want a patent” -  their goal was to spread this technology to as 
many people as possible -  with a particular focus on grade school-age children through 
disseminating “kits” (or an example low cost SWH) to be used in classrooms 208 
Having said this, although there were some examples of companies working with 
universities on R&D activities, the SWH companies did note that they rarely worked 
with others due to IPR concerns.209
Also, as noted in Chapters 1 and 4, the problem with using these proxies as ways to 
measure knowledge is that they do not account for the differences between information 
(e.g. number of patents applied for and received, R&D dollars) and knowledge (how 
this information is processed and interpreted). While recognizing these limitations, one 
way to measure the software is to examine those organizations working on SWHs in 
Sao Paulo.
5.4.1. Organizations working on SWHs in Sao Paulo
All interview respondents working on SWHs spoke of capacity building initiatives 
underway regarding solar energy and SWHs in and around Sao Paulo. All respondents 
from a broad range of stakeholders indicated that there are two key players involved in 
capacity building efforts for SWHs in Brazil and especially in Sao Paulo. These 
organizations are the trade association ABRAVA through their DASOL section and the 
Brazilian environmental NGO Vitae Civilis. Activities undertaken include active 
participation in an International Construction Industry Trade Fair in Sao Paulo, or Feira 
da Industria e Comercio (FEICOM), a yearly conference of the construction industry, 
workshops and presentations to various municipalities throughout Brazil, maintenance
206 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
207 Interview, two SWH companies, March 2006
208 Interview, two NGO representatives, March 2006
209 Interviews, two SWH companies, one NGO, March 2006
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of the ABRAVA and Cidades Solares website and fostering these networks, studies on 
solar water heating for Brazil and pursuing the climate angle for this technology, details 
on SWH companies and the SWH market, etc.210 Other active organizations working 
on SWHs in and around Sao Paulo include the consultancy Lumina, the NGO 
Sociedade de Sol -  mainly through their “Do It Yourself’ model of a SWH which is 
disseminated through various courses run throughout the year on SWHs, information 
on the low cost SWH available on their website, and their project aimed at distributing 
kits to all grade schools within the Grande Sao Paulo region and the Grupo Solaris, 
running out of the Piracicaba campus of the USP (about 160 km from the city of Sao 
Paulo).211
Formal capacity building efforts in and around Sao Paulo include the Piracicaba 
campus of USP and, while located in Minas Gerais, the Pontifica Catholic University of 
Minas Gerais, in Belo Horizonte, is also very active on this front in Brazil. This 
university has a Green Solar lab where they simulate solar conditions -  only one of six 
available worldwide - so as to test SWH equipment.
There are also other universities and groups in other parts of Brazil working on SWHs 
such as the Federal University of Santa Catarina or Universdade Federal de Santa 
Catarina (UFSC) in the south (their LABSOLAR) and National Reference Centre for 
Solar and Wind Energy, or Centro de Referencia para Energia Solar e Eolica Sergio de 
Salvo Brito (CRESESB) in Rio de Janeiro.
This is interesting because Belo Horizonte, the capital of Minas Gerais, is the nexus of 
SWH activity in the country, but it is not close to Sao Paulo (they are about 300 miles 
apart). By contrast, one key hub of SWHs in Mexico is in Cuernavaca which is less 
than an hour by vehicle south of Mexico City. At the same time, a number of those 
involved in the SWH industry in Sao Paulo were aware of this research and had 
contacts with these institutes -  especially with the Green Solar Lab in Belo Horizonte 
where SWHs were tested. For instance, one SWH company representative from Belo 
Horizonte but now working outside of Sao Paulo had formerly studied and worked at
210 Interviews, 11 SWH companies, three NGOs, one consultancy, one energy company, four government 
officials
211 Interviews, one consultancy, one NGO, March 2006 and May 2007
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212LABSOLAR and was in communication with his former colleagues. In Mexico 
City, although connections between academics and industry also existed (e.g. 
Cuernavaca researchers with Cuernavaca SWH companies, and the changing dynamics 
of ANES where academics and industry representatives were a part of the steering 
board), these networks were smaller and more recent.
Regarding government involvement, at the federal level, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology has at least one official examining SWHs under the renewable energy 
portfolio.213 There are no people working specifically on SWHs at the state level 
government in Sao Paulo -  only one person is devoted to renewable energy sources 
within the Secretary of the Environment of the State of Sao Paulo.214 The municipal 
government however is becoming increasingly involved in SWHs especially their 
Secretary for Green and Environment but also the Secretary for Social Housing215 as 
they approved a law at the municipal level on June 30, 2007, making it mandatory for 
various new buildings in Sao Paulo to have 40% of their water heating come from 
SWHs -  residential buildings with 4 or more bathrooms, and commercial and industrial 
buildings (Vitae Civilis 2007).
In Mexico City, the municipal government was also very active on SWHs at the time of 
study 2005/06, with some key voices supportive of this industry in the federal 
government too. However, as one Mexican federal government official told me, there 
were still “many missed opportunities”216. In other words, as is demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, it is important to pay attention to the dynamics between and among 
stakeholder groups, as these connections can play a role on RET use.
In Brazil, certification of people working on SWHs -  developers, producers, 
distributors and / or installers generally occurs through companies themselves. People 
are trained through their experience in the companies after receiving technical training 
at universities.217 One company representative noted that initially he was a distributor 
for a SWH and then, as the technology was simple, and he had university-level,
212 Interviews, eight SWH companies, March -  May 2006
213 Personal communication, one government official, November 2006
214 Interview, one government representative, March 2006
215 Interviews, two government officials, November-December 2006
216 Interview, one government official, November 2005
217 Interviews, three SWH companies, March - May 2006
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218technical training, he decided to make SWHs himself and open up his own company.
To summarize, there are about nine organizations (including three government 
agencies), apart from SWH companies, actively working on SWHs in and around the 
context of Sao Paulo.
In 2006, there were over 3.6 million SWHs installed in Brazil and, using the estimates 
above, almost 200 000 installed in the city of Sao Paulo. This would be a rate of 
almost 2 m2/ 100 inhabitants for Brazil or 2 m2 / 100 inhabitants for Sao Paulo in 2006. 
While low when compared with other countries with similar populations and climates, 
these are higher numbers than Mexico (0.7 m2 / 100 inhabitants) and Mexico City 1.3 
m2 / 100 inhabitants, not including pools. That said, if pools were included, the number 
would be similar 2 m2/ 100 people.
So in other words, SWH use on a per person basis is similar in both cities. But, when 
broken down by market segment the numbers are quite different -  including about 28% 
for residential use in Mexico City versus 80% in Sao Paulo and commercial and 
industrial use219 about 72% in Mexico City versus 20% for commercial, industrial and 
swimming pool use in Sao Paulo. What accounts for these differences? This question 
will be explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Like Mexico, the SWH market is growing steadily. In addition, the SWH industry has 
been in existence for over 30 years and an increasing amount of players are becoming 
actively involved in this technology. Before turning to the factors that affect SWH use 
in Sao Paulo identified by informants we will first examine another viable RET for 
urban environments in Brazil -  biogas to produce electricity.
5.5. Using Biogas to Produce Electricity in Brazil and Sao 
Paulo -  the hardware
5.5.1. Biogas to produce electricity equipment use in Brazil
218 Interview, one SWH company, April 2006
219 This number also includes SWH for multifamily dwellings (i.e. apartment buildings) but I was told by 
informants that there were very few examples of this in Mexico City, Informal discussions, key 
informants, November 2005 -  January 2006.
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Like Mexico, another potential renewable energy source for urban areas in Brazil is 
biogas -  and specifically, the production of electricity through landfill gas. This 
technology was chosen based on previous research done in this area, arguing for its 
potential. The majority of waste from urban areas in Brazil is sent to lixdes, which are, 
in essence, open dumps, lacking basic technologies required in order to minimize the 
environmental and health impacts of the waste.220
In addition, even though the waste per capita in Brazil is significantly less than many 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, the huge 
population of Brazil (186 million est.) means a large amount of waste is generated. As 
an example, in 2007 Sao Paulo generated nearly 15 000 tons of waste daily with half 
going to one landfill in the north (Bandeirantes) and the other half going to another 
landfill to the east of the city (Sao Joao).221 This amount is also confirmed through 
other sources, such as the CDM Bandeirantes project proposal (2005: 2).
As noted in Chapter 1, the decomposition process of organic waste in a landfill in the 
absence of oxygen (anaerobic digestion) produces methane gas, which, rather than 
being passively released, is directed through tubing to an electricity generating plant. 
The gas is treated (cooled down and then heated again) to enable it to be used as a fuel 
for electricity generation. The gas is constantly monitored, measured and analyzed. 
Here, motors are adapted to work on a smaller scale and to use biogas as their fuel. 
Some methane gas may also be flared.222 This information is also confirmed in the 
detailed project proposal prepared for the CDM Executive Board to generate Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) for the Bandeirantes and Sao Joao Landfill Gas to 
Energy Project (Biogas 2005): 2-8 and Sao Joao 2005: 4-5).
Government and university officials noted that research in this area began after the first 
energy crisis in the 1970s, however when the prices for fossil fuels decreased in the 
1980s, much research in this area was abandoned.223 More recently however, experts 
indicated that there is increasing interest in the biogas market in Brazil by investors due 
to the climate change link -  the potential to generate Certified Emissions Reductions
220 Interview, one consultant, one government official, March 2006
221 Interview and Personal Communication, one government official, March 2006 and October 2007
222 Personal communication, one biogas engineer, March 2006
223 Interviews, one government representative, one university representative, March 2006
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(CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This is because 75% of the 
methane produced in Brazil is from landfills and the other 25% is from industrial
0 0  Aeffluents or treated domestic effluents. This is confirmed in Wagner Silva Alves and 
Lucon’s “Brazilian Country Profile -  Methane to Markets Partnerships” (Wagner Silva 
Alves and Lucon 2005: 2).
Another reason for the interest in biogas to produce electricity (or through flaring 
biogas) is due to local air pollution problems. One respondent indicated that the 
burning or flaring of landfill gas was also a means through which to decrease the 
concentrations of a number of harmful gases (e.g. NOx and carbon monoxide) at lower 
levels of the atmosphere.225 In addition, work on this area has been occurring for a 
number of years. For example, in 1998, the first meeting of good practices to reduce 
methane to address climate change occurred through an initiative of CETESB and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).226
As of late 2007, there were five landfill gas to energy projects up and running in Brazil. 
Two projects are in Sao Paulo (Bandeirantes and Sao Joao -  discussed below) and the 
others are in the states of Maud and Espirito Santo and NovaGerar, just outside of Rio 
de Janeiro227. According to Osvaldo Stella Martins, National Reference Centre on 
Biomass (CENBIO), the majority of investment and interest in landfill projects as 
potential CDM projects is on flaring methane, rather than producing electricity, using 
biogas as a fuel to run a motor. This is because carbon emissions generated in both 
cases (whether the biogas is flared or burned to operate a motor) are about the same. In 
fact, emissions generated by using biogas to run a motor rather than through flaring are 
a little bit more, but “the difference is very small”.228 Similar to Mexico too, Brazil’s 
electricity sector -  characterized by stipulations for IPPs is not so conducive for 
investment in this area.
However, discussed further in Section 5.7 and Chapter 8, this situation may change as 
there have been some changes in Brazil’s electricity legislation and there is increasing
224 Interview, one government representative, March 2006
225 Interview, one engineering consultant, March 2006
226 Interview and Personal Communication, one government official, March 2006 and October 2007
227 Personal Communication, one government official, October 2007
228 Interview, one university representative, March 2006
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interest to have CDM projects contribute to the development dividend, where 
electricity can benefit community members.
Interest in this RET is also occurring at the national level of government. According to 
one engineering consultant, the federal government -  the ministries of Science and 
Technologies, Cities, Environment and Energy — are working on a biogas program at 
the national level with assistance from UNDP. The World Bank is also interested in 
this initiative -  they conducted a course regarding how to do these projects. The 
federal government put together a group of experts (about 20 experts throughout the 
various regions) in the country to examine the 200 largest municipalities in Brazil in 
order to identify 30 potential landfills throughout Brazil where biogas to generate 
electricity would be most feasible. The Japanese government is providing funds for 
these studies.229
5.5.2. Biogas to produce electricity equipment use in Sao Paulo
As noted above, there are two biogas to generate electricity projects up and running in 
the two landfills where waste from Sao Paulo was and / or is deposited (a third landfill, 
San Mateo, is no longer operational) at the time of the study (2006) and writing 
(2009).230
Bandeirantes - This landfill is located north of the city and has been operational since 
1979. The active part of the landfill (which is two of five parts, or “cells AS-4 and AS­
S’’) or the part still receiving waste in 2006, is about 400,000 m2. However, the landfill 
was closed in March 2007.231 In March 2006, Bandeirantes had over 36 million tons 
of waste deposited. In addition, unlike many of the other landfills in Brazil, 
Bandeirantes uses some of the most modem technology to decrease environmental 
degradation in Brazil.233 Moreover, the waste located in Bandeirantes has a high 
organic content (about 70%). At present, inorganic and organic waste is not separated,
229 Interview and Personal Communication, one government official, one engineering consultant, March 
2006 and October 2007
230 Interviews and Personal Communication, one government official, one engineering consultant, three 
university representatives, March 2006 and October 2007
231 Personal communication, one government official and one engineer, March 2009
232 Interview, one engineering consultant, March 2006
233 Interviews, one government official, one engineering consultant, March 2006
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but there are plans to do so in the future.234 In the past, the waste was buried in strips 
with clay separating the layers and there were pipes placed throughout the system, 
which served as vents to release the methane gas produced through the anaerobic 
process of the organic waste. Occasionally, the gas was flared but more often than not, 
methane was simply released into the atmosphere.235
This landfill was viewed as a potential for biogas since 1996 by CETESB, and 
reiterated in 2001 after an extensive study on the potential for biogas from landfills in 
and outside of Sao Paulo with the assistance of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). After this study there was a Brazil-wide seminar with 
World Bank aid on solid waste and carbon credits. During this time, technicians 
interested in this project spoke with CETESB about the possibility of this project.
In this project, a consortium of companies -  both Brazilian and international -  decided 
to work together, creating the company Biogas, to generate electricity through biogas. 
In other words, rather than releasing the methane through the venting system, the gas 
would be used to run 24 motors from Caterpillar (an American company) to generate 
electricity, and a small amount would be flared to reduce methane emissions. These 
companies are two Dutch firms -  Arcadis and Van der Wiel and a Brazilian 
construction company, Heleno & Fonseca. Caterpillar would guarantee the electricity 
produced and the companies operating in Brazil would handle the administrative and 
financial aspects of the project. While the installed capacity is for 20 MW of 
electricity to be produced, as of 2006, about 15-18 MW was produced. Unibanco, one 
of the largest banks in Brazil, owns the electricity generation equipment (leased out to 
another company biogeracao). The electricity produced through this plant is owned by 
Unibanco and provides electricity to their various branches throughout Brazil.237
One interesting point about the Bandeirantes project is that it was implemented in a 
very short time frame (September -  December 2003) -  including the construction of the 
powerhouse, as well as installation of the motors and flaring and monitoring
234 Interview, one engineering consultant, March 2006
235 Interview, one engineering consultant, March 2006
236 Interview, one government representative, one engineering consultant, March 2006
237 Interviews, one university representative, one government representative, one engineering consultant, 
March 2006
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equipment. This is because there was a very short window in the Brazilian federal 
legislation regarding electricity, which allowed energy producers to transmit electricity 
free of charge and not necessarily sell it to Eletropaulo, which had been the requirement 
otherwise238 - Unibanco was able to transmit the electricity generated from 
Bandeirantes to their bank branches throughout Brazil (about half of the electricity 
required by the branches comes from Bandeirantes).239 Half of the generated CERs go 
to the municipality of Sao Paulo (who owns the landfill) and the rest is shared between 
biogas and Unibanco.240
Conventional technology adoption arguments emphasize how this legislation was a 
direct incentive for this RET by providing free access to the grid. But this does not tell 
the whole story. Rather, this legislation was also related to Brazil’s trade and 
competitiveness approach, favouring neoliberal reforms but with stipulations, allowing 
more flexibility and reducing costs for IPPs thus encouraging private investment.
Sao Joao - This was other active landfill for the municipality of Sao Paulo in 2006, 
located to the east of the city, which was expected to close down in April 2009. (A new 
landfill, Ecourbs o Floresta, is being built in front of Sao Joao at the time of writing).241 
This landfill has the potential capacity to accept waste for the next 40 years. Moreover, 
the potential to generate biogas is the same as Bandeirantes. The same consortium of 
companies created a landfill gas to energy project, which came into operation May 
2007. Detailed information about this project was unavailable from key informants at 
the time the majority of information was obtained (Spring 2006) but according to the 
CDM project proposal it is expected to generate the same amount of electricity (20 
MW), using the same types of technologies and possessing the same company to 
manage the project as the Bandeirantes project (Sao Joao PDD 2005: 2).
238 Since June 2007, a new federal law was created allowing for free transmission of electricity from 
renewable energy sources (Personal Communication, one government representative, October 2007).
239 Interview, one engineering consultant, one government representative, March 2006
240 Personal communication, one government official, October 2007
241 Interviews, one government official and one engineer, March 2009
242 Interview, one government official, March 2006
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5.6. Using Biogas to Produce Electricity in Brazil and Sao 
Paulo -  the software
As noted earlier, some indicators used in other studies to measure technological 
knowledge, such as R&D expenditure, number of researchers, patents and types of 
patents, were difficult to use in this case study. This is because even though there are 
both national and international technology options available for biogas from landfills to 
produce electricity, the projects in Sao Paulo are using international technology -  
making these attributes harder to trace.
Capacity building efforts and interest in this technology are increasing in Brazil. Joao 
Wagner of CETESB provided an example to demonstrate this point. He noted that 
when he undertook his Masters at the University of Sao Paulo (USP) (1995-2000), he 
was the only one studying the issue of biogas. However, as of 2006, he noted that there 
were 20 studies underway on the issue -  he has seen a major increase in interest in the 
last eight years (1998-2006).243
There are a number of companies, such as Biogas, Econergy and EcoSecurities, 
working on landfill gas to generate electricity in Brazil. Moreover CETESB, of the 
state government of Sao Paulo is working with the federal government MCT and the 
State Secretary of the Environment on a software program, which simulates methane 
emissions at a landfill (as well as another version dealing with wastewater and rural 
waste) and measures potential biogas recuperation rates. CETESB is also working on a 
guide regarding biogas, also produced with the municipality of Sao Paulo, and financed 
by the federal Ministry of Science and Technology.244 The federal government is active 
on this issue, mainly through the nation-wide project being jointly run by the MCT, the 
Ministry of Cities, MME and MMA. One of the key areas where Brazilians saw a good 
potential for this technology was Sao Paulo due to the large amounts of waste 
concentrated in one area and the sophistication of the two landfills used by the 
municipality of Sao Paulo.
243 interview, one government official, March 2006
244 Interview, one government official, March 2006
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5.6.1. Organizations working on biogas to generate electricity in Sao 
Paulo
With respect to the amount of organizations working on biogas to produce electricity in 
Sao Paulo, as noted above, there is one company (actually a consortium of companies), 
one university, and two government agencies. The specific number of consultants 
working on this issue was difficult to determine (my research brought me into contact 
with one of the key engineering consultants), but informal discussions indicate there are 
a number of consultants working on this issue in Sao Paulo.
To summarize, in contrast to Mexico City where the key player working on the 
potential for biogas projects at the time of study (2005-06) was the private sector, with 
the majority of companies coming from abroad, Brazilians, including the government, 
especially at the state level and others who are consultants, engineers and other 
technicians, are more actively engaged in this technology. Networks between 
stakeholders have also been around for longer and are more established verses Mexico 
City. This is important for two reasons. First of all, one reason for Brazilian earlier 
engagement on biogas technology is due not only to direct government incentives 
(encouraging research on renewables including biogas after the oil price shocks of the 
1970s), but also because of their trade and competitiveness approaches, which 
discouraged imports of foreign technologies up until the reforms that Cardoso put in 
place in 1994. Even after Brazil began allowing more imports, the country did so at a 
slower place and with more stipulations involved. For instance, as explained earlier in 
the chapter, foreign companies with more than 3 people employed in Brazil had to 
ensure that 2 / 3rd s of their workforce and payroll recipients were Brazilian. These 
represent more opportunities for Brazilians to develop their technological capacity, 
where they acquire knowledge, skills and expertise, as well as physical equipment. 
Secondly, as is explained further in Chapter 7, the nature of the relationships between 
and within stakeholder groups can also impact adoption. In this case, like SWHs, links 
between the groups had been established for longer and were more institutionalized.
5.7. Factors Affecting SWH Use in Sao Paulo
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The graph below represents the frequency that processes were discussed by informants 
-  namely those factors having an impact on the uptake of SWHs and biogas to produce 
electricity. Codes were themes identified by respondents, with some based on 
predetermined topics to serve as guideposts, during the discussions.
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As indicated in the graph above, themes identified by respondents ranged from trade 
and environmental policies to social movements and appropriate technology. This
211
chapter on findings will explore the most prevalent themes affecting the uptake of these 
RETs, as identified by key informants. Initial explorations are made in this section, but 
these themes are expanded upon in the analytical chapters -  6, 7 and 8.
The most prevalent theme noted by respondents was trade and competitiveness 
regimes. Specific topics identified include origins of the technology and standards. In 
Brazil, as noted above, SWH companies are domestic and mainly rely on products 
found in Brazil (one major exception is copper, but all copper in Brazil is concentrated 
in two firms in Sao Paulo), which reduces the time between acquiring components and 
production.
Similar to Mexico, there was no general consensus among informants that Brazil’s 
current regime (conditionally open trade) was helping or hindering the uptake of 
SWHs. One informant for instance indicated that the current make up of the SWH 
market in Brazil -  consisting of Brazilian standards, Brazilian technology, and tax 
exemptions between Brazilian states was “helping to commercialize this 
technology.”245 Another echoed the same sentiment “you can purchase all of the 
components [needed to make a SWH] in a loja da esquina, or a comer store -  
everything is made using local material.”246
On the other hand, all emphasized the fact that because the alternative to SWHs in 
houses was an electric shower (very inexpensive), and that the electricity sector was 
heavily regulated -  contributing to cheaper prices for electricity247, played a negative 
role on adoption. Brazil has some programs in some distribution and transmission 
networks that charge different prices for electricity consumed during peak, and outside 
of peak, hours, and for large consumers of electricity and residential users, but these 
were not in place in Sao Paulo at the time of research (2006).
The second most prominent theme identified was the role of direct environmental 
policies; or, those policies which sought to increase the adoption of renewables -  either 
in general, or specifically Solar Water Heaters (SWHs). A number of informants spoke
245 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
246 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
247 One reason for these government subsidies was to help several industrial sectors in Brazil, such as 
aluminium
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about the federal government’s increasing interest in renewables through the 
Alternative Sources of Electricity Incentive Programme (Programa de Incentivo as 
Fontes Altemativas de Energia Eletrica, PROINFA), where the government is actively 
seeking the generation of 3,300 MW of energy from biomass, micro hydro plants and 
wind. In order to qualify, 60% of the project’s components must be from Brazilian 
sources (ITA 2005).
People also spoke about Brazil’s National Electricity Conservation Program, or 
Programa Nacional de Conservacao de Energia Eletrica (PROCEL), created in 1985, 
which focuses on various energy savings programs including demand side management 
(DSM) activities. In 1993, Presidential decree created the Energy Efficiency seal, or 
PROCEL seal, which recognizes energy equipment used by Brazilians that have the 
best energy efficiency levels and / or consumes the least amount of energy. Informants 
indicated that these programs were helpful in generating interest in renewables 
generally speaking, but not SWHs per se as they are not specifically targeted in either 
initiative.
One policy informants from NGOs and the private sector considered helpful is the joint 
PROCEL-INMETRO Performance seal (classification “A” under INMETRO 
standards) that SWHs can received -  to be used by companies and organizations in 
their marketing, on their equipment, etc. But all did not share this view. Some 
interviewees however felt that these standards, albeit voluntary, penalized other forms 
of SWHs that may not be as reliable, but were significantly cheaper (and thus more 
affordable for many Brazilian families).248
248 Interviews, six SWH companies, two NGOs, March 2006; Rodrigues and Matajs, 2005
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Figure 5.4 PROCEL-INMETRO seal
Source: ww w.eletrobras.com .br
Another policy at the federal level noted by interviewees requires energy utilities to 
devote a small percentage of their annual revenue on research and development (R&D) 
for conservation measures, of which SWH programs would qualify. Eletropaulo, for 
instance, is required to spend 0.5% of its revenues on energy efficiency projects.249 
There were no SWH projects operating under this fund however at the time of study 
(although there was one project considered successful in Rio de Janeiro). I was told 
one reason for this was because at the time of study (2006), “Eletropaulo is not 
interested in this issue”.250 But things have likely changed at the time of writing (2009) 
because responses from Eletropaulo in 2007 indicated that they were starting to initiate 
projects regarding this technology (planning stages), through this mandatory 
requirement to allocate some revenues to energy efficiency projects.251
Some interviewees noted discussions, lead by the municipal government and Vitae 
Civilis and ABRAVA, to mandate the use of SWHs in various buildings including 
houses, apartments, as well as commercial, service and industrial buildings. These 
discussions occurred over two years, and were made into a law at the end of June 2007. 
This law 11.228/1982 was incorporated in municipal building codes.252 A subset of 
this theme identified was climate change, where some respondents had worked on 
reports estimating the potential to generate carbon credits through SWH CDM projects 
as will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
Related to this area were environmental policies in other locations or for other 
renewables, where respondents noted success stories or failures with other RETs or in
249 Interview, one electricity distributor, April 2007
250 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
251 Interview, one electricity distributor, April 2007
252 Personal communication, two NGOs, June 2007
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other settings. One example of SWH adoption considered successful in Brazil, 
mentioned by the majority of respondents from a range of stakeholders, is the case of 
Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. Here, the Energy Company of Minas Gerais, or 
Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais, (CEMIG), a state-run electricity company for 
the state of Minas Gerais was concerned about electricity being used, especially during 
peak hours. One major consumer of energy, which forms much of the electricity 
demand during this period (about 6-9pm in the evening), is the electric showerhead as it 
customary for Brazilians to take a second shower in the evening. For this reason, 
CEMIG put in place a number of incentives, such including rebates to encourage 
people -  consumers, construction companies and architects, to adopt this technology. 
This was done as a result of the apagao of 2000 / 01. Over the past 10 years SWHs 
have become very common in this city; they can be seen on top of many apartment 
buildings. This technology is common among the middle and popular classes also.253
People highlighted this story however as a way of indicating their discouragement as to 
what was happening in Sao Paulo. That said, this situation might be changing with the 
introduction of the mandatory SWH law of April 2007 noted earlier and most recently 
Sao Paulo’s comprehensive climate change policy law of June 5, 2009 (14.933). This 
law promotes the use of renewables and the gradual substitution of fossil fuels, and the 
research, development, dissemination and promotion of low carbon technologies. 
Incentives are to be put in place for decentralized energy options, focusing on 
renewables and to eliminate the subsidies on fossil fuels. The city will also implement 
energy efficiency and renewable energy programs in the construction, transport and 
industry sectors (Paulo 2009; Robinson 2009); Robinson 2009).
To summarize, one cannot say definitively whether or not these environmental policies 
have played a positive role on increasing SWH use in Sao Paulo. Brazil’s policies 
favouring renewables were considered useful in instigating more interest in renewables, 
but it was not clear that they were helping the uptake of SWHs. Most felt that Brazil’s 
voluntary standards program for SWHs was a positive influence on SWH use, as they 
guaranteed quality and reduced ‘bad quality’ products in the market, but some felt that
253 Interviews, two NGOs, one government representative, one consultancy, three SWH companies,
March 2006, April 2006, November 2006, May 2007
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this program pushed out simpler, more affordable SWHs, even though there were not as 
reliable.
The third theme that respondents underscored was the role that networks, or a lack of
networks, can have on the uptake of SWHs in Sao Paulo. Although many companies
worked independently, at least some form of connections existed between companies,
government agencies (mainly INMETRO) and some universities (those with solar
labs). A number of SWH companies in and around Sao Paulo had some form of
individual contact with universities as those companies wishing to have their product
certified by INMETRO were required to send their technology to university test labs
(either IPT in Sao Paulo or GreenSolar Lab in Belo Horizonte).254
“INMETRO is a government organization that tests products. So a product 
must pass a series of minimum requirements...INMETRO analyzes whatever 
product...so that the product will reproduce what you have promised 
... [INMETRO] has a classification system.”.255
Another network occurred as a result of the work of the NGO Sociedade de Sol, which 
is physically located at the University of Sao Paulo’s “incubator park” called the 
Incubator Centre for Technical Businesses, or Centro Incubador de Empresas 
Tecnologicas (CIETEC). Sociedade do Sol has been housed at the university since its 
beginning, in 1992, where it began as an engineering firm as a means to implement 
some of Agenda 21’s goals -  namely to find a simple, indigenous, non-fossil fuel 
energy technology for Brazil. It became an NGO in 1999, and after 10 years of 
research, they developed a cheap solar water heater, using local materials. The NGO 
continues to work with CIETEC but it also noted that some university professors -  
those interested in cutting edge and ‘state-of-the-art’ technologies -  did not agree with 
the NGO’s philosophy of pursuing social, economic and environmental goals 
simultaneously, at the expense of efficiency and quality.
A further factor that respondents indicated as playing a role on technology adoption is 
awareness. Rather than awareness of the technology however, many spoke about the
254 Interviews, six SWH companies, March -  May 2006
255 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
256 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
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apagao of 2000/01, where they had witnessed a strong spike in sales of SWHs 
immediately after the event.257
Figure 5.5 - Solar W ater Heater Market Growth in Brazil_________________________________
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Respondents indicated that some of the public in Sao Paulo is more aware of 
environmental issues, conserving energy, and renewable energy options because of the 
apagao. However a number felt that as time passed, memories of black outs and energy 
rationing were decreasing.
Responses varied with respect to government engagement. Some felt the government 
was active, while others felt the government was not doing enough. The majority of 
informants however indicated that the Brazilian government has been interested in 
renewables for a long time (focusing on hydro electricity, through the PROALCOOL 
program, etc.). That said, the interest of government on energy, environmental issues 
and climate change depends on the technology and the level of government. The 
government at the federal level is active in biogas to generate electricity, and (mainly 
through the work of INMETRO) on SWHs. The state government of Sao Paulo has
Nova Area Coletora Instalada(m2)
Area Coletora Acumulada em Operacao(m 2)
257 Interview, eight SWH companies, March -  May 2006
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been an active player on biogas to generate electricity at the technical level for many 
years, and most recently in the mid-1990s, but was absent on SWHs at the time of 
study. The municipal government was an active player regarding both technologies.
Financial and technical problems with SWHs were also noted as playing a role on 
adoption. Whether using a PROCEL-certified SWH (about US$900.) or Sociedade de 
Sol’s low cost SWH (about US$100.) for a family in Sao Paulo, the electric 
showerhead, costing roughly a little over $US10, is significantly cheaper than the 
SWH. Some also felt that efforts to produce a cheap SWH at the expense of quality 
and efficiency (i.e. technical problems), i.e. to popularize this technology, would lead 
to more people having a negative perception of this technology as a whole, not just 
the cheaper types; they were afraid that all SWHs would be perceived the same -  as a 
technology that did not work.
As indicated in many conventional studies on RETs noted in Chapter 1, financial and 
technical difficulties with SWHs do play a role on their use. But this finding is also 
important for the following reasons. First of all, as is discussed further in Chapter 7, it 
reveals the divisions within stakeholder groups as some NGOs were advocates for 
popularizing this technology through promoting an affordable, if not as reliant, option, 
while another NGO, working with a trade organization, were keen on increasing this 
technology to lower income populations through the creation of financial credit 
schemes. At present, the SWH market is dominated by those used in residences but the 
majority of those customers come from the top 10% earners in Brazil. In order to 
effectively reach the other 90% of the Brazilian population some reconciliation is 
needed between these actors pursuing these two distinct philosophies.
Secondly, these divisions show that some in Brazil are afraid that popularizing the 
technology will lead to negative perceptions of the technology, as a whole, not just the 
cheaper, simpler versions. Comparing with the Mexican case study where many 
informants felt that these negative experiences with SWHs were hindering its adoption 
in that country, and as some other studies have pointed out (e.g. Philibert 2006), these 
concerns may be valid. But, the Mexican case study also showed that these negative 
experiences occurred as a result of not only technical issues such as shoddy 
installations and equipment but also due to a lack of communication among players
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involved in the technology cooperation process and due to trade and competitiveness 
policies, as many informants in Mexico City indicated that these poor quality products 
were generally a result of 1) a lack of nationally-certified standards -  which the 
majority of informants felt were not in place due to divergences of opinion among 
foreign and domestic firms and 2) Mexico’s free trade policies that allowed cheap, 
inferior products into the country easily.
Similar to Chapter 4, after assessing these relevant themes, I undertook a second level 
of analysis to determine how often these codes manifested themselves in the four 
explanations proposed by the thesis 1) conventional explanations, 2) Diffusion of 
Innovations 3) Trade and competitiveness regimes, and 4) urban technology 
cooperation.
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Table 5.2258 F requencies of Key Explanations for SWH Use in S ao  Paulo
Conventional
Explanations
Rogers Diffusion of 
Innovations
Trade and competitiveness 
regimes
Urban Technology 
Cooperation
P36 6 3 4 4
P37 2 1 6 1
P38 9 8 5 1
P40 10 10 4 10
P41 6 7 2 0
P42 16 9 4 2
P43 4 4 4 7
P45 7 7 5 0
P46 11 13 5 18
P47 10 8 8 7
P48 5 4 4 3
P49 2 2 6 5
P51 5 6 4 5
P52 3 5 9 14
P53 3 4 6 3
P54 13 11 9 5
P55 11 13 21 14
P60 2 5 6 6
P61 16 17 9 16
P62 11 17 3 9
P63 31 20 14 13
TOTALS: 183 174 138 143
Source: Author b ased  on Atlas ti analysis, August 2 0 0 9
Table 5.2 above shows how common themes grouped under these frameworks were 
among SWH informants in Sao Paulo. As shown above, factors considered 
conventional explanations for RET uptake in developing countries, as well as those 
captured under Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations were prevalent. Yet in contrast to 
many conventional studies of RETs in developing countries themes grouped under the 
trade and competitiveness regimes and urban technology cooperation frameworks, were 
also significant. Similar to Sections 4.7 and 48 regarding responses in Mexico City, the 
next step is to examine the details within these code families regarding how these three 
alternative frameworks reveal the most important factors affecting RET use in 
developing countries. This analytical task is carried out in Chapter 6, 7 and 8
5.8. Factors Affecting the Use of
in Sao Paulo
258 See Annex 2 for details on respondents
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The graph below represents the frequency that processes were discussed by informants 
-  namely those factors having an impact on the uptake of SWHs and biogas to produce 
electricity. Codes were themes identified by respondents, with some based on 
predetermined topics to serve as guideposts, during the discussions.
G raph 5.2 F acto rs Affecting B iogas to  P roduce Electricity Use in Sao  Paulo
Biogas Informants in Sao Paulo
Urban poor I  
Standards J  
Finances |  
Communication I  
Capacity building I  
Appropriate technology |  
Municipal government 
Bnvtal studies 
Universities 
Other institutions w orking on RE 
NGOs 
Investment 
Agents 
Social movements 
Culture 
Triple helix 
Prices 
Motivation 
Technology perceptions 
Technical or infrastructure problems 
Sao Paulo 
Other RETs
Envtal polices_other locations or techs 
International influences 
Aw areness 
Brazil energy issues 
Climate change 
Government engagement 
Networks (or lack of) 
Direct envtal policies 
Biogas market 
Trade and competitiveness regimes
0 10 20 30 40
Frequency of Codes
50 60 70
Source: Author b ased  on Atlas ti analysis, July 2008 , updated August 2 0 0 9
The first factor most prevalent in discussions was the potential impact of trade and 
competitiveness regimes on this technology. Specifically, informants spoke about 
taxes, which constituted 50 percent of project start up costs, and the momentary
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“break” in the Brazilian legislation which allowed IPPs access to the electricity grid to 
sell to others, not just Eletropaulo, as noted above.
According to one government official, when determining which technology to use in 
the Bandeirantes project, there were three options available for this type of technology: 
Brazilian equipment costing 1000 reais per kW installed, more sophisticated Brazilian 
equipment costing 2000 reais per kW installed and foreign equipment costing 3000 
reais per kW installed. Due to negative experiences with Brazilian technology and the 
better guarantees provided by the imported technology, the latter form was chosen for 
these projects.259 In other words, despite these initiatives put in place by the Brazilian 
government to encourage the use of domestic technology, project developers were 
willing to pursue a foreign technology, despite these taxes. Similar to the SWH 
example in Mexico City, previous experiences or underlying conditions involved in a 
technology, rather than just awareness of a technology itself can affect adoption 
This is important because despite the theoretical and econometric studies that indicate 
otherwise, trade and competitiveness policies in and of themselves will not necessarily 
lead to the adoption of renewables but rather are context and technology-specific.
The second factor identified by participants affecting adoption rates of this technology 
was direct environmental policies, and especially climate change policies (e.g. CDM, 
methane to markets initiative, renewable energy sources). In the Bandeirantes project, 
for example, the municipal government of Sao Paulo owns half the money generated by 
the carbon credits from Bandeirantes. The city uses 50% of this money for a “green 
fund” for the city, to finance projects to work on the city’s ‘green spaces’. Further 
discussions with study participants indicated that international influences, including 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S.-led methane to markets 
international initiative, have generated interest in this area.
Another factor participants identified is under the heading government engagement. . 
The Brazilian government is engaged on this issue at various levels, especially at the 
technical level. For specific projects however, government engagement -  especially at
259 Interview, one government official, March 2006
260 Interview, one government official, one engineering consultant, March 2006
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the political level -  is mixed; one informant joked that the politicians showed up only 
when it was time to “take their picture”. I considered energy security issues under 
this heading. Biogas technology informants and some SWH informants indicated that 
Brazil still remained interested in energy security, as they were after the oil shocks of 
the 1970s, but that what was different now is that environmental considerations were 
also being taken into account. The general view among informants from all 
stakeholder groups however was that for all the government’s rubric on the importance 
of diversity of energy sources, they still remained wedded to hydro power due to 
massive earlier investments and powerful interest groups. In addition, although the 
Lula administration indicates their interest in being more self-reliant, the South and 
Southeast of Brazil, and the state of Sao Paulo in particular is heavily dependent on 
natural gas from Bolivia, largely because of their 2004 agreement to ‘use it or pay’.262 
As indicated in Section 5.1, this view is also similar to other studies (Roman 2007; 
Ruiz et al. 2007).
A further area identified by participants as affecting the use of this technology has to do 
with Brazilian energy issues. This is because Brazil, including Sao Paulo, is heavily 
reliant on hydro electricity. Some challenges with having a less diversified power 
portfolio include those identified earlier -  the apagao, which caused power rationing 
and strains on peak electricity hours, where sources of electricity that can operate for 24 
hours and not be dependent on seasonal fluctuations are attractive. On the other hand, 
as noted under trade and competitiveness regimes, usually IPPs were required to sell 
their electricity to Eletropaulo, but Unibanco was given access to the grid to transmit 
their electricity elsewhere (to their bank branches). Informants also spoke about the 
complications and complexities involved with generating electricity in Brazil -  
including various legislative and bureaucratic issues that deterred a number of potential 
investors away from these technologies.
Also, similar to discussions with informants involved in SWHs in both countries, and 
biogas to produce electricity in Mexico City, some interviewees spoke about increasing
261 Interview, one engineering consultant, March 2006
262 Interview, two university representatives, two NGO representatives, three SWH firms, two 
government officials, March 2006
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awareness about renewable energy in Sao Paulo, in general -  with increasing 
knowledge of climate change, and as a result of the apagao.
Table 5.3263 F requencies of Key E xplanations for B iogas T echnolog ies to  G enerate  
E lectricity Use in S ao  Paulo
Conventional Rogers Diffusion of competitiveness Urban Technology
Explanations Innovations regimes Cooperation
P37 2 1 6 1
P39 11 4 16 19
P40 10 10 4 10
P41 6 7 2 0
P56 6 9 9 11
P57 3 2 5 4
P58 10 7 5 4
P59 8 8 7 8
P60 2 5 6 6
TOTALS: 58 53 60 63
Source: Author b ased  on Atlas ti analysis, August 2 0 0 9
Table 5.3 below shows how common themes grouped under these frameworks were 
among biogas informants in Sao Paulo. These results are particularly interesting 
because as indicated above, trade and competitiveness regimes and urban technology 
cooperation, as explanation groupings are higher than those factors grouped under 
conventional explanations and Rogers diffusion of innovations. The discussion 
chapters -  6, 7 and 8 — assess these findings using the frameworks indicated.
5.9. Conclusion
In both countries, SWHs and biogas are marginal inputs into the energy matrix. 
Regarding SWHs, in both Mexico and Brazil, there are many different types of SWHs 
being used and this technology is steadily increasing in use within these countries but 
when compared to other developing countries with similar climates, the adoption rate is 
rather low. In terms of hardware, there are slightly more SWHs being used in Sao 
Paulo on a per person basis. But this difference is only slight. When broken down by 
market segment, differences between the cities are rather stark -  with the majority of 
the SWH market in Mexico City devoted to commercial and industrial purposes or
263 See Annex 1 for details on respondents
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pools (depending on assumptions), and the majority of the SWH market in Sao Paulo 
allocated to residential use. This difference also has implications for energy savings 
because the majority of SWHs used for pools do not require as much energy as the 
water temperatures required are lower. So, in terms of energy savings, addressing 
climate change and energy security concerns, this is higher in Sao Paulo.
Secondly, the SWH hardware is more domestic in Brazil -  SWH companies are 
Brazilian owned, and there are very little imports (copper from Chile and a few 
components by one company operating in another region of Brazil. In Mexico City 
however, there are domestic and foreign companies using foreign and domestic 
technology. As shown from the findings, issues related to trade and competitiveness 
regimes were the theme most highlighted by interviewees but opinions were mixed as 
to whether policies in this area were helping or hindering the use of SWHs in these 
countries. Under what conditions, if any, do trade and competitiveness policies impact 
the use of these technologies is the subject of Chapter 8.
With respect to biogas, in Mexico City, landfill gas to generate electricity is only at the 
exploratory stage -  and as of 2008 there were no studies providing specific details 
about this possibility publicly available. Nevertheless, in both places there is a 
decades-old industry in place for SWHs and increasing interest by mainly the private 
sector in Mexico and both the private and public sectors in Brazil on biogas to generate 
electricity -  the main impetus for the interest being the ability to generate CERs from 
the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol. In both places there is consensus that interest in 
these technologies is growing and that there is a real potential for the market to grow in 
these cities.
There is also a general sense that interest in renewables is also increasing in both 
places. Moreover, in both cities, there is a core set of active stakeholders -  and these 
stakeholder groups are growing. In both places, a lot of people working on these 
technologies had either been involved with these technologies for a very long time 
(since the oil shocks of the 1970s), or relatively recently (since 2000).
Regarding the “software” for SWHs, there are slightly more organizations working on 
this technology in Mexico City, but this difference is very small (20 versus 18 SWH
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companies, and eleven versus nine organizations). With respect to biogas to produce 
electricity, there is more usage of this technology (looking at both hardware and 
software) in Sao Paulo. Chapter 6 which attempts to answer the question “why?” 
using Rogers’ technology adoption model to explain RET adoption in these urban Latin 
American centres.
With respect to factors affecting the uptake of this technology, many of the key themes 
identified were similar in both places -  including trade and competitiveness regimes, 
direct environmental policies, networks, and awareness. The impact of direct 
environmental policies and awareness has been well documented in other studies on 
renewables in developing countries (See Chapters 1 and 2 for details). That said, many 
RET studies from developing countries focus on awareness of a particular technology 
(e.g. Muntasser et al. 2000; Wilkins 2002). In this instance however, what appears to 
be more relevant are prior experiences which have shaped awareness and awareness of 
energy conservation issues more generally. In the case of Sao Paulo, positive awareness 
has become more pronounced due to the apagao. In Mexico City, there are negative 
connotations towards SWHs due to previous negative experiences with the technology.
What is also particularly interesting is that two of the prevalent themes -  trade and 
competitiveness regimes and networks -  are often neglected in conventional 
technology adoption and transfer models. Furthermore, although research regarding 
trade and competitiveness policies and the use of low carbon technologies is recent, the 
majority of evidence suggests that an open trade and competitiveness approach is more 
conducive to their uptake. Looking at evidence from Mexico and Brazil for both 
technologies however -  SWHs and biogas technologies to generate electricity -  it is not 
clear that an open or conditionally open approach leads to more use of RETs. 
Therefore, Chapter 8 assesses these findings in further detail by focusing on the 
question under what conditions, if at all, do trade and competitiveness regimes affect 
the uptake of low carbon energy technologies?
So what does this all mean? How are these factors, including similarities and -  more 
importantly — differences explained? The next step is to assess these findings using 
some alternative approaches. I have chosen to analyze these findings using three 
systemic approaches, accounting for economic and social factors, which have been
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proposed as different ways to explain RET uptake. These three lenses centre attention 
on the linkages between actors and stress the interdependent nature of technology 
adoption, which can in turn tease out the potential role of indirect / systemic policies on 
the adoption of RETs. For these reasons, as well as those noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the 
dissertation now examines Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations approach in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION -  EXPLAINING RET UPTAKE IN MEXICO CITY 
AND SAO PAULO THROUGH ROGERS’ DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 
MODEL
6.1. Introduction
Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the findings by looking at how much Solar Water Heaters 
(SWHs) and biogas to produce electricity technologies are being used, and factors 
affecting their use, in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. When broken down by market 
segment, these chapters concluded that more SWHs for homes and biogas to generate 
electricity technologies are being used in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City. But on the 
other hand SWHs for larger applications are being used more in Mexico City versus 
Sao Paulo. Discussions with informants indicated that some of the key factors 
affecting the use of these are direct environmental policies and awareness (similar to 
conventional approaches), but also RETs are trade and competitiveness approaches and 
networks between and within stakeholder groups, or technology cooperation 
participants, areas often neglected in classical explanations for RET use.
The following three chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) analyze the findings using the 
research questions indicated earlier -  namely what are the most important factors 
affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world?, And the sub-research 
questions - how can systemic approaches help to explain the uptake of RETs in the 
urban developing world? why are SWHs and biogas to produce electricity technologies 
being used or not in Mexico City and Sao Paulo? And under what conditions, if any, do 
trade and competitiveness approaches affect RET use?
Chapter 2 discussed three systemic approaches considered relevant for this study -  
Rogers’ diffusion of innovations, urban technology cooperation and trade and 
competitiveness approaches. Another objective of these next three chapters is to assess 
these systemic approaches in explaining RET adoption in developing country cities.
The focus of Chapter 6 is on applying Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations model to the 
case of explaining SWH and biogas technologies use in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. I
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chose this model for a number of reasons. First of all, the model accounts for the 
classical explanations regarding RET use including economic and technical aspects. 
But this model is broader in that it also captures the potential affects of social factors 
and has a broader view of awareness, accounting for previous experiences and 
awareness of issues related to the technology, not necessarily the technology itself. 
Furthermore, the model examines a technology over time and recognizes the role of 
people who can influence technology uptake.
This chapter centres on three assertions. First of all, conventional explanations for RET 
adoption -  stressing economic and technical facets, which are also captured in Rogers’ 
model -  are helpful in explaining why overall adoption rates are rather low. But when 
comparing these two cities, they cannot effectively account for certain differences 
between the two locations -  why are more SWHs in homes and biogas technologies 
being used in Sao Paulo and why are more SWHs for commercial and industrial 
applications being used in Mexico City? This is because some results are actually the 
opposite of what would be expected from the diffusion of innovations model. As a 
specific example, the alternative for SWHs in homes in Sao Paulo is significantly 
cheaper there versus Mexico City (about US$10 versus US$300), and yet more are 
being used in Sao Paulo. Furthermore, results indicate that while incentives to 
encourage the use of these technologies are important steps, their ability to directly 
assist the uptake of SWHs and biogas technologies is not quite clear. Thus, there are 
limitations involved in applying systemic approaches to real world situations, as history 
and context can alter expected assumptions.
Secondly, Rogers’ model helps to understand how prior experiences and awareness of 
energy conservation issues, rather than just awareness of technology, can impact 
adoption in these cities. He asserts that as awareness of a technology grows, so does 
the propensity for people to use it. But, he also indicates that negative experiences can 
have ramifications for adoption of the technology. Specifically, many informants 
claimed that Brazil’s apagao of 2000/01 positively affected SWH adoption there, while 
in Mexico City past experiences with SWHs were deemed to have had a negative effect 
on the industry as a whole.
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But, I suggest that it is not as clear-cut as this. Rather, history and context are 
important, which put some of his assumptions into question when applying the 
approach to Mexico City and Sao Paulo. For instance, Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
prior experiences led Brazilians to use a foreign technology to produce biogas despite 
the numerous taxes put in place by the government to encourage Brazilians to use 
domestic technology. In this case, one cannot say that prior experiences had a negative 
impact on the technology as a whole, just certain types of this technology, leading 
Brazilians to favour foreign versus domestic technology.
Thirdly, Rogers also recognizes the importance of change agents, which are people or 
organizations (agencies) aiming to promote the use of technologies. In Sao Paulo, the 
change agents for both technologies are readily identifiable, as in Mexico City for 
SWHs. However, in the case of biogas in Mexico City, there is no one (or two, etc.) 
identified "champions" for biogas technologies; only small pockets of research being 
done by various groups, which can play a role on their uptake.
That said, in Sao Paulo, there are two distinct groups of change agents promoting 
differing philosophies. Furthermore, in Mexico City, differing groups are seeking to 
influence the behaviour of change agents (e.g. to favour flexible or more stringent 
SWH standards). As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, time and time again informants spoke 
about divisions between and within stakeholder groups -  including communication 
problems, promoting differing philosophies, company origins (domestic or foreign), 
etc. I propose an alternative lens, urban technology cooperation, centring focus on the 
dynamics of these relationships, to help better assess the uptake of RETs in these cities.
Details about Rogers’ model can be found in Section 2.1.2. To remind readers, 
attributes of the model are also found in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 -  R o g ers’ T echnology A doption Model
S tage A ttributes Relevant Factor and  /  o r S om e Exam ples
Knowledge A w areness, How-to U se, Principles
P ersuasion Econom ic Relative 
Advantage
Cost in general
C ost vis-a-vis alternatives
Compatibility V alues, Beliefs
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Complexity Ability to understand technology (how it 
works and the principles behind it)
T riability W hether or not a  potential user has the ability 
to “try out” an  innovation -  either for a  limited 
time period, or a s  a  com plem ent to 
conventional system
Observability W hether or not the technology can  be 
observed
Decision Type of Decision Optional, collective, authority or conditional
All Communication Channels Can be m ass media or interpersonal 
(cosmopolite or local) or internet
All Nature of Social System Norms, degree of interconnectedness can 
affect adoption
All Change Agents
Source: Adapted from Rogers 2003a, Diffusion of Innovations, p. 222
The bulk of information from these case studies discusses the attributes of technologies, 
as well as the efforts of change agents as these were found to be most relevant. From 
there, a re-examination of the factors affecting RET use provided by informants is 
undertaken, to determine the ability of this model to explain the use of these RETs in 
Mexico City and Sao Paulo and to determine how systemic approaches can help to 
explain RET adoption in the urban developing world.
6.2. Knowledge and Relative Advantage - Complexity and 
Compatibility of Solar Water Heaters and Biogas for electricity 
production
Rogers indicates that there are three types of knowledge that relate to: i) what the 
innovation is, ii) how it works, and iii) why does it work. These discussions are similar 
to those found in technology transfer studies such as Lall (2000) and Bell (1990), which 
distinguish between these three types of knowledge. Roger also indicates that 
knowledge is related to complexity, arguing that the more ‘complex’ a technology, the 
less likely it will be used.
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However, there are a number of concerns with this approach. The first lies with how 
knowledge is treated. As noted in Chapter 2, Rogers does not provide a clear definition 
for knowledge. Based on the above definition, there is not enough recognition that 
knowledge is more than just information, as individuals will process information 
differently depending on their experiences, social setting, etc. Also, some scholars 
suggest that whether explicit or implicit, words like ‘knowledge’, ‘technology’ and 
‘complexity’ tend to equate to the dominant technocentric view of these terms in 
Europe and North America, i.e. focusing on concepts of scientific principles and 
engineering, and negating alternative forms of knowledge and interpretation (Jasanoff 
et al. 1995, Mills 1998).
Secondly, although Rogers asserts that the more people know about a technology, they 
will be more likely to adopt it, he also recognizes the influence of prior experience. He 
argues that a technology must be compatible with an actor’s values, beliefs and prior 
experiences. He argues that a negative past experience of an innovation can lead to 
innovation negativism, where a technology’s failure conditions a potential adopter to 
reject other future technologies; viewing all with apprehension (Rogers 2003a: 245). 
While Rogers’ assertions are helpful in explaining RET use, I argue in the following 
section that this is not always the case.
6.2.1. SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
As indicated in Chapter 4 and 5, one of the top themes identified by respondents 
affecting the use of SWHs in Mexico City was awareness. Informants indicated that 
most people in Mexico City are unaware about Solar Water Heaters and / or that they 
can be used as an alternative to gas to heat their water, although some people with 
technical skills264 are aware of this technology. One government official stated that 
there was a lot of research into solar energy after the oil shocks, but that, even though 
there was some research now, “it was not like before”.265 The majority of respondents 
indicated however that as a general trend (as noted in the previous chapter) they were
264 Although discussions on what interviewees meant by technical skills were not extensive, further 
conversation revealed that some had a broader view, i.e. those skills needed to undertake a certain task, 
to those that equated technical skills to mean abilities in engineering and the ‘hard’ sciences (physics, 
chemistry, biology)
265 Interview, one government official, December 2006
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noticing increasing awareness as reflected by increasing interest in SWHs in Mexico 
City and Mexico -  especially since 2000.
In Mexico City, understanding about SWHs was wide-ranging including those that did 
not know about this technology, those who were aware of SWHs but did not understand 
the technology (awareness-knowledge), those understanding the basics (how-to 
knowledge), to experts understanding the technology and the principles behind it -  
which Rogers refers to as principles knowledge (2003a: 173), or Lall calls the “know 
why” aspect in his discussion of technological capacity (2000). One company had this 
to say “no one knows this technology nor the companies [that sell them]. It’s not like 
Coca-cola, which everyone knows”.266
Awareness was also one of the principal themes affecting SWH use in Sao Paulo noted 
by respondents in Chapter 5. Respondents indicated that those with technical 
knowledge knew of SWHs. Some noted that people who attended relevant trade fairs 
were aware of this technology, but that generally they were aware of only the basics 
and were generally not interested in knowing the technical details -  just that it heated 
water.267 Another company stated that of those who knew about SWHs, many were not 
aware of the details -  “we receive phone calls for people looking for PV as they think it 
is the same technology.”268 Interviewees also asserted that awareness as reflected by 
interest in this technology was increasing in Sao Paulo and Brazil.
But, as noted earlier, awareness was affected due to prior experiences. Some 
interviewees indicated that the general population in the city is more aware of SWHs as 
an alternative to the electric showerhead or gas to heat water (as well as energy 
conservation issues in general) due to the apagao of 2000/01. One SWH company 
noted that both the electricity and gas prices rose substantially in 2000. Another 
pointed out that large water heating consumers (e.g. hotels, hospitals, industry) have 
been particularly active after this time in seeking out alternative ways to heat water.270
266 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
267 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
268 Interview, one SWH company, May 2006
269 Interviews, five SWH companies, one government agency, one consultancy, March 2006
270 Interviews, two SWH companies, March 2006 and April 2007
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A further SWH company indicated that the energy crisis of 2000/01 “was good for the
9 7 1popularization of solar energy because at least people now know that a SWH exists”.
That said, all did not share this view. A number of informants viewed the apagao of 
2000/01 as a major event that increased energy conservation issues in general and / or 
created opportunities for renewable energy, but that it did not necessarily translate to 
awareness or interest in SWHs.272 In urban environments, people were often not aware 
that SWHs could be an option -  “they only think of electric showerheads.”273 
Awareness of the SWH as an alternative to heat water is confined to certain pockets in 
the population (e.g. the wealthy and / or the middle class). According to one NGO, the 
wealthy and middle classes together in Brazil represent about only 10 percent of the 
population.274
In the case of SWHs, others’ previous experiences with the same technology did 
negatively affect SWH usage, especially in Mexico City. Informants -  whether 
pointing the finger at specific SWH companies, their distributors, or just distributors 
and unqualified people (e.g. plumbers with no specific training) in general -  told me 
that the fact that certain cheaper versions of SWHs in Mexico (whether locally-made or 
imported) are of poor quality has had a profound effect on the adoption of SWHs from 
bad experiences with the technology -  due to bad installations, or a poorly working 
system. In Mexico, many argued that because there are no standards, those 
purchasing a SWH do not know if they are receiving a good one or a bad one -  as many 
of these technologies are available and range enormously in terms of price and 
quality.275 For this reason, some perceived this as a technology to be “written off’276 
as it simply did not work. Similar to Frewer et al’s (1998) study noted earlier, they 
argued that these negative experiences did more to hurt adoption than any positive 
experience.
271 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
272 Two SWH companies, one university representative, one government official, one union 
representative, one alternative energy company
27 Interview, one NGO, April 2007
274 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
275 Interviews four SWH companies and one government official, November 2005 -  January 2006
276 Interviews one SWH companies, November -  December 2005
234
This negative impact for SWH use was also not mentioned in Sao Paulo as much as it 
was in the Mexican case study -  instead many spoke of the Brazilian standard system 
in place for SWHs by INMETRO, where products went through a series of tests, and if 
they passed these tests, they would be given the PROCEL seal. Not all Brazilians 
shared this view however. The Brazilian NGO Sociedade de Sol, argued that even 
though their low-cost SWH did not meet the technological nor efficiency standards of 
INMETRO’s PROCEL, this technology would increase empowerment amongst the 
general population -  creating pride, self-esteem and happiness that they were able to 
put this technology together by themselves -  they can do what professionals do.
6.2.2. Biogas to produce electricity in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
All key informants noted that the general population in Mexico City and Mexico for
that matter really “had no clue”278 about the technology of biogas from landfills to
generate electricity. However, experts, such as engineers and government
representatives with a technical background, were aware of this technology and the
principles behind it (bacteria forming gas mainly composed of methane in the
decomposition of organic matter in the absence of oxygen or anaerobic digestion, and
using this biogas to run a motor or flaring it, rather than releasing it into the atmosphere
‘as is’).279 According to all key informants working on biogas projects in Sao Paulo,
the general population “has no idea”280 about this technology, but, similar to Mexico
281City, experts were aware.
None of the informants working on biogas technologies mentioned the apagao as 
having affected awareness of that technology. One important distinction between the 
landfills used in Mexico City and Sao Paulo is that in Mexico City there are 
populations that work and / or live informally in and around there, but in Sao Paulo 
there are none because access to the landfills is controlled.282
277 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
278 Interview, one biogas company, December 2005
279 Interviews, two biogas companies, five government agencies, November 2005 -  January 2006
280 Interview, one government official, March 2006
281 Interviews, two government representatives, one engineering consultant, three university officials, 
March 2006
282 As discussed in Chapter 4, in 2009, Mexico City is currently considering the possibility of biogas 
projects from the Bordo Poniente landfill when it closes. A number of informal residents who make their 
livelihoods through the landfill are concerned about these changes because Mexico City is planning to 
build some state of the art landfills, which would be more controlled. See
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Although informants noted that this technology was relatively unknown, none felt that 
there would be any negative reaction to using these technologies in these cities.283 At 
the time of study (mainly 2005/06) informants indicated there were no NGOs actively 
working on this issue in either city. This is different than Forsyth (1999, 2005) ’s 
studies on biogas and biomethanation from India and Thailand where environmental 
NGOs were actively opposed to these strategies as they were viewed as legitimizing 
waste and foreign technologies, sometimes linked to corrupt politicians.
Past experiences were not as relevant when looking at biogas for electricity use in 
Mexico City, except to say that the Monterrey project was largely considered a success 
-  it was viewed as a learning process with which to draw lessons from -  making people 
more apt to regard it as a viable RET for Mexico City.284 In Sao Paulo, interestingly, as 
shown in Chapter 5, past experiences with Brazilian technology in this area lead to the
285use of a foreign version in the two landfill gas to energy projects.
To conclude, most people are not aware of these technologies in both cities. Certain 
segments of the population are aware of SWHs, but there are differences regarding how 
much they know (i.e. awareness, how-to and / or principles behind the technology). 
Through recognizing the role of previous experiences, Rogers model would conclude 
that the apagao makes SWHs and biogas technologies more compatible to people.
However, as noted above, it is not clear exactly what role the apagao may have played 
on the adoption of SWHs in Sao Paulo due to increasing awareness. As indicated in 
Chapter 5, the event had a positive impact on increasing awareness for renewables, and 
perhaps SWHs immediately following, where sales spiked. One interviewee wanted to 
ensure that I understood just how profound this event was -  “everyone in the city of 
Sao Paulo (as well as many other parts of Brazil) had to ration their energy use”.286
http://www.msnbc.msn.eom/id/28777897// and http://www.clintonfoundation.org/i/mexico-city-waste- 
management. While in Brazil, I was able to see one of the two landfills being used in Sao Paulo 
(Bandeirantes), which confirmed the assertions made by experts working in this area.
283 Interviews, one government representative and two consultants, March 2006 and April 2007 and three 
consultants, three government officials, December 2005-January 2006
284 Interview, two biogas companies, one government agency, December 2005 -  January 2006
285 Interviews, 1 government agency, 1 engineering consultant, March 2006
286 Interview, one NGO, April 2007
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Other researchers have also noted that this event seriously led the Brazilian 
government, companies and public to look for alternatives -  after 2000/01, sales of 
CFLs in Brazil tripled.287 At the same time, reactions were mixed as to whether the 
apagao was directly increasing adoption of SWHs through awareness at the time of 
writing -  with some noting that over time, people forgot.
Building on this, it is not necessarily clear from the model how exactly previous events 
and current trends can shape compatibility, knowledge and perceptions. History and 
context matter and when integrated into a model, some assumptions are put into 
question. As Johnson points out in his article regarding common property relations, 
highlighting current trends in social science (especially in the U.S. political science 
discipline) favouring a positivist, methodological individualism approach, ’’peculiarities 
of historical events [are undermined by] the logic of deductive reasoning” (2004: 427).
As demonstrated above, the apagao had a positive impact on renewables but not all 
informants were convinced that this directly translated to increased SWH usage, while 
none of the biogas informants mentioned it playing a role. In addition, prior 
experiences in Mexico and Brazil had a different outcome -  with bad experiences in 
Mexico with SWHs negatively affecting the industry, whereas in Brazil, only certain 
types of technologies were negatively affected (domestic rather than foreign).
History and current trends can have a positive or negative impact, and change over 
time. There are other historical events and current trends that shape knowledge and 
perceptions. Relevant factors include the oil shocks of the 1970s, climate change, and 
source of technology.
1970s Oil Shocks and Impacts on Knowledge and Perceptions in Mexico and Brazil
Interest in these two RETs occurred in Mexico and Brazil as a result of the oil shocks 
of the 1970s, which made governments and universities look for alternatives to fossil 
fuels mainly for energy security reasons.288 Interest in renewables in Mexico was
287 Personal Communication, David Ockwell, June 2008 on Richard Bradley, IEA, Presentation, Bali, 
Indonesia, COP13, December 11. 2007
288 In 1973-1974, the price of oil quadrupled, which had a major impact worldwide. The price of oil also 
increased in 1979. Oil producing nations therefore had access to hard currencies with which to finance 
public spending projects and increase services (e.g. public health care). Oil importing nations -
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especially apparent during the first oil shock, which was before Mexico discovered vast
new oil reserves in the late 1970s (Du Pin Calmon et al. 1998). One respondent
working on solar energy since 1974 informed me that at the time it was considered to
be “the career of the future”.289 Although the discovery of oil in Mexico did increase
foreign reserves and cash, and thus public spending and credit to the private sector, this
prosperity was short lived and limited. Upon discovery of oil in the late 1970s, the
government of Mexico at the time
“vowed to avoid the ‘mistakes’ of other energy exporters, i.e., ‘disastrous 
political results’ in Iran, Venezuela's reliance on food imports, Nigeria's port 
congestion, and Saudi Arabia's enterprises overrun by foreign technicians. And 
yet, ‘almost fatefully,’ [that government] also became addicted to oil.” 
(Amuzegar 1982: 833)
Economic imbalances occurred as a result of this oil, leading to “hyperinflation, a 
stagnation in tourism and non-oil exports, one of the largest external debts of a 
developing country, towering interest rates and a reduction of purchasing power for 
‘ordinary’ Mexicans” (Amuzegar 1982: 820-821).
In Brazil, the government was particularly focused on alternatives to fossil fuels after 
the oil shocks of the 1970s, creating its world-renowned National Alcohol Program, or 
Programa Brasileiro de Alcool, (PROALCOOL) in 1974290. In the 1980s interest in 
renewables decreased as the price of oil decreased, but interest in RETs has slowly 
been increasing since the 1990s. One major difference between this renewed interest in 
renewables in both Mexico and Brazil is the fact that environmental considerations as
2Q1
well as energy security considerations are being taken into account.
These oil shocks laid a solid foundation to establish a committed group of actors (albeit 
small) in both cities to the promotion of renewable energy.
especially developing countries -  were hit hard, due to dependency on this commodity. For further 
information, see Amuzegar 1982 for example.
289 Interview, one university representative, December 2005
290 The federal government provided tax breaks and subsidies which encouraged farmers to plant more 
sugar cane crops, investors built distilleries to convert the crop to ethanol, and automobile manufacturers 
built cars which could run solely on ethanol in Brazil. For further details please see W R I2005 
http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database/brazil/national-alcohol-program-proalcool
291 Interview, one university representative, March 2006
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Climate Change
As noted in the prevalent themes in Chapters 4 and 5, in both Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo, climate change awareness and policies were increasing interest and uptake of 
renewables.
Mexico City established a “Local Climate Action Strategy of Mexico City” in 2004. 
The initiative provided:
• a GHG Emissions Inventory;
• Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends to 2012;
• Mexico City's Vulnerability Analysis;
• Mexico City's Adaptability Analysis; and
• Emissions Mitigation: Programs and Projects -  including reforestation, waste 
management, environmental education through a Child Summit on climate 
change in 2003, switching to more efficient florescent lighting in businesses, 
promotion of public transit through various measures such as the Bus Rapid 
Transit Corridors (based on Bogota’s model) and taxi substitution, and as 
indicated in Chapter 4, the Solar Water Heating obligation.
Mexico City’s Metrobus program was the city’s first registered CDM project purchased 
by Spain, where it is estimated to save 37 000 tons per year of CO2 equivalent 
(Sheinbaum and Vasquez 2006).
Mexico has an Inter Ministerial Climate Change Commission, developed in 2005, 
which consists of representatives from relevant government departments (e.g. energy, 
environment, agriculture). At the time of research (2005-06), the federal government 
was working on a coordinated approach to climate change. In May 2007, the 
government released their National Strategy on Climate Change, which provides a 
comprehensive overview of Mexico’s sources of emissions, as well as identifying 
existing and proposed opportunities to reduce that nation’s GHG emissions (Climatico 
2007). Mexico has also identified reducing GHG emissions and promoting efforts to 
further that country’s ability to adapt to climate change in their current National 
Development Plan (2007-2012). Following this strategy, the government established a 
Programa Especial por Cambio Climatico” (PECC) or Special Climate Change 
Program in 2009. The government has set a long term goal to reduce GHG emissions 
in 2050 by 50% of 2000 levels, and a short term goal to reduce GHG emissions by 
about 50 Mt of CO2Q by 2012. A range of measures -  mainly in land use and land use
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change, energy generation and use, and solid waste and wastewater, are currently being 
promoted (Martinez 2009).
Sao Paulo developed a comprehensive GHG emissions inventory in 2005 and as noted 
in Chapter 5, recently established a comprehensive climate change law, Law 14.933 in 
June 2009. The goal of the law is to reduce Sao Paulo’s GHG emissions by 30% in 
2012 based on 2005 emissions levels through a series of policies and programs noted in 
Chapter 5. In addition, the city must complete a GHG inventory every five years (Sao 
Paulo Prefeitura 2009; Robinson 2009). Sao Paulo is also an active player in the 
'International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives'- Local Governments for 
Sustainability (ICLEI)’s Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Programme, where cities 
agree to reduce GHG emissions and receive software, information from case studies, 
technical assistance, etc. by taking part (Setzer 2009).
At the state level, the government has been particularly interested in climate change 
because of global attention to alternative non-fossil transportation fuels -  including 
ethanol. The State of Sao Paulo is the country’s principal area where ethanol from 
sugarcane is produced (over 60% of sugarcane is grown there), and Brazil is the largest 
producer of ethanol in the world. In 1995 the state established a Climate Change 
Prevention Program (PROCLIMA) -  the group working in PROCLIMA’s goal was to 
increase awareness of climate change through seminars, workshops, etc. and the group 
assisted the federal government in establishing Brazil’s national emissions inventory. 
The state has also established an Integrated Transportation Plan to encourage the use of 
public transit and a program called Transporte Solidario, where free software indicating 
place of residence and habits (e.g. smoker, non-smoker) helps people in communities to 
establish car pools (Rei and Cunha 2007).
In 2005, the State of Sao Paulo and the State of California in the United States jointly 
developed a plan to work together to identify climate change mitigation opportunities 
climate change strategy jointly with the State of California in the United States. The 
plan, called “No reason to wait”, was an effort to demonstrate that sub-national efforts 
could happen despite inaction on climate change at the federal level (Brazil currently 
has no mandatory GHG emissions reductions stipulation under Kyoto and the United 
States under Bush did not ratify the treaty). The state has three main areas of focus for
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policies 1) landfill emissions reductions -  highlighting the Bandeirantes project in Sao 
Paulo (the Sao Joao project was not implemented at that time) and other potential 
landfill gas to energy projects in the state, 2) carbon sequestration programs, 3) 
electricity through biomass, mainly from sugarcane, 4) transportation programs such as 
those noted above (Goldemberg and Lloyd 2005). The state is also an active member of 
the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD), a group 
established at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, which shares 
information, and opportunities for capacity building and technology transfer (Setzer 
2009).
At the federal level, similar to Mexico, the government established an Interministerial 
Commission on Climate Change (CIMGC in Portuguese) in 1999, with the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MCT) serving as the lead, coordinating agency. The country 
also has a Brazilian Climate Change Forum, where other actors such as NGOs and 
industry can articulate their views to the federal government (Roman 2007).
There are three policies in particular that assist Brazil’s GHG emissions reduction. The 
first program is Brazil’s National Alcohol Program, or PROALCOOL, established in 
1975 to reduce Brazil’s reliance on foreign oil imports through encouraging the 
production of ethanol through sugarcane as an oil alternative. The government had a 
number of subsidies in place, which were eliminated in 1999. It has been estimated 
that from 1980 -  2003, there was 82 million tons of C02 equivalent avoided in Sao 
Paulo state because of gasoline replacement with ethanol. Brazil’s National Program 
for Motor Vehicle Pollution Control (PROCONVE), has also helped reduce carbon 
emissions although it was put it place to reduce air pollution since 1986 (Rei and 
Cunha 2007).
Two other federal programs that are reducing carbon emissions were highlighted earlier 
in Chapter 5 (Section 5.6), identified by informants as policies potentially helping the 
uptake of SWHs in Sao Paulo, as they were increasing interest in renewables and 
awareness of energy conservation. These programs are PROINFA and PROCEL. That 
said, as indicated earlier, it is not clear from my research that these programs had a 
direct impact on the use of SWHs in Sao Paulo.
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Regarding the two technologies in particular, climate change is the principal reason 
prompting research, knowledge and understanding of biogas to generate electricity 
technologies.292 The main reason for this interest is due to the international climate 
change market — the potential amount of carbon credits under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) that can be generated293. As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the 
CDM is a tool through which developing companies can generate carbon credits 
through projects that abate carbon emissions that would occur otherwise (e.g. through 
installing more renewable energy options versus original plans to develop thermal 
power plants).
In Mexico, although there is strong potential for biogas from landfills in that country, 
the market is considered limited; only about 40 cities or so -  one expert considered 
those cities with a population of 200, 000 or more people only — would be viable 
options for this RET294.
Promoting SWHs as a way to address climate change was not as prevalent a rationale in 
Mexico City; although informants had clearly assessed the potential to generate carbon 
credits under the CDM through this RET. Moreover, all respondents viewed SWHs as 
a possible CDM option in the future. More recent efforts to include efforts to address 
climate change at a larger-scale, such as through programmatic CDM295, may serve as 
an important way forward.
In Brazil, key players in Sao Paulo, such as Vitae Civilis, ABRAVA and various 
consultancies (e.g. Lumina), were actively promoting SWHs as a way to reduce carbon 
emissions. For instance, in addition to their Solar Cities campaign which includes 
information on climate change potential (see www.cidadessolares.org.br for more 
details), Vitae Civilis included an assessment of the CDM potential for SWHs in Brazil 
in their publication “Brazil Finds its Place in the Sun” (Rodrigues and Matajs 2005).
292 Interviews, two biogas companies, five government agencies, November 2005 -  January 2006 and 
Interviews, two government representatives, one engineering consultant, three university officials, March 
2006
293 Interviews, two biogas companies, four government officials, November 2005 -  January 2006
294 Interview, one biogas company, January 2006
295 The idea of programmatic CDM is to bundle individual projects together, or amalgamate projects 
under a programme of activities. Programmatic CDM is being considered and can occur in more than 
one sector, location and /  or project type. See Ellis, J. (2006). Issues related to implementing 
“programmatic CDM”. Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC. Paris, IEA.
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At the time of the interview (April 2007), the consultancy Lumina was undergoing a 
study for a hospital to assess the potential for carbon credits should that hospital use 
SWHs to heat its water.
In other words, in both places, governments and other groups such as NGOs, 
consultants, and trade associations are paying attention to climate change, which has 
generated an increased interest in and commitment to renewables in these cities -  
especially biogas technologies to generate electricity, although it is not clear exactly 
how this interest at a more general level translate to the use of Solar Water Heaters.
Source of Technology
A further aspect of awareness that Rogers’ model does not adequately account for has 
to do with where the technology comes from -  whether indigenous or foreign or both. 
Respondents in Mexico City and Sao Paulo spoke about this topic for both RETs. For 
instance, with respect to SWHs in Mexico City, the hardware and ownership of the 
technology is either Mexican, foreign, or both (often designed abroad but using 
Mexican inputs to make the finished products). The “software” is also either foreign or 
domestic.296 Regarding SWHs in and around Sao Paulo, the hardware is almost 100% 
Brazilian (copper, a primary product used for piping water in some SWH systems is 
imported from Chile), the ownership of the technology is Brazilian, and the “software”
-  after having been in the country for over 30 years -  is mainly Brazilian too 297
With respect to biogas technology in Mexico City, at present the principle feasible 
option would be to use foreign hardware (although some companies are looking for 
national production) -  and likely joint efforts between Mexicans and foreign “software”
-  including personnel and process.298 In Sao Paulo on the other hand, there is Brazilian 
hardware (motors adapted to use biogas), but in the case of the two biogas projects 
(Bandeirantes and Sao Joao), there is also a recognition that the foreign hardware 
options are more efficient even if more expensive. For this reason, foreign hardware 
and joint Brazilian and foreign “software” are being used. The origins of a technology
296 Interviews, eight SWH companies, three university representative, one university official, two
government officials, two consultancies, one NGO, November 2005 -  January 2006 
97 Interviews, eight SWH companies, one university official, two NGO representatives, one consultancy, 
March -  May 2006
298 Interviews, two biogas companies, two government agencies, November 2005 -  January 2006
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may have an impact on its adoption but using Rogers model it is not clear exactly how. 
In both places, indigenous technological capacity building is increasing but in Sao 
Paulo it is more pronounced. Studies which argue that successful technology 
cooperation is a result of being a broader process at acquiring skills and knowledge and 
not just technology (Ockwell et al. 2007; Bell 1990; Nelson and Pack 1999) may be a 
way in which to help explain the differences in uptake between these two cities. 
Chapters 7 and 8, examining urban technology cooperation and trade policies, will 
explore this above issue further.
In summary, the apagao in Brazil, as well as the oil shocks and climate change in both 
cities have definitely increased interest, awareness and uptake of renewables in these 
case studies, but not necessarily always the two technologies under scrutiny. The 
origins of technology may also play a role on adoption but at this point it is not clear 
exactly how. Chapters 7 and 8 explore this issue further. These findings suggest that 
history and context matter and their integration into a model puts assumption -  such as 
the assumptions that awareness and compatibility are positively correlated to adoption 
found in Rogers model -  into question.
One interesting question is involved with previous experiences. Using Rogers’ 
technology adoption model, one could say that potential end users had gone through 
this decision-making process earlier (whether in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s) and based 
on negative experiences (due to either bad quality equipment or good quality 
equipment but bad installations among other reasons) did not adopt this technology. 
However, since that time some technological advancements have been made improving 
the efficiency and making the technology less costly. Is there a way to incorporate 
those “revisiting” adapted versions of the same technologies again? Moreover, these 
past experiences can be traced to questions about foreign versus domestic technology 
and standards -  areas examined when looking at trade and competitiveness policies, in 
Chapter 8.
6.3. Relative Advantage -  Cost
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Another stage in Rogers’ decision-making model is termed persuasion. Several aspects 
that Rogers’ identified in his persuasion stage were found to potentially impact the use 
of these RETs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. The first is termed “relative advantage”. 
In the case of SWHs and biogas in these two places, the relevant relative advantages 
deemed pertinent include the cost of the technologies in general, and the cost of the 
technologies relative to their alternatives. Economically speaking, if the cost of a 
technology is expensive in general, and / or more expensive than an alternative (with 
comparable functions and outputs), cost will impact technology adoption. This section 
will first discuss these relative advantages as they relate to the situation of SWHs in 
both locations, and then biogas in both places. Other relative advantages the 
framework notes, such as “a decrease in discomfort, social prestige and a saving of 
time and effort” (Rogers 2003a: 233) were not considered to be as relevant in these 
case studies.
6.3.1. Cost of SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
With respect to SWHs in Mexico City, the cost of equipment and installation in 
general, and vis-a-vis alternatives is key to understanding their use.299 In Mexico City, 
water is mainly heated using Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), which is more expensive 
than natural gas, the other main option for Mexican cities. About 80% of LPG in the
O A A
home goes towards heating water and 20% is used for cooking. This figure is higher 
than other studies such a one done on the potential for SWHs in Mexico City conducted 
by Quintanilla et al. (2000: 18), which showed that in 1999, a little over 50 percent of 
LPG was used to heat water and the rest was for cooking.
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the cost of a SWH in Mexico City (equipment and 
installation) ranged from about US$800 - 1100 for a single family, to more expensive 
models, costing about US$2200. These figures are confirmed by other studies such as 
Hoyt et al. (2006: 32). For many people in Mexico City, some versions of SWHs are 
simply too expensive or people cannot afford the up front cost of the equipment and 
installation of a SWH at one time. Other studies, also confirm that even though there 
are monthly gas payments involved with a gas water heater versus a SWH, many 
people find this easier to pay as these payments are over time, rather than paying for the
299 Interviews with eight SWH companies, three government agencies, November 2005 -  January 2006
300 Interviews, one university, three SWH companies, December 2005 and January 2006
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installation and equipment of SWHs all at once (Quintanilla and Mulas 1998; 
Quintanilla et al. 2000). That said, simple, cheap versions of SWHs also exist in 
Mexico City (although not as common). In Mexico, “there is a little bit of 
everything”301 with respect to SWHs.
Cost was the main reason cited by some informants for market growth for SWHs in the 
commercial, industrial and government sectors versus the residential sector in and 
around Mexico City. These buyers have more capital available and so are not as 
worried about cost. Even though there are no credit schemes in place specifically for 
SWHs for institutions in either place, in general, institutions have better access to credit 
versus individual families, which can help them come up with the capital needed to 
purchase a SWH. 302 This point is reiterated in Castro Negrete’s study on SWHs in 
Mexico (2005: 30).
The cost of a SWH in Sao Paulo for a family, representing about 80% of the SWH 
market in Sao Paulo and Brazil is about US$900 as noted in Chapter 5. The average 
cost per m2 is US$100. While the equipment is cheaper in Brazil when looking at m2, 
generally a larger tank is needed for families in Brazil, as people in Sao Paulo tend to 
take two showers per day -  one in the morning and one in the evening. As noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5, one would likely purchase an alternative technology as a “back up” 
in both locations due to the climate. In Mexico City the “back up” would often already 
be in place (e.g. the LPG water heater), so no extra cost would be needed. This would 
be similar in Sao Paulo where the electric shower (already in place, thus requiring no 
further cost) would serve as the “back up” technology. Costs would be similar in both 
places in larger buildings (e.g. apartments, sport complexes) as these larger buildings 
rely on gas for water heating. Costs would be significantly higher in Mexico City 
versus Sao Paulo however in cases where a SWH and a back up system would be put in 
new houses — Mexico City US$900 + US$300 = US$1200 versus Sao Paulo US$900 
+ US$10 = US$910 + labour time for modifications.
With respect to SWHs being used on a larger scale in Sao Paulo (whether for pools or 
other uses), they are cheaper than their counterparts in Mexico City (comparing specific
301 Interview, one government official, November 2005
302 Interview, one SWH company, one government official, November - December 2005
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parts -  panels, tanks of the same size, etc.) -- although this is only 20% of the SWH 
market in Sao Paulo. Only 1% of twenty percent is for industrial purposes. In Mexico 
City by contrast, as noted in Chapter 4, industrial and commercial applications of 
SWHs are about 15% of the Mexican market and 72% of this number is in Mexico 
City. It is interesting to see more SWHs for large-scale purposes being used in 
Mexico City versus Sao Paulo, as the hardware is cheaper in Brazil (when comparing 
specific components).
Rogers’ also suggests that costs must be assessed in comparison with alternative 
technologies, with increasing rates of adoption happening when the alternative is more 
costly or comparable to the price of the innovation.
6.3.2. Cost of SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo vis-a-vis 
Alternatives
The main alternative to SWHs to heat water in Mexico City (whether for bathing, pools 
or other uses) is a LPG water heater. The cost of a boiler for natural gas or LPG is 
about a third of the cost of a good quality SWH (equipment and installation). Key 
informants noted that the equipment for SWHs accounted for about 80% of the cost and 
the installation the rest.303 This is similar to other studies, such as Quintanilla et al. 
(2000) and Castro Negrete (2005) who claim that the equipment is about 85% of cost 
and installation 15%. Although it is not clear how much of the population uses LPG in 
the city, respondents noted that hot water alternatives to natural gas (including SWHs, 
electricity and wood) are marginal.304
Informants avowed that studies demonstrate that in the long run, a SWH is more cost 
effective than the LPG system. Respondents indicated that the payback time for a 
SWH is about three years, but that because the price of natural gas was increasing, a 
payback time of two years was becoming more plausible. Various factors changed 
this number including: price of natural gas or LPG (as noted above), assumptions on 
energy savings, the climate or weather which affected not only the amount of hot water
303 Interviews, one government representative, one SWH company, November 2005
304 Interviews, three SWH companies, two government representatives, November -  December 2005
305 Interview, one university representative, two SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006
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produced but also the “wear and tear” and lifespan on the equipment, the size and type 
of the system, among others. The increasing price of natural gas and LPG -  especially 
noticeable since 2000 — has been advantageous for SWH companies.306 In Mexico, 
which generally allows market prices for LPG and natural gas (albeit with some major 
exceptions) , natural gas has been increasing at a higher rate than inflation, “with 
major price spikes occurring between 2000 and 2001”.308 Specifically, the price of 
natural gas in the central zone of Mexico (which includes Mexico City) fluctuated from 
about US$ 2.20/MBTu in January 2000, to a high of about US$9.50/MBtu in January 
2001, to US$5.80/MBtu in February 2004 (Probst 2004: 5),
The main alternative to the SWH in Sao Paulo is without a doubt the electric shower 
(chuveiro eletrico). Whether using a PROCEL-certified SWH (about US$900.) or 
Sociedade de Sol’s low cost SWH (about US$100.) for a family in Sao Paulo, the 
electric showerhead, costing roughly a little over $US10., is significantly cheaper than 
the SWH.
Some informants highlighted the fact that many studies demonstrate that over time, one 
would eventually recoup the costs of a SWH when taking the cost of electricity into 
account.309 Other studies provide further insights into why this is the case. For 
example, PROCEL’s extensive 1988 study on household energy consumption habits in 
Brazil noted that water heating represented about 33 percent of home electricity costs in 
the country (Rodrigues and Matajs 2005: 13). More recent statistics from the Brazilian 
government demonstrate that “...a quarter of all electrical energy of the country is used 
in residences. The electric shower is one of the major [culprits] responsible for the 
high price of the [electricity] bill at the end of the month” (Brasil 2007). Having said 
this, gas water heaters are being used increasingly in operations on a larger scale (e.g. 
apartments, hospitals) in Sao Paulo. Nevertheless, they represent only a small 
percentage of the water heating market in Sao Paulo.310 In contrast to Mexico, where 
LPG and natural gas prices have been increasing, in Sao Paulo, the prices of natural gas
306 Interviews, 3 SWH companies, 3 university representatives, 2 government representatives, November 
2005 -  January 2006
307 For example, the Fox administration authorized a six-month subsidy for natural gas for residents of 
Monterrey in 2005 (which some interviewees pointed out was ‘coincidently’ the home riding of the 
Energy Secretary at that time).
308 Interview, one university representative, December 2006
309 Interviews, three SWH companies, two NGOs, March 2006
310 Informal discussions, February -  March 2006
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are more regulated. The cost of natural gas in Brazil varies depending on the source. 
For example, in 2003, the average price of national natural gas was US$2.60 / MBTu, 
whereas the price of natural gas from Bolivia was US$3.60 / MBTu. The majority of 
natural gas used in Sao Paulo is from Bolivia (Moraes 2003).
One other reason why the alternative is cheaper in both Mexico City and Sao Paulo is 
because the infrastructure is already in place -  including personnel (e.g. LPG 
distributors, electric shower sellers), and those involved in the building industry such as 
architects and construction workers -  they are “used to” LPG water heaters and electric 
showers and the necessary surrounding attributes. Moreover, interviewees in Sao Paulo 
noted that there is no separate piping for hot water, pointing out that this practice 
[separate piping for hot water] was not common in Brazil, “a hot country”311-  there are 
only one set of pipes carrying water to buildings. As the majority of SWH systems used 
in Brazil heat water in the solar panel, this separate piping would be needed to make 
them a viable alternative. This aspect can be traced to institutional barriers, which 
indicate the existing infrastructure favours the status quo, thus making it harder for 
RET penetration (Philibert 2006; Rodrigues and Matajs 2005).
6.3.3. Cost of Biogas for electricity generation in Mexico City and 
Sao Paulo
There was no biogas for electricity generation project in Mexico City implemented as 
of 2007, and so it was difficult to obtain information regarding the price of this 
technology. Although the HE had conducted some studies regarding the viability of 
biogas projects for the Valley of Mexico, where Mexico City is situated inside, were 
mainly focused on rural options (e.g. biogas from agriculture and forests) rather than 
from landfills.313 However, the Monterrey biogas project, starting in 2003, cost about 
US$11.5 million in total to produce about 7 MW of electricity314.
311 Interview, one consultancy, May 2007
312 None of the respondents mentioned this factor in Mexico City.
313 Personal communication, research institute representative, November 2007
314 Having said this, one government official in Brazil estimated the Monterrey project cost closer to 
US$20 million to produce 7 MW versus Bandeirantes which cost about US$20 million to produce almost 
20 MW -  joking that the Mexicans were able to negotiate better salaries (Interview, one government 
representative-B, March 2006).
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Figure 6.1 “Back of th e  E nvelope” C ost E stim ates for Potential B iogas to  Energy Project 
in Mexico City Using M onterrey Project Details
Several assumptions can help to understand the “ cost” of a hypothetical biogas plant in Mexico 
City:
• One could assume that this power plant is off line for various reasons (e.g. repairs, etc.) 
about 20% of the time throughout the year315. This would mean that every year about 0.8 
* 365 days/year * 24 hours/day * 7MW = a little more than 49 000 MWh (mega-watt 
hours) of electricity is produced.
• Using a project life of 21 years and annual costs (including O&M and costs involved with 
having it as a CDM project) of US$1.5 million per year, this would mean costs would be 
about US$418 per MWh).
• This money included the construction of a powerhouse, 7 motors adapted to work on a 
smaller scale, flaring and monitoring equipment
•  This figure is useful to know, as any biogas project for electricity production in Mexico 
City would likely require similar costs.
Source: Author based on information from Bartone et al. 2005, p. 20
The Bandeirantes landfill gas to energy project cost about US$20 million to build but 
the overall investment was calculated to be approximately US$80 million (where a 
project life of 10 years was used to make estimates) in the CDM project proposal. 
According to one government official involved with the project about 50% of the start 
up costs were taxes (something explored further in Chapter 8). About 18 MW of 
electricity was produced as of 2006316. There are 24 motors being used to generate this 
amount of electricity.
Figure 6.2 “Back of th e  E nvelope” C ost E stim ates for B iogas to  Energy Project in Sao 
Paulo using  B andeiran tes project inform ation
Several assumptions can help to understand the cost of the biogas plant in Bandeirantes:
One could assume that this power plant is off line for various reasons (e.g. repairs, etc.) about 
20% of the time throughout the year.
This would mean that every year about 0.8 * 365 days/year * 24 hours/day * 18MW = more 
than 126 000 MWh (mega-watt hours) of electricity is produced every year, which, using a 
project cost estimate of about US$80 million above, would represent a cost of about US$634 
per MWh.
Source: Author, based on discussions with biogas informants in Sao Paulo, November 2007
In Brazil, as noted in Chapter 5, even though cheaper, domestic options of motors 
modified to use biogas versus other fuels to generate electricity exist, project
315This estimation was confirmed with landfill gas experts, November 2007
316 Although there is capacity to produce 20 MW, only 18 MW is produced as that is the maximum 
amount that the transmission lines can carry as if 2006 (Interview, one engineering consultant, March 
2006).
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developers decided to use more expensive forms of the technology from foreign 
sources in Bandeirantes as they can provide better guarantees.317
This is interesting because, using these back of the envelope calculations as guidelines, 
a biogas plant in Mexico City would be cheaper than Sao Paulo, and yet there are none 
operating at present (although this may change) there, while there are two in Sao Paulo.
6.3.4. Cost of Biogas for electricity generation in Mexico City and 
Sao Paulo vis-a-vis Alternatives
The main alternative to biogas to produce electricity in Mexico City would be from 
thermal power plants using natural gas which served as 42.5% of the sources of 
electricity for the city in April 2006 (the other two sources being thermal electric plants 
using steam from oil to generate electricity) and hydroelectricity) (Luz y Fuerza del 
Centro 2007). The Mexican government plans on meeting new energy demand mainly 
through combined cycle gas-fired turbines.318 Combined cycle means that both a gas 
turbine and a steam turbine, using the gas released from the gas turbine to then turn the 
steam turbine, are used. Project developers for the CDM proposed landfill gas to 
generate electricity project in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, provide some cost comparisons 
in Table 6.2.
317 Interview, one government representative, March 2006
318 Interview, two government representatives, November -  December 2005
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Table 6.2 Examples of Cost Comparisons by Technology per MW
Technology Cost Comparison
Natural Gas
Combined
Cycle
Simple Cycle Gas Turbine Diesel Engine Landfill Gas 
Engine
(Reciprocating)
(World Bank) (Boyce) (World
Bank)
(Boyce) (World
Bank)
(United States 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency)
Size
Range
(MW)
300 0.5-400 50 0.02-25 5 1-15
Turnkey
Cost
($/MW)
510 000 to 
690 000
300 000 to 
650 000
380 000 to 
520 000
200 000 to 
500 000
470 000 to 
650 000
1 200 000
Source: Adapted from Project Design Document (PDD) for Ciudad Juarez LFG to Energy, 2006 
- See pp. 14-15 for original World Bank, Boyce and US EPA sources
While these comparisons can provide readers with an idea of costs, there are some 
major uncertainties in place, making cost projections for CCGT power plants difficult. 
For example, as noted above, the price of natural gas has fluctuated greatly in Mexico 
in the past decade. Another uncertainty involved with using natural gas for electricity 
generation in Mexico City is that because one third of natural gas is imported (mainly 
from the US), prices must be paid in US dollars.319
The point of these ‘back of the envelope’ cost comparisons is to provide readers with 
some guidelines to understand why they are being used in the first place. According to 
Rogers’ model, and conventional technology adoption models, if costs of a RET are 
than there counterparts, they will not be used. But, as indicated in Table 6.2, the costs 
are significantly higher to use landfill gas versus natural gas or diesel to generate 
power. So, a glaring question becomes, why are they being used in the first place? But, 
Rogers’ model also examines how climate change plays a role on increasing use -  
which in the case of biogas technologies was considered to be the single most 
important driver by informants.
With respect to alternative technologies to produce electricity in Sao Paulo, plans 
examining future sources of electricity generation for the State of Sao Paulo are from a
3,9 Informal discussions, November 2005 -  January 2006
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number of sources including gas-fired power plants320, more hydroelectricity, small 
hydro, solar, and biogas. However, the main alternative to hydroelectricity being 
considered in Sao Paulo state is biomass through bagasse from a sugar mill (e.g. 
combined heat and power plants from bagasse). These plants would mainly operate at 
peak times ( 6 - 9  pm) to help with the electricity burden.321 As many sugar mills exist, 
the costs would not likely include building a new “power plant” but focus on putting in 
place equipment to bum the bagasse, which creates steam, and turbines, to produce 
electricity, thus being significantly less costly than biogas which involves building new 
(even if smaller) power plants.322
Another alternative with strong support in Sao Paulo, Brazil at the time of field 
research (January -  March 2006), was CCGT plants, but these plans may have waned 
due to supply concerns of natural gas, which have increased with the nationalization of 
natural gas production and export in Bolivia -  the main provider of Sao Paulo’s natural 
gas - in May 2006323. On the other hand, there may be increasing support again for 
gas-fired plants in the region due to more recent major oil and gas reserves finds of 
Petrobras in November 2007324.
Similar to Mexico, there are also uncertainties involved in projecting costs between 
biogas and alternative sources for electricity. Regarding natural gas, according to 
Ellsworth and Gibbs, gas prices for existing power plants are “based on a formula that 
links gas to a basket of international oil prices” (2004: 33) and gas prices for new 
power plants are fixed at about US$2.58 / MMBTu with adjustments for inflation 
incorporated (Ellsworth and Gibbs 2004: 33). Another problem with using natural gas 
in Sao Paulo (where it is imported from Bolivia) is that its price is in US dollars, 
whereas the price of electricity is in reais (Ellas and Myers Jaffe 2004; Moraes 2003). 
In other words, although natural gas in Sao Paulo is not subject to the same amount of
320 One reason for this is due to the large gas reserves found off shore near Santos, Sao Paulo in May 
2003 (Personal communication, one government official, November 2007). Ellsworth and Gibbs also 
confirm this find, while pointing out that Petrobras indicated this gas would not be available for 
consumers until about 8 to 10 years (2004: 10-11).
321 Personal communication, one government official, November 2007; Interviews, two government 
officials, one NGO, March 2006
322 Interview, one government official, one university representative, March 2006
323 Interestingly one government official informed me in March 2006 that they [the state of Sao Paulo] 
were not concerned about Bolivia “reneging” on their supply contracts as this was a provincial /  state 
issue rather than federal issue in Bolivia (Interview, one government official, March 2006).
324 See http://www.cnn.eom/2007AVORLD/americas/l 1/08/brazil.oil.ap/index.html
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price fluctuations in Mexico City, there are still some risks involved with its usage (e.g. 
supply concerns, foreign exchange concerns).
To summarize, Rogers’ emphasis on economic relative advantage, similar to other RET 
studies in developing countries that use conventional approaches noted in Chapters 1, 
when looking at adoption rates overall, cost whether in general or vis a vis alternatives 
does have an impact on the adoption of SWHs and biogas to produce electricity, but 
costs cannot fully explain the major differences between the uptake of SWHs in these 
cities when broken down by market segment.
Costs of SWHs overall are similar in both cities, except in two instances. The first case 
is for SWHs for large-scale purposes where they are slightly more costly in Mexico 
City. Why are SWHs being used for larger-scale purposes more in Mexico City if costs 
are slightly higher there? The alternative to SWHs for large-scale applications is 
cheaper in Sao Paulo as the price of natural gas is more regulated. Less SWHs for 
commercial and industrial applications are used in Sao Paulo, concurrent with Rogers’ 
model. But it is also important to understand exactly why there are cost differences of 
the alternative (natural gas) in both cities. As is explored in further detail in Chapter 8, 
these cost differences of natural gas and LPG can be traced back to trade and 
competitiveness policies at the macro level, which further sheds light on RET adoption.
The second instance is for SWHs and a back up system for new homes, which are more 
costly in Mexico City (US$800-900 (SWH) + US$300 (LPG furnace) in Mexico City 
versus US$800-900 + US$10 (electric showerhead) in Sao Paulo). Rogers model 
indicates that technologies with higher costs will be less likely adopted; a factor one 
would expect to be more pronounced in developing countries. The alternative to 
SWHs for houses is significantly cheaper in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City. Rogers’ 
model would assume less SWHs being used in houses in Sao Paulo, but in fact the 
opposite is happening. I propose that although classical explanations for RET 
adoption, focusing on economic and technical attributes, are useful they are inadequate 
in and of themselves to explain RET use. Rogers’ model also fails to explain this 
phenomenon. This is particularly interesting because, as noted in Chapter 3, 
disposable income is comparable in both cities.
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With respect to biogas, the cost of this technology -  including all aspects of the project 
-  is somewhat higher in Sao Paulo versus Mexico. Also, about 50 % of the costs for 
the Bandeirantes project were devoted to taxes -  does this make a difference on 
technology adoption? Chapter 8, examining trade and competitiveness policies can help 
answer this question. Moreover, biogas projects in both countries are significantly 
more costly versus potential CCGT projects and / or biomass projects, so why are they 
being used in Sao Paulo and explored for use in Mexico City in the first place?
As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, all informants stressed that the main reason that landfill 
gas to generate electricity activities were being pursued was due to climate change 
opportunities. Some informants working on SWHs also spoke of policies in place 
aimed at increasing the uptake of RET, whether to address climate change, energy 
security issues and / or other environmental challenges. As I argued in Section 6.2, 
regarding knowledge and compatibility, historical events and current trends shape 
knowledge and perceptions. This may have a positive impact on their uptake (climate 
change’s role for biogas technologies in both places), whereas in other instances, the 
impact is not as discernible (climate change’s role on SWHs in both places, the apagao 
on biogas projects in Brazil, previous experiences in Sao Paul), is debatable (the apagao 
on SWHs in Sao Paulo, source of technology for both in both places), or is negative 
(previous experiences in Sao Paulo).
6.3.5. Incentives for SWHs and biogas technologies in Mexico City 
and Sao Paulo
As noted in Chapter 1, numerous studies on RETs in the developing world (e.g. 
Rodrigues and Matajs 2005, Milton and Kaufman 2005, Renewables 2004, Wilkins 
2002, Mor 2008) emphasize the key role that incentives -  whether voluntary or 
mandatory - play on encouraging the uptake of renewables. Rogers (2003a) also 
recognizes that incentives can play an important role on adoption as they can increase 
the relative advantage of innovations. Incentives include government policies at 
international and national levels aimed at encouraging the use of renewables. Specific 
examples include subsidies for renewables, a long-term feed in tariff system (where a 
government and / or electricity utility guarantees a specific rate of electricity to
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potential producers over a long period of time), rebates and an obligatory renewables 
requirement.
With respect to the case studies in particular, at the international level there are a 
number of policies and programs to encourage the use of RETs in developing nations -  
especially through technology transfer. As noted in Chapter 1, in the UN climate 
change process, the main tool is through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
This instrument provides a monetary value on the amount of projected carbon dioxide, 
or carbon dioxide equivalent emissions avoided in developing countries. Other 
avenues also exist, such as Article 4.5 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which obligates industrialized countries to diffuse lower 
carbon emitting technologies to developing countries. As indicated in Chapter 1, the 
effectiveness of these tools at achieving reduced carbon emissions and / or increasing 
technology cooperation has been the subjective of numerous studies.325 Speaking about 
increasing technology cooperation for instance, Dechezlepretre et al. (2009) claim that 
“ there is no visible effect of the Kyoto protocol on technology transfer: international 
technology flows have been increasing in the recent period, but the growth rate is the 
same as the average” (2009: 3).
As indicated in Chapter 4 and Section 6.2, interviewees in Mexico familiar with the 
CDM saw it as a potential opportunity for SWHs in Mexico City, but argued that the 
only way this would be economically viable, would be through a program done on a 
large scale. This finding is echoed in Hoyt et al.’s study which showed that in order for 
CDM opportunities to make sense for SWHs, at least 10, 000 units (single family) 
would need to be implemented to make up a single CDM project -  as well as noting the 
difficulty involved in monitoring and verification and making the project cohesive as 
the SWHs systems would be implemented in a number of places (2006: 61). Groups in 
Brazil however, such as Vitae Civilis and ABRAVA, are promoting this technology as 
a CDM opportunity -  especially when considered on a large-scale, taking Brazil’s 
electricity peak and the sources used to generate electricity at this time into account.
325 For further information on these topics, including debates and assessments, please see Haites et al. 
(2006). Technology Transfer by CDM Projects. Toronto, Canada, Margaree Consultants Inc.,
Seres (2007 and 2008) for the CDM and Ockwell, D., Alexandra Mallett, Ruediger Haum and Jim 
Watson (in review). "Intellectual Property Rights and low carbon technology transfer: the two polarities 
of diffusion and development." Global Environmental Change for the Article 4.5 issues for example.
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As noted in Chapters 4 and 5 and Section 6.2 however, the CDM was one of the key 
drivers encouraging the adoption of biogas to produce electricity technologies in both 
places.
Regarding domestic policies, in Mexico, with respect to SWHs, although the general 
consensus was that little was being done domestically, there were a few exceptions. 
For instance, many interviewees highlighted CONAE’s program to encourage the use 
of SWHs in Mexican homes. However, as indicated in Chapter 4, the program had a 
number of problems. It was rather complicated, there was little awareness, and deemed 
onerous for potential participants required to calculate their current use and expenses, 
among others. A few people also noted that tax breaks existed for those firms 
operating in Mexico that sought to import RET components. But, many SWH firms 
did not know this -  industry leaders claimed that programs and policies to help 
renewables were often complicated, convoluted, and / or unknown. In other words, it is 
not clear how effective these policies have been. A more recent law at the municipal 
level mandating the use of SWHs in new buildings of a certain size introduced in April 
2006 may hold more promise.
In Brazil, there are few domestic policies to encourage SWH use in Sao Paulo, 
although one major exception is the municipal law of June 2007, mandating their use in 
certain buildings. Many noted broader renewable energy and energy conservation 
policies, including PROINFA, PROCEL, and the national level law requiring energy 
companies to spend 1% of their revenues on R&D for energy savings programs, which 
could play more of an indirect role on adoption of SWHs. On the other hand, many 
noted that these efforts, while important, were not enough and that the government 
needed to do more to encourage the adoption of this important technology. For 
instance, key informants underscored the absence of the state government and 
Eletropaulo Metropolitana Eletricidade de Sao Paulo (Eletropaulo), the key electricity 
distributor in Sao Paulo, which is owned jointly by AES of the U.S. and the (Brazilian) 
National Bank for National Social and Economic Development (BNDES) on this issue.
Regarding biogas technologies in Mexico, there are few domestic policies in place. 
Government agencies and other research institutes, such as the INE and HE, are
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studying their potential in Mexico City. Other agencies, such as the Ministry of Social 
Development (SEDESOL), offer support for those interested in pursuing these types of 
projects, from the landfill design-phase to the generation of electricity (Torres and 
Gomez 2006: 65). In Brazil, governments at the federal, state and municipal levels 
have been or are becoming engaged in this area. For example, at the state level, 
CETESB has been working on this issue seriously since the mid 1990s and also offers 
support to potential project developers.
Related to incentives are environmental studies. In the case of SWHs a number of 
studies had been done in both cities. Numerous experts were aware of Quintanilla’s 
work on SWHs in Mexico City. Quintanilla showed that the residential sector in 
Mexico City “generates, approximately 3 percent of NOx, 2 percent of methane, and 13 
percent of C02 emissions” (2000: 22-23) and that SWHs would be an excellent way to 
help reduce these emissions. West et al. (2003) also argued that SWHs could represent 
an important manner through which to reduce the emissions from these three 
pollutants). A more recent study (Hoyt et al. 2006: 8) also confirms the local 
environmental benefits of reduced NOx and CO emissions, and the global environment 
benefits of mitigating climate change through reduced C02 emissions and potential 
ozone depleting pollutants when using SWHs versus LPG in Mexico City.
In Brazil, groups such as Vitae Civilis and Lumina, are undertaking studies to 
demonstrate the environmental benefits of SWHs. Interestingly, one study comparing 
SWHs to LPG systems and SWHs + electric back up systems in Sao Paulo using a Life 
Cycle Assessment (LCA)326 approach demonstrated that there were more GHG 
emissions released from the SWH + electricity back up water heating system versus an 
LPG system (Taborianski and Prado 2004: 650). Despite these studies, many 
informants stressed that, generally speaking, environmental studies were few and that 
much more research was needed.
326 Life Cycle Assessment, or Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) examines the environmental impact of a good 
or service throughout its entire lifespan (a cradle to grave approach). In the case of a product, this would 
include the energy, air and water pollution, and solid waste involved in the collection and transportation 
of raw materials, the process involved in making it a finished product (e.g. a water heating system), the 
distribution and use of the system, and finally its disposal Macauley, M. and M. Walls (2000). Solid 
Waste Policy. Public Policies for Environmental Protection. P. a. R. Portney and Stavins. Washington 
D.C., Resources For the Future: 286.
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But one problem with these studies, and related to Rogers’ compatibility argument, is 
that even if people were aware of scientific studies that exist demonstrating savings of 
stand-alone SWHs, or SWHs with a “back up” gas system versus their stand-alone 
natural gas or LPG counterparts, in Mexican culture, the concept of making such a 
large investment in which payback may be seen in about five years is incongruent with 
a culture in which many people tend to live day by day. Many people in Mexico would 
only make this kind of investment (with a payback of five to six years) on a house or a 
car.327 This facet was not mentioned as much in the Sao Paulo case study for SWHs. 
However, informal discussions in Sao Paulo indicated that many people in that city also 
live day to day or month to month, and echoed by Brazil’s 2003 INGE study on income 
levels discussed in Chapter 5, likely negatively affect the uptake of SWHs at the 
household level in that city.
Some conventional studies on renewables categorize this challenge as an economic 
trait, noting that those with less disposable income have higher discount rates (i.e. 
money they have today is worth significantly more than money they will have 
tomorrow) (Philibert 2006). But this facet is also intrinsically linked with socio­
cultural aspects, which are often neglected when promoting these environmental 
advantages. Jorge Cela’s (1997) Culture of Poverty, speaking about the urban poor in 
the Dominican Republic, highlights instability involved in all aspects of their lives, 
institutions, family and other relationships; not just finances -  moving to various 
locations, living with various family members, perhaps, or perhaps not attending 
schools, and having numerous workplaces and / or forms to generate income.
Policies encouraging these RETs are important steps but the role they have played on 
the uptake of SWHs and biogas technologies in Mexico City and Sao Paulo is not clear. 
Incentives at the international level have played a role in encouraging the use of biogas 
to generate electricity technologies in Latin America, but considering the technology is 
more costly in Sao Paulo they cannot explain the differences between the two cities 
adequately. It is important to take a step back and ask what are the driving forces for 
these incentives? The main rationale behind encouraging the adoption of RETs is due
327 Personal Communication, Mexican scholar, February 2006; Interviews, three SWH companies, two
consultancy, November - December 2005 and January 2006
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to phenomena occurring at a systemic level. These aspects include poverty alleviation, 
climate change, energy security, other environmental challenges, and increasing 
technological capacity; all of which merit responses at a systemic level.
As argued in Chapter 1 however, these incentives -  offered as solutions to barriers — 
are often too economic or technical focused, neglecting other aspects just as important. 
By the same token, policy incentives are often too narrow and do not account for the 
role that other, seemingly unrelated, indirect policies can have on RET adoption. 
Incentives put in place to address barriers are often interdependent and their existence 
can be traced back to policies formulated at the macro-level. Thus, addressing one, 
several, or all of the barriers does not necessarily equate with an increase in technology 
adoption.
6.4. Triability, Observability and Social System
The other two attributes that Rogers identifies as potential factors affecting adoption 
are triability and observability. In Mexico City and Sao Paulo at present no “trial 
periods” exist in which a family / hotel / hospital, or, in the case of a landfill, a 
municipality, can “try out” a SWH (even if a “back up” alternative to heat water was 
also used) or biogas technology to produce electricity for a period of time without 
undertaking a major investment in the equipment and installation -  thus making some 
potential users more reluctant to take on this technology.328
In Sao Paulo, Vitae Civilis and ABRAVA were starting to work with others, including 
a government bank that focuses on lower income populations (Caixa Economica 
Federal (also known as Caixa or CEF)), on an Energy Service Company (ESCO) option 
for SWH usage. Under this initiative an ESCO would sell hot water or lease the SWH 
equipment, making this technology or the services from this technology (hot water) 
more viable for end users.329 However, at the time of writing (2009), this had still not 
been implemented.
328 Interviews with two SWH companies, one government agency, November -  December 2005; 
Interviews three SWH companies, one NGO, March 2006
329 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
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Observability of SWHs was similar in both places -  some examples existed in various 
places throughout the cities (e.g. houses, hospitals, sports centres) but not enough that 
they were deemed commonplace. Biogas technology to produce electricity was also 
similar in both places amongst the general public because even though this RET existed 
in Sao Paulo, the majority of the general public had not been to their landfills nor did 
they desire to go there. In both cities, even though there was not a local example of the 
RET up and running in Mexico City, most experts were aware of the details involved in 
the Monterrey biogas to energy project. However, one interesting point noted in Brazil 
was that there were some journalists that had taken an interest in the Sao Paulo biogas 
projects.330
The core organizations focused on increasing awareness and understanding for SWHs 
in Mexico City are ANES and ABRAVA, Vitae Civilis and Sociedade de Sol in Sao 
Paulo (discussed further in Section 6.8). Their main method of communication -  
organizing conferences, courses, and seminars as well as conducting presentations and 
mobilizing other stakeholders — is cosmopolite and to a lesser extent local interpersonal 
channels, as well as communication via the internet. The main communications 
channels used by organizations aimed at increasing awareness and understanding of 
this technology (discussed in detail in Section 4.10) is also cosmopolite and to a lesser 
extent local interpersonal channels and the internet. For both RETs in both Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo, mass media channels (e.g. television, radio) are not used much. As 
the communication forms are similar in both locations for both technologies, less 
attention was placed on this factor to explain the differences.
Two other features in the diffusion of innovation model -  type of innovation system 
and communication channels were similar in both cities, so less attention was placed 
there. Rogers (2003a) also indicates that the nature of a social system, such as its norms 
and degree of interconnectedness can affect the adoption of technologies. He defines it 
as “a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a 
common goal”. (Rogers 2003a: 23). But as has been stressed throughout the 
dissertation, these interconnections are ever evolving. Furthermore, as noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5 and discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8, rather than the degree of
330 Interview, one university representative, March 2006
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interconnectedness, the nature of these relationships and the dynamics not only 
between but also within stakeholder groups can affect adoption.
Moreover, the social systems under scrutiny are extremely complex -  with major 
differences between socioeconomic levels, various ethnicities, neighbourhoods, 
governments, policies, etc. Furthermore, these social systems are cities, with unique 
attributes and features including serving as nexus points for innovation, and providing 
opportunities for various sectors (e.g. public, private, academic) to have increased 
personal contacts. For these reasons, an alternative framework, termed urban 
technology cooperation and applied at the meso-level, was used to determine how the 
social system played a role on adoption.
6.5. Efforts of Change Agents
The final salient feature considered in Rogers’ model is the effort of change agents, or 
intermediaries. Change agents are members of a social system who seek to influence a 
person or organization’s decision to adopt (or not to adopt) a technology. The view is 
that a change agent is more successful in ensuring the adoption of innovations through 
a number of criteria including their effort to contact clients, orienting their efforts at 
clients versus the change agencies, the extent to which they work with opinion leaders, 
etc. (Rogers 2003a: 27 and 400). But, as explored below, the problem with this 
definition is that not enough attention is placed on the dynamics occurring between 
these change agents, or within stakeholder groups.
6.5.1. SWHs in Mexico City
As indicated in Chapter 4, the NGO ANES was considered the main change agency 
promoting this RET in Mexico City. ANES has shouldered most of the responsibility 
of creating awareness and understanding of SWHs through undertaking a multitude of 
activities in order to increase awareness of this technology -  from the basics to its 
advantages — amongst many different actors (e.g. students, engineers, potential 
developers, etc). ANES works with other active players, such as the academics and 
CIE and SWHs.
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A number of SWH companies in Mexico City noted that, since the majority of their 
time is spent on keeping afloat, they have little time to devote to increasing awareness 
and promoting the technology among potential consumers. Many companies also 
claimed that the government was doing little to promote SWHs, although a number 
noted actions taken by the municipal government which facilitated discussion amongst 
key players during 2005/06331. At that time, the agency was lead by the Secretary of 
Environment of Mexico City, Dr. Claudia Sheinbaum, an engineer by training very 
familiar with solar energy. However, they are unable to promote SWHs amongst the 
general public due to a lack of time and financial resources332. Some individuals at the 
federal government or outside of government are also critical change agents (e.g. Odon 
de Buen, when he was Director of CONAE or working as an energy expert for a 
consultancy), but by far the most organized efforts are those of ANES.
6.5.2. SWHs in Sao Paulo
Many SWH companies in and around Sao Paulo are too busy to focus their efforts on 
promoting this technology amongst the general public. Many defer this task to 
ABRAVA. The municipal government is interested in this technology (like Mexico 
City, Sao Paulo has recently approved a mandatory SWH norm for new buildings) but 
many informed me that governments (especially at the federal and state levels) were 
simply “not interested in this technology”.333 The bulk of awareness raising of SWHs in 
Sao Paulo (the city, the greater city area, and the state) is being done by two initiatives 
supporting two distinct philosophies.
The first initiative is the joint activities of ABRAVA and Vitae Civilis. Change agents 
are individuals working at these two organizations. Through their efforts (e.g. 
workshops, presentations, advocacy efforts), information about SWHs is increasing 
amongst experts and also, through their Cidades Solares program, amongst 
municipalities -  including Sao Paulo (both technical and non-technical personnel).
The second effort, albeit on a smaller scale, and more at the “grassroots” are the efforts 
of Sociedade de Sol -  the individuals working there would be considered other change
331 Interviews, six SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 200
332 Interviews, 2 government representatives, November -  December 2005
333 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
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agents. Through their monthly courses on a low-cost model of a SWH and their SWH 
kit in the classroom program, information on SWHs is also increasing in Sao Paulo. 
Another organization also focusing on easy to build / install and cheap SWHs, although 
more for rural applications -  building on the intermediate technology movement of the 
1970s — is the Grupo Solaris, operating out of the Piracicaba campus of USP. Their 
philosophy, like that of Sociedade de Sol’s, is to focus not only on technical attributes, 
but on how to ensure it is simple and cheap, and therefore more accessible to the 
general population334.
In conclusion, efforts to increase awareness and understanding of SWHs amongst the 
general population and experts by consultants, companies and government officials are, 
generally speaking, sparse due to a lack of time and resources, and / or a lack of interest 
(in the case of some government agencies).
The NGO ANES, through their various activities, are actively disseminating 
information about this technology in Mexico City and in the country. In Sao Paulo, 
three organizations are undertaking efforts to increase awareness of this technology -  
ABRAVA, Vitae Civilis and Sociedade de Sol. What is interesting about these three 
groups is the fact that while their ultimate goal is the same -  to increase awareness 
about SWHs in Sao Paulo and Brazil — these are two distinct “branches” or forms of 
knowledge. One branch, lead by Vitae Civilis and ABRAVA, in addition to creating 
awareness about the technology in general, also focuses their efforts on making 
certified SWHs more accessible to the population -  through proposing credit schemes, 
ESCOs, and legislation requiring their use.
The other knowledge branch, akin to the Schumacher, intermediate / appropriate 
technology school of thought. This philosophy stresses not only the technology, but 
also the social benefits that can accrue from its use (including pride, and an increase in 
self-esteem). In essence, the philosophy of Vitae Civilis and ABRAVA’s efforts is to 
get the social situation to “fit” the technology, while Sociedade de Sol and Grupo
334 The Grupo Solaris representative pointed out that there were a number o f organizations across Brazil 
working along these lines (intermediate technology) including groups in Parana and others in the 
northeast of Brazil, Interview, April 2007
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Solaris’ is to get the technology to “fit” the situation. Rogers’ model fails to account 
for these different types of knowledge being pursued concurrently.
Table 6.2 discusses these features as they relate to SWHs in Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo.
6.5.3. Biogas in Mexico City
As noted in Chapter 4, there is some work being done on biogas in and around Mexico 
City by various organizations, including the DE, SEMARNAT, INE, SENER, and 
CONAE. They are not focusing their efforts on increasing knowledge of this 
technology amongst the general population. Several biogas companies are also active 
in this area — mainly Mexican subsidiaries of international companies, such as 
Ecoenergy and MGM International -  but their efforts to increase knowledge are aimed 
at potential investors. However, some of these potential investors include 
municipalities (both technical and non-technical personnel). The majority of the work 
in this area is relatively new, stemming from the Monterrey biogas project, which 
began in 2003, to determine the feasibility of replicating this project elsewhere.335 
Mexican expertise is growing -  amongst technical personnel in the government, biogas 
companies (whether Mexican or Mexicans working at foreign-owned companies) and 
municipalities, although this technology remains basically unknown amongst the 
general public in that city.
6.5.4. Biogas in Sao Paulo
Since the mid 1990s, there has been a lot of work done on this issue in Sao Paulo, 
especially by the state environmental agency CETESB. This agency has undoubtedly 
served as the nexus of information regarding this topic. Activities conducted include 
providing the technical and administrative knowledge at a Brazil-wide methane 
emissions reduction workshop in 1998, and fostering networks, drawing on national 
expertise from the USP (e.g. IEE, IPT and CENBIO), the federal government (e.g. 
MCT) and engineering consultants and international partners, such as the Japanese 
government, the World Bank and the US EPA. In addition CETESB has created 
software aimed at simulating a landfill so potential project developers can determine
335 Informal discussions and Interviews, 2 biogas companies, 5 government representatives, November
2005 -  January 2006
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methane emissions reductions and electricity generation, a guidebook and a webpage to 
help disseminate information about this technology to experts, students, and, to a lesser 
extent, the general population. They are also a core partner in the country-wide effort 
by the federal government to determine the feasibility of this technology in 40 
municipalities throughout Brazil. Sao Paulo-based experts are one of the driving forces 
behind increasing awareness of this technology in the city and state of Sao Paulo and 
beyond. Indigenous expertise has a solid basis in Sao Paulo -  through CETESB and 
the USP, amongst others, and is growing within government agencies at the federal and 
state levels -  as well as the municipal levels through the Bandeirantes and Sao Joao 
landfill gas to energy projects.
These aspects are important for the following reasons. First of all, the fact that there is 
no one clear change agent in Mexico City may partially explain why biogas 
technologies are not being used there, but they are being used in Sao Paulo. That said, 
as noted in Chapter 4, since the time of research things are changing in this area as the 
mayor of Mexico City is working with the Clinton Foundation on a biogas initiative. 
The second area to point out is the fact that regarding biogas technologies, in Sao Paulo 
these change agents were domestic, while in Mexico City, they were foreign and 
domestic. Although the main change agents in both cities for SWHs are domestic, 
there is more indigenous technological capacity in Brazil, which has also been in place 
for a longer period of time. This can have positive implications for adoption. Other 
studies also emphasize the importance of developing indigenous technological capacity 
through the sharing of knowledge and not just equipment and skills to ensure 
sustainable technology cooperation and use (e.g. Ockwell et al. 2007, Bell 1990; 
(Worrell et al. 2001). Developing indigenous capacity is also related to trade and 
competitiveness policies, as there is evidence to support the view that technology 
cooperation through joint ventures rather than through creating subsidiaries is more 
conducive to doing so (Ivarsson and Alvstam 2005); Ockwell et al. 2007).
Table 6.3 lays out the concepts identified above and how they were applied in the case 
of Biogas for electricity generation in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
Table 6.2: Aspects of Rogers* Technology Adoption Model to Explain the Adoption of SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
Stage Attributes Relevant
Factor
Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
Knowledge Awareness Little aw areness of 
technology or as  an 
alternative to a  gas water 
heater by general public
Apagao -  more 
aw areness of energy 
conservation
Some suggest aw areness 
of SWHs due to apagao 
but view not shared by all
May partially explain 
more SWH adoption in 
houses in Sao Paulo.
Underlying 
conditions affect 
aw areness, not 
just aw areness of 
technology
Prior
experiences 
with technology
Negative perception of 
SWHs due to previous 
experiences (inferior 
equipment and / or bad 
installations)
Not really noted May partially explain 
more SWH adoption in 
houses in Sao Paulo
Underlying 
conditions affect 
aw areness, not 
just aw areness of 
technology
Other prior 
events -  oil 
shocks and 
climate change 
Source of 
technology
Oil shocks and climate 
change positive for RE but 
not necessarily these 
technologies 
SWH technology foreign, 
joint, and domestic 
Biogas technology 
generally foreign
Oil shocks and climate 
change positive for RE but 
not necessarily these 
technologies
SWH technology domestic 
Biogas technology 
domestic, joint and foreign
Not clear in both places 
if playing a  direct role
May play a  role on 
adoption but not clear 
from model how
unclear
More opportunities 
for technological 
capacity and 
absorption in 
Brazil? (Bell 1990, 
Lai11995)
Persuasion Economic
Relative
Advantage
Cost in general A ssessed SWHs for 
applicable users 
Unaffordable to majority of 
population in city (at least 
17% of popn can afford)
A ssessed SWHs for 
applicable users 
Unaffordable to majority of 
population in city (at least 
16% of population can 
afford)
SWH for domestic use 
have similar costs -  
larger tank is used in 
Brazil. SWH for larger 
scale operations -  
SWHs are a  little 
cheaper in Brazil, so  
one would expect more 
used there, but more are 
being used in Mexico 
City
Alternative to 
large-scale 
applications of 
SWHs is cheaper 
in Sao Paulo
BUT alternative to 
household SWHs 
is cheaper in 
Brazil
Stage Attributes Relevant Mexico City Sao Paulo
Factor
Comparison Explanation
Economic
Relative
Advantage
Cost vis-&-vis 
Alternatives
Versions of SWHs exist 
that are equivalent or 
cheaper than conventional 
counterparts (over time) 
LPG boiler is a  little over 
1/3rd cost of SWH, but 
80% of LPG is used to 
heat water vs. cooking 
Need auxiliary system
Compatibility Social aspects Culture of more day to day
Complexity
Triability
Mixed -  some understood 
basic concept (using the 
sun to heat water through 
pipes) but not complexities 
(how does water stay hot 
at night /  cloudy days?) 
Experts -  yes -  do not 
need to convince 
engineers of its 
advantages
At present, no option for a 
trial period for a  SWH 
(whether on its own, or 
with a  conventional “back 
up” system)
No SWH is cheaper than 
alternative for single family 
homes at present 
(chuveiro eletrico), but, 
over time, 33% of 
electricity bill is used to 
heat water they will be the 
sam e cost 
Some multifamily 
dwellings and industry use 
gas -  some SWHs are 
cheaper at present or in 
the long run 
Need auxiliary system
Many living month to 
month
Mixed -  some understood 
basic concept (using the 
sun to heat water through 
pipes) but not complexities 
Experts -  yes - -  do not 
need to convince 
engineers of its 
advantages
At present, no option for a  
trial period for a  SWH 
(whether on its own, or 
with a  conventional “back 
up” system)
Chuveiro eletrico is so 
cheap, Alternative to
SWHs for larger 
applications is cheaper 
in Sao Paulo.
Both countries -  people 
who do find out about 
SWHs are interested but 
find them too expensive 
Similar in both cities
Generally does not exist 
in either country 
ESCO model of VC -  
too early -  not up and 
running in Sao Paulo
One would think 
there would be 
less SWHs used 
in Brazilian 
homes, but 
opposite is 
happening.
Can help to 
explain why more 
being used in 
Mexico City.
Stage Attributes Relevant
Factor
Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
Observability Can be viewed in a 
number of places 
throughout city, but not 
commonplace
Planning ESCO model but 
not operational
Can be viewed in a  
number of places 
throughout city, but not 
commonplace
Similar in both cities.
All Change
Agents
Individuals working at 
ANES are main change 
agents
Individuals at Vitae Civilis, 
ABRAVA and Sociedade 
de Sol are main change 
agents but promoting two 
distinct philosophies
Distinct change agents 
in both places
Not clear from 
model implications 
of promoting 
differing 
philosophies
Source: Author, August 2008, updated August 2009
Table 6.3: Aspects of Rogers’ Technology Adoption Model to Explain Adoption of Biogas for Electricity Generation (Mexico City, Sao 
Paulo)_______________________________________________________________________ _________________________ ________
Stage Attributes Relevant
Factor
Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
Knowledge Awareness Generally speaking public 
had no or little idea about 
this technology but experts 
were aware.
General public had no or 
little idea about this 
technology but experts 
were aware.
Similar in both cities.
Prior
experiences 
with technology
Other prior 
events -  oil 
shocks and 
climate change
No implications noted 
Climate change key driver
Lead actors to use a 
foreign versus domestic 
version of the technology
Climate change key driver
In Brazil, only a  negative 
impact on som e types of 
technology, not industry 
as  a  whole 
Similar in both cities
Not clear from 
model
Persuasion Economic
Relative
Advantage
Cost in general Estimated at about 
US$417 per MWh
Estimated at about 
US$634 per MWh
Costs are a  little higher 
in Sao Paulo (50% of 
costs are due to taxes)
Not clear from 
model
Economic
Relative
Advantage
Cost vis-a-vis 
alternatives
Significantly more 
expensive then alternative
Significantly more 
expensive then alternative
Why are they being 
used? Projected 
revenues due to CDM
Prior conditions 
affect use
Compatibility
Complexity
Social aspects Public generally thought 
little about landfills unless 
living nearby, working in 
industry or having no 
garbage collection 
Only experts
Similar 
Only experts
Similar in both cities. 
Similar in both cities.
Triability
Observability
This option is not 
available.
As technology would be 
located at landfill which is 
outside of the city,
This option is not 
available.
Technology is located at 
landfill which is outside of 
the city, therefore hard to
Generally does not exist 
in either country.
Similar in both cities.
Stage Attributes Relevant
Factor
Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
therefore hard to generate 
a  lot of observability 
unless living / working 
near. Also, access to 
landfill would be restricted.
generate a  lot of 
observability unless living / 
working near. Access to 
landfill is restricted.
All Change
Agents
No one organizational (or 
individual) “champion” -  
numerous change agents
Individuals working at 
CETESB are the main 
change agents
May partially explain 
why more biogas 
technologies being used 
in Sao Paulo
Change agents 
can play a  key 
role on adoption
Source: Author, August 2008, updated August 2009
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6.6. - Conclusion
What can Rogers model tell us regarding the research question - what are the most 
important factors affecting RET adoption in the urban developing world? Through 
focusing on the first research question how can systemic approaches help to explain RET 
adoption in the urban developing world, I found that Rogers’ model is useful to help 
explain RET adoption in these settings because it captures the classical explanations for 
RET adoption in developing countries, while also accounting for social aspects. In 
addition, the approach focuses on a system and places emphasis on technologies and 
actors. On the other hand using a model to determine causality is with limitations -  
history and context matter, which can put some of the model’s assumptions into question.
Specifically, what can Rogers’ model tell us about why or why not SWHs and biogas 
technologies are being used in Mexico City and Sao Paulo?
First of all, Rogers’ model -  akin to those approaches emphasizing economic and 
technical aspects -- is especially useful in explaining why adoption rates in both cities for 
both technologies are rather low (reflection of cost, lack of finances, lack of awareness of 
the technologies, a lack of and / or problems with implementing incentives and 
administrative hurdles). These themes are consistent with some of the findings noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5 including awareness and direct environmental policies.
However, when comparing the two case studies, there are a number of differences 
between the locations that the model cannot explain. For instance, the model can help to 
explain why more SWHs and a back up in new houses are being used in Sao Paulo versus 
Mexico City - because they are cheaper. However, SWHs in existing homes are 
significantly higher in Brazil versus Mexico, although the alternative to the SWH is much 
cheaper in Sao Paulo.
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Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations model helps to explain why more large-scale 
applications are being used in Mexico City -- because the alternative to SWHs is cheaper 
in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City. This dissertation suggests however that analysis must 
take a step farther back and determine exactly why the alternative to SWH is cheaper -  
are there policies in place that affect this? I argue in Chapter 8 that policies at the 
systemic level put in place for different reasons can impact RET adoption nevertheless -  
such as trade and competitiveness policies.
In fact, trade and competitiveness regimes were one of the most prevalent themes 
identified by informants, as well as networks. These themes are not accounted for 
enough using Rogers’ model. Therefore, two other frameworks -  urban technology 
cooperation and trade and competitiveness regimes were also applied.
Secondly, the model helps to partially explain why there are more SWHs being used in 
Sao Paulo among residential consumers. Rogers’ model asserts that knowledge of a 
technology does impact RET adoption and that the more people understand a technology, 
the more willing they are to adopt it. At the same time, Rogers’ recognizes the 
importance of previous experiences. In the case of Mexico City, many indicated that 
these prior experiences negatively affected the use of SWHs, while in Sao Paulo, that 
city’s experience with the apagao had a positive impact on SWH use through increased 
awareness of RETs and energy conservation leading some actors to seek out SWHs. 
However, a minority of informants felt that this awareness of energy issues did not 
necessarily led to increased use of SWHs. In this case, I assert that awareness of energy 
conservation issues in general in Sao Paulo in combination with previous experiences 
with SWHs in Mexico City also affect the uptake of RETs, rather than just awareness of 
these technologies themselves.
But, one thing interesting is that in Brazil, prior experience with biogas technologies led 
participants to choose a foreign rather than domestic technology, despite numerous taxes 
put in place to encourage the use of domestic technologies. Here, negative experiences 
only impacted the use of some types of the technology. In other words, a model’s
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attempt at determining causality must also reflect the context and historical experiences 
of that particular setting.
Sources of technology, perceptions of technology ownership and the fact that indigenous 
knowledge of these RETs is increasing may also influence technology use but it is not 
clear from this approach exactly how. Frameworks emphasizing the role of developing 
technological capabilities through acquiring knowledge as well as skills and equipment, 
and absorptive capacity (e.g. Lall 1995, Bell 1990; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2005) provide a 
better explanation for how these attributes can impact adoption.
Related to knowledge are the efforts of change agents, which seek to increase knowledge 
of innovations. One assumption of Rogers’ model is that they have similar goals (to 
encourage adoption of an innovation), but what if differing philosophies are being 
pursued concurrently, as in the Brazilian case study? This aspect will be discussed in 
Chapter 7.
Another concern with the approach is how knowledge is treated - it implicitly equates 
knowledge with information, but as stressed throughout, each individual processes and 
interprets information differently making them distinct.
The dissertation therefore turned to debates in technology transfer and innovation to 
better explain how key factors can influence renewable energy use in urban environments 
in developing countries. Technology transfer is an integral part of the technology 
adoption process, especially in developing countries. An alternative form of technology 
transfer, termed ‘urban technology cooperation’ was the second framework chosen for 
analysis of RET adoption in these two cities. This approach attempts to link actions at 
the local level with actions undertaken other levels, to capture the potential effects of 
indirect, systemic policies.
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CHAPTER 7: URBAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION -  AN ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATION FOR RET ADOPTION IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES
7.1. Introduction
As indicated in Chapter 6, Rogers’ diffusion of innovation model was useful in that it 
helped to explain:
• The fact that overall adoption rates are low in both cities;
• why more SWHs + a back up in new homes are being used in Sao Paulo and why 
large scale SWHs are being used in Mexico City (because they are cheaper than the 
alternative)
• how energy conservation issues through the apagao in combination with prior 
experiences played a role on the uptake rates of SWHs in Sao Paulo versus Mexico 
City;
• why biogas technologies are being used in the first place in Mexico and Brazil 
(climate change); and
• why more biogas technologies were not being used in Mexico City but are in Sao 
Paulo (presence of distinct change agents).
On the other hand, the approach was unable to explain:
• why more SWHs in homes are being used in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City (as the 
alternative is much cheaper in Sao Paulo);
• how trade and competitiveness regimes and networks -  two pivotal themes noted by 
informants -  impacted adoption;
• how source of technology and divisions between and within stakeholder groups can 
play a role on uptake.
Furthermore, the model treats knowledge as similar to information, but it is more than 
this. Information is processed, shaped and interpreted differently based on people’s 
experiences and understanding.
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Also, as noted in Chapter 2, some technology adoption and transfer approaches focus on 
interactions between stakeholder groups. But more attention is needed on the nature of 
these relationships.
When examining the interactions between stakeholder groups, there were a number of 
insights gleaned. Firstly, in the case of SWHs, these networks were considered to be 
stronger because their nexus point was in a city. Secondly, although Rogers’ pointed out 
the importance of change agents, this approach helped to understand why these change 
agents were so effective. Thirdly, an assessment of networks, rather than mainly change 
agents and the person or organization making a decision whether or not to use a 
technology, showed some weaknesses within these links, which can play a role on 
adoption. Finally, this chapter shows that in Sao Paulo, networks that had been around 
longer were more institutionalised and the stakeholders groups more mobilized, affecting 
RET use for both technologies.
When examining the impact of international influences, I found that in addition to 
realizing the important role that climate change and the CDM has on adoption of these 
technologies (as noted in Chapter 6), examining the source of these drivers is also key. 
Here, international influences are key drivers prompting networks between technology 
cooperation participants at the level of the city, which helps to explain why these 
networks are fostering. But more importantly, Brazil has more indigenous expertise in 
this area due to the early engagement on climate change and the CDM by the 
government, academic communities, NGOs, and other stakeholders.
I also found that dynamics within stakeholder groups, affected by international 
influences, such as divisions uncovered at the meso-level, help explain RET use in these 
cities.
There were several implications involved with using this alternative paradigm. First of 
all, having more players does not necessarily equate to more successful technology
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cooperation. Secondly, although cities can serve as centres of innovation and nexus 
points to foster personal contacts between various sectors, unlike Porter (1990), who 
argues that rivalries among firms is good to trigger innovation and adoption, I found that 
these divisions played a negative role on technology adoption. In addition, although the 
urban technology cooperation approach recognizes the importance of engaging end users, 
in the realities of Mexico City and Sao Paulo regarding these two technologies, they were 
virtually absent -  albeit the efforts of Sociedade do Sol and Grupo Solaris to popularize 
SWHs are important steps.
Finally, the model fails to tell us exactly the rationale behind some of these findings -  
why they were happening in the first place -  for that answer, we must turn to an 
assessment of trade and competitiveness policies.
7.2. The Urban Technology Cooperation Approach
In Chapter 2, aspects of technology cooperation were discussed in detail. Technology 
cooperation is rooted various traditions including:
1) technology transfer and innovation literature, such as triple and quadruple helix 
(Etkowitz and Carvalho de Mello 2004; Saad and Zawdie 2005, Bunders et al. 
1999), Douthwaite’s (2002) innovation feedback model, technological capabilities 
(Lall 1995), technological systems (Hekkert and van den Hoed, citing Carlsson 
and Stankiewicz 1995), and technology cooperation (Heaton et al. 1994);
2) approaches marrying environmental and energy issues with local governance 
concerns, such as Glasbergen’s cooperative environmental governance (1998), 
Mason’s environmental democracy (1999) and Forsyth’s work on climate change 
in the developing world and deliberative institutions and cross-sector partnerships 
(1999); Morsink, Hofman and Lovett’s technology transfer work of 
environmentally sound technologies in Lesotho (in press);
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3) system dynamics -  recognizing that the process (or system) is as important a facet 
in determining how it acts as are the individual parts -  a tool used as a way to 
address policies in a complex system (Forrester 1961).
To advance urban technology cooperation as a way to explain the adoption of renewable 
energy technologies, there are a number of assumptions and attributes to be examined. 
Discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, these include:
• the notion that sustainable technology cooperation includes technological capacity 
building;
• It is an iterative two- or more-way process where all participants are active 
players, inputting into the technology cooperation process;
• cohesive and continuous communication between technology cooperation 
participants -  developers, producers, distributors, intermediaries, and ideally, end 
users;
• It operates at the meso-level -  focusing on links existing between networks across 
levels -  from the global to the local, better capturing the potential affects of policy 
and events at the macro-level that may affect the urban experience;
• It attempts to recognize the heterogeneity of stakeholders;
• It focuses on the importance of cities
Technology cooperation, like Rogers’ technology adoption model, is an actor-centred 
approach, one that emphasizes the importance of actions and people. However, as noted 
in Chapter 2, defining actors is difficult as the category is an arbitrary one. Actors 
include the conventional parties noted in technology transfer models -  developers, 
producers, distributors and users. But this concept also recognizes the role of 
intermediaries. Participants’ roles can vary. For example, a developer can also be an 
intermediary and an end user; they are not mutually exclusive. In other words, 
technology developers can also be distributors and / or end users, etc. In contrast to 
Rogers that singles out the efforts of change agents, urban technology cooperation 
examines the networks that are taking place at the meso-level -  incorporating the 
perspective of all partners involved in the technology cooperation process, and paying
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attention to their relationships. It is a broad view of technology cooperation, meaning in 
addition to formal agreements between companies, organizations, etc., it also includes 
conferences, informal information exchange between friends and colleagues, among 
other activities.
As discussed previously, many studies on energy and / or technology transfer in 
developing countries focus on the micro-level or the macro-level. However, technology 
cooperation was applied at the meso-level, or the level between individuals, firms and 
household, and the national level, as this level of analysis consists of two common 
aspects -  interdependency dynamics and the heterogeneity of actors (Schenk et al. 2007), 
considered important when assessing RET adoption. The meso-level was also chosen as 
the focus of analysis to properly account for cities, which “tend to become both 
centrifugal and centripetal nodes in a national, and increasingly international, society 
linked by means of networks” (Capello et al. 1999: 5). In addition, in developing 
countries, cities -  due to their infrastructure, services available, the presence of 
institutions, etc. -  can serve as clusters, or areas where an industry, through the work of a 
group of firms and other institutions, has a competitive advantage (Porter 1990).
Rather than linear models of technology transfer or innovation, technology cooperation 
manifests itself as a series of interacting nodes, thus making the model an iterative 
process. Figure 7.1 provides a graphic representation of the urban technology 
cooperation approach as it evolved after evidence from the case studies. Of course it is 
difficult to capture the ever-changing nature of these relationships, so it should be thought 
of as a simplified version, providing a ‘snapshot’ of the process during a particular time. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the urban technology cooperation approach attempts to understand 
the most important factors affecting the uptake of RETs in developing country cities 
through examining how public policy and technology cooperation can play a role. In 
addition, by focusing on various urban and innovation literature, the concept considers 
the potential affects that the unique aspects of cities may have (e.g. nexus of innovation, 
proximity and social networks of different stakeholders at the meso-level). The centre 
circles are at the meso-level, with the centre circle including players directly involved in
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the process, while those in the surrounding circle are more indirectly involved. At the 
same time, the concept also captures links between players operating mainly at other 
levels (marco and micro) with those at the meso level. After research, it was decided to 
concentrate the approach on actors as a way to capture more abstract notions such as 
‘public policy’ and ‘technology cooperation’, as it is through these actors that specific 
aspects manifest themselves (e.g. the federal government of Brazil’s policy to require 
foreign firms with three or more employees ensure Brazilians constitute two thirds of the 
workforce and receive two thirds of the payroll).
Figure 7.1 Urban Technology Cooperation -  Post Field R esearch
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7.3. Applying the Urban Technology Cooperation Approach to 
Explain RET Adoption in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
After undertaking field research in Mexico City, I did some initial analysis by applying 
this approach (which I was -  and am still formulating) to the case of Solar Water Heaters 
in Mexico City (see Mallett 2007) for further information). As indicated above, the 
centre of focus for this approach is on the networks that exist between the various 
technology cooperation players, paying attention to their relationships. The first task is to 
assess the nature of these relationships to determine which players are active. Key 
questions include:
1) which sectors are engaged in the technology cooperation process? Several types 
of networks were explored including triple helix, or linkages between the 
academic, government and private sectors, and public-private partnerships, or 
linkages between government agencies and the private sector, and engaging with 
the public or non-experts.
2) Are these examples of clusters?
3) Where are the key influences on the networks (local? International? Regional?)
4) What about the relationships between and within these groups? Are they in 
constant communication? United or divisive?
The following themes emerged from the study, but which are not picked up or 
downplayed by Rogers’ model. These factors include the nature of interactions between 
the technology cooperation participants, the role of international influences, and divisions 
occurring within stakeholders involved in technology cooperation.
7.3.1. Interactions between participants
The first factor that can affect RET adoption involves the interactions between the 
technology cooperation participants. This theme, coded as networks, was one of the most
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prevalent factors affecting the adoption of these Renewable Energy Technologies 
(RETs), as noted in Chapters 4 and 5. When examining this factor, several questions 
were considered including: are these networks institutionalized or ad hoc? Are they 
formal or informal? Are relationships long-term or short-term? Are there too many or too 
little players involved in the technology cooperation process? How do perceptions affect 
these networks?
A) Solar Water Heaters
For the majority of actors involved in the technology cooperation process for Solar Water 
Heaters (SWHs) in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, when looking at the micro level, 
interactions among the three sectors -  academia, industry and government — remain 
limited at best. For example, as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, SWH companies would 
answer occasional queries by students, and universities mainly link with other 
universities. Links between SWH companies were sparse as they often operated in 
isolation, focusing on their niches and the distinctiveness of their product(s) and / or 
processes. That said, as the technology cooperation process is examined a step higher, at 
the meso-level, some important networks between participants emerged in both cities.
Solar Water Heaters in Mexico City
Triple Helix -  With respect to Mexico, like other countries in Latin America, the country 
supports the triple helix concept. There are small pockets of networks forming between 
these three sectors (academia, industry and government), but the majority of public funds 
are aimed at government agencies (e.g. management of funds and decisions on strategies) 
and public / academic institutions (e.g. university research on science and technology 
(S&T)) rather than the private sector.336 Having said this, there are two major exceptions 
to this trend.
The first exception is the process instigated by the Secretary of the Environment of the 
Federal District of Mexico (i.e. Mexico City municipal government) to develop a
336(OECD), O. o . E. C. a. D. (2004). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2004 (Mexico). 
Country Responses to Policy Questionnaires. OECD. Paris, OECD: 1-14.
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mandatory standard on the application of solar water heaters in the city. Through this 
standard, which was approved on April 7, 2006, in new buildings of medium (50 -  100 
employees) or large size (more than 100 employees) a minimum of 30% of the energy 
needed to heat water must come from SWHs337. The second exception is the efforts of 
the National Association of Solar Energy of Mexico, or the Asociacion Nacional de 
Energia Solar (ANES) to promote, support and build capacity on SWHs / renewable 
energy in the city and country. In both of these processes, major stakeholders, including 
representatives from the private and public sectors, academic institutions and consultants, 
come together to discuss the technology cooperation process. The general view among 
all stakeholders was that these two initiatives were important in encouraging the adoption 
of SWHs in Mexico City and Mexico. Many stressed the efforts of ANES in particular.
These revelations are similar to those found in Rogers, where these change agents were 
identified. But, because this approach fixates on the networks and the dynamics within, 
the urban technology cooperation approach helps to explain why networks in cities can 
be stronger and why these change agents were so effective.
Networks in Cities - An advantage of these two initiatives cited by informants in the city, 
was the fact that many of the events took place in Mexico City. Larger companies and 
organizations located outside of the city were in Mexico City enough to be able to attend 
important events. Mexico City was considered to be an important “nexus”. Although 
one representative from a smaller company located on the outskirts of Mexico City noted 
that he would “like to attend more meetings, conferences and workshops...but it is 
difficult for me to get there,”338 the majority of informants found it advantageous to 
attend meetings in Mexico City, as they could undertake other activities (e.g. meet 
potential clients, suppliers, other researchers). In other words, networks were considered 
to be stronger as they were centred on Mexico City and the surrounding area.
337 www.cidadessolares.org.br/cs/downloads/leis/mexico_norma_ambiental_obrigatorio_solar.zip
338 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
283
As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, more SWHs in homes and biogas to produce electricity are 
being used in Sao Paulo than Mexico City. However, in the case of SWHs, differences 
between the hardware being used at the national level (0.7 m2 / 100 inhabitants in 
Mexico versus 3 m2 /100 inhabitants in Brazil), were not as stark between the cities (1.6 
m2 / 100 inhabitants in Mexico City for SWHs not including those used for pools) versus 
2 m2 / 100 inhabitants in Sao Paulo). One explanation for this could be because cities, as 
centres of innovation, and places in which various actors can more easily come together 
(through proximity and the infrastructure to take people from place to place), can increase 
technology adoption. Cities also play a role on RET adoption by having more ‘traffic’. 
By virtue of high population densities, more people are exposed to certain RETs such as 
SWHs. As noted in Chapter 5, a number of informants in Sao Paulo highlighted the 
experience of Belo Horizonte and SWHs, indicating that they were commonplace on 
rooftops. Further exploring the role that cities can have on RET adoption, by comparing 
these settings with rural environments, is a further area warranting exploration.
Informants also argued that ANES was becoming increasingly effective, as the 
organization has more links with the private sector (traditionally the organization has 
been dominated by academics). For example, one respondent noted that one of the 
executive committee members working at a SWH company at ANES is also active in the 
National Chamber of Transformation Industry, La Camara Nacional de la Industria de 
Transformacion (CANACINTRA).339
Rogers also focuses on the efforts of change agents rather than all players in the process. 
An assessment of all players is important because although the efforts of change agents 
play an important role, an assessment of dynamics among other groups revealed weaker 
links, which can have a role on uptake.
Specifically, those technology cooperation players in Mexico City with stronger links to 
ANES tended to see an increase in the use of their ‘hardware’, or SWHs (as measured by
339 Interviews with six university representatives, two consultancies and three SWH companies, November 
2005 -  January 2006
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metres installed and maintained relative to the size of their operation, continued new 
sales, etc.340). These companies also tended to have links with other companies and / or 
government agencies and / or universities.341
These efforts are encouraging but further examination of these networks reveals instances 
when communication links and interactions are not as solid. For example, in discussions 
on the mandatory standard for SWHs in Mexico City, the National Agency to Save 
Energy in Mexico, CONAE -  a key agency responsible for energy conservation policies, 
“participate in the meetings, but they do not make much impact.”342 In another example, 
at a high level meeting on renewable energy in Mexico, the sub Secretary of Energy told 
a SWH company that he wanted to install one in his house “but the company did not 
provide a proposal...they never got back to him...can you imagine [the potential 
opportunity for exposure]...the sub Secretary of Energy!”343 Moreover, some academics 
indicated that relations between universities and the private sector had some challenges as 
those working in industry “found it difficult to accept advice from universities...[as 
academics] do not have any practical experience”.344
Public-Private Partnerships - In Mexico City, there are government programs to try and 
help companies working in renewable energy. According to one informant “...any 
program or policy that is aiming to avoid the use of combustibles is helpful for renewable 
energy”.345 However, as the findings in Chapter 4 indicated, often these programs are 
difficult to find out about and complicated. Some interviewees also suggested that these 
programs were privy to only a small core group of companies (revealing yet another 
division between companies).346 One SWH company had this to say.
340 It is important to point out that some of the most successful SWH companies in Mexico (having close 
links with ANES) had suffered some setbacks including dissatisfied customers due to poorly installed / not 
working equipment, lawsuits, etc., but that they had managed to ensure new contracts and satisfaction by 
consumers (Interviews, three SWH companies, November 2005-January 2006).
341 Interviews, three SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006
342 Interview, one government official, December 2005
343 Interview, one government official, November 2005
344 Interview, one university representative, November 2005
345 Interview, university representative, December 2005
346 Interviews, three SWH companies, December 2005
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Supposedly there is help, but it is little...it is not always feasible...there is help but 
we do not know of them [programs]. [These are] lost funds. The problem is that 
we need a person specifically devoting their time looking for this help. We have 
to pay this person - we just do not have the capital for this.347
Another factor compounding a lack of awareness of government programs is that many 
SWH companies operate in isolation. In the Mexican case, public-private partnerships 
did not necessarily equate to more use of SWHs, due to a lack of communication among 
partners.
This is not to say that other links within and between the sectors working on SWHs were 
completely absent in Mexico City. Links among SWH companies have occurred from 
time to time, but they are more ad hoc and sporadic. For example, a number of SWH 
companies got together in 2005 to jointly write a letter to CONAE protesting the federal 
government’s natural gas subsidy of Mexican pesos $800 million to Nuevo Leon state for 
six months (which a number of respondents noted was, incidentally, the same state the 
Mexican Energy Secretary was from), arguing that these funds “could have been used to 
help those looking for alternative clean sources [of energy]”.348
Engaging End Users /  Quadruple Helix -  In Mexico City, the end user in general cannot 
be said to be an active player in the technology cooperation process in the area of SWHs. 
They are only involved at the point of sale, and only briefly. SWHs are sometimes 
perceived negatively (as an expensive technology that does not work) by some, based 
upon past experiences where there was little follow up by those selling / providing the 
technology to those using the technology. Thus, in Mexico there are bad installations and 
/ or bad quality technology, and so some original users have discarded their SWHs and 
‘written off the technology.349 In sum, little empirical evidence could be obtained 
regarding the end user perspective model in the technology cooperation process -  and in 
the case of Mexico City and SWHs, where contact was made with the end users, their 
perception of technology or their experience in the technology cooperation process was,
347 Interview, one SWH company-M, December 2005
348 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
349 Interviews, six SWH companies, one government agency, and one NGO, November 2005 -  January 
2006
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more often than not, a negative one. Indeed, perceptions are important factors affecting 
networks between these various sectors.
Solar Water Heaters in Sao Paulo
Triple Helix and Public-Private Partnerships -  Brazil also espouses the importance of 
the triple helix. There are increasing networks forming between the three sectors 
(academia, industry and government). For instance, in the ethanol sector, where Brazil 
has become the world’s leading producer of ethanol from sugar cane, these links are 
“long-standing and solid”.350 Other studies also attest to Brazil’s interest in the triple 
helix. While in 1988 there were only two ‘incubator parks’ in the country, in 2005, there 
were 339 incubators (Sampaio 2006: 9). Unlike a number of other countries, such as the 
United States, Brazil’s government is the main body spearheading science and 
technology. For example, even though it has the largest number of scientists in Latin 
America (with 50 000 scientists in 2006), 73% work in public research institutions -  
versus the U.S. where 72% of scientists work in companies (Sampaio Aranha 2006: 5).
Links between the sectors were more prevalent in Sao Paulo. For example, a number of
SWH companies in and around Sao Paulo had some form of individual contact with
universities as those companies wishing to have their product certified by INMETRO
were required to send their technology to university test labs (either IPT in Sao Paulo or
GreenSolar Lab in Belo Horizonte).351
“INMETRO is a government organization that tests products. So a product must 
pass a series of minimum requirements...INMETRO analyzes whatever 
product...so that the product will reproduce what you have promised 
... [INMETRO] has a classification system.”352
Another example is the work of the NGO Sociedade de Sol, which is physically located 
at the University of Sao Paulo’s “incubator park” called the Incubator Centre for 
Technical Businesses, or Centro Incubador de Empresas Tecnologicas (CIETEC).
3ffl Interview, one government representative, March 2006
351 Interviews, six SWH companies, March -  May 2006
32 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
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Sociedade do Sol has been housed at the university since its beginning, in 1992, where it 
began as an engineering firm as a means to implement some of Agenda 21’s goals -  
namely to find a simple, indigenous, non-fossil fuel energy technology for Brazil. It 
became an NGO in 1999 and continues to work with the Centre. The NGO is well 
respected in Sao Paulo and various parts of the USP, including the Piracicaba campus of 
USP, which works on SWHs, mainly for rural applications. However, the NGO noted 
that some university professors -  those interested in cutting edge and ‘state-of-the-art’ 
technologies -  did not agree with the NGO’s philosophy of pursuing social, economic 
and environmental goals simultaneously, at the expense of efficiency and quality. This 
NGO also had links with companies which donated tubes for the Low Cost Solar Water 
Heater by an informal agreement.353
Another network among participants in Sao Paulo is being lead by the trade association 
ABRAVA and the NGO Vitae Civilis. They are important change agents in the city and 
Brazil. They have been very effectively working together in Sao Paulo with the 
municipal government. Representatives from USP are also involved in these discussions, 
although at the time of research they were not as active. On June 30th, 2007, the 
municipal government of Sao Paulo adopted a law making it mandatory for all new 
public buildings in the city to have SWHs in place to provide, as a minimum, 40% of the 
energy needed to heat water354. Their goal is to increase the uptake of “good quality” 
SWHs -  adapting the context to fit the technology. It is generally known within the 
SWH community that those companies who have received INMETRO’s “seal” and who 
are associated with ABRAVA are considered ‘good’, meaning their products and services 
meet a certain technical standard.355
Engaging End Users /  Quadruple Helix -  The NGO Sociedade do Sol is the main agent 
undertaking efforts to engage the public about SWHs. ABRAVA and Vitae Civilis are 
also working to make more people aware about SWHs, but they are targeting key
353 Interview, one NGO, March 2006
354 www.cidadessolares.org.br/cs/downloads/708103_propositura_projetodelei_SP.zip
355 Interview, one SWH company, March 2006
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decision leaders including government representatives rather than the public at large. 
The Sociedade do Sol are engaging the public in three ways: 1) running several one day 
workshops every month on how to build a SWH; 2) recruiting technicians from the 
surrounding favelas, or underprivileged neighbourhoods around USP, 3) establishing a 
network of volunteers throughout Grande Sao Paulo and the State of Sao Paulo and 
beyond who are promoting SWHs by distributing the technology as a demonstration kit 
to schools throughout the region -  targeting students in grades 5 and 6. The view is that 
the children will learn about the technology and get their parents interested.
Networks in Cities - In the Sao Paulo case study, because the ‘home bases’ of these 
participants were more spread out (e.g. towns located in the state of Sao Paulo, outside of 
the city), the city of Belo Horizonte, etc., they tended to defer responsibility to the trade 
association ABRAVA, and to keep abreast of trends through the internet / ABRAVA’s 
website. That said, the general view was also that Sao Paulo was considered as ‘nexus’ 
for these networks, and participants located outside of the city (as well as those inside the 
city) used events happening continuously (e.g. many cited the FEICOM meeting that 
happens yearly, usually in April), as opportunities to maintain contacts, meet 
counterparts, etc.
B) Biogas to Generate Electricity Technologies
Biogas to Generate Electricity Technologies in Mexico City
Triple Helix and Public-Private Partnerships - Government representatives, companies, 
and consultants alike all claimed that a key hurdle for this technology in Mexico was that 
it was too administratively heavy to do a project -  there were too many jurisdictional 
issues, forms to fill out, permits to get and ‘hoops’ to get through; thus scaring off any 
potential investors, for the time being. Despite this recognition by all players, no projects 
have been under construction or in operation in Mexico City on this technology at the 
time of research 2005/06.
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One reason for this is because activities on this technology in Mexico City are mainly 
being done in various “pockets” -  the private sector, the government (mainly federal 
level) and research institutions. Networks are starting to form between these groups, but, 
generally speaking, they are working in isolation. The private sector is the main player 
working on this issue in Mexico City -  in terms of studies conducted and expertise. 
Specifically, there are a number of consulting firms active on climate change working on 
this area in Mexico City and Mexico. These companies, such as Ecosecurities (head 
office in Oxford, U.K.) and MGM International (head office in Miami, USA) are mainly 
foreign, or jointly Mexican and foreign. In terms of public sector activities, as of 2009, 
the federal government and a research institution have only conducted feasibility studies.
End User /  Quadruple Helix -  There were no efforts underway to engage the general 
public on this issue in Mexico City at the time of research.
Biogas to Generate Electricity Technologies in Sao Paulo
Triple Helix and Public-Private Partnerships - In Sao Paulo, the key drivers in the 
technology cooperation process for the Bandeirantes project were the consortium of 
foreign and Brazilian companies, which call themselves “Biogas” and consist of Hellica 
& Fonseca (Brazilian), Arcados Logos (70% Dutch) and Vandervilt (Dutch), and several 
consultants. Another project developer was Unibanco, one of the largest banking firms in 
Brazil, working with CETESB, who had technical expertise in this area. These players 
acted quickly when a window opened up in the Brazilian legislature in 2003 (September
-  December), allowing them access to the grid to transmit their electricity to other
locations, to implement the project. Once the project was running, other players began to 
become more involved, including the University of Sao Paulo, the municipal government 
(who saw an opportunity) and other parts of the state government.
As noted in Chapter 5, the second biogas to electricity project in Sao Paulo, at Sao Joao 
landfill was not up and running at the time of field research, however, the same 
consortium of companies purchased the Sao Joao landfill from another company and are 
currently managing another biogas to electricity project there. Speaking about this
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technology more generally, the state government (CETESB) has been working with 
international organizations (World Bank, US EPA), and the private sector and the 
University of Sao Paulo on biogas to produce electricity in landfills just outside of the 
city.
Informants also noted that there were a number of challenges involved, including 
obtaining the adequate permits among others, in developing a project. One reason these 
projects are in operation is likely because links between the academic, public and private 
sectors have existed for quite some time on the Bandeirantes landfill. One informant 
indicated that there are masters and doctoral studies being conducted on the landfill site -  
where participants from these three sectors work together — with respect to agriculture, 
environmental issues and seismology in that location.356 In Sao Paulo, the state 
government and USP have been working with others on issue since the mid-1990s. For 
this reason these processes are more “institutionalized” and so can be managed better by 
interested technology cooperation participants.
End User /  Quadruple Helix -  There were few efforts underway to engage the general 
public on this issue in Sao Paulo at the time of research. One activity however, as noted 
in Chapter 5, is being done by CETESB. This organization has been working on 
developing a guide for this type of technology, available electronically, in Portuguese, 
although it is not clear how many Brazilians are aware of and access this resource.
So what does all this mean? Generally speaking, stakeholder groups and organizations 
within a stakeholder group (e.g. individual SWH companies, government agencies and 
divisions within agencies, biogas consultancies, etc.) often operate in isolation. However, 
links between these various groups are increasingly being formed. In both countries the 
importance of personal relationships cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, links between 
these actors were mainly informal -  agreements between friends, versus formalized 
memorandums of understanding, joint ventures, etc. Intermediaries have been playing a 
pivotal role in both cities in terms of creating awareness, encouraging collaboration and
356 Interview, engineering consultancy, March 2006
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the use of these technologies. Examining these links can help to explain why there is 
more use of SWHs for homes and biogas technologies in Sao Paulo. In Mexico, most of 
these links are more recent (an exception being ANES’ work, but even informants 
highlighted recent efforts by the ANES to diversity by integrating more industry 
representation in their structure as being positive steps), and more sporadic and ad hoc. 
In Brazil, networks have been around longer, are better established and more 
institutionalized, and there are more instances of triple helix, and attempts at quadruple 
helix.
Others working on renewables also recognize the importance of collaboration to further 
the uptake of clean energy technologies, although collaboration between different 
countries, with different histories and peculiarities is likely to be more difficult versus 
cooperation among players within these cities, as noted by (Al-Widyan and Al-Muhtaseb 
2009), who examine collaboration on clean energy between Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) countries. They indicate that although regional cooperation is being 
discussed among academics, this has not transcended to the energy agendas of these 
countries. That said, although divisions occur among nations in all regions, the MENA 
region is faced with some serious regional and national risks to security, forming deep 
divisions within this region and beyond (including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
Sudanese civil war, the war in Afghanistan, etc.) (Shiyyab 2008). In other words, these 
examples from Mexico City and Sao Paulo can inform initiatives on renewables 
occurring in other parts of the world, but an analyst must thoroughly scrutinize the 
relevance of these examples to their particular situation, as each region, country, and 
community are unique.
Scrutinizing these networks revealed that major differences of opinion occurred not just 
between, but also within the various stakeholder groups -  a facet often neglected by other 
studies looking at links between the various sectors. These divisions will be explored 
further in 7.3.3. Another revelation is that in the SWHs case study, key groups working 
on this technology are Mexican and Brazilian. In the biogas case study, the key group is 
foreign (international consulting firms) in Mexico, but domestic in Brazil. How these
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international influences may play a role on RET adoption in these settings is the next 
topic to be explored.
7.3.2. International Influences -  climate change
The second factor explained by the urban technology cooperation approach is the role of 
international influences on adoption, which is a key driver prompting and / or 
strengthening networks between technology cooperation participants at the level of the 
city. As opposed to conventional studies that emphasize direct policies, this encompasses 
more than just incentives; also interest, attention and engagement. As noted in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6, the main area of international influences discussed by participants is climate 
change.
Although the influence of climate change was also examined in Chapter 6, what the 
urban technology cooperation approach revealed were differences between the two cities 
-  in that in Mexico City, the key players are foreign, whereas in Brazil, the key players 
are domestic and foreign.
These international influences manifested themselves in several ways, including direct 
environmental policies aimed at increasing RET adoption (e.g. mandatory requirements 
for buildings to have a certain percentage of their hot water come from SWHs in both 
cities, or the municipality of Sao Paulo’s 50 percent stake in carbon credits being 
generated at one of the cities landfills through biogas to generate electricity) as discussed 
in Chapter 6, under incentives.
There are also other ways in which international influences can play a role on RET 
adoption. For instance, a more indirect way is through encouraging more public 
awareness about climate change and specific processes under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) including the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), or through conducting or supporting studies 
demonstrating the potential for avoided carbon emissions.
293
In Mexico City, many agents from all sectors also indicated that, although it was slow 
and at the margins of mainstream society, interest and awareness in climate change was 
growing in Mexico City. At the time of fieldwork (late 2005 / early 2006), Hurricanes 
Wilma and Stan had done some major damage in Mexico and people were starting to pay 
attention. Having said this, knowledge about climate change, and the potential benefits of 
the carbon market remains limited -  some technology cooperation participants knew only 
a little about these topics.
The local government in Mexico City indicated that climate change was one of the 
reasons for pushing SWHs in the city. They recognized that the potential for carbon 
credits through SWHs would only make sense in terms of transaction costs, capital 
requirements, etc., in the short term, on a large scale. Because of this, they were 
promoting SWHs for large-scale applications (e.g. large businesses, large schools, 
hospitals, sports clubs, etc.). The federal government also noted the potential for SWHs 
to generate carbon credits, but also echoed the rationale that these projects would only be 
viable on a large scale. Others also share this point of view such as a study done by 
Econergy, a foreign consultancy firm on the carbon market, on the potential for SWHs in 
Mexico. The study indicated that a minimum of 50,000 SWH systems for residential use 
would need to be sold to create a potential CDM project (Hoyt et al. 2006: 7).
Here, many companies argued that more efforts were needed to promote the potential for 
reducing carbon emissions. They suggested that there were not enough studies being 
done espousing the environmental benefits that can accrue using SWHs -  from local air 
quality problems to global climate change. Foreigners fund the bulk of studies that are 
being done. One interesting theme came out in the case of Mexico City and SWHs. 
According to some respondents “the Mexican government knows the potential [for 
addressing climate change through RETs] but the Mexican government is afraid of new 
things.... things will happen when there is international help.”357 They further noted that
357 Interviews, two consultancy representatives, December 2005
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there were some domestic government funds to support the use of electricity from 
renewables “but not for studies”.358
This is interesting because it is in stark contrast to the Brazilian government experience 
with climate change and the CDM, which has been an active player on climate change for 
many years, as discussed further below.
In the case of SWHs in Brazil, studies on climate change are increasingly being viewed 
as powerful tools. The NGO Vitae Civilis has conducted numerous studies on the role 
that SWHs can play in addressing climate change, including Brazil’s Place in the Sun 
financed by the Blue Moon Fund, a U.S. foundation that supports sustainable 
development and environmental projects, including climate change. Vitae Civilis’ effort 
to advocate the use of SWHs in various cities in Brazil, through their CidadesSolares 
initiative359 also includes information sessions on the CDM. Numerous SWH companies, 
in addition to brochures, also have “Fact Sheets” comparing SWHs to conventional 
technologies -  gas, wood and electricity in terms of energy and carbon emissions savings.
Regarding biogas technologies, informants in both countries indicated that, without a 
doubt, a key driver generating interest in biogas technologies was climate change and the 
potential to generate carbon credits through biogas projects. Others also suggest that the 
CDM played a key role in increasing the uptake of landfill gas technologies in Brazil 
(Lederer 2009).
This is different from other studies examining biogas in other countries, such as India and 
the Philippines (e.g. Forsyth 1999, 2005), where the main rationale for investment was 
obtaining the energy; the carbon credits were viewed as being an additional benefit. The 
main reason for this was because, as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, regulations regarding 
electricity from Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were restrictive, unclear and 
involved a lot of paperwork. That said, more interest and investment was occurring with
358 Interviews, two consultancy representatives, December 2005
359 See www.cidadessolares.org.br for further information
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respect to flaring methane (rather than allowing it to be passively released) versus 
generating electricity from biogas, as the carbon equivalent emissions reduced is about
- j / rn
the same for methane flaring and using biogas to run motors to generate electricity.
With respect to biogas technologies to generate electricity, in Mexico City, all studies 
examining their potential, whether foreign or domestic, include carbon emission 
reduction estimations as an element. This is similar in Sao Paulo.361 Brazil has also been 
working with other countries for many years, including the U.S. EPA and Japan’s 
International Cooperation Agency on biogas technologies. They are also active players 
in the U.S.-led Methane to Markets initiative.
To expand upon the above points, although Mexico has a well-versed committed 
community of domestic climate change experts and advocates, this community is rather 
small. A company in Mexico told me “they have learned more about climate change and 
the carbon market from foreigners”362 than from Mexicans. Brazil on the other hand has 
developed a robust community of indigenous experts -  including government officials, 
NGOs, consultants, and industry -  active on this topic.
Brazilian experts have been at the forefront of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) market since its inception. In fact, the CDM was a compromise developed by 
Brazilian and U.S. negotiators. Brazil had proposed a Clean Development Fund (CDF) to 
fund climate change mitigation projects in developing countries in June 1997, which 
would be funded by industrialized nations out of compliance of their commitments. 
Industrialized nations, called Annex I countries in the UNFCCC, did not like proposed 
‘penalties’ for non-compliance however, and were supporting a similar like mechanism to 
Activities Implemented Jointly (ALT), but under the Kyoto Protocol. Under AU, Annex I 
countries could undertake projects that reduced GHG emissions in developing countries, 
thus offsetting GHG emissions in their own country. But many developing countries 
were not so keen on AU, as noted in Chapter 1, as they felt less attention was being
360 Interview, one university representative, March 2006
365 See PDD Ciudad Juarez, Bandeirantes and Sao Joao for example
362 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
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placed on technology transfer and more attention was being placed on sinks, and certain 
regions (Latin America) were being favoured. Many developing countries also felt that 
industrialized nations should reduce GHG emissions domestically.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was a proposal for projects to reduce GHG 
emissions in developing countries to help developed countries meet their commitments, 
but unlike the CDF, it was based on incentives, rather than penalties. In addition to 
reducing GHG emissions, the CDM would promote sustainable development, capacity 
building, technology transfer, renewable energy, and additional activities, or those 
activities that would not have occurred without the incentive of generating emission 
reduction credits.363 As indicated in Chapter 1, there are a number of critiques of the 
CDM. On the one hand, some indicate that the CDM is not promoting enough of these 
other objectives, that certain regions and countries are favoured (e.g. China, India, Brazil 
and Mexico versus Less Developed Countries (e.g. in 2006, they were only 0.9% of 
CDM projects) and Asia and Latin America versus Africa), and that the CDM process is 
not transparent (Environmental Defence Fund 2007; CDM Watch 2009; Lederer 2009). 
Others suggest that the CDM is unable to instigate policy reforms in developing 
countries, that credits issued do not reflect real emissions reductions (de Sepibus 2009), 
or focuses mainly only finding the cheapest way to generate carbon emissions reductions 
per dollar spent, termed ‘low hanging fruit’ (Informal discussions, Carbon Expo 2005).364
Some claim that this is because “despite the rhetorical trimmings, the CDM is a market, 
not a development fund nor a renewables promotion mechanism” (Pearson 2007: 249). 
On the other hand, some consider the CDM to too regulated -- plagued with transaction 
costs, and bureaucratic hurdles (Personal communication, CDM executive board meeting 
with stakeholders, Carbon Expo, May 2005). Nevertheless, Brazil is one of the principal
363 Deliberations exist regarding how to determine additionality has occurred as a result of the proposed 
CDM projects, although the CDM Executive Board has developed a tool to help assess additionality. For 
further information please see Muller, B. (2009). Additionality in the Clean Development Mechanism Why 
and What? O. I. f. E. Studies. Oxford, Oxford University: 1-18.
364 For a thorough examination of the CDM please see Holm Olsen, K. and J. Fenhann (2008). A Reformed 
CDM - including New Mechanisms for Sustainable Development. Roskilde, Denmark, UNEP Riso Centre.
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countries that have CDM projects, especially dominant at the time of research in 2006. 
See Figure 7.2
Figure 7.2 - CDM projects in pipeline from Brazil, Mexico, India and China 2004-2008
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A study done on technology transfer in the CDM indicates that of those CDM projects 
with a technology transfer element assessed, Brazil, along with China, India and South 
Korea, account for 72% of the projects and 80% of the annual greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions reductions as of June 2008 (Seres 2008: 8). Informants indicated that Brazil 
has developed a well-established and credible expertise in this area, producing CDM 
project proposals and other studies, which forecast carbon emission reductions.365 The 
CDM plays a key role in Brazil -  according to Lederer (2009), carbon credits are the 20th 
largest export commodity in Brazil, Brazilians have strong local capabilities, and the 
CDM has helped turn government attention towards renewables, through PROINFA.
365 Informal discussions, key informants, February -  March 2006
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But, Brazil’s involvement in the CDM has not been without controversies. For instance, 
the Brazilian company Plantar S.A. submitted a proposal to the World Bank’s Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF) to plant eucalyptus in 2003. The eucalyptus would be used for the 
production of charcoal for Plantar’s pig iron plant, which would displace coal, used by 
many of the world’s iron producers. This project proposal prompted a letter to the World 
Bank from more than 50 Brazilian NGOs, community groups, and other organizations 
asking for the Bank to not support this project.366 Also, Brazil’s dominant role in the 
CDM is changing as noted in Figure 7.2 above. In 2009, Brazil only constituted 7.8% of 
all CDM projects in the pipeline (Lederer 2009).
Furthermore, the Mexican government is also increasingly becoming an active non- 
Annex 1 player in the climate regime. For example, in addition to the government’s 
Special Program on Climate Change, Mexico also has updated their GHG emissions 
inventory to 2006 and is currently completing their 4th National Communication, 
expected in November 2009 (Martinez 2009). That said, because Brazil has had an early 
start in the CDM market, this has lead to more indigenous expertise in this area. This is 
important for adoption because as noted earlier (e.g. Ockwell et al. 2007; Bell 1990; 
Worrell et al. 2001), the development of indigenous technological capabilities can also 
lead to an increase in the uptake of low carbon technologies.
In sum, the principal area where international players are engaged on these technologies 
in Mexico and Brazil is through climate change. In the case of biogas technologies, the 
potential for CDM projects is considered the principal driver increasing their adoption. 
Informants in Mexico and Brazil indicated that possible biogas to generate electricity 
projects had been looked at for a long time, but that the potential to generate carbon 
credits had really prompted interest. In Mexico, the Monterrey project of the PCF is 
considered an example, with the hope of replicating it elsewhere in the country. In 
Brazil, Bandeirantes and Sao Joao are two certified CDM projects.
366 www.fem.org/pubs/ngostas/Planteng.htm
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Unlike Rogers’ model which also noted the importance of climate change through 
indicating the importance of ‘prior or underlying conditions’, the urban technology 
cooperation approach attempts to capture the origins of these prior conditions. In both 
places, interest in climate change at the onset mainly stemmed from the international 
community, but in Brazil, more stakeholders are aware, and have been aware longer, of 
climate change and the potential to generate carbon credits under the CDM. In the case 
of the CDM and climate change, Brazil has been engaged early on. This has led to more 
local expertise and knowledge of these technologies, which may partially explain an 
increase in the adoption of these technologies. The final factor considered using urban 
technology cooperation scrutinizes the relationships occurring within various stakeholder 
groups. Here, a number of divisions were found which are discussed below.
7.3.3. Divisions within Stakeholder Groups
Studies that focus on the interactions of sectors stress the links that are needed between 
these groups to ensure effective transfer and adoption of technologies (e.g. Bunders et al. 
1999; Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005). As noted in Chapter 1, drawing from Reed (2008), 
stakeholders are those affected by or that affect the technology cooperation process. One 
assumption made by these studies is that points of view within those in a stakeholder 
group are similar. However, in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, there were differing opinions 
within these stakeholder groups, which have caused some major divisions. This is the 
final theme explored by urban technology cooperation.
Mexico City
In the case of SWHs, in Mexico City, there were several forms of divisiveness. The main 
two divisions were found among companies. These divisions included:
1) those companies selling imported SWHs and those producing and / or distributing 
nationally-made SWHs;
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Some informants claimed that divisions were so pronounced between domestic and 
foreign SWH companies, this could be termed “a war”.367 One foreign company told me 
that in order to qualify for government contracts (e.g. SWHs for public hospitals, schools, 
etc.) one had to ensure that a certain percentage of products were Mexican in origin. If 
the government itself is the consumer, then 50% of the products must be Mexican.368 On 
the other hand, some Mexican-owned companies and researchers however indicated that 
due to free trade, “the market is being flooded with cheap, often inferior products”369 with 
many citing China as the country of origins for these ‘bad quality’ SWHs.370
and
2) those SWH companies that always received government support and contracts 
(termed by some SWH companies as being “in the club”371), and those that did 
not.
A number of SWH companies indicated that “it is always the same group of people”372 
that receive government support and contracts. Those outside of ‘the club’ remained on 
the margins. As an example, some firms spoke about CONAE’s program to promote 
SWH use in Mexican homes. In this program six companies were chosen based on a 
series of criteria (years in business, SWHs sold, reputation). “We are a new company -  
how can we compete?”373
In addition, as noted earlier, there were many different perceptions towards the 
government in Mexico. These differing perceptions occurred within sub-groups too (e.g. 
domestic and foreign SWH companies; SWH companies in ‘the club’ and outside of ‘the 
club’). Some companies felt that the federal government’s interests were intertwined with 
the fossil fuel industry, while others felt the government was indifferent. Some indicated
367 Interview, two government officials, two consultancy representatives, November-December 2005
368 Interview, one SWH company, November 2005
369 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
370 Interviews, four SWH companies and two university representatives, November -  December 2005
371 Interviews, four SWH companies, November 2005-January 2006
372 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
373 Interview, one SWH company, December 2005
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that the government favoured Mexican companies, while others claimed the government 
favoured foreign companies. These divisions were not as prevalent within stakeholder 
groups involved in biogas technologies to generate electricity in Mexico City.
For both technologies, divisions also existed within other stakeholder groups too. In 
Mexico City, divisions exist within the various levels of government, as each agency 
seeks to promote its interests. In Mexico, an obvious reason for these divisions is that the 
country is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, including the revenue generated; therefore 
any steps towards renewables would not be in its interest. However, even fossil fuel 
exporters are encouraging renewables as a way to free up domestic consumption, 
allowing them to sell more combustibles (Victor and Heller 2007). For instance, in 2006, 
the Middle East was the second fastest location (only behind China) for oil consumption, 
with a growth rate of 5.4% (Meisen and Hunter 2007: 4) -  renewables, as well as 
nuclear, are thus being seriously considered by oil exporters in that region, as a way to 
increase conventional energy exports. Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has also been a 
keen supporter of renewables in that country in order to sell more fossil fuels abroad 
(Massabie 2008: 232).
Sao Paulo
In Sao Paulo regarding SWHs, the SWH companies and organizations operating in the 
city and state of Sao Paulo are Brazilian-owned using Brazilian technology. As of 2008, 
there existed only one company that sold imported Israeli SWHs, located outside of Sao 
Paulo state. As noted earlier, the main division is among those companies and other 
organizations (led by ABRAVA an d Vitae Civilis) advocating good quality products and 
services with guaranteed results (i.e. SWHs which meet the standards set by INMETRO), 
and those organizations (Sociedade do Sol, Grupo Solaris) who are advocating for 
intermediate technology, or technically-simple products and services (and thus 
inexpensive, making them affordable to the majority of Brazilians) with no guarantees.
The main goal of Sociedade do Sol is to popularize the SWH technology, which they 
term Aquecedor Solar de Baixo Custo (ASBC), or a Low-Cost Solar Heater, by making a
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Do-It-Yourself model -  adapting the technology to fit the context. The NGO indicated 
that their principal focus is on popularizing the technology by making it simple and 
affordable. I was told that “...between 1992 until 2002 we worked very hard and we did 
research, research and more research and finally, we came up with a cheap SWH”.374
This approach is distinct from ABRAVA and Vitae Civilis’, focusing on increasing ‘good 
quality’ SWHs in Brazil. In other words, these two networks are advocating two distinct 
philosophies, further supporting the view that actors within stakeholder groups are 
heterogeneous. Divisions within stakeholder groups in Sao Paulo working on biogas 
technologies to generate electricity were not as prevalent.
Divisions also existed within other stakeholder groups in Sao Paulo. One reason for 
divisions among government agencies may not be so obvious. In Sao Paulo, the term 
“Belindia” was used to describe Brazil -  or in other words, ‘Belgium in the middle of 
India’.375 This is basically the notion that on the one hand, Brazil acts like a developed 
country, where the government and universities are focused on innovation and high 
technology policies and activities, while on the other hand, the Brazilian government 
focuses attention on addressing basic needs of its population -  including access to food, 
clean water and basic education. Sampaio and others refer to this as the “two Brazils” 
(Sampaio 2006: 8).
As an example, several informants noted the federal government program “Light for All” 
or Luz Para Todos. This program suggests that renewables can provide electricity in 
certain areas (e.g. rural, isolated settings), but the bulk of attention has been placed on 
grid extension. Informants indicated that efforts to promote renewables through 
PROINFA, a key renewable energy promotion policy discussed in Chapter 6, and Luz
374 Interview, NGO, March 2006
375 Interview, one state government representative, March 2006
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Para Todos are largely separate.376 Informal discussions in Mexico indicate a similar 
phenomenon in that country.377
Clusters? I view both technologies in both cities as clusters, in the sense that both cities 
have a number of companies and institutions in an industry. Although no Mexican 
company is producing biogas technologies to date, in both places, the cities serve as a 
nexus point for consulting firms, and government research and activities.
In the case of SWHs in Mexico City, actors located within or around Mexico City were 
able to establish links, attend meetings and draw from the plentiful expertise found within 
this metropolitan area. Those with closer links to ANES also had higher rates of success 
with their technologies in terms of sales, reputation, etc.
However, in sharp contrast to Porter (1990), I argue that these divisions played a negative 
role on the use of these technologies in Mexico City, as it was difficult to reach 
consensus on a number of areas including a nationally-based certification program, as 
explained further below. Porter (1990) on the other hand purports that this rivalry is 
“desirable...the benefits are even stronger if concentrated within a region, or a city” 
(1990: 120). In other words, his claim is that this competition breeds innovation, which 
can also encourage adoption as these clusters stand out above their counterparts through 
various means (better quality products and services, unique features, low cost but good 
quality, etc.).
Although divisions within stakeholder groups in Brazil also negatively affect uptake of 
these technologies, I argue that there are two reasons why the effects are not as 
pronounced in Sao Paulo rather than Mexico City. The first reason draws from the 
example of SWHs in Sao Paulo. In Brazil, the two different groupings working on 
SWHs come together at various times to support the ultimate objective, which is 
increasing the adoption of this technology in the city and Brazil (e.g. Sociedade do Sol
376 Interviews, one renewable energy company, two government officials, one NGO, two SWH companies, 
March 2006
377 Informal discussions, informants, November 2005 -  January 2006, April 2006, September 2007
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was supportive of Vitae Civilis and ABRAVA’s efforts to have the Sao Paulo city 
council develop a law mandating their use in certain buildings)378. Secondly, speaking 
about both technologies, as noted earlier, networks in Brazil are stronger, more 
institutionalized and have been around longer, versus in Mexico City where they are 
more recent and more ad hoc.
To summarize, although numerous literature exists highlighting the importance of links 
between various sectors for innovation, diffusion and / or adoption of technologies (e.g. 
Etkowitz and Carvalho de Mello 2004, Douthwaite 2002, Bunders et al. 1999), the 
dynamics within these stakeholder groups also warrant examination. Different 
individuals and / or institutions have different opinions. Some of these differences are so 
stark as to create major divisions within these stakeholder groups. In Mexico City, two 
key divisions were between foreign and domestic SWH companies, and between SWH 
companies considered ‘in the club’ and those outside of ‘the club’. These divisions made 
collaboration difficult in Mexico City. Discussions with government officials indicated 
that one reason why Mexico had yet to develop government-led national standards, was 
due to these divisions -  some SWH companies involved in discussions that imported 
were advocating flexibility, and some Mexican companies wanted strong certification. A 
voluntary standard has been in place since 1994, but it was only in 2004 that a number of 
SWH companies approached the privately run organization Normas Mexicanas 
(NORMEX), to create a more comprehensive, broadly-sanctioned standard, which 
materialized in 2005 NORMEX, and another in 2006. Brazil on the other hand, has had a 
voluntary but well-known standard on SWHs in place since 1998. These divisions can 
help to explain why networks in Brazil are better established, more institutionalized and 
organized. Divisions exist in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, but in Brazil these divisions 
are not as pronounced. This unity of purpose has afforded Brazilian groups opportunities 
to mobilize and advocate this technology, helping to explain why more SWHs in homes 
and biogas technologies are being used in that country. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present the 
information discussed above in table format.
378 Personal communication, NGOs, June 2007
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Key Assumptions
• Technology cooperation includes technological capacity building
• Iterative two- or more-way process where all participants are active players
• Cohesive and continuous communication
• Operates the meso-level
• Heterogeneity of stakeholders
• Importance of cities
Attributes Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
Nature of 
Networks
■ Triple Helix Not very prevalent but two 
exceptions
ANES and DF Secretary of Envt 
(more recent)
Not very prevalent but more 
examples of links including 
companies with universities, 
Vitae Cilivis and ABRAVA, 
Sociedade de sol
More links between sectors in Sao 
Paulo
Links more established, 
institutionalized and organized 
in Sao Paulo, vs. Mexico City 
where links between sectors 
are more recent, more ad hoc
■ PP
Partnerships
ANES increasingly effective due 
internal structure - more links 
between sectors 
Are programs but complicated, 
convoluted, or unknown
No specific PP partnerships for 
SWHs
More in Mexico City but not 
considered so effective
Links considered stronger on 
both places as nexus is city
Communication between 
technology players is lacking
■ Engaging
Public
Efforts mainly aimed at experts Efforts mainly aimed at experts 
but Sociedade do Sol engaging 
general public
In Mexico City, players are 
promoting a market-driven, 
technocentric philosophy, vs. Sao 
Paulo where different players are 
promoting both the market-driven, 
technocentric and social 
philosophies
More efforts to engage public 
linked to efforts to popularize 
technology in Sao Paulo
International 
Influences -  
Climate 
Change
■
■
■
Incentives
Public
Awareness
Studies
Potential for CDM
Vitae Civilis, ABRAVA conducting 
workshops
Vitae Civilis doing studies financed 
from foreigners
Potential for CDM
General workshops on climate 
change, CDM
Some international consultancy 
firms conducting studies
Foreigners most active player in 
Mexico, while in Brazil, both 
domestic and foreign players are 
very active
More opportunities for 
technological capacity and 
absorption in Brazil
Divisions
within
Stakeholder
groups
Foreign and domestic companies 
Companies in and outside of the 
club
Market-driven, technocentric vs. 
social / contextualizing 
approaches
More in-fighting and more difficult to 
mobilize groups in Mexico City
Macro-level policies 
exacerbate divisions
Table 7.1 Urban Technology Cooperation and the Adoption of SWHs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo
Table 7.2: Urban Technology Cooperation and the Adoption of Biogas Technologies to Generate Electricity in Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo
Key Assumptions
• technology cooperation includes technological capacity building
• iterative two- or more-way process where all participants are active players
• cohesive and continuous communication
• operates the meso-level
• heterogeneity of stakeholders
• importance of cities
Attributes Mexico City Sao Paulo Comparison Explanation
Nature of ■ 
Networks
■
■
Triple Helix 
PP
Partnerships
Engaging
Public
Pockets of 
research occurring 
in all sectors, but 
no effective links 
between sectors in 
Mexico City. Key 
driver is foreign 
private sector.
All sectors active in Brazil 
and work together at various 
times; links are 
strengthening. Key drivers 
are domestic and foreign, 
even if originally foreign
Links have been around 
longer and expertise is more 
indigenous
More opportunities for technological 
capacity and absorption in Brazil
International - 
Influences -  
Climate Change ■
■
Incentives
Public
Awareness
Studies
Potential for CDM 
key driver
Workshops geared 
towards experts
Potential for CDM key driver
Workshops geared towards 
experts, although CETESB 
developing guidelines in 
Portuguese but not clear 
how many ‘lay1 Brazilians are 
aware of this resource
Foreigners most active 
player in Mexico, while in 
Brazil, both domestic and 
foreign players are very 
active
More opportunities for technological 
capacity and absorption in Brazil
Divisions within
Stakeholder
groups
Not as prevalent Not as prevalent Similar in both cities
Source: Author, March 2009, updated August 2009
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Now that we have explained various facets using this approach, an important question 
remains -  what are the implications of applying the urban technology cooperation 
model to urban Latin America?
7.3. The Implications of applying the urban technology 
cooperation approach to urban Latin America
As indicated in Chapter 2, there are several critiques involved in using this approach. 
Some suggest that the term ‘technology cooperation’ may not appropriately reflect the 
power dynamics involved in these networks and processes (Stirling 2008). The SWH 
experience of a number of end users in Mexico City (unsatisfied, no follow up, etc.) 
could be characterized in this way. But, I argue that reverting back to transfer, 
immediately leads researchers back to the discourse implying a relationship between a 
donor and recipient, and a one-way flow of ideas.
Secondly, the approach emphasizes the advantages of developing country cities -  as 
sources of innovation, and a rich network of various sectors, establishing and 
maintaining contact through personal relationships -  as nexus points for adoption 
efforts. These links serve as opportunities to develop technological capacity, 
considered a key component in ensuring technology development and sustainable 
technology use. This is similar to Porter (1990)’s view that these are clusters, but 
unlike his claim that rivalries spur more innovation and competitive advantage, I 
argue that these divisions -  especially pronounced among SWH companies in Mexico 
City -  hinder the use of the technologies there.
Thirdly, the benefits that can accrue as a result of participatory approaches have been 
espoused by much literature, yet many problems remain when putting them into 
practice.379 For example, in Mason (1999)’s study on environmental democracy, none 
of the case studies he selected, despite “all selected initially as promising forms of 
collective communication favouring environmental democracy norms, have so far 
triggered a meaningful governmental commitment to the one common political goal
379 For more details on these challenges, please see Ockwell 2008: 264.
309
they all share” (Mason 1999: 212), which in that case was decentralizing 
environmental decision making. After applying the urban technology approach, 
relevant questions include claim can the active participation by all actors involved in 
the technology cooperation process would best ensure technology adoption 
realistically occur? And what are the implications of including all relevant 
stakeholders?
The above evidence suggests that links between the various technology cooperation 
actors can help the adoption of RETs. Having said this, it is important to point out 
that having more players does not necessarily equate to more adoption. As shown in 
the case of Mexico City and biogas, even though a number of agents are conducting 
work in this area, of the group, there is no single “champion”, and so efforts continue 
to be separated. The origins of these technology cooperation actors also play a role. 
In Mexico City and SWHs, public -  private programs were not as affective in eliciting 
RET adoption as those efforts engaging people from the three sectors of academia, 
government and industry. In Sao Paulo and biogas while there was one party largely 
responsible for getting the biogas to electricity project implemented (the consortium 
of businesses and the bank), other actors also played important roles (e.g. CETESB 
and an engineering consultant). In Sao Paulo and SWHs, efforts involving the 
government, industry and NGOs were occurring, however there was only one 
example of public engagement. In addition, this study has shown that intermediaries 
can serve as key bridge between experts and non-experts -  NGOs, consultants, and 
government representatives. This finding is similar to other regions, where in China a 
local public-private agency, providing technical expertise and loans, is considered a 
key reason for the successful dissemination of renewables in rural areas (Sawin 2004). 
Also, Forsyth (1999) examining renewables in Southeast Asia notes that “specialist 
energy agencies...can act as links between international investors and local end 
users...such as Preferred Energy Investments in the Philippines” (1999: xxi).
Another revelation this study suggests is that while it is important to inform, engage, 
and make the public aware, in Mexico City and Sao Paulo, it is difficult to have non­
experts be active participants in the technology cooperation process. Reasons for this 
could include -  as Pietrobelli (2000) suggests, there may be too many people “under 
the tent”, leading to logistical and coordination problems. What is more likely
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however is the fact that, although both places have a very active civil society, 
engaging the public has not been institutionalized enough by governments, among 
others. These aspects warrant further study.
On the other hand, while some may argue (an argument often made by some experts) 
that involving the public on technology issues is a gargantuan task, it is not 
impossible. Efforts by Sociedade do Sol and Grupo Solaris are important initiatives 
that demonstrate that the end user -  from all parts of the socioeconomic spectrum -- 
can be an engaged and active participant in the technology cooperation process as 
other studies also suggest (Douthwaite 2002, Bunders et al. 1999).
7.4. Conclusion
Conventional approaches focus on interactions between stakeholder groups. But more 
attention is needed on the nature of these relationships. In Sao Paulo, networks that 
had been around longer were more institutionalised and the stakeholders groups more 
mobilized, affecting RET use.
Specifically, interactions between the technology cooperation actors play an important 
role on the adoption of RETs. In Mexico City and Sao Paulo, when referring to 
SWHs at the micro level, generally speaking, there is a lack of communication 
between technology developers, producers, distributors and end users, and between 
the public, academic and private sectors.
In Mexico, in the case of SWHs, this lack of cohesive and continuous communication 
in some cases has lead to divisions between and also within various stakeholder 
groups. There are also other instances when players work together -  such as through 
the joint protest by a number of SWH companies to CONAE regarding the natural gas 
subsidy to Nuevo Leon state as noted in Chapter 4, but these efforts are more sporadic 
and ad hoc.
Many SWH companies in Brazil had some form of contact with universities as those 
companies wishing to have their product certified by INMETRO were required to
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send their technology to university test labs. In only one example, the Brazilian NGO 
Sociedade de Sol’s efforts to create awareness about SWHs, were the end users 
engaged in the technology cooperation process -  otherwise, the public remains 
outside of these actions. In Sao Paulo, links between the various players are more 
institutionalized -  they have been around longer and are more organized. Also in 
Brazil, the NGO Sociedade do Sol has made a concerted effort to try and popularize 
this technology through public awareness and engagement. In Sao Paulo, Vitae 
Civilis and ABRAVA have worked with the Prefeitura of Sao Paulo to do the same. 
The NGO Sociedade do Sol is also encouraging the adoption of SWHs, although the 
philosophies of these two networks remain distinct.
Intermediaries in both countries for both technologies have played an important role 
encouraging their adoption. Links between most stakeholder groups are more recent, 
and more sporadic and ad hoc in Mexico City. In Brazil, networks have been around 
longer, are better established and more institutionalized. In and around Sao Paulo, 
both movements -  one promoting a more techno-centric approach, and the other a 
more intermediate, Schumacher-influenced approach — are more mobilized than in 
Mexico and become unified from time to time in the overarching goal to increase the 
use of these technologies in the city, state and beyond.
As noted in Chapter 6, incentives do exist to encourage the adoption of these RETs in 
both countries. However, in Mexico City, they are complicated (e.g. CONAE’s 
program to increase SWHs in Mexican homes consisted of a number of detailed 
forms, and the onus was on the user to calculate their current usage and expenses), 
convoluted and not promoted. There is no single champion within government, so 
very few companies access these programs. In terms of engaging the end users, there 
were little efforts being done in both countries. The Brazilian NGO Sociedade de Sol 
was the main agency attempting to engage end users that are not experts into the 
technology cooperation process.
Furthermore, in addition to just noting the importance of climate change as a driver, 
the source of this driver can also play a role. In Mexico, the main source promoting 
climate change at the time of research (2005/06) was from foreign sources (e.g. 
foreign biogas companies and other consultancies, international organizations, etc.)
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whereas in Brazil the main sources promoting climate change were indigenous (e.g. 
Brazilian NGOs, governments, academics) and foreign (e.g. US EPA, US foundations 
financing studies done by Brazilians). In essence, Brazil has more indigenous 
capacity in this area, which I argue has helped to positively affect the uptake of biogas 
technologies and SWHs in homes there.
I also found that dynamics within stakeholder groups, such as divisions uncovered at 
the meso-level, help explain RET use. One reason behind these divisions can be 
traced to trade and competitiveness policies, where in Mexico there is a major divide 
between foreign and domestically-owned firms.
Divisions also occurred among government agencies. People spoke about the two 
Brazils, concurrently undertaking policies similar to industrialized and developing 
countries alike. Informal discussions in Mexico indicate a similar phenomenon in that 
country.380 While there have been claims that Mexico and Brazil are looking to RETs 
in order to diversify their energy portfolio; reducing over-reliance on one energy 
source (fossil fuels in Mexico and large-scale hydro in Brazil), many informants 
indicated that in reality, in both countries, attention remained on activities 
surrounding these conventional sources -  from increasing exploration and production, 
developing new large-scale hydro projects, to making the refining process and 
transmission lines more efficient. Pursuing these divergent agendas has led to some 
conflicting policies and actions; a theme to be explored further in Chapter 8, when the 
potential role that trade and competitiveness regimes can have on RET adoption is 
examined.
380 Informal discussions, informants, November 2005 -  January 2006, April 2006, September 2007
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CHAPTER 8: TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS REGIMES AND RET 
ADOPTION IN URBAN LATIN AMERICA
8. 1. Introduction
The study was informed by results from Mexico City and Sao Paulo and Solar Water 
Heaters (SWHs) and biogas to produce electricity. As noted in the previous chapters, 
both biogas technologies and SWHs in homes and SWHs in general (not including 
pools) are used more in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City, but a little more SWHs 
(including pools) and more SWHs for commercial and industrial use, are being used 
in Mexico City -  despite similar population sizes, income levels, supporting 
institutions, large state-owned oil and energy sectors, etc.
Some of the identified factors affecting RET use were explained in Chapter 6, using 
Rogers’ diffusion of innovations model, as other events effected awareness, rather 
than just awareness of the technology itself, which in turn played a role on adoption. I 
argue that because more of the general population were aware of SWHs in Sao Paulo, 
due to the apagao of 2000/01 in combination with the negative prior experiences with 
SWHs in Mexico City, helps to explain the different rates of adoption between these 
cities for SWHs in homes, and overall (SWHs not including for pools). However, at 
times, other aspects of technology adoption predicted by Rogers’ model -  such as that 
a higher cost in general or vis-a-vis alternatives should lead to less adoption of RETs - 
-did not occur.
Moreover, referring back to Chapters 4 and 5, other findings regarding factors 
affecting the uptake of RETs -  including trade and competitiveness regimes and 
networks, were not explained through Rogers’ model. Chapter 7 applied a new 
concept -  urban technology cooperation -  to better explain RET adoption in the urban 
developing world.
Using the urban technology cooperation approach at the meso-level revealed 
important insights. These insights include the fact that these networks were 
considered stronger as their nexus point was a city. In addition, in Sao Paulo,
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networks that had been around longer were more institutionalised and the 
stakeholders groups more mobilized, affecting RET use for both technologies. Also, 
international influences such as climate change have been encouraging these 
networks, but over time, in Brazil, these key drivers supporting climate change are 
both Brazilian and foreign, versus in Mexico, where they are mainly foreign. There is 
more indigenous capacity in this area in Sao Paulo. Finally, divisions were found 
within stakeholder groups at the meso-level, such as between Mexican SWHs that 
were foreign and those that were domestically-owned. But more information is 
needed -  including the reasons behind why these dynamics are happening. For that 
reason, I turn to trade and competitiveness approaches in Chapter 8.
This chapter asserts that under certain conditions trade and competitiveness regimes 
can affect the adoption of Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) in the urban 
developing world. As indicated in Chapter 2, the nexus between trade and the uptake 
of low carbon technologies is a relative new area of scrutiny. Research generally 
focuses on the potential role of IPRs. However, the common view of researchers in 
this area that espouse the neoliberal approach, such as the World Bank (2008a), 
Cosbey (2007) and Stem (2006), is that trade liberalization can lead to more RET use 
in developing countries. The UNFCCC also suggests that one way to foster an 
enabling environment for the transfer of low carbon energy technologies is through 
reducing taxes for imports of RETs (UNFCCC 2006).
While this may be true in some cases, this chapter argues that a conditionally open 
versus open trade and competitiveness regime can also lead to the use of more RETs 
under certain conditions. In other words, one cannot say definitely that more trade 
liberalization will equate to more use of RETs in the urban developing world. This is 
because technology transfer is also linked to local technology cooperation, as in these 
cases more successful technology cooperation occurs in environments where there are 
more opportunities to develop local technological capacity.
Chapter 8 focuses on the third sub-research question -  under what conditions, if  at all, 
do trade and competitiveness regimes affect the use o f RETs in the urban developing 
world, comparing Mexico City, Mexico, an open trade regime, with Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
a conditionally open regime. It answers this question by taking a step back, at the
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systemic level, examining the trade and competitiveness regimes underway in each 
setting. As argued previously, the dissertation avows that efforts to address climate 
change and energy security are often focused on incentives, or “end of tailpipe” 
solutions. These are important but insufficient in and of themselves to effectively 
increase RETs.
A more comprehensive understanding for those interested in understanding why RETs 
are or are not being used is to turn to more indirect policies and influences that 
operate at the systemic level. Trade and competitiveness policies were focused on in 
this dissertation, due to their strong presence globally, where “over the past five 
decades, world trade has quietly grown at rates that dwarf the growth in world 
income” (Cosbey 2007: 137). Some argue that trade in goods plays a role in 
international technology diffusion (Saggi 2004: 75), providing further rationale to 
examine how these systemic policies can play a role on RET adoption in the 
developing world.
To recap from Chapter 2, which explored the themes of the dissertation, trade and 
competitiveness policies can be viewed as a series of instruments, which governments 
undertake to regulate the actions of others operating (or wishing to operate) in their 
jurisdiction.
Specifically, I found that in contrast to those studies stressing that elimination of 
tariffs is necessary to encourage adoption of RETs, in the case of SWHs and biogas 
technologies, high tariffs were not enough of a deterrent to stop project developers 
from using foreign technologies, considered better quality.
Secondly, I found that more state regulation on the prices of natural gas in Sao Paulo 
has had a negative impact on the use of large-scale SWHs in that city. By contrast, 
higher natural gas prices, dictated more by the market versus the Mexican 
government, have played a positive role on their use in that country, especially for 
large-scale applications. At the same time, privatization of the electricity industry in 
Sao Paulo -  separating generation from transmission from distribution - is argued by 
some to discourage efforts aimed at conserving energy, as currently, profits are linked 
to increased generation, transmission and distribution.
316
Thirdly, I found that Brazil’s foreign investment strategy (emphasizing more local 
engagement) has afforded that country more opportunities to develop indigenous 
capacity in these two RETs and climate change more generally. Fourthly, I found that 
the role of IPRs on the uptake of low carbon technologies is context and technology- 
dependent (in this case patents were less relevant a determinate on uptake), unlike 
those studies that purport that strong IPRs either help or hinder the use of low carbon 
technologies. In other words, through using the trade and competitiveness regime 
lens I was able to expand upon how some findings found in Chapters 6 and 7 can 
impact RET use.
8.2. Trade and Competitiveness Policies and RET Adoption
This section will place attention on how trade and competitiveness policies can affect 
RET use in urban Latin America. Four specific trade and competitiveness policies 
stood out as having a potential role on the adoption of RETs in Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo. These policies include the approach to 1) taxes, 2) privatization, 3) foreign 
investment, and 4) patents and intellectual property rights. It is important to note that 
the specific trade and competitiveness policies examined are only a small part of these 
regimes. Activities were occurring in other areas as well. For instance, in Mexico, 
the national agency for science and technology, a key government department 
promoting innovation in that country, CONACYT has a program which supports 
R&D efforts of Mexican firms in general (renewables or energy are not targeted in 
particular).381 But, as indicated in the interview responses in Chapter 4, not many 
companies in Mexican involved in either technology mentioned them. For SWHs, 
CONACYT also has laboratories which SWH companies can use to ensure their 
equipment meets the voluntary standard established through NORMEX.382 In Brazil, 
federal law mandates that Eletropaulo and other electricity utilities must devote 1% of 
their annual gross income into energy efficiency projects and 50% of this must be for 
R&D. However, at the time of field research, Eletropaulo was not involved in either 
technology in Sao Paulo. But, as noted in Chapter 5, they were looking at the
381 Interview, one government official, December 2005
382 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
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potential for SWH projects when discussed with them in 2007.383 That said, those 
four policies considered above were ascertained to be the most relevant.
8.2.1.Taxes
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) negotiations, debates continue regarding non-tariff barriers and tariff 
barriers as discussed in Chapter 2 and in Section 8.1. With respect to tariffs, the most 
prevalent view is that tariffs to environmental technologies must be reduced in 
developing countries to encourage adoption.
Regarding SWHs in Mexico City, there are no taxes in place for companies to 
purchase many foreign finished products or components, or tariffs are fairly low -  for 
instance, the average tariffs for industrial goods is about 8.53% in 2008 (International 
Trade Centre 2008). This is due to the nature of the country, which practices trade 
liberalization. For example, in 1985 it joined the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT), joined the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 
established a free trade agreement with the European Union in 1997, and became a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member in 1995. Moreover, since 2004, any 
goods subject to tariffs that are for environmentally-friendly technologies are 
exempted for companies. However, consumers in Mexico City must pay a value 
added tax (impuesto al valor agregado, IVA -  about 15% should they wish to 
purchase this RET).384 This tax is also confirmed by other studies such as (Hoyt et al. 
2006: 29). In addition, informants noted that there were no municipal taxes 
applicable. The general view among experts in Mexico was that a lack of taxes -  or 
anything to reduce the price of SWHs - was beneficial for increasing their use. But 
many companies complained more about the customs system in general -  plagued 
with delays and bureaucracy, an issue examined later on in the chapter.
In Sao Paulo, regarding SWHs, as noted earlier, Brazilians owned all the companies 
in Sao Paulo and the surrounding area, and nearly all materials and expertise were
383 Interview, one electricity utility, April 2007; Interviews, one NGO, two government representatives, 
March 2006
384 Interviews, five SWH companies, two government representatives, November 2005-January 2006
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Brazilian. Companies are exempted from two taxes: 1) the Industrialized Product 
Tax, or Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (IPI), which is a federal level tax on 
many domestic and foreign manufactured products and applied to manufacturers or 
importers of finished goods, and 2) the Merchandise and Service Circulation Tax, or 
Imposto sobre Circulaqao de Mercadorias e Servigos (ICMS) (18% in the State of Sao 
Paulo), which is a state-level tax applicable to manufacturers as well as traders on 
both domestic and foreign products. However, SWH companies must pay a 
Contribution for the Financing of Social Security tax, COFINS for components (a 
federal tax -  about 12%). Companies indicated that the extra cost from COFINS was 
passed on to consumers (as the IPI and ICMS would be too if they were not exempt). 
There were no municipal level taxes applicable.385
Brazilian SWH companies also noted that the only component that they acquired from 
abroad was copper (from Chile), and that only two companies based out of Sao Paulo 
imported copper into the country386. No informant indicated that they paid a higher 
amount for copper versus other countries -  likely because Chile is part of the 
Southern Common Market or Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL) where tariffs 
on merchandise from within these countries is zero. However, a number of 
respondents indicated that as the price of copper has been steadily increasing in recent 
years (which they argued was mainly due to demand from China), the overall price of 
SWHs was expected to increase versus decrease387. That said, this has likely changed 
due to the reduced demand from China across the board since the global recession of 
fall 2008.
Comparing the two cities, organizations and people interested in purchasing SWHs 
are subject to similar taxes. The main difference however is that in Mexico, 
components and / or finished products are mainly imported, while in Brazil, virtually 
all aspects of SWHs are domestic.
Regarding biogas to produce electricity, in Mexico, informants did not identify taxes 
as a key factor affecting the adoption of this technology. Examining several Project
385 Interviews, six SWH companies, March -  May 2006
386 Interviews eleven SWH companies, one NGO, one consultancy, March 2006, April -  May 2007
387 Interviews, three SWH companies, March 2006, April-May 2007
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Design Documents (PDD) of registered CDM landfill gas to energy projects in 
Mexico, taxes were on the electricity generated versus the imported products or 
services. These were estimated to be about 7-8 cents per kWh of electricity produced 
(Ecosecurities 2006a; Ecosecurities 2006b).
Figure 8.1 “Back of th e  E nvelope” C ost E stim ates for T axes of a Potential B iogas to  
Energy Project in Mexico City Using M onterrey Project Details
•  O ne could a ssu m e  that this power plant is off line for various reason s (e .g . repairs, 
etc.) about 20%  of the tim e throughout the year388. This would m ean that every year  
about 0 .8  * 365  d ays/year * 2 4  hours/day * 7MW = a little m ore than 49  0 0 0  MWh 
(m ega-w att hours) of electricity is produced.
•  This would m ean ta x es of about U S $3430  or U S $ 3 9 2 0  per year
• The Monterrey b iogas project h as b een  running s in ce  2 0 0 2  -  a s  of 2009 , ta x es are
about U S $28  000.
•  In the c a s e  of Monterrey, incom e ta x es w ere a lso  d eem ed  applicable in the project, 
but specific details w ere not provided.
Source: Author, b ased  on Bartone et al. 2 0 0 5  and d iscu ssio n s with Brazilian b iogas experts
In Brazil, I was informed that taxes made up almost 50% of project costs for the 
Bandeirantes project, almost $US 10 million. For instance, the taxes noted above in 
the SWH case study also applied here. In the case of ICMS, this tax is applied not 
only to the technology but also electricity distribution. In addition, a Common 
External Tariff, or Tarif External Comum (TEC), must be applied to products and 
services with origins outside of MERCOSUL countries, as well as the Import Duty, or 
Imposto de Importa^ao (II). Moreover, project developers need to ensure that a 
specific amount of local content is contained in the goods and services (DFAIT 2007). 
This amount is even higher than numbers suggested by previous studies, including the 
United States’ Trade Representative (USTR)’s report on “Progress in Reducing 
Trade-Related Barriers to the Export of Greenhouse Gas Intensity Reducing 
Technologies”, where the average applied tariffs is 14% and the maximum tariff is 
35% on these types of technologies with origins from the United States (USTR 2006: 
36). See Table 8.1 below.
388 This estimation was confirmed with landfill gas experts, November 2007
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Table 8.1 Approximate Average Tariffs Applied at Border and Maximum Average Bound 
(Ceiling) Tariff Rates for Renewable Energy and Air Pollution Control Products - 2006
Country Approximate Average 
Applied Tariffs (%)
Maximum Average 
Bound (Ceiling) Tariffs 
(% )
China 9 35
India 15 40
South Africa 3 25
Mexico 0 0
Brazil 14 35
Indonesia 6 40
Thailand 7 30
Malaysia 7 30
Egypt 7 60
Argentina 6 35
Venezuela 12 37
Pakistan 14 75
Nigeria 17 40
Philippines 4 50
Colombia 12 35
Chile 0 0
Bangladesh 9 25
Source: Adapted from United S ta tes Trade R epresentative, Report, October 2006, p. 36
Although Brazilians chose foreign equipment, Brazilians played a leading role on the 
rest of the project- construction of the plant was done by a Brazilian / Dutch 
company, and engineers, consultants, technicians, etc. were all Brazilian. Moreover, 
the fact that two of the three types of equipment considered as options for the project 
were Brazilian is also telling, in that there was enough indigenous expertise in the 
area of biogas technologies to develop domestic options in the first place. In other 
words, there was more Brazilian ‘ownership’ of the technology cooperation process.
To summarize, in the case of SWHs, taxes are similar in both places. In the case of 
biogas to generate electricity, despite the fact that taxes constituted a significantly 
higher amount of project costs in Brazil versus Mexico, there are currently two 
landfill gas to energy projects operating around Sao Paulo, versus none in Mexico 
City. This is interesting because a number of studies consider reducing taxes on the 
imports of RETs to be an important part of creating an enabling environment for 
technology cooperation (World Bank 2008a; Cosbey 2007). I argue that technology 
use is also related to local technology cooperation dynamics, where in Brazil there
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was more indigenous capacity in this area, more established networks, rather than just 
trade and competitiveness policies.
Seres’ (2008) study examining technology transfer from foreign sources in the CDM 
noted a downward trend for technology transfer in two of three types of CDM projects 
prominent in Brazil -landfill and biomass projects. One reason for this is likely due 
to the Brazilian government’s stipulation that the CDM project must contribute to 
technological development and capacity building (Seres 2008), which is in line with 
their approach to trade and investment overall. He argues that as Brazilians become 
more familiar with a technology -  through implementing more and more CDM 
projects using a particular technology - they rely increasingly on local sources of 
knowledge and expertise. Although in my research the developers of the particular 
landfill gas project (Bandeirantes) chose an imported technology, high taxes on 
imported equipment are also likely contributing to this downward trend on technology 
transfer from foreign sources. This phenomenon has implications for developing 
technological capacity, further encouraging adoption in Brazil.
One may wonder why tariffs on environmental goods and services exist, as Doha 
promises to eliminate them. However, debates continue regarding what constitutes an 
‘environmental’ good or service -  its use, its production or its characteristics (Cosbey 
2007). Debates also continue regarding whether or not proposals by developed 
countries on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), where most low carbon 
technologies would be classified, emphasizing tariff reductions to imports would be 
beneficial for developing countries (although some OECD nations support ‘special 
and differential treatment’ (S&DT) for least developed countries). Shafaeddin (2009) 
asserts that these proposals, if agreed upon, would ‘lock’ Africa into paths based on 
the production of primary products, and those requiring low- skills labour. He 
stresses that trade policies put in place to encourage developing countries’ industrial 
sector, including tariffs, help these countries to diversify and develop expertise in 
other areas. For Africa and other low-income developing countries, “the use of tariffs 
is almost their only remaining trade policy instrument” (2009: 16).
Furthermore, as the evidence on two RETs in Mexico City and Sao Paulo shows, the 
existence of tariffs on foreign RETs does not necessarily equate to less uptake of the
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technologies in general, or even the exclusion of foreign versions of the technologies 
in these markets (although the market share for domestic technologies is likely to be 
greater than foreign ones). Others, such as Paul Waide (2007), looking at higher 
tariffs on environmentally friendly technologies more generally in Brazil and 
China389, have also questioned whether tariffs are one of the important factors 
affecting RET uptake in various countries.
In this instance, taxes do not explain the differences between uptake of SWHs in these 
two cities; or, in the case of biogas to produce electricity, cannot be said to be a key 
factor hindering their use. In fact, these taxes may actually be encouraging their use 
through developing technological capacity, thus creating more of a sense of 
‘ownership’ of the technology, in Brazil. Using evidence from the solar energy 
industry in India, Harriss-White et al. (2009) also suggest that imports can lead to 
disincentives for domestic research being conducted in that country’s public science 
institutes.
8.2.2. Privatization
The second trade and competitiveness policy that was highlighted to have a potential 
role on the adoption of RETs is privatization. Generally speaking, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, those countries opting for trade liberalization are also increasing 
privatization, or increasing private ownership of previously publicly owned firms. In 
Mexico, following the path of trade liberalization, the 1990s saw the private sector 
enter the airline, highway construction, banking and telecommunications industries in 
that country. In 1995, over 1000 previously state-run firms were privatized (WSTB) 
1995: 74).
Having said this, in the area of electricity management, the energy sector is more 
privatized in Brazil versus Mexico. In Sao Paulo, electricity is distributed through 
Eletropaulo, which is jointly owned by a Brazilian and American company (AES). 
Electricity in Mexico City on the other hand is distributed by Luz y Fuerza del Centro
389 Personal communication with David Ockwell, July 2008, on Waide’s presentation regarding the 
potential role of higher tariffs on environmentally friendly technologies at the 13th Conference of the 
Parties meeting, Bali, Indonesia, December 2007
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(LyFC) and is generated by the Federal Energy Commission, or Comision Federal de 
Energia, CFE, both state-owned agencies.
Private firms are able to distribute LPG in Mexico City (de Buen Rodriguez and 
Bustillos 2006), and the price of LPG fluctuates, as it is based on the market price, 
although there have been times when the federal government has stepped in to 
provide a subsidy for residents.390 In the case of water distribution -  relevant when 
examining SWHs -  the opposite situation exists, in that this is privatized in Mexico 
City391, although a municipal level water commission exists, created in 1992, which 
regulates these companies, and in Sao Paulo, it is managed by a state agency Basic 
Sanitation Company of Sao Paulo State, or Companhia de Saneamento Basico do 
Estado de Sao Paulo (SABESP).
As noted in Chapter 4, in speaking with SWH experts in and around Mexico City, the 
majority felt that the main way in which privatization had played a role on their use 
was through rising natural gas prices. No one mentioned water distribution. These 
rapidly increasing prices had a positive impact on SWH sales -  with experts linking 
higher prices to higher SWH use392. For instance, as indicated in Chapter 6, I was 
told that one third of Mexico’s natural gas consumption comes from imports -  mainly 
from the United States which is purchased at international market prices (although 
sometimes subsidized to the Mexican populace)393. Even though natural gas deposits 
have been located in Mexico, the country has largely been unable to extract these 
resources for various reasons (insufficient technical capacity), thus making Mexico 
more vulnerable from an energy security perspective. This correlation between 
higher natural gas prices and increased adoption of SWHs in Mexico is confirmed by 
other studies such as Castro Negrete (2005) and Hoyt et al. (2006).
390 As they did for natural gas for Monterrey residents for six months in 2005 -  prompting some SWH 
companies to collective write to CONAE to express their displeasure at this government policy, 
Interviews and informal discussions, four SWH companies, November 2005 -  January 2006.
391 Four private firms currently distribute water for Mexico City; one firm for each one of the four 
zones the city was divided into. These firms consist o f a consortium o f Mexican, French, American 
and British firms (WSTB 1995: 74).
392 Interviews, three SWH companies, two consultancies, one government representative, November 
2005-January 2006
393 Interviews, three SWH companies, December 2005
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Informants in SWHs in Sao Paulo indicated that there was one way in which 
privatization -  specifically I am referring to the instances in which the government 
has sold off some public firms to the private sector either fully or partially - has 
impacted the use of SWHs and it was a negative impact. This was through the 
restructuring of the electricity sector -  separating the electricity generators from the 
transmitters from the distributors, making it not financially attractive for distributors 
to encourage electricity use reduction394. Other studies from Brazil indicate the same 
(Rodrigues and Matajs 2005).
On the other hand, a few informants felt that numerous RETs were not being adopted 
in Sao Paulo as natural gas was affordable, regulated by the government and readily 
available395. The price of natural gas in Brazil is lower than the market price. 
Brazilian gas prices are highly regulated and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) are 
required to cap the price of natural gas to distributors (and thus consumers) at a 
certain maximum amount (Ellsworth and Gibbs 2004: 5 and 33)396. This is important 
because the main alternative to SWHs in Sao Paulo for commercial and industrial use 
is natural gas, where SWHs only make up a small percentage of the market 1% for 
industrial and 11% for commercial applications -  significantly less than Mexico City 
where commercial and industrial applications are about 20% of the SWH market 
there. There are more SWHs being used in Mexico City (20% of the SWH market, or 
121 000 m2 in 2006) versus Sao Paulo (1% for industrial use and 11% for commercial 
use of the market, or 23 484 m2). This suggests that more state control on natural gas 
prices played a negative role on the use of SWHs for larger applications in Sao Paulo.
In the case of biogas to produce electricity in Mexico City, some experts noted that 
the price of electricity being offered to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to the 
state-run CEE was lower than one desired by potential biogas investors. But, none 
viewed this as a key reason why these projects were not occurring in Mexico City.397
394 Interviews, two organizations and one consultancy, March 2006 and May 2007
395 Informal discussions, industry experts, March 2006; Interview, one government official, March 
2006. However, Sao Paulo is supplied by gas from Bolivia, where the price is higher due to the 
contract agreed and transportation costs, versus other parts of Brazil, like Rio de Janeiro which receives 
its natural gas from national sources, which had a 38.5% higher price in 2003 Moraes, S. E. G. d. 
(2003). O mercado de gas natural no Estado de Sao Paulo: historico, cenario, perspectivas e 
identificacao de barreiras. Economy and Administration. Sao Paulo, Universidade de Sao Paulo: 91).
396 For a thorough look at Brazil’s natural gas industry, please see Ellsworth and Gibbs 2004
397 Interviews, two biogas companies, two consultancies, November 2005-January 2006
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The Brazilian electricity sector is also viewed by some IPPs as being unfavourable to 
RET applications, as IPPs had to sell their electricity to Eletropaulo at an unattractive 
price. However, in 2003, the Brazilian legislature agreed to a three month (September 
-  December) window in which IPPs could supply electricity directly to places, versus 
selling it to Eletropaulo -  a move that allowed Unibanco (one of the owners of the 
biogas project) to supply electricity directly to all of their bank branches throughout 
Brazil. The conglomerate of Brazilian and foreign companies were able to get the 
project implemented within that short time frame. Interestingly, in November 2007, 
the Brazilian federal government changed the laws, allowing IPPs more flexibility on 
who they can supply electricity to, versus the previous stipulation requiring them to 
sell to the closest distributor / user.398
As the above examples illustrate, privatization can have a role on RET use in 
developing country cities. Privatization has had a positive impact on RET use in the 
case of SWHs in Mexico City, especially noticeable when comparing SWHs for large 
scale applications in both cities. Allowing more flexibility on destinations for 
electricity generators is also encouraging adoption of biogas technologies in Sao 
Paulo. That being said, privatization has not always lead to increased uptake of 
RETs, as attested to by informants. In other words, although much of the literature 
examining climate technologies, espouses the link between privatization and 
increased RET adoption (through increasing competition and access of IPPs to the 
grid for instance) this is not always the case. This is similar to other studies, which 
purport that “the impacts of privatization [on renewables] have depended on the 
specific policies and regulations in place.” (Sawin 2004: 4). In essence, privatization 
has resulted in a number of implications, some having an overall positive affect on 
RET use, while others have a negative affect.
8.2.3. Foreign Investment
As indicated throughout the thesis, Mexico has a more open trade and 
competitiveness approach. Little stipulations are in place regarding foreign 
investment. One result of this approach is the fact that the sources of products,
398 Personal communication, one government official, one biogas company, November 2007
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processes and / or knowledge -  or technology -  were foreign for the majority of SWH 
companies. Some SWH companies -  whether Mexican or foreign -  have embraced 
the idea to receive technology from all sources. Some felt that this was a useful 
approach, recognizing that there was limited capacity in Mexico. These companies 
“have the advantage [because] whatever they need, they can import”.399 Other 
companies, either because they did not have the capacity to import, or the desire to 
import, centred their efforts domestically. However, foreign investment restrictions 
were not completely absent in Mexico. As noted in Chapter 5, for example, 
government projects for SWHs required that a certain percentage of equipment be 
from Mexico.
Thus, as explained in Chapter 7, the origins of companies and / or their technologies 
created “a political space in the group where there are clashes between importers and 
others”.400 In the case of biogas technologies in Mexico, the key actors active on this 
technology are foreigners or Mexicans working for international biogas firms, 
although some domestic institutions are also playing a role. For both technologies, 
Mexican companies were more oriented towards international partnerships.
Brazil has a more conditionally open trade and competitiveness regime, placing more 
requirements on foreign investment. These requirements include having a certain 
amount of local products, personnel and knowledge be used by foreign companies, 
foreign companies having to form joint ventures with Brazilian firms, etc. For 
instance, as noted in Chapter 5, in order to quality for PROINFA, 60% of the project’s 
components must be from Brazilian sources (ITA 2005), or 70% for wind projects. 
Brazil imposes limitations on foreign capital participation in procurement bids401.
In and around Sao Paulo, all SWH companies are Brazilian owned. The majority of 
SWH companies in and around Sao Paulo and Brazil use either 100% or almost 100% 
of Brazilian components for their equipment (copper is imported from Chile and all 
copper in the country is distributed through two companies located in Sao Paulo).
399 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
400 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
401 Interview, one consultancy, April 2007
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These policies have had an impact on the networks formed between and within 
various stakeholder groups, affecting RET adoption, as shown in Chapter 7.
This is important for two reasons, expanding upon arguments made in Chapter 7. 
First of all, I argue that it is these policies regarding foreign investment that have lead 
to more established, institutionalized and mobilized networks between the various 
technology cooperation participants in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City. In the case of 
SWHs, the majority of firms were willing to defer responsibility of various actions 
(e.g. mobilizing cities to mandate SWHs in Brazil) to ABRAVA, the trade 
association, as well as Vitae Civilis, the Brazilian environmental NGO. In Mexico, 
SWH companies also deferred to ANES, but not to the same extent. This is because 
the interests of firms in Mexico were more difficult to group together as the origins of 
these companies and the technologies they produced or distributed where different. 
This finding is particularly interesting because it is supportive of Pietrobelli (2000)’s 
view that too many players involved in the technology cooperation process, with 
competing interests, may hinder its success.
Secondly, Brazil’s more conditional trade and competitiveness approach has afforded 
that country more opportunities to develop absorptive and technological capacity in 
the areas of these particular RETs, and climate change and the CDM more generally, 
which has in turn had a positive effect on the adoption of both these technologies.
Forsyth (1999) also acknowledges these contextual-dependent assertions, as he 
indicates that foreign investment can lead to technology transfer. In his research from 
Southeast Asia, he notes that although increased indigenous capacity may not be an 
immediate goal, this foreign investment can help to achieve other goals, such as rural 
electrification. But, on the other hand, it could lead to increasing the market share of 
industrialized firms’ technologies in the South, rather than increasing adoption 
overall.
Others indicate that emphasis on developing absorptive capacity is also important
when assessing foreign investment. According to Saggi,
“Several studies indicate that absorptive capacity in the host country is crucial 
for obtaining significant benefits from FDI. Without adequate human capital
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or investments in R&D, spillovers from FDI many simply be infeasible. Thus, 
liberalization of trade and FDI policies needs to be complemented by 
appropriate policy measures with respect to education, R&D and human 
capital accumulation if developing countries are to take full advantage of 
increased trade and FDI. Domestic policies that improve absorptive capacity 
might be of higher order importance than openness to trade and investment.” 
(Saggi 2002: 229).
8.2.4. Patents and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)
The fourth types of trade and competitiveness policies assumed to have an affect on 
RET adoptions were Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), and more specifically patents 
on RETs. As indicated in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, with respect to linking 
IPRs and uptake of low carbon technologies in developing countries, the evidence has 
been mixed. On the one hand, Srinivas’ (2009) review of analysis of certain 
technologies relevant for climate change, such as clean coal technologies and climate 
resistant crops, show that strong IPRs have been a barrier to the dissemination of 
these technologies. On the other hand, the United States’ Trade Representative 
(USTR) report (2006) examining barriers to GHG emission reduction technologies, 
cites weak IPR protection in a number of developing countries including Mexico and 
Brazil as “further barriers to the widespread use of such important environmental 
technologies” (2006: 10). Mexico and Brazil are placed on the USTR’s Special 301 
Watch List and Priority Watch List respectively (USTR 2006).
But, others assert that Brazil and Mexico have been taking strides for stronger IPR 
regimes since their accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 
1995, whose stipulation was also to join TRIPs. Studies suggest different 
implications for these two countries upon joining.
In the case of Mexico, Forero-Pineda (2006) argues that, more often than not, the 
trade benefits afforded to developing countries that join the WTO / TRIPs come at the 
cost of technological development, as the goods and services provided by developing 
countries are often of low “technological content”. He cites the case of Mexico where 
there was a distinct reduction in patent activities from domestic sources after patent 
reforms in that country in 1994, emphasizing robust patent protection. He examines a 
study on the Mexican pharmaceutical sector, which indicates that although foreign
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investment increased after these reforms, Mexican companies have yielded very few 
new technologies.
In Brazil by contrast, the OECD conducted a macro econometric analysis examining 
IPRs (through patent rights and applications) and technology transfer (through 
merchandise and service imports and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)) to a 
many developing countries, as well as the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, the BRICs. They indicated that Brazil significantly strengthened its 
IPR regime after TRIPs. “While the average developing country experienced a 37.5% 
change in the patent rights index [which was used as a proxy to measure strength of 
IPR regime in the study] over the period 1995-2005...., Brazil, China, and India 
experienced more than a doubling of their scores.” (Park and Lippoldt 2008: 26).
They found that in these countries stronger IPRs lead to an increase in inflows of 
high-technology products (e.g. computer and information technology, chemicals, 
aerospace). They further assert that stronger IPRs can also stimulate local innovation, 
which they measured through developing country applications for patents (by both 
residents and non-residents). Applications for patents by developing country firms as 
well as expenditure on R&D in these countries increased, as the strength of patent 
rights increased. Looking at evidence from Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the fact that Brazil’s 
trade and competitiveness regime has provided the country with more opportunities to 
develop technological capabilities may help to explain these differences.
That said, patents and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) did not play as much a role 
on the adoption of the two RETs under scrutiny in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. 
Regarding SWHs, in both places, the general view was that informants did not have a 
patent for their SWHs, while some companies claimed that yes, they did have a patent 
or trademark. Rather, many experts noted that the hardware -  the general concept -  
was in the public domain and companies worked on strengthening their niches within 
the details.
When informants talked about the history of the SWH industry in both places -  
mainly originating from Americans living in Guadalajara in 1950s bringing insights 
about SWH technology with them in Mexico, and from a Brazilian professor going to
330
Israel and learning details about SWH technology in Brazil — none indicated that 
IPRs or patent infringement was an issue. At the same time, companies in both 
countries were very guarded about the 'nitty gritty' details (trade secrets). SWH 
companies were reluctant to get into too much detail about their products, process and 
technical knowledge; although they knew I was a social scientist versus engineer. 
Trademarks also exist for some SWHs in both countries.
In a study done regarding the transfer of low carbon energy technologies in India, 
researchers from The Energy Resources Institute (TERI) suggested that the money 
spent on research and development, represented as a cost of IP in terms of overall 
price, gets passed on to the consumer, which can hinder adoption in some cases. In 
other cases, the cost of IP represented only a small amount of the price differential 
between a low carbon technology and its alternative (Mallett et al. 2009). In this 
dissertation research in Brazil and Mexico no one wanted to mention specifics, 
including what percentage of overall cost IP would constitute, but the main costs for 
SWHs are materials and installation. For instance, in Brazil the majority of 
companies were using copper and the price was steadily increasing at the time (2006) 
due to demand from China (although this has likely changed after the global recession 
of Fall 2008). Other interviewees also noted that installations could be rather 
expensive depending on the retrofitting needed.
In the case of biogas to produce electricity, both Mexicans and Brazilians realized that 
the most cost effective hardware was from foreign sources and are willing to use it, 
while encouraging Mexican and Brazilian expertise in the software at the same time. 
Brazil has domestic technology available, but decided to use foreign technology 
because, while more costly, it could be better guaranteed to achieve the desired 
performance. In Bandeirantes, the conglomerate of Brazilian and foreign companies 
bought the equipment from Caterpillar, of the United States. Mexicans also indicated 
that companies from Germany, Switzerland (hardware) and Canada (software), were 
active in this area. No informant from either country mentioned that there were or 
would be problems accessing the technology (i.e. that firms possessing the technology 
would be unwilling to sell it to them due to fear of IP infringement). The foreign
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technology was adapted, but Brazilians were not concerned about infringing on IPRs 
through their small tweaking.402
Some university representatives working on another RET in Brazil indicated a similar 
experience. Brazilians working at CENBIO, the National Reference Centre for 
Biomass in Brazil at the USP were using an Indian technology which was a motor, 
combusting vegetable oil. The Indian technology was not as ‘finished’ and so 
adaptations were made in Brazil. The Brazilian researchers repeatedly attempted to 
contact the Indians to ensure they were not infringing on any patent issues, but they 
did not hear anything back 403
So in other words, whether or not IP helps or hinders the adoption of low carbon 
technology in developing countries is context and technology-dependent -  in some 
cases, IP is not as relevant an explanatory factor. This is a similar finding to other 
studies examining this issue (Mallett et al. 2009, Ockwell et al. 2007). As Harriss- 
White, Rohra and Singh indicate in their study regarding the solar energy industry in 
India, “while the international politics of state participation supports the transfer of 
ownership of IPRs, national politics supports licensing and import” (2009: 35-36). 
The above finding -  that IP is context and technology-dependent - may help to 
explain the dichotomy found between what some developing country governments’ 
are espousing at the international level, and what they are supporting at the domestic 
level.
8.3. Outcomes of Trade and Competitiveness Policies and 
RET Adoption
Four aspects occurring as a result of trade and competitiveness regimes affected RET 
adoption were revealed. These aspects include: 1) quicker access to SWHs for 
producers; 2) more perceived ‘ownership’ of technologies in Brazil versus Mexico; 3)
402 Informants spoke about this topic generally, rather than providing details. It can be assumed that the 
companies involved had a Technology Transfer Agreement (TTA), where the terms of how the 
technology would be used, how any changes made would be dealt with, etc. would have been laid out.
403 Interviews, three university representatives, March 2006
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more effective mobilization in Sao Paulo; and 4) well established standards in Brazil. 
Each of these themes is explored in turn below.
8.3.1. Quicker Access to Technologies -  SWHs but not biogas
Both Mexico City and Sao Paulo are considered administratively heavy. However, in 
the case of SWHs, Mexico’s import of finished products or components meet with 
delays at customs, etc. -  making it difficult for companies to deal with any rapid 
changes in the market. In Sao Paulo, there are exemptions on taxes between states, to 
encourage trade between them. In addition, as noted earlier, companies in and around 
Sao Paulo do not import any material apart from copper, which is centralized in Brazil 
as only two companies in Sao Paulo do so, and SWH companies purchase the copper 
from these suppliers or their distributors. In the case of biogas, Brazilian companies 
involved in this technology have opted for foreign versions of the “hardware” and so 
face the same potential delays as those in Mexico.
Delays with customs, proper paperwork, among other administrative requirements 
involved with using all RETs, but more pronounced when using foreign RETs or 
components or services, may have a negative impact on the use of SWHs in Mexico 
City and biogas technologies in both places, in that they affect the production process 
of companies and their ability to deliver a product on time, and / or to get a project up 
and running.
But these aspects may also be a question of the origins of technologies in the market 
(whether they are more domestic or more foreign), rather than whether or not this ‘red 
tape’ hinders the uptake of RETs in general. As an example, although Mexico and 
Brazil’s cumbersome trade documentation system was identified as a trade barrier for 
US environmental technologies (USTR 2006: 12), a number of U.S. companies have 
managed to navigate the Mexican bureaucracy, as U.S. exports of these technologies 
to Mexico “have more than doubled since the implementation of NAFTA, from 
US$987 million in 1994 to more than $2 billion in 2005” (USTR 2006: 11).
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8.3.2. More perceived technology “ownership” in Brazil
This proliferation of American products into Mexico has created an interesting 
dynamic explored in the second factor revealed by the study, which is the effect of 
‘ownership’ of technology on RET adoption. In Mexico, I was reminded that “trade 
relationships are dictated more by proximity”404, and for that reason, Mexico’s largest 
trading partner is the United States. Between 1993-2007, Mexico’s Gross National 
Product (GNP) from exports increased from 15% to 32%, and four-fifth’s of their 
exports go to the United States (U.S.). This interdependence has some profound 
effects in Mexico; as some commentators have said, “when the U.S. gets a cold, 
Mexico gets pneumonia” (Perez-Rocha and Anderson 2008). During my stay in 
Mexico, many reminded me that they have a “love-hate” relationship with the U.S -  
enjoying the benefits of being close to such as powerful country, and yet feeling 
resentment whenever “the gringos” exercised their muscle, meddling into Mexican 
affairs.
Regarding SWHs in Mexico, they are considered foreign and domestic. Biogas 
technologies are considered foreign in Mexico. By contrast, in Brazil, both the 
hardware and software of SWHs are considered Brazilian. Generally speaking, only 
one component (copper) is imported from Chile, another MERCOSUR country.
In the case of biogas to produce electricity, in Brazil, even though the “hardware” is 
foreign, Brazilians perceive themselves to be an integral player in the process. Brazil 
has long standing expertise in the area. Distinct champions exist; especially 
CETESB, and a number of Brazilians working on this issue have been actively 
involved in the international climate change process.
This is important because, as explained earlier, these dynamics are linked to trade and 
competitiveness policies as well as local technology cooperation dynamics. In Brazil, 
there have been more opportunities to develop technological capabilities for both 
technologies, which have positively affected adoption, as there is more indigenous 
capacity there.
404 Interview, one university representative, December 2005
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8.3.3. More effective mobilization in Sao Paulo
Comparing the two types of trade and competitiveness regimes elicited another 
finding. This result was found in the SWH case study, expanding upon the findings 
shown in Chapter 7 that there were more institutionalized networks in Sao Paulo 
versus Mexico City. Here, in countries practicing more conditionally-open trade 
regimes (e.g. those that encouraged foreign trade but had more stipulations in place, 
such as using local suppliers, etc.), the renewable energy companies were more 
united, and so, working with NGOs and other stakeholders, they spent more time on 
mobilizing governments and other groups (e.g. construction associations) to increase 
RET adoption. Brazilian SWH companies were not interested in joint ventures with 
foreign companies unless it was to export their Brazilian SWH technology abroad. 
On the other hand, in more open trade regimes (e.g. more free trade), companies spent 
more time fighting amongst themselves -  there was a sharp division between national 
and foreign-owned companies, making efforts to accomplish objectives (e.g. national- 
level standards) more difficult. Many Mexican companies were interested in 
collaborating with international companies, rather than domestic ones. This is not to 
say that there were no divisions within stakeholder groups in Brazil. Rather, as 
explained in Chapter 5 and 7, in and around Sao Paulo, the two movements pushing 
for SWHs were using distinct philosophies (one based more on a technocentric, 
market-based approach, and another based more on appropriate technologies). But 
these movements are more mobilized than in Mexico, and come together to support 
the objective of increasing SWH use in Brazil, although they differ regarding the way 
in which to do so (providing incentives to make the technology more affordable or 
popularizing the technology, through making it cheaper and less complicated).
8.3.4. Well-established Standards in Brazil
The third outcome that a comparison of trade and competitiveness regimes has shown 
is that there are well-established standards for SWHs in Brazil versus Mexico.
In Mexico, there are no mandatory standards regarding SWHs at the national level. 
Due to the variations in products including prices and technology origins, which are
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“enormous”405, it is difficult to create a standard regarding SWH systems. However, 
SWH companies came together in 2004 to create the first voluntary norm on solar 
energy at the national level from the National Organism (Organization) of 
Normalization and Certification of Mexico, or NORMEX. NORMEX is a private 
company in Mexico that provides services that can develop norms and verify and 
certify products and / or systems through laboratory testing to ensure they comply 
with these norms406. The first norm on solar energy, at the national level, NMX-ES- 
001-NORMEX 2005 is entitled “Energfa Solar -  Rendimiento Termico y 
Funcionalidad de Colectores Solares para Calentamiento de Agua -  Metodos de 
Prueba y Etiquetado, or Solar Energy -  Thermal efficiency and functionality of solar 
panels to heat water -  methods of testing and labelling”. This norm, not mandatory, 
provides technical guidelines for companies and consumers regarding solar panels407. 
However, the information is quite technical and so many potential SWH users do not 
really know what exactly they mean408.
In addition, discussions were underway at the time of research 2005/2006 to create a
national level norm regarding solar water heating systems409. Since that time, another
norm regarding definitions and terminology in solar energy was created in 2007
NMX-ES-002-NORMEX 2007. In 2007, there were also two more norms regarding
solar water under development -  one regarding minimum installation requirements
NMX-ES-003-NORMEX 2007, and another regarding a method to test the heating
requirements of SWH systems NMX-ES-004-NORMEX 2007 (NORMEX 2007).
While progress is being made, it is slow. One respondent spoke about some of the
difficulties involved:
One requirement for a Global Environment Fund (GEF) project [to put some 
SWHs in Ciudad Juarez] required that a certain percentage of SWHs used 
meet with NORMEX 2005 standards, but then a laboratory is needed to 
confirm that this equipment does meet these certifications”410, requiring more 
time, personnel and money.
405 Interview, one government representative, November 2005
406 Interview, one government representative, December 2005
407 One government representative, one NGO and one SWH company, November - December 2005
408 Interview, one university representative, November 2005
409 Interview, one government representative, November 2005
410 Interview, one consultancy, January 2006
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In Mexico in 2005 and 2006,1 was told that companies continue to argue over details, 
as well as the general approach (e.g. should these standards be stringent or flexible?). 
Those that import products (already subjected to international standards) are generally 
more receptive to nationally-certified mandatory standards, while some domestic 
firms are not. A number of Mexican informants felt this lack of national standards 
was hindering the adoption of these technologies. “Customers want to ensure they 
have purchased a good quality product -  that it will work.”411 But, ultimately, any 
government standard at the national level would be administered through Secretaria 
de Economia (Secretary of the Economy), where the General Bureau of Standards is 
held (GEF 2008).
In Brazil on the other hand, since 1998, certification of SWH equipment is done 
through INMETRO, which has worked with universities, who test equipment at the 
Green Solar lab, Pontifica Catholic University of Minas Gerais, in Belo Horizonte and 
the IPT USP, and ABRAVA. This is a comprehensive national-level standard and 
certification program, which, if the equipment meets certain technical specifications 
(e.g. temperature reached, ability for materials to withstand heat, etc.) will receive the 
PROCEL “seal” indicating that the equipment has met these conditions. As indicated 
in Chapter 5, for those companies wishing to be a part of ABRAVA, their SWH 
equipment must have the PROCEL “seal”. Although this Brazilian standard is unique 
to that country, it is largely based on European Union standards.412 In other words, as 
noted earlier, key technology cooperation participants are more unified and organized 
in Brazil, and so more collaboration among the various sectors occurs, leading to 
increased RET adoption.
In contrast to my assertion, some would argue that standards could reduce innovation 
and uptake of technologies because their introduction may “(inadvertently or by 
design) reduce options for the use of existing and future technologies -  in the form of 
technical production methods or product-specific features.” (Lee 2008). This can 
prompt a ‘lock in’ to certain technologies, as alternative paths shrink, pushing
411 Interview, one government representative, November 2005
412 Interview, five SWH companies, March 2006
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innovation in one direction413. Secondly, another study on SWHs in Mexico suggests 
that standards can increase the costs of products -  borne by manufacturers and 
installers and thus passed on to consumers (Castro-Negrete 2005).
But, I argue the following points. Firstly, the nationally-sanctioned voluntary 
standards in place since 1998 in Brazil has not diminished alternative innovation paths 
for SWHs as the NGO Sociedade do Sol and Grupo Solaris, in their efforts to produce 
low-cost SWHs, continue to conduct research and disseminate their respectively 
different technologies.
Secondly, as indicated in Chapter 6, the previous experience of SWHs in Mexico has 
lead to some repercussions for the entire industry in that country. These negative 
experiences can have deeper negative effects on adoption, versus the impact that a 
good experience with a technology can have on increasing adoption (Frewer et al. 
1998). Interestingly, Castro Negrete (2005)’s study on SWHs in Mexico noted above 
also advocates a strategy for high quality standards, because it “improves customers’ 
service and in the long run increases the reliability of the SWH industry leading to an 
increment of SWH market volume”. (Castro Negrete 2005: 55). Another study by the 
IEA shows that when developing countries have introduced standards and labelling 
with regard to energy-efficient induced products, considerable demand has been 
generated for these technologies 414 In Lovett et al. (2009)’s assessment of technology 
transfer discussions at Poznan, and what is occurring in the private sector, they also 
assert that there are a number of examples where environmental standards have 
spurred rather than hindered innovation. That being said, care must be taken that 
these countries practice some flexibility regarding standards -  my research shows 
where they can work effectively at the national level (even if based on more 
internationally recognized standards), rather than international harmonization of 
standards.
413 See Unruh, G. C. (2000). "Understanding carbon lock-in." Energy Policy 28(12): 817-830. for an 
examination of this concept at a more macro level
414 Personal communication, David Ockwell, June 2008, on IEA presentation from Paul Waide, 13th 
Conference of the Parties, Bali, Indonesia, December 2007
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8.4. Conclusion
This chapter shed light on findings established in Chapters 6 and 7 -  including:
• why the alternative to large-scale SWHs is cheaper in Sao Paulo versus Mexico 
City (because there is more state regulation on the price of natural gas);
• why there have been more opportunities to develop technological capabilities in 
Brazil (due to its trade and competitiveness regime favouring more external 
versions (e.g. JVs, Brazilian involvement) versus internal versions (e.g. more 
subsidiaries) of technology cooperation);
• why there are more divisions and in-fighting among Mexican SWHs firms 
(partially because of company origins); and
• why networks are more institutionalized and mobilized in Brazil (more 
indigenous capacity with respect to these technologies).
As demonstrated above, trade and competitiveness policies do play a role on RET 
adoption, but this research suggests that one cannot say definitely that they will have 
an overall positive or negative effect. This recognition warrants the use of a nuanced 
approach, one that better reflects these complex realities. This is result is different 
than studies conducted at the macro level which make ‘broad brush’ statements such 
as trade liberalization will lead to more use of low carbon energy technologies, 
putting these results into question. Research regarding the role of trade and 
competitiveness policies and the uptake of low carbon energy technologies is a new 
but growing area. The majority of this research has focused particularly on the 
potential role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on technology cooperation in 
developing countries, and evidence is mixed. Research that is broader indicates that 
lower barriers to trade in these RETs will increase their adoption in developing 
countries (UNFCCC 2006; World Bank 2008a; Cosbey 2007).
However this research shows that that under certain conditions, a conditionally-open 
trade and competitiveness regime can also increase RET adoption. Specifically, taxes 
were relatively similar in both cities for SWHs. However, they were significantly 
higher in for biogas technologies in Sao Paulo, and yet two biogas projects are 
currently underway, while in Mexico City there are none. This finding is particularly
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interesting, as the majority of research advocates a reduction of taxes to encourage the 
adoption for environmental technologies. This would be an interesting area for 
further study because at a macro-level, these high taxes may be discouraging use of 
foreign technologies for other biogas to electricity projects in other parts of Brazil, 
which may negatively affect overall uptake in the long run.
On the other hand, one case in which more interventionist trade and competitiveness 
policies have played a negative role on adoption is in the industrial / commercial 
SWH sector in Brazil as the price of natural gas (which is the main alternative) is 
regulated versus Mexico’s price of natural gas, which is generally dictated by the 
market, although the federal government does provide a subsidy periodically. That 
said, some informants in Brazil argued that the privatization of the electricity sector 
reduced motivations for these separate companies to try and curb electricity demand, 
especially during peak hours, which is when the majority of Brazilians use the electric 
showers.
Approach to foreign investment played a role through creating divisions between and 
among stakeholder groups and through creating more opportunities for developing 
indigenous capacity. With respect to IPR and the uptake of these technologies, 
patents did not appear to play much of a role. Trade secrets may be affecting 
cooperation among and within stakeholder groups involved in SWHs however, thus 
exacerbating the divisions noted above.
Trade and competitiveness regimes also had other implications. For instance, in 
Brazil, as SWH technologies were generally not imported and taxes between states 
were exempted, Brazilian producers had quicker access to SWH components versus 
Mexico, despite its free trade policies. For both technologies, there was more 
perceived ‘ownership’ of technologies in Brazil versus Mexico and more effective 
mobilization in Sao Paulo. In addition, there are well-established standards in Brazil. 
Each of these examples supports the view that a conditionally open trade and 
competitiveness regime can encourage adoption of RETs.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
9.1. Introduction
Energy is a critical component of societies. At the same time, contemporary 
challenges dictate that we re-examine the way in which we produce, use and consume 
energy. Citing reasons including climate change, energy security, poverty alleviation, 
opportunities to develop technological capabilities, among others, researchers, 
practitioners and policy makers agree on the need to increase the share of renewable 
energy in developing countries’ energy portfolio. Yet they continue to debate on the 
most effective ways to do so.
At the abstract level, there is a broad recognition that RET adoption requires 
considerations of the human dimensions involved in any transition -  including 
sustainable development, quality of life, and access to meaningful employment. But 
this recognition has not translated down into concrete actions addressing complexities 
and peculiarities on the ground. Conventional strategies aimed at increasing RET 
uptake in developing nations often stress economic and technical factors, which, 
while important tend to neglect sociocultural aspects. Frameworks examining a 
systems perspective have been offered as an alternative approach, but there is little 
application of them in this area to date. In addition, studies examining the adoption 
and transfer of renewable energy technologies tend to rely on evidence from rural 
environments. Yet, the world is becoming increasingly urban -  and a large portion of 
this urban growth is happening in large, developing country cities.
This thesis adds to these debates through answering the research question what are the 
most important factors explaining RET use in developing country cities? Here it was 
revealed that in addition to conventional explanations, prior experiences in 
combination with awareness of energy conservation versus just awareness of the 
technologies, the networks involved in the technology cooperation process and trade 
and competitiveness policies also play pivotal roles in explaining RET adoption. This 
was done through determining how systemic approaches can help to explain 
renewable energy technology adoption in developing country cities -  a neglected but 
critical area of study warranting examination.
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My findings indicate that systemic approaches are useful tools, better able to capture 
multiple facets at multiple levels, influencing the adoption of renewable energy 
technologies. However, in addition to their strengths, these approaches have 
limitations, including the fact that history and context are often not taken into account 
enough, leading to variations between what is occurring in the real world versus what 
one would assume from the model. Furthermore, any one approach provides only a 
partial view, but examining a phenomenon through various approaches yields a more 
comprehensive, in-depth examination, and often some unique insights.
Specifically, I have added to these debates in the following ways. First of all, in this 
dissertation I have tested three systemic approaches. Secondly, I have also applied a 
new methodological approach in the area of RETs and developing country cities by 
focusing my research at the meso-level. Thirdly, I have applied a new concept: urban 
technology cooperation to this area of study. These insights are discussed in detail in 
the sections below.
Also, it is important to be aware that there are many differences among nations, 
regions and communities within the developing world. Strategies followed by 
emerging economies such as Mexico and Brazil will undoubtedly be distinct from 
those strategies employed by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and / or Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). Nevertheless, one overarching objective can be to develop 
low carbon technological capacities within all developing countries; an integral part 
of ensuring long term, low carbon transitions. Emerging economies in particular can 
play a role as leaders and advocates for other developing nations. Brazil, which 
opened its doors to foreign trade and investment in the 1990s, but attempted to ensure 
that opening these doors would be beneficial for Brazilians, is a particular case in 
point. In some instances, the lure of the Brazilian market was enough of a draw for 
foreign firms to agree to some rather stringent stipulations (e.g. in companies with 
three or more people, the requirement that two thirds of the workforce be Brazilian, 
drawing two thirds of the salaries). Although the majority of advice indicates that this 
type of approach may slow down the uptake and diffusion process of RETs, there are 
instances where by providing more opportunities to develop indigenous capacity,
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ultimately has witnessed positive effects on the use of low carbon energy 
technologies.
9.2. Systemic approaches provide a more complete 
explanation for RET Use in the urban developing world
The dissertation argues that the most common paradigm used to explain RET 
adoption often places too much emphasis on technical and economic attributes. 
While there are differences between these models, the main thrust is on advice, 
providing ways to overcome these barriers. Although these aspects are important, 
there are other sociocultural factors often neglected that also shape technology 
adoption. Systemic approaches have been proposed as an alternative lens as they try 
to include social and economic factors at various scales to explain RET adoption, but 
to date there is little evidence supporting their application.
I began this dissertation by asking what are the most important factors affecting RET 
adoption in the urban developing world? I answered this question through answering 
a series of sub-research questions. The first was how can systemic approaches help to 
explain RET uptake in developing country cities?
I found that classical explanations for RET use (such as those emphasizing cost, 
awareness and incentives) can help to explain adoption rates in each location, but 
were unable to adequately account for differences between the two settings. By 
comparing the case studies, I conclude that applying alternative frameworks provide a 
more complete picture as they account for other facets, including how networks and 
trade and competitiveness regimes and take a step further back, tracing conventional 
explanations to their causes. This research indicates that systemic approaches can be 
effective tools to explain RET adoption because in addition to accounting for factors 
affecting adoption noted in conventional approaches (e.g. cost, direct incentives), they 
highlight larger social and policy trends. Yet, while systemic approaches are useful, 
they are not without their limitations when applied to real world examples, including 
the practicality of participatory approaches. Rather, history and context are important,
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which put some assumptions into question when applying these approaches to Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo.
9.3. Awareness of energy conservation and prior experiences 
play a role in the uptake of RETs
The first section turns to the sub-research question, what are the reasons SWHs and 
biogas technologies to generate electricity are being used or not in Mexico City and 
Sao Paulo.
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations technology adoption was the first model applied to 
the case studies. This model was considered useful because it highlights social factors 
in addition to economic and technical attributes highlighted by conventional 
approaches. For instance, Rogers’ suggests that prior experiences and underlying 
conditions can affect awareness, which in turn can play a role on adoption. By using 
this approach I found that one factor influencing RET adoption highlighted using this 
model is due to the apagao of 2000/01 in Sao Paulo. A number of informants felt that 
this event had a profound effect on encouraging awareness of renewables and energy 
conservation, which helps explain why more SWHs in homes and biogas technologies 
are being used in Brazil. However, it is not clear how much of a role this played on 
adoption because not all informants were convinced that awareness of environmental 
and energy issues and the specific RETs had significantly increased among Brazilians 
due to this event. In contrast, in Mexico City, the model showed how previous 
negative experiences with SWHs hindered their adoption in that setting. I argue that 
awareness of energy conservation due to the apagao, in combination with negative 
experiences in Mexico City affects uptake, rather than just awareness of a technology 
itself, as highlighted by other studies on RETs in developing countries.
There were a number of factors that could not be explained using this approach. First 
of all, on the surface, discrepancies exist between what Rogers’ model would predict 
and what is occurring in these cities regarding biogas to produce electricity. For 
example, the cost of biogas to produce electricity is higher in Sao Paulo versus
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Mexico City (as noted in Chapter 6, estimated to be about US$417 per MWh vs. 
US$634 per MWh), and yet there are projects up and running in the Brazilian city 
while there are none so far in the Mexican capital. Rogers’ approach also tells us that 
the role of change agents is key as in Sao Paulo there is a distinct change agent 
(CETESB) encouraging this technology, while in Mexico City there was not one at 
the time of research (2005/06). But what is distinct about the change agents in these 
two countries is the fact that in Mexico, they are mainly foreign, with some domestic 
players, while in Brazil they are mainly domestic.
Secondly, by using this approach I found that climate change, and the potential to 
generate carbon credits is the key driver instigating biogas to generate electricity 
projects in both countries. What is different between these two countries however is 
that the main advocates pushing the climate change angle in Mexico are foreign 
whereas in Brazil they are domestic and foreign. The model cannot explain how 
source of advocacy can play a role on adoption.
Thirdly, Rogers argues that adoption of technologies is related to cost, a similar claim 
to many classical explanations. While true when examining adoption rates in each 
city, when examining uptake of SWHs in homes between the two cities, more are 
being used in Sao Paulo versus Mexico City, although the alternative technology is 
significantly cheaper in Sao Paulo. As noted previously, the cost for SWHs in 
Mexico and Brazil are similar. However, the cost of the alternative to SWHs for 
domestic use (an electric shower at about US$10) in Sao Paulo is significantly 
cheaper than the alternative to SWHs for domestic use in Mexico City (a gas water 
heater at about US$300), and yet there are many more SWHs for domestic use being 
utilized in Sao Paulo (80% of SWH market in the city, or 156 650 m2) versus Mexico 
City (using an estimate of 5% of the SWH market in the city for single family homes, 
or 11 760 m2 in 2006).
Fourthly, Rogers’ (2003a) model helped identify one reason that SWHs for larger 
applications are being used more in Mexico City versus Sao Paulo; because the 
alternative to SWHs in both cities, natural gas, is cheaper in Brazil. An important 
question is why? Analysis must take a step farther back, determining those policies 
that make the alternative to SWHs cheaper. Policies at the systemic level put in place
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for different reasons can impact RET adoption nevertheless. Ultimately, Rogers’ 
model, while useful, is insufficient on its own in explaining RET adoption in the 
urban developing world.
9.4. More opportunities to develop indigenous capacity, 
creating more ‘ownership’ in the technology cooperation 
process, plays a positive role on RET adoption
Other factors affecting RET adoption in these cities were identified using the urban 
technology cooperation approach. The first assertion is that the interactions between 
the various players can affect technology adoption. General speaking, players operate 
in isolation, but links are forming. However, these links are more institutionalized, 
established in Brazil and more sporadic, ad hoc in Mexico
More of SWH in homes are being used in Sao Paulo, which can be partially attributed 
to the fact that the networks between actors are more institutionalized, more 
communication occurs between the three sectors (public, private and academic) and 
efforts (albeit limited) are being undertaken to engage the public about SWHs. In the 
case of biogas, players are active in both locations, but in Sao Paulo, more links exist 
and most interactions have been occurring for longer periods of time.
In addition, international influences, especially climate change, have also played a 
positive role on the adoption of these RETs. A key driver prompting technology 
cooperation processes between various participants at the level of the city can be 
traced to international influences -  with the main one being climate change. Agents 
in both countries — especially the private sector, and some NGOs and government 
agencies — are increasingly becoming aware of the potential role that carbon credits 
and environmental / climate change studies can have to increase adoption. But as 
noted earlier, one distinct feature between the two cities is the fact that the main 
agents promoting biogas technologies are domestic in Brazil, while in Mexico they 
are foreign. In the case of SWHs, the key agents are domestic in Sao Paulo, while in 
Mexico City they are domestic and foreign.
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A further factor, not captured as much at the firm, national, or global levels, was the 
divisions that occurred within the stakeholder groups. A lot of studies focus on 
divisions between stakeholder groups (e.g. academics, public and private sectors, civil 
society), but divisions within stakeholders groups are just as important. In the case of 
SWHs, there are two key divisions in Mexico City 1) between foreign and domestic 
firms, 2) between firms ‘in the club’ and ‘outside of the club’. This divisiveness 
between these players has had a negative impact on adoption, as it is more difficult to 
unify efforts and mobilize actors under one common objective (increasing the 
adoption of this technology in Mexico City). In Brazil, there was one major division 
between players involved with these technologies but they came together from time to 
time to support the overall objective of increasing SWHs in Sao Paulo.
I argue that the above three phenomena 1) more institutionalized links and more links 
between different sectors in Brazil, 2) more domestic engagement on climate change, 
biogas technologies and SWHs, in Brazil over time, and 3) more divisions among 
firms in Mexico, are linked to the trade and competitiveness approaches used in these 
countries. In Brazil, there have been more opportunities for developing technological 
capabilities, therefore establishing more indigenous capacity and more ‘ownership’ of 
the technology cooperation process, which in this case has helped with RET uptake. 
However, things are changing, as Mexicans are becoming increasingly engaged on 
climate change, spreading awareness and developing domestic ‘home-grown’ 
solutions to climate change. Indigenous capacity -  which studies link to successful 
technology cooperation — can also happen under an open free trade regime, but this 
suggests that it may take longer to become established in developing nations.
9.5. Under certain conditions conditionally open trade 
regimes can also encourage RET adoption in urban 
developing country cities
The next sub-research question examined under what conditions trade and 
competitiveness regimes explain RET adoption in developing country cities.
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Evidence indicates that they do play a role, but how they do so depends on the 
circumstances. This suggests that any approach used to examine these facets be 
contextual, rather than purport generalizations based on meta-analysis. Although 
research in this area is recent, the general consensus is that trade liberalization can 
lead to more RET use in developing countries. However, my findings show that 
under certain conditions a provisionally open trade and competitiveness regime can 
also increase RET use.
This finding is in contrast to those studies that indicate the opposite. Specifically, 
regarding taxes, in Brazil, despite the fact that 50% of project start up costs were 
taxes, the consortium of companies were willing to undertake endeavour -  due to the 
appeal of generating carbon credits and “getting in the game early”. In other words, 
in the case of biogas technologies to generate electricity, taxes did not appear to have 
hindered the adoption of a foreign technology (hardware).
Secondly, I found that privatization has had different effects on the same technology. 
In Mexico City, it has helped with commercial and industrial SWH applications, and 
regulated natural gas prices have hindered their adoption in Sao Paulo. However, also 
in Sao Paulo, a number of informants suggested that the segregation of electricity 
utilities into separate companies (one for generation, one for transmission and / or 
another for distribution), has reduced the impetus on these utilities to create energy 
conservation programs. Foreign investment requirements can help to explain some 
divisions found within stakeholders groups, namely in-fighting occurring between 
foreign and domestic SWH companies in Mexico City.
Thirdly, I found that the role of IPRs on the use of low carbon energy technologies is 
context and technology-dependent. In this case, patents did not appear to play much 
role on adoption with respect to either technology, although trade secrets may have 
exacerbated divisions among producers of the technologies (most relevant for SWHs).
Other implications of trade and competitiveness policies were that Brazilian SWH 
producers had easier access to hardware versus their Mexican counterparts, as they 
were not really engaged in importing products (and all the bureaucratic processes 
involved). In addition, there is more ‘ownership’ of both SWHs and biogas
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technologies in Brazil rather than Mexico. In both instances, Brazilians appear to be 
more “in the drivers seat” of the technology cooperation processes. In the case of 
biogas technologies, they chose to use a foreign versus national technology and use 
more national versus, foreign experts. However, they came to this decision after 
assessing all of the technologies available, both domestic and foreign; ultimately 
deciding on the foreign option due to better guaranteed results, despite the added costs 
and the administrative burdens involved with importing products outside of 
MERCOSUR.
There are also better-established standards in Brazil in the case of SWHs. In Mexico, 
a voluntary standard does exist, but only after a number of SWH companies paid an 
organization outside of government to have a standard established. In Brazil by 
contrast, there is a government-sanctioned standard by INMETRO, which, although 
voluntary, has been in place since 1998.
In Brazil, the system is designed to encourage the use of more domestic components, 
products and expertise regarding both RETs. Those involved in the Bandeirantes and 
Sao Joao projects highlighted the fact that numerous and complicated processes were 
involved with respect to importing technology from abroad. Perhaps if foreign SWHs 
were in Brazil, it would spur innovation through competition, but it is difficult to say. 
One informant told me that in previous years, an Israeli company tried to enter the 
Brazilian market, but decided to leave after a number of unsuccessful years.415 A 
study from the point of view of RET companies wanting to enter the Brazilian market 
may also shed some light on this topic.
9.6. Systemic Approaches and RET Adoption in Mexico City 
and Sao Paulo -  Conceptual and Methodological Implications
This dissertation has expanded on the debates regarding technology transfer through 
taking the concept of technology cooperation several steps further. This was done in 
the following ways. First of all, I provided some clarification on what was meant by 
urban technology cooperation. It is viewed as a way in which to recognize that all
415 Interview, one SWH company, May 2006
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actors involved in the process are participants, exchanging views and engaging in 
relationships. The concept also attempts to recognize the heterogeneity of actors, and 
that these relationships and networks change over time. Secondly, by adding the 
notion of ‘urban’ the concept has attempted to account for unique attributes of cities -  
including serving as nexus points for innovation and creativity, and understanding the 
importance of proximity in engaging various pivotal sources of technological change 
-  academics, the private sector, government and communities / civil society.
One interesting finding was that actors engaged in networks in these cities felt that 
these relationships were stronger by virtue of their location (being centred in and 
around Mexico City and Sao Paulo). At the same time however, in contrast to 
Porter’s (1990) argument that rivalries found within these clusters will instigate more 
innovation and adoption through fostering competition, I found that these rivalries had 
negative repercussions for RET adoption in the case of SWHs in Mexico City.
Taking a step back and examining the effectiveness of using the meso-level approach 
in Mexico City and Sao Paulo has also yielded some considerations. It proved 
advantageous in that by taking this ‘bird’s eye view’ of a city, rather than a specific 
community or neighbourhood, political dynamics playing out between various groups 
operating at the city-level became pronounced. For instance, as noted in Chapter 7, in 
Sao Paulo, I saw two distinct movements -  one advocating a more market-driven, 
technocentric approach (I view it as ‘here is the technology, let’s adapt the society to 
match’), and another advocating a more socially-driven contextual approach (I view it 
as ‘here is the society, let’s adapt the technology to match’) to SWH adoption. In 
Mexico City, the ‘war’ between foreign and domestic SWH companies also featured 
prominently. It is not clear that these dynamics would have been revealed had I 
decided to pursue this study at a more macro or micro level.
Secondly, one critique of this approach is that it is rather abstract, and difficult to 
determine exactly what ‘space’ it constitutes. I chose to define the meso-level as a 
city and its surrounding areas, all the while recognizing that there is no distinct 
boundary, and there are continual ebbs and flows. Third, similar to other studies 
recognizing the importance of public engagement, I was particularly interested in 
understanding how the public was involved in the technology cooperation process. I
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felt that by using frameworks based on understanding networks and motivations 
would be an effective tool to achieve this goal. Yet apart from the efforts of 
Sociedade do Sol and Grupo Solaris, the public in general is not really an active 
player.
Some disadvantages with this approach were the fact that by providing a city-level 
analysis, it may not have captured the differences within these cities enough. For 
instance, at present, the majority of SWHs being used in homes are within the 
wealthier and middle class segments -  and so policy makers and communities 
interested in increasing the use of these technologies in lower-income communities 
will need to tailor these results to their circumstances. Nevertheless, they will likely 
find some results from this study of relevance to them.
9.7. A Cleaner World -  Implications for renewable energy and 
climate change policies
Renewable energy technology remains a pivotal part of any strategy aimed at 
addressing climate change -  in both industrialized and developing nations. This need 
is particularly acute in developing countries, which are now experiencing, and 
expected to experience, more pronounced effects of climate change, and whose 
energy demand -  especially in emerging economies like Mexico and Brazil -- is 
increasing exponentially. As indicated in Section 9.1, it is also important to 
understand that developing countries represent an extremely diverse group of nations 
-  ranging from large, emerging economies with robust industrial sectors, to small 
island states largely based on agriculture for exports and tourism, to nations suffering 
from the conflicts of war and major environmental degradation (e.g. droughts, etc.).
One commonality these countries have is the challenge of addressing climate change, 
which is particularly pronounced in many developing nations. This could be because 
some countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change effects and / or due to 
due to rapid urbanization, where the construction and use of buildings often involves 
energy-intensive processes (e.g. steel, cement) and because a number of economies
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are heavily based on manufacturing and industry -  often highly carbon intensive 
activities. For instance, glaciers are becoming smaller in the Himalayas. This is 
particularly concerning, as it has been estimated that more than 1 billion people rely 
on the Himalayas to meet their various needs (Kuroda 2009).
Against this backdrop, a number of larger developing economies, such as Mexico and 
Brazil, are seeing the emergence a more significant middle class, and, similar to paths 
followed by many industrialized nations, the concurrent increase in private vehicle 
ownership, household energy use (with the purchase of home electronics and 
appliances for instance), high ‘carbon footprint’ lifestyles, and subsequent increases in 
carbon emissions.
Industrialized nations must take on a leadership role in addressing climate change. 
But, the gravity of the climate change threat requires actions from both industrialized 
and developing nations in order to be effectively addressed. Developing nations can 
capitalize on opportunities from the carbon market and technology transfer and there 
are many co-benefits involved (e.g. energy security, improved environmental quality) 
when pursuing low carbon efforts. At the same time, these benefits are not 
necessarily guaranteed, as some developing countries are concerned that introducing 
these technologies can have negative repercussions for domestic industry and / or 
reinforce continued dependence on the industrialized world for ‘frontier’ 
technologies, curbing innovation. Other studies also purport the importance of 
focusing on technological capabilities in developing countries, while some suggest 
that the key focus should be on introducing low carbon technologies rapidly in order 
to help reduce GHG emissions sooner rather than later. Yet what this dissertation 
shows is that an approach focusing on indigenous capacity includes both foreign and 
domestic technologies, where domestic actors have a solid foundation through which 
to assess which of these technology are most applicable to their situation and that, in 
certain instances, in the long run, is beneficial to the overall objective of increasing 
the use of renewables.
As indicated in Chapter 1, conventional channels of technology cooperation between 
the North and the South -  ranging from joint ventures, subsidiaries, to technology 
licensing and partnerships have had mixed success. Yet, tools designed to foster
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collaboration between various countries within the UNFCCC context, while important 
steps, are falling short of their purported goals. For example, the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT), a body designed at ensuring implementation of 
UNFCCC country commitments on technology transfer recognizes the need for 
cooperation on all aspects of low carbon energy technologies (from the experimental 
to the more commercial stage), and the importance of finance. However, while the 
group talks about the need to harness the private sector and is starting to engage with 
various representatives, the majority of their efforts focus on public sector avenues.
Based on evidence from this dissertation the following policy suggestions are offered. 
To reiterate, there are a number of caveats concerning the generalizability of these 
findings to other contexts -  including countries and technologies. For example, these 
findings may be considered less relevant for -  say -  an agrarian-based African nation 
with little domestic industry. However, opportunities to develop technological 
capacity also exist in the agrarian sector, and in a number of African nations -  due to 
influence from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), for a number of countries, a significant 
portion of agriculture is for exports (e.g. Senegal and cotton). Here, often the 
technologies used are foreign and a lot of refining of products is done elsewhere. 
African nations -  working in groups -  could assert the stipulation for the need to 
encourage more opportunities for indigenous training and innovation as a means to 
access their markets. This notion is particularly interesting as the Chinese have been 
major foreign investors in African infrastructure in their quest to obtain more natural 
resources from the African continent in exchange -  as the Chinese at present require 
Chinese workers to develop and build this infrastructure.
Ultimately however, the purpose of these suggestions is not to be prescriptive, but 
rather to serve as guidelines for policy makers. This is because one key assertion of 
the dissertation is that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach, rather the ‘right’ policy 
approach for renewables adoption in developing country cities will be context and 
technology-dependent.
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i) Support multi-disciplined, systemic analysis -  Policy makers often base 
their decisions on economic and technical analyses. Having worked for 
the Canadian government and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
for a number of years before returning to academia, I know -  “numbers 
talk”. While these factors are important, my evidence shows that larger 
social and policy aspects are just as important. For instance, I found that 
networks were more established and institutionalized in Brazil, and links 
were more prevalent among various sectors when examined at the meso- 
level. There are also more divisions within stakeholder groups in Mexico. 
I argue that these facets can be traced to trade and competitiveness 
policies, as in Brazil there have been more opportunities for developing 
technological capabilities, therefore establishing more indigenous capacity 
and more ‘ownership’ of the technology cooperation process, which in this 
case plays a positive role on uptake. Using systemic approaches revealed 
that, as demonstrated in Mexico City, historical experiences had a negative 
effect on the whole SWH industry. And yet, negative prior experiences 
with a technology do not necessarily equate to ramifications affecting all 
types of the technology, as demonstrated in Sao Paulo, where Brazilians 
opted not to use certain versions of technology, rather than discard the 
technology altogether.
ii) Use events to harness support -  My findings suggest that the apagao 
played a role on increasing energy conservation in Sao Paulo, prompting 
people -  from the government to the general public — to seek out 
alternatives to electricity from hydro power, but that over time this interest 
was waning. I am not suggesting that developing country players 
deliberately create a major event like the apagao in Brazil, or undertake 
smaller actions, including blowing up natural gas and oil pipes as in 
Western Canada, to gamer support for renewables in developing countries, 
but rather to capitalize on events already happening worldwide (e.g. 
increases in oil and food prices) that provide a more conducive 
environment for renewables support.
iii) Provide more opportunities for developing technological capabilities -  
As the challenge of climate change and renewable energy technology 
uptake in developing countries has animated the global community, there
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are increasing instances of new commitment, investment and development 
of low carbon energy technology. Even as the world reels from this global 
recession many countries have indicated that pursuing a ‘green economy’ 
will be part and parcel in their economic recovery efforts. In addition, a 
number of developing countries -  whether advocating a more government- 
controlled or private sector run approach - continue to reform their energy 
sectors. These represent important opportunities through which 
developing countries can enhance indigenous technology use and 
development. Examples from other developing countries such as India 
and China, now with companies considered global players in the solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and wind industries, can also be examined. These are 
two other countries which have historically taken a more conditionally 
versus fully open approach to trade and investment. That said, although 
these examples are important, these industries have mainly focused efforts 
on exports, rather than domestically, although with new mandates that it 
starting to change. But, evidence from this dissertation suggests that 
building indigenous capacity in certain RETs can also increase domestic 
use, as well as innovation. Developing country cities can serve as pivotal 
nexus points, acting as hubs to engage various sectors.
iv) Foster local champions for these technologies -  In both settings, 
champions for these technologies really served to galvanize the 
community and networks towards encouraging their use. Generally 
speaking, worldwide, and Brazil and Mexico are no exception, actors 
involved in new renewable energy technologies (excluding large scale 
hydro) operate on the margins of conventional, often fossil fuel-based 
vested interests -  deeply entrenched interests through which systems are 
built upon. Yet in both locations, I found a small but extremely committed 
community. The majority of these champions, or change agents, developed 
indigenously in both Mexico City and Sao Paulo and were found through 
various sectors (e.g. NGOs, trade associations, individuals within the 
government). In the case of Mexico City, although there were domestic 
change agents working on biogas technologies (e.g. DE, CONAE), the 
loudest voice was the private sector, and these were mainly foreign firms.
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That said, this situation is likely changing as the new mayor of Mexico 
City is promoting their use.
v) Understand local technology cooperation politics and dynamics -  This 
thesis shows that effective technology cooperation requires understanding 
of local dynamics at play. The SWH market segments are completely 
different for these countries and cities. Advocates for free trade can point 
to the example of Mexico City and the use of SWHs in the commercial and 
industrial sectors, versus Sao Paulo, where in Mexico City the price of 
natural gas, based on market rates, is argued to be a direct contributor to 
their growth. (However, it would be interesting to compare more recent 
rates of SWH growth in these sectors, as the market prices of natural gas 
have been dropping in 2009.) Yet there are more SWHs being used in 
homes and biogas technologies in Sao Paulo, despite the fact that the 
alternative technology is significantly cheaper there in the case of SWHs 
(about US 10 dollars versus US 300 dollars), and that biogas technologies 
are slightly more expensive in Sao Paulo (where taxes made up 50% of the 
project costs). Having the opportunity to interact with players involved in 
this sector in both countries revealed a number of political issues and 
dynamics, including the ‘war’ between domestic and foreign SWH firms 
in Mexico City,, which ultimately have an effect on RET uptake.
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Annex 1 -  Example of Interview Questions -  Firms in Mexico City (English and 
Spanish in italics)
First of all, I would like to say that if you prefer, when I write information in my 
thesis, I will not put names together with quotes / information -  this will be 
anonymous.
Primero, quiero decide que si usted prefiere, cuando escriba la informacion en mi 
tesis, no voy a poner nombres juntos con la informacion — eso va a ser como 
anonimo.
Also, I would like to say that although I have written questions with respect to my 
research, if you have any suggestions, additions, wish to change some questions, 
please feel free to input.
Tambien, me gustaria decide que aunque he escrito preguntas con respecto de mis 
investigations, si usted tiene algunas sugerencias /  adiciones /  piensa que es mejor si 
cambiar las preguntas, etc. por favor digame.
1) Tell me about your company -  for example, how many people work here, you in 
this position, since when has the company been working in renewable energy
Quiero saber informacion sobre la compahia -  ej. icuantospersonas trabajan en la 
compahia? ihasta cuando ha estado la compania trabajando en ese area? i  Usted en 
esta position?
Is your company national or intenational (where is your HQ)? 
lEse su compahia nacional? ^international? Donde esta su “HQ”
2) I wish to know more about Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) in Mexico (or Brazil) in 
cities -  which type is the most popular?
Me gustaria saber mas sobre las calentadores solares del agua. i  Que tipo es mas 
popular?
(ej- (if they want more prompts) those more simple and cheap, with a black tank and 
water, or those more sophisticated where the tank is insulated -  closed looped or open 
looped? Where do people use SWH (or biogas technologies)? On the grid or outside 
of the grid (for biogas technologies) or pools? Houses (for SWHs)?
lo mas sencillo y barato — como un tanque negro con agua, o algo mas sofisticado 
donde el tanque esta aislado -  closed looped o open looped) i  Donde se usan esta 
technologias? lEn el “grid”? iFuera del "grid"? liaspicinas? iCasas?
3) Who are your consumers?
iCuales son sus consumidores?
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(more prompts if needed) schools, governments, hotels, the public (e.g. direct 
purchases for houses) since when? Do you have an idea why this is the case?
Iescuelas, gobiemos, Hotels? lElpublico (ej. personas directamente para sus 
casas)? lDesde cuando? I Tiene una idea porque eso es asi?
4) I also wish to know about your selling process.
Tambien, me gustaria saber sobre su proceso de la comercializacion.
(if more prompts are needed) -  do people look for you? Do you look for people? Is 
there an organization (e.g. one for renewables) -  to help? After a sale, what follow up 
do you do?
I La gente se busca para ustedes? lO  ustedes se buscan la gente? lHay una 
organizacion, ej. una organizacion para energias renovables - energias solares, que 
les ayuda? Despues de una venta, que "follow up" /  continuacion hacen ustedes?
Energy / Electricity / Environmental / Climate Change Policies
Politicas sobre energia /  electricidad /  medio ambiente /  cambio climatico
9) Do you know if there are government policies or programs (national, regional or 
local level) to promote the development, production and use of energy technologies, 
including renewables and SWHs or biogas technologies in particular?
Sabe usted si hay politicas o programas del gobiemo (al nivel nacional, regional or 
local) para promover el desarrollo, la produccion y el uso de las tecnologias energias 
incluyendo technologias para energias renovables? Y esta tecnologia en particular?
(more prompts) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to increase electricity 
access to the porr
(Para reducir las emisiones de los gasos del invemaderos? Para ampliar el aceso de 
la electricidad a los pobres?)
If there are some, what are they? Explain. What opinion do you have about carbon 
credits?
<?Si eso es asi, cuales son? Explicame. Que opina tiene sobre los creditos del 
carbono?
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Trade, competitiveness and technology policies 
Politicas del comercio y de la competitividad y tecnologias
5) Do you know if there are restrictions on the import or export of technologies 
including components in the country, state or city? Specific technologies such as 
energy / renewable energy? Including training and processes and implementation? 
Other areas?
iSabe usted si hay restriciones de importaciones o exportaciones con respecto de 
tecnologias incluyendo partes en el pais, estado o ciudad? £ O tecnologias 
especificas? iComo energias/ energias renovables? £El entrenamiento y / o 
procesos? £La ejecutacion? lOtras cosas?
6) Where was this technologyo developed? Originally and now? Who was involved? 
For example, was this an internal process or were there different partners (e.g. a 
university, another company). Describe the process.
I Donde estaba esta tecnologia desarrollada? £ Originalemente y ahora? £ Quienes 
hizo eso? £Por ejemplo eso fue internal o habia diferentes socios? (ej. una 
universidad, otra compahia). Describame elproceso
(ej. If prompts are needed) If there were partners was it a formal or an informal 
agreement? Has the process changed over time?
si habia socios, habia un acuerdo formal o informal) £Ha desarrollado /  cambiado el 
proceso en un cierto plazo?
7) Where was this technology produced? (same questions as above if prompts are 
needed)?
£ Donde estaba esta tecnologia producida? Quienes hizo eso? (ej. ustedes, otra 
compahia) £Eso fue originalemente tambien o ha visto cambios en un cierto plazo? 
Describame el proceso (ej. internal, socios)
8) What are some alternative technologies to SWHs and biogas technologies? What 
are the costs of these alternatives?
£Cuales tecnologias son altemativas de este tipo de tecnologia? £Cuales son los 
gastos de estas altemativas?
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Opinions
Opiniones
10) In your opinion, what are the most important problems that affect the use of these 
technologies
En su opinion, que son los problemas mayores que se afectan el uso de estas 
tecnologias?
11) Who are not using these technologies? Why?
I Quienes no estan utilizando estos calentadores solar es del agua? iPorque?
12) I am also interested in your opinion about the perceptions of these technologies in 
general -  the public, your work colleagues and employees, the government, etc.? 
Have you noticed a difference when the origins of the technology are different?
Me gustaria saber su opinion sobre las percepciones de esta tecnologia en general -  
el publico, sus empleos /  cole gas del trabajo, el gobiemo? iH a notado una diferencia 
cuando las origines son diferentes?
13) Is there anything you wish to add?
Hay algo que quiere ahadir?
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Annex 2 -  List of Interviewees
Annex 2: List of interviewees
Informants -  Mexico City 
P1 Jorge Davila, Sunway 
P2 Ubaldo Inclan, SENER
P3 Rodolfo Strevel Martinez, Bufete de Tecnologia Solar (BUTESCA)
P4 Areli Gom ez and Guadaloupe, Ecomania 
P5 David Meklar, Heliocol 
P6 Saul Breton, G enersys 
P7 Jo s6  Castelan, Grupo PIM 
P8 Daniel Garcia, Modulo Solar 
P9 Adriana Oropeza, SEMARNAT 
P10 Gabriel de la Torre, Ecosecurities 
P 11 Lourdes Fernandez, MGM International 
P12 Juan  Garcia, Reisol
P13 2 representatives, Servicios Especial Falcon 
P14 Eduardo Lopez, Solartec
P15 Alberto Valdes, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana (UAM) and small renewable
energy com pany
P16 Eric Tripp, UMERYC
P17 Federico Sierra, USOL
P18 David Morillon, Asociacion Nacional de Energia Solar (ANES) and Universidad 
Nacional Autnoma de Mexico (UNAM)
P19 Aaron Sanchez, CIE, UNAM 
P20 Isaac Pilatowsky, CIE, UNAM 
P21 Octavio Garcia, CIE, UNAM 
P22 1 representative, CONACYT 
P23 1 representative, CONAE
P24 2 consultants, and Consultoria y Servicios en Tecnologias Eficientes (CYSTE) 
P25 Odon de Buen, Energia, Tecnologia y Educacion (ENTE)
P26 Alberto Sanchez, IPN 
P27 R osa Isela Sdnchez, Novae
P28 Claudia Sheinbaum , Federal District Secretary of Environment 
P29 O scar Vasquez, Federal District Secretary of Environment
Informants - Sao Paulo
P36 Celio Bermann and Jane t Belleza, IEE, USP 
P37 Gustavo, Sociedade do Sol 
P38 Sergio Ennes, Lumina 
P39 Ademar Ushima, IPT, USP
P40 Oswaldo Lucon, S tate of S ao  Paulo, Secretary of Environment
P41 1 representative, City of Sao Paulo, Secretary of Green (issues) and Environment
P42 Maria Tereza Diniz, SEHAB
P43 Paulo Ruggeri, Alpina Termoplasticos
P44 Paula Caldwell, Canadian em bassy  in S ao  Paulo, informal discussion
P45 Carlos Longue, Eletropaulo
P46 1 representative, Hidrosolar
P47 Breno Augustino, Ouro Fino
P48 Nelson, Solarpress
P49 Nelson Agustinho, Solartec
P50 Marcio Dias, Solarterra
P51 Rafael, Soletrol
P52 2 representatives, Tecnosol
P53 1 representative, Unipac
P54 Jo se  Lourengo Cassuci ,A Atual
P55 Euclides Jo se  Mininel, Unisol
P56 Luis Sergio, engineering consultant
P57 Orlando, CENBIO
P58 Osvaldo Stella Martens, CENBIO
P59 Jo ao  W agner, CETESB
P60 Tem istocles, CUT
P61 Augustin Woelz, Sociedade do Sol
P62 Maria Lidia Romero, Grupo Solaris, USP
P63 Delcio Rodrigues, Vitae Civilis
P64 Carlos Felipe Faria, ABRAVA-DASOL
